A27004:2181
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
If then you take the word [form] for the order of the parts, I say that man's soul is not his form in that sense, nor is his form a substance: but if the regent, predominant, active, vital, intelligent principle be called the [form] so the form is a substance, and the soul is that form.
Here we must not confound formam corporis, formam animae, & formam hominis. 1. The form of Adam's body, before it had received a soul, was but the contemperation or order of all the parts, by which it was apt to receive a soul, and to be actuated by it, as corpus physicum organicum. 2. The form of the soul it self, (e.g. in its separated state) is that vis naturalis inteligendi, volendi & exequendi, by which it is essentially differenced from all other kinds of being, (commonly comprehended under the name of reason alone.) 3. The forma hominis, taken for the state of the parts contemperate and ordered, is that said state or order, and not the soul. But taken for the vital, intelligent, regent part or principle, it is the soul it self. So that the soul is not the forma corporis, nor the forma hominis in the one sense; but it is the forma hominis in the other: and its own differencing nature is its own form.
The li•e ambiguity there is in the word Quality, used in the objection. As I was never satisfied with the order or number of Aristotle's ten predicaments, so especially I never understood him in the predicament of Quality it self. As it is a very hard thing to know what those are that are by him, and commonly, called Qualities; so I think that name too general and defective to signify the nature of them aright. And I supposed ever that his forma & figura differ much more from the other species of Quality, than most of the predicaments do from one another, (of which see Bergersdicius Metaph. l. 2. cap. ult. & Gassendus in Logic.) Judicious Mr. Pemble, de origine formarum, pleadeth hard that principia