Now that we may know, when theft will be a mortal crime, it must be known of what value the thing stolen must be, to make it so: and this not being determined by any law natural, divine or humane; they agree, that (m)this must be determined by the judgment of a good man; and who better than the Casuists since they ought, and are presumed, to be, both knowing and Conscientious? let but them conclude (and they have done worse, in many cases) that things of great worth are not of value sufficient, to make the stealing thereof, to be a mortal sin, and then theft neither little nor great will be criminal. ⟨p. 240⟩Thus this command of God (as the rest are) will be made of none effect by this distinction. An engine which (as they work it) serves to destroy both Law and Gospel; and to sink Christianity, in morals, many degrees below Heathenism. Let us see what progress they have made herein, and whether they have not done it in effect already. They teach, (n)that to steal any thing, though in it self small, yet of great value in the account of the owner, and of much consequence to him; so that the damage he suffers by it, and the trouble it gives him, is really great: yet if the thief did not, or could not know it, it is but Venial. Yet the reason, why they count the stealing of a small thing, to be but a little fault; is (o)because, the owner is presumed, not unwilling, the stealer should have it, it being no considerable loss, or trouble to him: but this cannot be presumed in the now mentioned cases. And if theft whether of small or great consequence, whether with or without that, which makes little theft to be Venial, be still no worse than Venial, than will no theft be mortal. They also teach, that (p)those who are in need, though it be not extreme, but such only, as would be counted great, may steal from others for their relief: (q)nor are they bound to make restitution, when they have got a good estate. Thus theft will be made as common as moderate indigence: and the practice being continued, as long as there is need, it may amount in a while, to a considerable sum; yea when the necessitous are grown rich, those whose estates are impaired by such thefts, shall have no reparation. Thus a wide door is ⟨p. 241⟩opened, for common thievery in considerable quantities; without any restraint, either from respect to sin, or to satisfaction.
Now that we may know, when theft will be a mortal crime, it must be known of what value the thing stoln must be, to make it so: and this not being determined by any law natural, divine or humane; they agree, that (m)this must be determined by the judgment of a good man; and who better than the Casuists since they ought, and are presumed, to be, both knowing and Consciencious? let but them conclude (and they have done worse, in many cases) that things of greate worth are not of value sufficient, to make the stealing thereof, to be a mortal sin, and then theft neither little nor great will be criminal. ⟨p. 240⟩Thus this command of God (as the rest are) will be made of none effect by this distinction. An engine which (as they work it) serves to destroy both Law and Gospel; and to sink Christianity, in morals, many degrees below Heathenism. Let us see what progress they have made herein, and whether they have not done it in effect already. They teach, (n)that to steal any thing, though in it self small, yet of great value in the account of the owner, and of much consequence to him; so that the damage he suffers by it, and the trouble it gives him, is really great: yet if the thief did not, or could not know it, it is but Venial. Yet the reason, why they count the stealing of a small thing, to be but a little fault; is (o)because, the owner is presumed, not unwilling, the stealer should have it, it being no considerable loss, or trouble to him: but this cannot be presumed in the now mentioned cases. And if theft whether of small or great consequence, whether with or without that, which makes little theft to be Venial, be still no worse than Venial, than will no theft be mortal. They also teach, that (p)those who are in need, though it be not extream, but such only, as would be counted great, may steal from others for their relief: (q)nor are they bound to make restitution, when they have got a good estate. Thus theft will be made as common as moderate indigence: and the practice being continued, as long as there is need, it may amount in a while, to a considerable sum; yea when the necessitous are grown rich, those whose estates are impaired by such thefts, shall have no reparation. Thus a wide door is ⟨p. 241⟩
- (m)Quae tamen parvitas excusat a peccato mortale, communis est opinio, standum esse arbitrio boni viri. Graff. ibid. n. 20. vid. Navarre cap. 17. n. 2.Quae tamen parvitas excusat a peccato mortale, communis est opinio, standum esse arbitrio boni viri. Graff. ibid. n. 20. vid. Navar cap. 17. n. 2.
- (n)Navarre ibid. Graft. ibid. n. 16.Navar ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 16.
- (o)Si minimi erit pretii-nemo mortalem esse culpam affirmabit ex D. Thom. et ratio est quia praesumitur non esse omnino contra voluntatem ejus qui hoc patitur. Graff. l. 1. c. 14 n. 5. Nav. ibid. n. 5.
- (p)Tradunt Medina. Angelus. Pet. Navarre Malderus & Plures alii in Dian. p. 2. l. 3. mis. res. 29. Quamvis non sit in necessitate extrema excusari tamen potest a toto, furtive subripiendo Sylvest. sum. v. futum. n. 10. Navarre. ibid. vid. Angelum. One in extreme necessity may kill the owner if he would hinder him from stealing, si a domino impediatur potest se tueri et occidere impedientem. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 1. q. 8. punct. 3. n. 4.Tradunt Medina. Angelus. Pet. Navar Malderus & Plures alii in Dian. p. 2. l. 3. mis. res. 29. Quamvis non sit in necessitate extrema excusari tamen potest a toto, furtive subripiendo Sylvest. sum. v. futum. n. 10. Navar. ibid. vid. Angelum. One in extream necessity may kill the owner if he would hinder him from stealing, si a domino impediatur potest se tueri et occidere impedientem. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 1. q. 8. punct. 3. n. 4.
- (q)Communis est opinio quam re•ert Sylvest. quod non teneatur ad restitutionem si ad pinguiorem fortunam pervenerit is—qui in magna necessitate surripit. Graft. l. 2. c. 93. n. 11.Communis est opinio quam re•ert Sylvest. quod non teneatur ad restitutionem si ad pinguiorem fortunam pervenerit is—qui in magna necessitate surripit. Graff. l. 2. c. 93. n. 11.
