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They give as much liberty to violate Faith, as truth; and no less encouragement to perfidiousness, and breach of promises: either where faith is engaged mutually, as in compacts, and agreements; or singly as in pollicitations. They distinguish perfidiousness as they do lying, and accordingly make the like decisions for both. There is a pleasant perfidiousness, another which they call officious, and a third pernicious: to be perfidious merely for delight, is Venial; to deal perfidiously, if it be for the advantage of any, and no great hurt to others, is as harmless; and they have ways enow to make that which is pernicious, to pass for innocent. (t)Cajetan gives this reason, why the two former sorts of perfidiousness, are but Venial; because from a simple promise no duty ariseth, but that natural duty of not telling a lie•: for in each is a moral duty, without which moral honesty cannot be preserved, and both are reduced to the same virtue, to wit, that of veracity: and both respect others, being for the society, and advantage, and conversation of mankind. One would think, those who regard natural duty, moral honesty, or veracity, and humane society; should for this reason rather judg both to be great crimes, than either of them petty faults. But let us take notice of their rules for conscience in this matter; (u)To make a promise, without an intent to •e obliged, is but Venial, if no great hurt be done or intended to others. He promiseth, but while he is doing it, intends not to perform, though he make others believe so; nor to be obliged to it, by that which should engage any one who has faith and honesty; and yet offends but Venially. If all men should ⟨p. 260⟩take the liberty, which this rule gives Roman Catholics, (x)
humane society would disband; all confidence on promises and assurances vanisheth; thereby I can never be sure of another, nor he of me. That which Navarre after many others, determines else where, does it more fully. He
that promiseth any thing outwardly, without any intention to promise; if he be asked, whether he promised, he may deny it, understanding that he made not any promise, that was obliging; and he may swear it too. He may promise, and yet not intend to promise, and so cheat; he may deny that he promised, and so lye; and swear that he did it not, when he did it, and so be perjured innocently, because he promised, as a perfidious knave.
THey give as much liberty to violate Faith, as truth; and no less incouragement to perfidiousness, and breach of promises: either where faith is ingaged mutually, as in compacts, and agreements; or singly as in pollicitations. They distinguish perfidiousness as they do lying, and accordingly make the like decisions for both. There is a pleasant perfidiousness, another which they call officious, and a third pernicious: to be perfidious meerly for delight, is Venial; to deal perperfidiously, if it be for the advantage of any, and no great hurt to others, is as harmless; and they have ways enow to make that which is pernicious, to pass for innocent. (t)Cajetan gives this reason, why the two former sorts of perfidiousness, are but Venial; because from a simple promise no duty ariseth, but that natural duty of not telling a lie•: for in each is a moral duty, without which moral honesty cannot be preserved, and both are reduced to the same virtue, to wit, that of veracity: and both respect others, being for the society, and advantage, and conversation of mankind. One would think, those who regard natural duty, moral honesty, or veracity, and humane society; should for this reason rather judg both to be great crimes, than either of them petty faults. But let us take notice of their rules for conscience in this matter; (u)To make a promise, without an intent to •e obliged, is but Venial, if no great hurt be done or intended to others. He promiseth, but while he is doing it, intends not to perform, though he make others believe so; nor to be obliged to it, by that which should ingage any one who has faith and honesty; and yet offends but Venially. If all men should ⟨p. 260⟩take the liberty, which this rule gives Roman Catholicks, (x)humane society would disband; all confidence on promises and assurances vanisheth; thereby I can never be sure of another, nor he of me. That which Navar after many others, determines else where, does it more fully. He (y)that promiseth any thing outwardly, without any intention to promise; if he be asked, whether he promised, he may deny it, understanding that he made not any promise, that was obliging; and he may swear it too. He may promise, and yet not intend to promise, and so cheat; he may deny that he promised, and so lye; and swear that he did it not, when he did it, and so be perjur'd innocently, because he promised, as a peefidious knave.
