§ 1. YOU come to the main thing which I importuned you to bless the world with your explication of, viz. The true difference of Substance and Matter. And you say, It's obvious to any observing Eye. They differ as Genus and Species. Ans. I would I had an observing Eye. If by Matter you mean sensible Matter, such as Man can see, feel, or measure, &c. the difference indeed is obvious: My doubt is here; seeing you confess that substare accidentibus is but a relative notion; (and it's commonly said that God hath no Accidents, and yet is a Substance: How true I say not,) and all your notice of it, besides Negatives is, that [Substance is a Being subsisting by it self] and call this [a complete Definition;] 1. How you can call that a complete Definition of that which indeed is not definable, for want of a Genus: For you say Metaph. c. 2. that Ens quatenus Ens non posse esse objectum Metaphysicae cum tam generale ⟨p. 42⟩sit ut & Ordine & Naturae & Doctrinae res Physicas antecedat, &c. But this I stick not at: Things not definable may be partly known. But 2. whereas it's granted by you, that Substantia and Vita (or Virtus Activa) are two inadequate Conceptus of a Spirit, do you hold that the Conceptus of Substantiality hath any more in it of Real Entity, than the bare Conceptus of Virtus Activa (or Vitalis) alone? Or whether the meaning be, that as it is Res the Virtus Activa is its total Conceptus, and Substantia is but added to signify that Res illa quae dicitur Vita vel Virtus Vitalis subsistit per se, & non in alio, id est, non est Accidens. If this be the meaning that the word Vis, or Virtus, speak all that is Res, and Substance speak only its state, as being no Accident, but a Self-Being; this is intelligible, and it agreeth with some mens thoughts of God himself. But this seemeth neither to be true (at least of Creatures) nor to be your sense. Not true; for a Created Virtus (vel Vita) quae non est alicujus Substantiae Virtus, vel ut Forma vel ut Accidens, seemeth above our reach to conceive. Though I know many call God Purus Actus, & the Schools mostly agree that Substantia is not univocally spoken of God and us, and deny it ⟨p. 43⟩to be properly said of God; and I can easily grant that God is utterly above all formal knowledge of ours; yet that Created Spirits should be a mere Virtus (or Potentia Activa, or Actus) seemeth hard to believe.
§ 1. YOU come to the main thing which I importuned you to bless the world with your explication of, viz. The true difference of Substance and Matter. And you say, It's obvious to any observing Eye. They differ as Genus and Species. Ans. I would I had an observing Eye. If by Matter you mean sensible Matter, such as Man can see, feel, or measure, &c. the difference indeed is obvious: My doubt is here; seeing you confess that substare accidentibus is but a relative notion; (and it's commonly said that God hath no Accidents, and yet is a Substance: How true I say not,) and all your notice of it, besides Negatives is, that [Substance is a Being subsisting by it self] and call this [a compleat Definition;] 1. How you can call that a compleat Definition of that which indeed is not definable, for want of a Genus: For you say Metaph. c. 2. that Ens quatenus Ens non posse esse objectum Metaphysicae cum tam generale ⟨p. 42⟩sit ut & Ordine & Naturae & Doctrinae res Physicas antecedat, &c. But this I stick not at: Things not definable may be partly known. But 2. whereas it's granted by you, that Substantia and Vita (or Virtus Activa) are two inadequate Conceptus of a Spirit, do you hold that the Conceptus of Substantiality hath any more in it of Real Entity, than the bare Conceptus of Virtus Activa (or Vitalis) alone? Or whether the meaning be, that as it is Res the Virtus Activa is its total Conceptus, and Substantia is but added to signifie that Res illa quae dicitur Vita vel Virtus Vitalis subsistit per se, & non in alio, id est, non est Accidens. If this be the meaning that the word Vis, or Virtus, speak all that is Res, and Substance speak only its state, as being no Accident, but a Self-Being; this is intelligible, and it agreeth with some mens thoughts of God himself. But this seemeth neither to be true (at least of Creatures) nor to be your sense. Not true; for a Created Virtus (vel Vita) quae non est alicujus Substantiae Virtus, vel ut Forma vel ut Accidens, seemeth above our reach to conceive. Though I know many call God Purus Actus, & the Schools mostly agree that Substantia is not univocally spoken of God and us, and deny it ⟨p. 43⟩to be properly said of God; and I can easily grant that God is utterly above all formal knowledge of ours; yet that Created Spirits should be a meer Virtus (or Potentia Activa, or Actus) seemeth hard to believe.
