A27004:2156
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Digby by saying only that the said disproportion is no inconvenience, I see not how these inconveniences will be answered. I am satisfied, that nothing, is not so good as Entity, and yet that the most subtle and invisible substances are the life of the World, and of greatest excellency and force. But what will hence follow about penetrability I know not; But I know that it's little about these things which men understand of what they say. The fiery nature seemeth as Patricius saith to be some middle thing between corporal and incorporeal. And I much doubt whether Materia be a summum genus; and whether the lowest degree of things incorporeal, and the highest degree of things corporeal, (suppose fire, or that which is the matter of the Sun) do differ so much more than Graduals, as that mortals can say, that one of them is penetrable and indivisible, and the other not. There have been some Philosophers that have thought that sensibility was as fit an attribute to characterize Matter or Bodies by, as any other; But then they meant not by [sensible] that which Man can perceive by sense: But that which is a fit object for senses of the same kind as mans, supposing them elevated to the greatest perfection that they are capable of in their kind. And so air and atoms being of the same kind as other matter, may be visible to a sight of the same kind as ours, if it received but the addition of enow degrees. And for ought I know, this is as wise Philosophy as that which is more common. I am sure it is more intelligible.
Digby by saying only that the said disproportion is no inconvenience, I see not how these inconveniences will be answered. I am satisfied, that nothing, is not so good as Entity, and yet that the most subtile and invisible substances are the life of the World, and of greatest excellency and force. But what will hence follow about penetrability I know not; But I know that it's little about these things which men understand of what they say. The fiery nature seemeth as Patricius saith to be some middle thing between corporal and incorporeal. And I much doubt whether Materia be a summum genus; and whether the lowest degree of things incorporeal, and the highest degree of things corporeal, (suppose fire, or that which is the matter of the Sun) do differ so much more than Graduals, as that mortals can say, that one of them is penetrable and indivisible, and the other not. There have been some Philosophers that have thought that sensibility was as fit an attribute to characterize Matter or Bodies by, as any other; But then they meant not by [sensible] that which Man can perceive by sense: But that which is a fit object for senses of the same kinde as mans, supposing them elevated to the greatest perfection that they are capable of in their kinde. And so aire and atomes being of the same kinde as other matter, may be visible to a sight of the same kinde as ours, if it received but the addition of enow degrees. And for ought I know, this is as wise Philosophy as that which is more common. I am sure it is more intelligible.