I. Matter and Motion, without any more, may do all that which you ascribe to incorporeal substances or souls: therefore you assert them without ground. II. To confirm this, the brutes have sense, imagination, thought and reason, by matter and motion only, without immortal or incorporeal substances: therefore by sense, imagination, thoughts or reason, you cannot prove that man hath more. III. Forms are but Accidents, that is, Qualities, or the mode of matter, and not Substances different from matter: therefore it is so with humane souls. IV. The soul dependeth upon matter in its operations, and acteth according to it, and not without it: therefore it is material, and consequently mortal. V. No immaterial substance moveth that which is material, or is the principle of its operations: but the soul moveth the body as the principle of its operations: ergo. VI. If in our dreams the thoughts do operate only according to the accidental irregular motion of the spirits, and sometime be so unactive, that we do not so much as dream, then the soul is nothing but the said active spirits, or some material corruptible thing: but, &c. ergo. VII. Sense is a more perfect apprehension than Reason: therefore Brutes, which have sense, have as noble and perfect a kind of soul as man; or at least reason is no proof of the immateriality of souls. VIII. Sensation and Intellection are both but Reception, and and the soul is but a patient in them: Ergo, it is not a self-moving, and so not an incorporeal substance. IX. Nothing is in the understanding but what is first in the sense: Ergo, the understanding can reach no further than to sensible things: Ergo, it is it self of no higher a kind. X. Corporeal objects move the soul: Ergo, it is corporeal. For things material cannot work upon that which is immaterial. XI. If the soul were incorporeal, it would know it self to be so: but it is not only ignorant of that, but hath no true notion, but merely negative, of immaterial beings. XI. That ⟨p. 494⟩which is generated is corruptible: but the soul is generated, as is proved by Senertus, and many others. XIII. Quicquid oritur interit; that which is not eternal as to the past duration, is not eternal as to the future duration: but all Christians maintain, that the soul is either created or generated, and not of eternal duration, as to what is past:
I. Matter and Motion, without any more, may do all that which you ascribe to incorporeal substances or souls: therefore you assert them without ground. II. To confirm this, the bruits have sense, imagination, thought and reason, by matter and motion only, without immortal or incorporeal substances: therefore by sense, imagination, thoughts or reason, you cannot prove that man hath more. III. Forms are but Accidents, that is, Qualities, or the mode of matter, and not Substances different from matter: therefore it is so with humane souls. IV. The soul dependeth upon matter in its operations, and acteth according to it, and not without it: therefore it is material, and consequently mortal. V. No immaterial substance moveth that which is material, or is the principle of its operations: but the soul moveth the body as the principle of its operations: ergo. VI. If in our dreams the thoughts do operate only according to the accidental irregular motion of the spirits, and sometime be so unactive, that we do not so much as dream, then the soul is nothing but the said active spirits, or some material corruptible thing: but, &c. ergo. VII. Sense is a more perfect apprehension than Reason: therefore Bruits, which have sense, have as noble and perfect a kind of soul as man; or at least reason is no proof of the immateriality of souls. VIII. Sensation and Intellection are both but Reception, and and the soul is but a patient in them: Ergo, it is not a self-moving, and so not an incorporeal substance. IX. Nothing is in the understanding but what is first in the sense: Ergo, the understanding can reach no further than to sensible things: Ergo, it is it self of no higher a kind. X. Corporeal objects move the soul: Ergo, it is corporeal. For things material cannot work upon that which is immaterial. XI. If the soul were incorporeal, it would know it self to be so: but it is not only ignorant of that, but hath no true notion, but meerly negative, of immaterial beings. XI. That ⟨p. 494⟩which is generated is corruptible: but the soul is generated, as is proved by Senertus, and many others. XIII. Quicquid oritur interit; that which is not eternal as to the past duration, is not eternal as to the future duration: but all Christians maintain, that the soul is either created or generated, and not of eternal duration, as to what is past: