A27059:279
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of…
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our nearer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tully / by Richard Baxter.Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our neerer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tullie / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for Robert Gibbs, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Prop. 4. It seems to me that in the same kind as we are guilty of Adam's actual sin, we are also guilty of the sins of our nearest Parents; allowing for some accidental differences, and also our guilt having a remedy at hand, which his had not that he knew of, we being under a pardoning covenant. Because ⟨p. 148⟩this proposition is not agreeable to the commonest opinion, I shall speak to the proof of it, and of some that are near to it, anon towards the end.
Prop. 4. It seems to me that in the same kind as we are guilty of Adam's actual sin, we are also guilty of the sins of our neerest Parents; allowing for some accidental differences, and also our guilt having a remedy at hand, which his had not that he knew of, we being under a pardoning covenant. Because ⟨p. 148⟩this proposition is not agreeable to the commonest opinion, I shall speak to the proof of it, and of some that are near to it, anon towards the end.
Prop. 5. If it should prove true, which some of the Reformed Divines maintain, that original sin doth consist only in the real qualitative corruption of our nature, and not directly in any imputation of Adam's actual sin to us; and that there is no such direct imputation of his sin to us, but that it is only the cause of our proper Original sin, and not our sin formally: then must it needs follow that the like must be said for the negative, of the sins of our immediate Parents: for they can be no more our sins, than Adam's was. If this opinion therefore stand good, then our controversy is at an end; and we are not guilty either of Adam's sin, or of our next Parents, nor of death for them. I will not presume to make my self judge between the Learned Divines that disagree upon this point: Camero and his followers go this way, against the imputation of Adam's sin to us: of which see the sum of their Arguments in Jos. Placaeus his Disputat. de statu hominis lapsi ante Gratiam in lib. 1. Thesium Salmuriens. pag. 206, 207. And Chamier is not only of the same mind, but confuteth the contrary among ⟨p. 149⟩the Popish errors, as you may see in Tom. 3. lib. 1. cap. 7. against Pighius sect. 20, 21. but specially throughout chap. 8. contra Salmeronem. So also Peter Martyr on Rom. 5. But yet the far greater number of our Writers go the other way, and so do the Papists too.
Prop. 6. It seems not to be a guilt so plenary and perfect, which we lie under for any Parents sin, (if such a thing be proved), as that is which a man is under for his own personal sin. The difference will appear, if we consider that it is not a punishment in so full and perfect a sense, which we are obliged to: for the suffering is but the matter of the punishment; its form lieth in the relation of that suffering to the fault: if the malum naturale be not propter malum morale, it is not punishment: and the punishment is his in the fullest sense, who suffereth for his own sin: now the sin of Adam, or any Parent, is not so fully our own as that is which we personally commit; seeing as we were but seminally, causally, and potentially in our Parents, and not by existence personally; so it is not so much to be esteemed the son of a sinner, as to be esteemed the actual sinner himself. So that it seems our guilt of, and punishment for the actual sin of any Parent, is so called by analogy of attribution ⟨p. 150⟩as they speak, (as Accidens is called Ens), being a more imperfect kind of guilt and punishment.
Prop. 7. It is past doubt that God may and doth punish Parents in their children: In which case the sufferings of the children are materially (though not as the next matter) the punishment of the Parent; but the next matter is the Parents own suffering (real or reputative) in the suffering of his children: but this God doth not without respect to some concurrent guilt in the child, unless as he will repair his hurt with a greater good.
Prop. 8. When the sufferings of a child are but the mere consequents of the Parents sin or punishment, then are they no punishment themselves, unless equivocally so called: but when they are intended by the Rector for the demonstration of justice for the Parents fault, then it hath the nature of punishment, though the child were imagined innocent. For example; If a Traitor be sentenced to death, and his estate forfeited to the Prince, his Heirs will be deprived of all their hopes, though the Judge never thought of them in his sentence, because the Parent cannot convey to his posterity what he hath lost himself. And here the suffering of the Heirs is not formally a punishment, ⟨p. 151⟩but the mere consequent of a punishment. But if the Rector do ordain that the Heirs of a Traitor shall be disinherited, and intend this as part of the penalty, to deter others from Treason, then it is not a mere consequent, but a real punishment, though the Heir be personally innocent.
