A27059:292
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of…
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our nearer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tully / by Richard Baxter.Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our neerer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tullie / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for Robert Gibbs, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Answ. It's true that God can do this, and man cannot: but withal God doth not all that he can do. He ruleth the World by means in an established order, and it is he that hath given men authority to rule under him: and therefore whatsoever punishment they righteously execute, it is God that righteously doth it by them. So that as men do us no wrong in such cases, so neither doth God. 3. But yet God hath determined in ⟨p. 155⟩his Laws, that none shall bear the punishment of eternal damnation, for the sins of a society, but for his own sin: yea, he hath resolved that all shall tend to the everlasting felicity of the innocent. 4. It cannot be accounted any wrong to such, when God will repair their hurt or loss with far greater advantages, which he might have denied them. 5. But yet for all this, it is certain that de facto God doth not punish any man who is not guilty by personal sins; for there is none such on earth to punish: but though God doth so sweetly, and in perfect order carry on the work of Government, that none shall have cause to complain of injustice, and doth keep an harmonious consent between his more general and his particular punishing justice, so punishing societies, that he will make good all his promises to each individual: yet, 1. It seems to me that in one and the same penalty materially considered, God may punish us both as individual persons for our own sin, and as members of a Society for the sins of the Society, which are no otherwise ours, than by being such members of a sinful body, and so being liable to the justice which that Body is liable to. 2. And it seems to me, that if we were supposed to be personally innocent, yet God might in justice punish us with such a ⟨p. 156⟩society, so far as may stand with his Covenant to individuals: and that that Covenant doth not restrain him from inflicting the least penalty on us for any besides our own sins which we have personally committed: Though still even the guilt of that common sin, is participative personally ours, as we communicate in it by being members of the society: as the hand is guilty of the sin of the tongue, because it is a member of the body that is guilty.