A27004:2168
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
For my part I profess, that as my understanding is fully satisfied by the operations and effects, that there are such invisible potent substances, which we call Angels and Spirits, so it is utterly unsatisfied in the common properties of Penetrability and Impenetrability, Extension, or discerptibility, and indiscerptibility or indivisibility, as the Characters to know them by. And as I think that Materia had been as fit a name as another, for that part or notion of spiritual substances which is distinguished from their form, if Custom had so pleased to use it; so I think that such Substances as we call Spirits or immaterial, may be well said to be compounded of Metaphysical or spiritual matter and form, and this in consistency with such simplicity as belongeth to a Creature. And I remember not what apt word we have instead of matter to supply its place in Latin, which taketh not in the notion of the Form: For the word Matter signifieth no real Being, but only a partial inadequate Conception of Real Beings quoad hoc, which have all something more which is essential to them. There is no such thing existent as matter without form or peculiar nature. And the matter and form are such parts intelligibiles as can neither of them exist alone. Therefore as it is not fit to make too eager a Controversie de nomine materiae, vel materialis; so I think that it is little that we know of any substances at all, but what their accidents and effects reveal. Matter we know by the quantity, figure, colour, heat or cold, density or rarity, hardness or softness, levity or weight, &c. And forms, or differencing natures we know by their operations: But that either matter or form is known to us immediately by it self, and is the objectum ⟨p. 531⟩sensus per se & immediatè, I cannot say by any observed experience of mine own.
For my part I profess, that as my understanding is fully satisfied by the operations and effects, that there are such invisible potent substances, which we call Angels and Spirits, so it is utterly unsatisfied in the common properties of Penetrability and Impenetrability, Extension, or discerptibility, and indiscerptibility or indivisibility, as the Characters to know them by. And as I think that Materia had been as fit a name as another, for that part or notion of spiritual substances which is distinguished from their form, if Custom had so pleased to use it; so I think that such Substances as we call Spirits or immaterial, may be well said to be compounded of Metaphysical or spiritual matter and form, and this in consistency with such simplicity as belongeth to a Creature. And I remember not what apt word we have instead of matter to supply its place in Latine, which taketh not in the notion of the Form: For the word Matter signifieth no real Being, but only a partial inadequate Conception of Real Beings quoad hoc, which have all something more which is essential to them. There is no such thing existent as matter without form or peculiar nature. And the matter and form are such partes intelligibiles as can neither of them exist alone. Therefore as it is not fit to make too eager a Controversie de nomine materiae, vel materialis; so I think that it is little that we know of any substances at all, but what their accidents and effects reveal. Matter we know by the quantity, figure, colour, heat or cold, density or rarity, hardness or softness, levity or weight, &c. And forms, or differencing natures we know by their operations: But that either matter or form is known to us immediately by it self, and is the objectum