A27004:2077
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Conclusion: THE CONCLUSION, Defending the Soul's Immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans, a…
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
It is only then the Epicureans, and some novel Somatists that I have now to answer, who think they have much to say against the separated subsistence and immortality of mans soul, which I may reduce to these objections following.
I. Matter and Motion, without any more, may do all that which you ascribe to incorporeal substances or souls: therefore you assert them without ground. II. To confirm this, the brutes have sense, imagination, thought and reason, by matter and motion only, without immortal or incorporeal substances: therefore by sense, imagination, thoughts or reason, you cannot prove that man hath more. III. Forms are but Accidents, that is, Qualities, or the mode of matter, and not Substances different from matter: therefore it is so with humane souls. IV. The soul dependeth upon matter in its operations, and acteth according to it, and not without it: therefore it is material, and consequently mortal. V. No immaterial substance moveth that which is material, or is the principle of its operations: but the soul moveth the body as the principle of its operations: ergo. VI. If in our dreams the thoughts do operate only according to the accidental irregular motion of the spirits, and sometime be so unactive, that we do not so much as dream, then the soul is nothing but the said active spirits, or some material corruptible thing: but, &c. ergo. VII. Sense is a more perfect apprehension than Reason: therefore Brutes, which have sense, have as noble and perfect a kind of soul as man; or at least reason is no proof of the immateriality of souls. VIII. Sensation and Intellection are both but Reception, and and the soul is but a patient in them: Ergo, it is not a self-moving, and so not an incorporeal substance. IX. Nothing is in the understanding but what is first in the sense: Ergo, the understanding can reach no further than to sensible things: Ergo, it is it self of no higher a kind. X. Corporeal objects move the soul: Ergo, it is corporeal. For things material cannot work upon that which is immaterial. XI. If the soul were incorporeal, it would know it self to be so: but it is not only ignorant of that, but hath no true notion, but merely negative, of immaterial beings. XI. That ⟨p. 494⟩