Vindiciae legis, or, A vindication of the moral law and the covenants, from the…Vindiciae legis, or, A vindication of the morall law and the covenants, from the…

For my my part, I am acquainted with them no other ways, but by their Books which they have written, and in those every error is more warily pressed, then in secret. There I find, that sometimes they yield the Law to be a rule of life, yea they judge it a calumny to be called Antinomists; and if so, their adversaries may be better called Antifidians And it cannot be denied, but that in some parts of their Books there are wholesome and good passages; as in a wood or forrest, full of shrubs and brambles, there may be some violets and primroses: yet for all this, in the very places where they deny this assertion as theirs, they must be forced to acknowledge it. The Author of the Assertion of Free-grace, who doth expressly touch upon these things, and disclaims the opinion against the Law, pag. 4. and pag. 6. yet he affirmeth ⟨p. 279⟩there such principles, from whence this conclusion will necessarily follow.

For my my part, I am acquainted with them no other waies, but by their Books which they have written, and in those every errour is more warily pressed, then in secret. There I finde, that sometimes they yeeld the Law to be a rule of life, yea they judge it a calumny to be called Antinomists; and if so, their adversaries may be better called Antifidians And it cannot be denied, but that in some parts of their Books there are wholsome and good passages; as in a wood or forrest, full of shrubs and brambles, there may be some violets and primroses: yet for all this, in the very places where they deny this assertion as theirs, they must be forced to acknowledge it. The Author of the Assertion of Free-grace, who doth expresly touch upon these things, and disclaimes the opinion against the Law, pag. 4. and pag. 6. yet he affirmeth ⟨p. 279⟩there such principles, from whence this conclusion will necessarily follow.

For first, he makes no real difference either in Scripture, or use of words, between the Law reigning and ruling; so that if the Law rule a man, it reigneth over him, Now then, they deny that the Law doth reign over a believer (and so do the Orthodox also) therefore they must needs hold, that it cannot be a rule unto him. And then, pag. 5. whereas Doctor Taylor had said, The Apostle doth not loose a Christian from the obedience to the Law, or rule thereof (he adds,) He dare not trust a believer without his keeper, as if he judged no otherwise of him, then of a malefactor of Newgate, who would rob and kill, if his Gaoler be not with him. Again, this is most clear by what he saith, pag. 31. he refuteth that distinction of being under the mandatory power of the Law, but not the damnatory: he makes these things inseparable, and as impossible for the Law to be a Law, and have not both these as to take the brains and heart from a man, and yet leave him a man still. Now then, seeing he denieth (and so do all Protestant Writers) that a believer is under the damnatory power of the Law, he must also deny, he is under the mandatory, because (saith he) this is inseparable.