(t)Perfidia quidem jocosa & officiosa venialis est; quoniam ex simplici promissione non nascitur majus debitum, quam sit naturale debitum non mentiendi: nam utrumque debitum est debitum morale, sine quo morum honestas salvari nequit: & ad eandem virtutem reduci creditur, scil. ad virtutem veracitatis: & utrumque ad alterum est, pro convictu, utilitate & conversation humana. Sum. v. perfidia. p. 460.Perfidia quidem jocosa & officiosa venialis est; quoniam ex simplici promissione non nascitur majus debitum, quam sit naturale debitum non mentiendi: nam utrumque debitum est debitum morale, sine quo morum honestas salvari nequit: & ad eandem virtutem reduci creditur, scil. ad virtutem veracitatis: & utrumque ad alterum est, pro convictu, utilitate & conversatione humana. Sum. v. perfidia. p. 460.
(u)Navarre. c. 18. n. 6. Sylvester, v. pact. 4. Angelus, Sum. v. pactum.Navar. c. 18. n. 6. Sylvester, v. pact. 4. Angelus, Sum. v. pactum.
(x)Nisi fide stet respublica •pibus non stabit. Liv. 3. doc. l. 1. Fides haec non solum ad justitiam attinet, verum est ipsissimum justitiae sundamentem. Cicer. 1. de off. periret convictus humanus & fides, si sibi persuaderent hominus, in promissis frauger• fidem, & verba dare non esse genere suo plusquam venial. Lopez. p. 2. c. 30.Nisi fide stet respublica •pibus non stabit. Liv. 3. doc. l. 1. Fides haec non solum ad justitiam attinet, verum est ipsissimum justitiae sundamentem. Cicer. 1. de off. periret convictus humanus & fides, si sibi persuaderent hominus, in promissis frauger• fidem, & verba dare non esse genere suo plusquam veniale. Lopez. p. 2. c. 30.
(y)Qui promisit exterius aliquid absque intentione promittendi, si interrogatur, an promiserit, negare potest, intelligendo, se non promisisse, promissione obligante, & sic etiam jurare, Vid. Navarre. in C. humanae aures 22. q. 5. q. 1 & 2. pro hoc doctrine adducit, S. Thom. Scotum, Paludan. Ricard. de Sancto Victore. Major. Adriau & alios.Qui promisit exterius aliquid absque intentione promittendi, si interrogatur, an promiserit, negare potest, intelligendo, se non promisisse, promissione obligante, & sic etiam jurare, Vid. Navar. in C. humanae aures 22. q. 5. q. 1 & 2. pro hoc doctrine adducit, S. Thom. Scotum, Paludan. Ricard. de Sancto Victore. Major. Adriau & alios.
Sylvester inquires, (z)whether one by a promise alone or a compact, be obliged in conscience? he answers, he is bound under pain of mortal sin, if it be of important matters signifying that in other matters, it is no mortal sin to break promises or agreements. And Navarre expresses their common opinion, when he tells us, (a)that the violation of a promise in a small matter is not mortal, though it be Venial. But why should perfidiousness be a crime in great things, and not in lesser; since it is no less perfidiousness in one than the other, and faith and truth is equally violated in both? The reason they give is, because in great matters there is injustice, (b)great wrong is done, and so by accident perfidiousness becomes criminal, from whence it follows, that perfidiousness, how great soever, without the addition of ⟨p. 261⟩injustice, is no crime, a man may be as treacherous, and faithless as he will, if he be not withal unjust too, there's no danger. And so the world must believe, that they would oblige men to be just, though not to truth or faithfulness: as if those who may by their rules, without scruple be false and faithless; will make any conscience, or find any more reason, to be just and righteous. However they teach, (c)that they who promise but small things, and perform not, are excused from mortal sin; though they confirm the promise with an Oath or a Vow. Whether the thing promised be little or great, if it be an internal promise, though an Oath be added not to revoke it; yet it obliges not, but may be revoked, without mortal sin. Panormitan. Jason. Rebellus & alii cum Bonacin de contract. disp. 3. q. 12. punct. 2. n. 1. & 3. yea, if it be made in the form of a Vow, yet when it is of a thing indifferent or less good; as if a man inwardly promise to marry such a woman, and promise it to God too, it does not oblige him. Idem ibid. n. 2. And how can it be expected they should be faithful, as to any engagement to man, who think, they are not bound to observe truth or faith with God, how much soever concerned, either as a witness (in Oaths) or as a party (in Vows)? Well but when the matter is of great importance, may they not then break promises, bargains, or compact; may not perfidiousness, which themselves account pernicious, pass commonly for an innocent Venial; yes, they have ways enough ready to make this currant, at so easy a rate.
