A27004:2169
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Would you have me to go further yet? I shall then adventure to say, That as I feel no satisfying notion to difference the highest simple Being called Material, from the lowest next it called Immaterial, but what is in and from the forms; so I think that it is too slippery a ground for any man to satisfy himself or others by, to say only that one is material and the other immaterial. Matter as I said being but a pars intelligi•ilis or inadequate conception of a thing, is not to be a Genus in any predicament. And if substance express the adequate conception, it must comprehend something answerable to Matter, with that differencing nature called the form. And what name besides matter to give to that part of the conception of a substance, which is contradistinct from the form, Philosophers are yet but little agreed in: some name there must be when we speak of any created substances: For the name of substance must not confound these distinct Conceptions: Therefore materia metaphysica vel spiritualis is the term, that hitherto men are fain to use.
Would you have me to go further yet? I shall then adventure to say, That as I feel no satisfying notion to difference the highest simple Being called Material, from the lowest next it called Immaterial, but what is in and from the forms; so I think that it is too slippery a ground for any man to satisfie himself or others by, to say only that one is material and the other immaterial. Matter as I said being but a pars intelligi•ilis or inadequate conception of a thing, is not to be a Genus in any predicament. And if substance express the adequate conception, it must comprehend something answerable to Matter, with that defferencing nature called the form. And what name besides matter to give to that part of the conception of a substance, which is contradistinct from the form, Philosophers are yet but little agreed in: some name there must be when we speak of any created substances: For the name of substance must not confound these distinct Conceptions: Therefore materia metaphysica vel spiritualis is the term, that hitherto men are fain to use.
Moreover, it is the form that doth difference and denominate. How then can you sufficiently difference corporeal and incorporeal from the material Cause, by calling one Physical and the other Hyperphysical, or Metaphysical? Doth any mans understanding perceive the true positive difference by these words? Is Matter as opposed to Nihil reale, and is Ens creatum, (or as it expresseth our half-conception both of corporeal and incorporeal substances) differenced so discernably or toto genere, vel tota specie, without a form to make the difference: Doth mole immunis & mole praedita speak a formal difference or not? If not, what place hath it in arbore Porphyrii vel Gassendi? And if it do not, you make the matter of substances ab origine differenced in se without any forms to difference them; that is the Physical and the Metaphysical matter. But if those words do express a formal difference, you should find some other to expound them by: For sure mole praedita, expresseth no form intelligibly: And mole immunis is but a mere negation of quantity.