Prop. 8. When the sufferings of a child are but the meer consequents of the Parents sin or punishment, then are they no punishment themselves, unless equivocally so called: but when they are intended by the Rector for the demonstration of justice for the Parents fault, then it hath the nature of punishment, though the child were imagined innocent. For example; If a Traytor be sentenced to death, and his estate forfeited to the Prince, his Heirs will be deprived of all their hopes, though the Judge never thought of them in his sentence, because the Parent cannot convey to his posterity what he hath lost himself. And here the suffering of the Heirs is not formally a punishment, ⟨p. 151⟩but the meer consequent of a punishment. But if the Rector do ordain that the Heirs of a Traytor shall be desinherited, and intend this as part of the penalty, to deter others from Treason, then it is not a meer consequent, but a real punishment, though the Heir be personally innocent.
Prop. 9. It seems to me that we are so far guilty both of Adam's sin, and of our nearer Parents, committed whilst we were seminally in them, as that God may, not only without injustice, but also in positive execution of vindictive justice, punish us with temporal death for such guilt, though it be but a more imperfect kind of guilt and punishment.
Prop. 9. It seems to me that we are so far guilty both of Adam's sin, and of our neerer Parents, committed whilst we were seminally in them, as that God may, not only without injustice, but also in positive execution of vindictive justice, punish us with temporal death for such guilt, though it be but a more imperfect kind of guilt and punishment.
Prop. 10. If this interest in our Parents sins deserve a temporal death, then also an everlasting death. For when the creature hath lost his life by the stroke of justice, God is not bound to restore it.
Prop. 11. It hence followeth that God may in justice deprive us of everlasting glory for such guilt; which is one part of Hell, viz. the poena damni: for the dead enjoy not glory.
Prop. 12. Hence also it followeth that God may justly, for such guilt, leave man under some penalty of sense too, as well as of loss: 1. Because he may, if he please, ⟨p. 152⟩continue natural life to man, when he depriveth him of glory; (for he that may justly take away both, may take away one only): and then man being rational, must needs have a sense of the greatness of his loss. 2. And there is no man of reason, but would rather choose a tolerable degree of pain for ever, (as a less evil) than to be annihilated. And he that may inflict the greater, may inflict the lesser.
Prop. 13. Those positive torments of conscience which follow the review of wilful actual sin, and which men must suffer for such in Hell, cannot be the punishment of our guilt either of Adam's or our nearest Parents actual sin. Because conscience hath no such matter to work upon; it cannot charge us with choosing that evil by our own wills; for so far this guilt was involuntary.
Prop. 13. Those positive torments of conscience which follow the review of wilful actual sin, and which men must suffer for such in Hell, cannot be the punishment of our guilt either of Adam's or our neerest Parents actual sin. Because conscience hath no such matter to work upon; it cannot charge us with choosing that evil by our own wills; for so far this guilt was involuntary.
Prop. 14. God is the Rector of the Universe, of Common-wealths, Churches, and Families, as well as of individual persons; and therefore he may punish the World as such, and punish a Common-wealth as such for their sins, or a sinful Church, or a sinful Family: And so some individual persons, not as such, but as parts of the society, may justly suffer the loss of those benefits, which as members of that society they did possess, ⟨p. 153⟩though they committed not the sins for which the punishment is inflicted: In which case the nature of punishment is divided between the society, and that individual sufferer. It is the Societies fundamentaliter, because they are the sinners; it is the sufferers Terminative, because he beareth it: and true punishment it is; for it is [suffering for sin], though not for his personal sin. And thus a Child, a Subject, a Church-member may suffer for the sins of the Heads or Body of the Society. Nor can it well be said that this is but on occasion of their sin, and not for it, and so that it is but equivocally punishment, and not truly so: for it is an evil of suffering for the evil of sin, and inflicted for demonstration of justice on the whole, and so on each part. Yea, and it seems that positive punishments, as well as losses, may be inflicted on this account.
Prop. 15. Yet as God is Rector of each particular person as well as of societies, so he dealeth justly with every person, and therefore in punishing societies, he still observeth his established Laws concerning individuals: and therefore he punisheth no person beyond his due: For, 1. it is supposed that a man who by consent is a member of any Society, doth consent to bear or venture on the common inconveniences and infelicity ⟨p. 152⟩[…] ⟨p. 153⟩[…] ⟨p. 154⟩of that Society, so that he may be partaker of the felicity and benefits of it: and where nature makes a man a member of a society, it supplies the place of our personal consent. For in it self it is a necessary good to us to be in society with others, seeing no man can live happily by himself; and it is supposed in nature, that no man will dissent from his own necessary good. It is therefore by their own consent fundamentally, that such persons, though innocent in themselves, are made liable to punishment; and therefore in all wars, when the innocent do suffer with the guilty, in the besieging of a City, the punishing of a Country, it is no injustice.