Sylvester inquires, (z)whether one by a promise alone or a compact, be obliged in conscience? he answers, he is bound under pain of mortal sin, if it be of important matters signifying that in other matters, it is no mortal sin to break promises or agreements. And Navar expresses their common opinion, when he tells us, (a)that the violation of a promise in a small matter is not mortal, though it be Venial. But why should perfidiousnness be a crime in great things, and not in lesser; since it is no less perfidiousness in one than the other, and faith and truth is equally violated in both? The reason they give is, because in great matters there is injustice, (b)great wrong is done, and so by acccident perfidiousness becomes criminal, from whence it follows, that perfidiousness, how great soever, without the addition of ⟨p. 261⟩injustice, is no crime, a man may be as treacherous, and faithless as he will, if he be not withall unjust too, there's no danger. And so the world must believe, that they would oblige men to be just, though not to truth or faithfulness: as if those who may by their rules, without scruple be false and faithless; will make any conscience, or find any more reason, to be just and righteous. However they teach, (c)that they who promise but small things, and perform not, are excused from mortal sin; though they confirm the promise with an Oath or a Vow. Whether the thing promised be little or great, if it be an internal promise, though an Oath be added not to revoke it; yet it obliges not, but may be revoked, without mortal sin. Panormitan. Jason. Rebellus & alii cum Bonacin de contract. disp. 3. q. 12. punct. 2. n. 1. & 3. yea, if it be made in the form of a Vow, yet when it is of a thing indifferent or less good; as if a man inwardly promise to marry such a woman, and promise it to God too, it does not oblige him. Idem ibid. n. 2. And how can it be expected they should be faithful, as to any ingagement to man, who think, they are not bound to observe truth or faith with God, how much soever concern'd, either as a witness (in Oaths) or as a party (in Vows)? Well but when the matter is of great importance, may they not then break promises, bargains, or compact; may not perfidiousness, which themselves account pernicious, pass commonly for an innocent Venial; yes, they have ways enough ready to make this currant, at so easie a rate.
(z)Quaeritur utrum ex sola promissione sive ex pacto, quis obligetur in conscientia: & dico quod sic sub peceato mortali in rebus scilicet alicujus importantiae. Ibid.
(a)Nec violatio promissae rei exiguae erit mortalis, quamvis venialis sit. c. 18. n. 7. Soto, Canus, Victoria, Sylvester, in Lopez. pars 2. c. 30.
(b)Quando non per se est persidus, non jucurret mortale, nisi per accidens, hoc est, propter notabile nocumentum sen •eandalam. Caietan. v. perfidia.Quando non per se est persidus, non iucurret mortale, nisi per accidens, hoc est, propter notabile nocumentum sen •eandalam. Caietan. v. perfidia.
(c)A mortali excusantur qui—parva pollicentur (& non implent) etiamsi juramento, aut v•to id ipsum confirmassent secundum eos quos sequimur, (viz. Antonin. Sylvest. Soto,) Navarre. c. 18. n. 7. c. 12. n. 10.A mortali excusantur qui—parva pollicentur (& non implent) etiamsi juramento, aut v•to id ipsum confirmassent secundum eos quos sequimur, (viz. Antonin. Sylvest. Soto,) Navar. c. 18. n. 7. c. 12. n. 10.
