A26976:104
Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits.…
Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits. Two discourses, one in a letter to an unknown doubter, the other in a reply to Dr. Henry Moore's Animadversions on a private letter to him, which he published in his second edition of Mr. Joseph Glanvil's Sadducismus triumphatus, or, History of apparitions by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for B. Simons, 1682
OF THE NATURE OF SPIRITS: › Section 7-8: Ad SECT. VII, VIII.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And many words intimate that it is not your Judgment, but that Substantiality signifieth not only the Modus of the Existence of the Actus Entitativus, or Virtus, but is the first half and fundamental Conceptus of a Spirit as Res, speaking halfly its Entity. In this I think we agree.
And now if this be so, this very Conceptus of Fundamental Reality, is but that same which Schibler, and abundance others call Materia Metaphysica, as different from Materia Physica; and which Dr. Crakenthorpe, & many others, take the general and most proper sense of Materia to contain. & therefore I say but, that you should not take an equivocal word for univocal, and lay so great a stress on an ambiguous name. And I confess still all your names of Indiscerpibility, Penetrability and Immateriality, give me no scientifical notion of the true difference between the lowest Substantiality of a Spirit, and the highest of Fire or Aether, or Aristotelis quinta Essentia (which you call Matter.) But I am ⟨p. 44⟩fully satisfied of an Incomprehensible Purity of Substance; 2. And of the true Form of a Soul; and I find my self to need no more.
§ 2. The Thomists take the Faculties of the Soul to be but Accidents (as Mr. Pemble de Orig. Formar. doth the Souls of Brutes to be but Qualities of Matter) which I have elsewhere confuted: And these must needs think that the Notion of […] is almost all of the Soul.
§ 2. The Thomists take the Faculties of the Soul to be but Accidents (as Mr. Pemble de Orig. Formar. doth the Souls of Brutes to be but Qualities of Matter) which I have elsewhere confuted: And these must needs think that the Notion of 〈…〉 is almost all of the Soul.