Prop. 15. Yet as God is Rector of each particular person as well as of societies, so he dealeth justly with every person, and therefore in punishing societies, he still observeth his established Laws concerning individuals: and therefore he punisheth no person beyond his due: For, 1. it is supposed that a man who by consent is a member of any Society, doth consent to bear or venture on the common inconveniencies and infelicity ⟨p. 152⟩〈…〉 ⟨p. 153⟩〈…〉 ⟨p. 154⟩of that Society, so that he may be partaker of the felicity and benefits of it: and where nature makes a man a member of a society, it supplies the place of our personal consent. For in it self it is a necessary good to us to be in society with others, seeing no man can live happily by himself; and it is supposed in nature, that no man will dissent from his own necessary good. It is therefore by their own consent fundamentally, that such persons, though innocent in themselves, are made liable to punishment; and therefore in all wars, when the innocent do suffer with the guilty, in the besieging of a City, the punishing of a Country, it is no injustice.
Obj. But that is because men are not able to discern between the righteous and the guilty, or to difference in the execution, as God can do.
Answ. It's true that God can do this, and man cannot: but withal God doth not all that he can do. He ruleth the World by means in an established order, and it is he that hath given men authority to rule under him: and therefore whatsoever punishment they righteously execute, it is God that righteously doth it by them. So that as men do us no wrong in such cases, so neither doth God. 3. But yet God hath determined in ⟨p. 155⟩his Laws, that none shall bear the punishment of eternal damnation, for the sins of a society, but for his own sin: yea, he hath resolved that all shall tend to the everlasting felicity of the innocent. 4. It cannot be accounted any wrong to such, when God will repair their hurt or loss with far greater advantages, which he might have denied them. 5. But yet for all this, it is certain that de facto God doth not punish any man who is not guilty by personal sins; for there is none such on earth to punish: but though God doth so sweetly, and in perfect order carry on the work of Government, that none shall have cause to complain of injustice, and doth keep an harmonious consent between his more general and his particular punishing justice, so punishing societies, that he will make good all his promises to each individual: yet, 1. It seems to me that in one and the same penalty materially considered, God may punish us both as individual persons for our own sin, and as members of a Society for the sins of the Society, which are no otherwise ours, than by being such members of a sinful body, and so being liable to the justice which that Body is liable to. 2. And it seems to me, that if we were supposed to be personally innocent, yet God might in justice punish us with such a ⟨p. 156⟩society, so far as may stand with his Covenant to individuals: and that that Covenant doth not restrain him from inflicting the least penalty on us for any besides our own sins which we have personally committed: Though still even the guilt of that common sin, is participative personally ours, as we communicate in it by being members of the society: as the hand is guilty of the sin of the tongue, because it is a member of the body that is guilty.
Obj. There is no sin, and so no punishment, where there is no willingness.
Answ. Here is a willingness fundamentally, in that in hope of the good of the society, and benefit from it, we consent to share with them, and speed as they, though we consent not to the sin: so that the sin is reputatively ours, so far as that we should be obliged to punishment by it, though not in it self, nor so as that we should be accounted the actual offenders. Even as our sins became Christ's by his voluntary sponsion, so far as to bear the penalty, but not so far as to be accounted the committer of them: so that his sufferings were truly punishments, because for sin, though not for his own; yet not punishments in so full and strict a sense as ours that suffer for our own sins; but by analogy of attribution, or ob inaequalem generis ⟨p. 157⟩attributionem: and such, as it seems to me, are those punishments which innocent persons suffer merely for the sins of the Societies that they are members of.
Answ. Here is a willingness fundamentally, in that in hope of the good of the society, and benefit from it, we consent to share with them, and speed as they, though we consent not to the sin: so that the sin is reputatively ours, so far as that we should be obliged to punishment by it, though not in it self, nor so as that we should be accounted the actual offenders. Even as our sins became Christ's by his voluntary sponsion, so far as to bear the penalty, but not so far as to be accounted the committer of them: so that his sufferings were truly punishments, because for sin, though not for his own; yet not punishments in so full and strict a sense as ours that suffer for our own sins; but by analogy of attribution, or ob inaequalem generis ⟨p. 157⟩attributionem: and such, as it seems to me, are those punishments which innocent persons suffer meerly for the sins of the Societies that they are members of.