The worst perfidiousness in the world, may be excused from mortal guilt, according to Cajetan, (d)through ignorance of the fact; or through forgetfulness (if one forget to be honest, he may be innocently a knave); or out of confidence in him, to whom he is engaged (the good nature of one party concerned, may be a warrant to the other to break faith with him); or for any cause, which he thinks reasonable. He need have said no more than this, any one may violate all truth, and ⟨p. 262⟩faith; not only, when there is some reasonable cause; but when there there is any that seems but so to him: when any thing will seem so to him, who is disposed to play the knave. This is enough to Licence a world of perfidiousness; but this is not all. Sylvester after others tells us, a (e)man is not obliged to perform, promise or compact, if he had not a mind to oblige himself thereby; yea or if he had a mind to dissemble, (to feign that he is engaged, when he did not mean it): for, says he, though he offend, yet he is not obliged, unless there was a cause from some command, which, of it self, would oblige him: as for Example, if he had promised Cloths to his Father, and he is now starving for cold, in such a case (would ye think it?) one may be bound to keep his promise, to wit, when he would have been a monster, if he had not done the thing, though he had never promised it. He tells us else-where, (f)that a promise does oblige, when it is made to a City, or an University, the Clergy, the Church, or the poor of a certain place, in case it be for some cause, to wit, for the honour of God, or the like: but if there be no cause, it does not bind, though it be made to those forementioned; and it does not bind, when it is made to any other besides those, though there be cause for it. Others maintain (g)that a promise or compact does not oblige in conscience to performance, if the cause why it is made be not expressed; so Panormitan, Angelus and Rosella, with others: so that if a man forbear but to mention the cause (which is most commonly ⟨p. 263⟩done, and may be always), though he bind himself with ten thousand promises or covenants, he may with a safe conscience break them all, by their rules. They hold that the firmest promise does but bind under Venial guilt. Cajetan, Armilla, Rebellus, Garzias, in Bonacin. ibid. n. 12.
The worst perfidiousness in the world, may be excused from mortal guilt, according to Cajetan, (d)through ignorance of the fact; or through forgetfulness (if one forget to be honest, he may be innocently a knave); or out of confidence in him, to whom he is ingaged (the good nature of one party concern'd, may be a warrant to the other to break faith with him); or for any cause, which he thinks reasonable. He need have said no more than this, any one may violate all truth, and ⟨p. 262⟩faith; not only, when there is some reasonable cause; but when there there is any that seems but so to him: when any thing will seem so to him, who is disposed to play the knave. This is enough to Licence a world of perfidiousness; but this is not all. Sylvester after others tells us, a (e)man is not obliged to perform, promise or compact, if he had not a mind to oblige himself thereby; yea or if he had a mind to dissemble, (to feign that he is ingaged, when he did not mean it): for, saies he, though he offend, yet he is not obliged, unless there was a cause from some command, which, of it self, would oblige him: as for Example, if he had promised Cloths to his Father, and he is now starving for cold, in such a case (would ye think it?) one may be bound to keep his promise, to wit, when he would have been a monster, if he had not done the thing, though he had never promised it. He tells us else-where, (f)that a promise does oblige, when it is made to a City, or an Ʋniversity, the Clergy, the Church, or the poor of a certain place, in case it be for some cause, to wit, for the honour of God, or the like: but if there be no cause, it does not bind, though it be made to those foremenrioned; and it does not bind, when it is made to any other besides tbose, though there be cause for it. Others maintain (g)that a promise or compact does not oblige in conscience to performance, if the cause why it is made be not expressed; so Panormitan, Angelus and Rosella, with others: so that if a man forbear but to mention the cause (which is most commonly ⟨p. 263⟩done, and may be always), though he bind himself with ten thousand promises or covenants, he may with a safe conscience break them all, by their rules. They hold that the firmest promise does but bind under Venial guilt. Cajetan, Armilla, Rebellus, Garzias, in Bonacin. ibid. n. 12.
(d)Excusatur à mortali—ex parte formae, hoc est quia non per se, seu ex intentione peccatum illud fit—sed ex oblivione, aut ignorantia fucti, aut ex fiducia quam accipit de eo cui promisit, aut ex causa quae sibi videtur rationabilis. Sum. v. perfidia.
(e)Est Theologorum doctrina (quod obligatur) si habuit animum see obligandi see•s si habuit animum essendi liber usque ad redditionem: vel si habuit animam fing• di: quia licet peccet non obligatur tamen, nisi subesset causa de se ex praecepto obligans: puta, si promissa est patri vestis, & frigoribus alget. Ibid. n. 4. Alias si non habuit animum obligandi, non tenetur subpoena mortalis peccati ad pactum nudum servandam: nisi subesset causa quae ad hoc obligaret de necessitate precepti, puta, promisi patri meo vestem, qui moritur ex frigore, quoniam tenetur quamvis non habuerit animum obligendi see. Angel sum. v. pactum n. 4.Est Theologorum doctrina (quod obligatur) si habuit animum se obligandi see•s si habuit animum essendi liber usque ad redditionem: vel si habuit animam fing• di: quia licet peccet non obligatur tamen, nisi subesset causa de se ex praecepto obligans: puta, si promissa est patri vestis, & frigoribus alget. Ibid. n. 4. Alias si non habuit animum obligandi, non tenetur subpoena mortalis peccati ad pactum nudum servandam: nisi subesset causa quae ad hoc obligaret de necessitate precepti, puta, promisi patri meo vestem, qui moritur ex frigore, quoniam tenetur quamvis non habuerit animum obligendi se. Angel sum. v. pactum n. 4.
(f)Utrum autem quis obligatur ex pollicitatione? & dico quod sic quando pollicetur civitati, universitati, clero Ecclesiae, vel pauperibus alicujus loci, & ex causa: puta, ad honorem Dei & hujusmodi: secus si fiat praedictis sine causa: vel aliis à praedictis etiam cum causa: quia non obligatur, nisi praetextu promissionis aliquid caeperit. Ibid v. pollicitatio. Ità & eisdem verbis. Angelus sum. v pollicitatio.
(g)In Sylvest. ibid. v. pactum n. 4. promissio sive pactum obligat in conscientia—hoc antem sum. Aug. & Rosell. & est limitatio Coll. quem sequitur Panor. quando exprimitur causa promittendi.
Or if it did of itself oblige further, yet he that intends to bind himself no otherwise, may break any promise without any more then Venial guilt, whether the matter be small, or great, which is promised. ibid. n. 11. (h)Lopez, that a promise may bind under mortal guilt, concludes it requisite; that he who makes it, should have a mind to be so bound by it: and so in promising (as he says), unless there be an Oath to confirm the promise, or a writing, as is usual: they are not thought to oblige themselves to mortal sin, and by this, says he, a multitude of scruples is removed. And he says true, for hereby a man may without any scruple, break any promises that are not under (*)his hand or Oath. But what if he had no mind so to oblige himself by his Oath, or writing? why then, by his own rule, he is no more bound by his written or sworn promise, than by any other. To this purpose he concludes again, that (i)he who promises in word, without mind, or intention to oblige himself, is not bound in Conscience to perform it: and this is their common Doctrine. So that if a man intend not to be honest, he need not be so, whatever he promise. These rules observed, are more than sufficient to excuse men from all saith and honesty in contracts, and promises of all sorts; to fill the world with cheats and perfidiousness; to take away all confidence and security from men in dealing one with another; to ruin humane society; and to render ⟨p. 264⟩Roman Catholics less conscientious, and more faithless and intolerable to mankind, than sober Heathens; nor are they more like the rules of Christianity, than those which bid defiance to it.
Or if it did of itself oblige further, yet he that intends to bind himself no otherwise, may break any promise without any more then Venial guilt, whether the matter be small, or great, which is promised. ibid. n. 11. (h)Lopez, that a promise may bind under mortal guilt, concludes it requisite; that he who makes it, should have a mind to be so bound by it: and so in promising (as he saies), unless there be an Oath to confirm the promise, or a writing, as is usual: they are not thought to oblige themselves to mortal sin, and by this, saies he, a multitude of scruples is removed. And he says true, for hereby a man may without any scruplc, break any promises that are not under (*)his hand or Oath. But what if he had no mind so to oblige himself by his Oath, or writing? why then, by his own rule, he is no more bound by his written or sworn promise, than by any other. To this purpose he concludes again, that (i)he who promises in word, without mind, or intenion to oblige himself, is not bound in Conscience to perform it: and this is their common Doctrine. So that if a man intend not to be honest, he need not be so, whatever he promise. These rules observed, are more than sufficient to excuse men from all saith and honesty in contracts, and promises of all sorts; to fill the world with cheats and perfidiousness; to take away all confidence and security from men in dealing one with another; to ruine humane society; and to render ⟨p. 264⟩Roman Catholicks less conscientious, and more faithless and intolerable to mankind, than sober Heathens; nor are they more like the rules of Christianity, than those which bid defiance to it.
(h)Ut sit vera requiritur primo quod adsit animus in promittente, dumb promittit obligandi se ad mortale. Et sic inter promittendum, nisi adhibuerit juramentum promissionis confirmatorium, vel scripturam ut pro more hominum contingit, fit ut non se censeant obligare ad culpam mortalem. Hinc tollitur scrupulorum multitudo. Pars 2. cap. 30. p: 175.Ut sit vera requiritur primo quod adsit animus in promittente, dum promittit obligandi se ad mortale. Et sic inter promittendum, nisi adhibuerit juramentum promissionis confirmatorium, vel scripturam ut pro more hominum contingit, fit ut non se censeant obligare ad culpam mortalem. Hinc tollitur scrupulorum multitudo. Pars 2. cap. 30. p: 175.
(*)Promissio obligat nisi non habuisti animum te obligandi, sed solum proposuisti facere. Navarre. Garzias in Sa. v. promiss. Vix autem quis promittentium obligari intendit, nisi juret aut faciat instrumentum. Idem ibid.Promissio obligat nisi non habuisti animum te obligandi, sed solum proposuisti facere. Navar. Garzias in Sa. v. promiss. Vix autem quis promittentium obligari intendit, nisi juret aut faciat instrumentum. Idem ibid.
(i)Qui dum aliquid promittit verbo tenus, animo & intentione see obligandi caret, non fit reus in conscientia obligationis promissi. Idem ibid. p. 176. Secundum cummuniter theologos, nemo ex quacunque promissione obligatur•, nisi qui habuit animum obligandi see. Angel. sum. v. puctum. n. 4.Qui dum aliquid promittit verbo tenus, animo & intentione se obligandi caret, non fit reus in conscientia obligationis promissi. Idem ibid. p. 176. Secundum cummuniter theologos, nemo ex quacunque promissione obligatur•, nisi qui habuit animum obligandi se. Angel. sum. v. puctum. n. 4.
Hitherto, thus much of deceit and lies, in word and promises, &c. Hypocrisy is a lye indeed, both are equally sinful. (k)Aquinas after some of the Ancients asserts, that it is all alike to lye in deeds, as in words: as that is a composing of words, so this of acts, to signify and make one believe what is false: both are used as instruments of deceit, and it is all one which way you cozen another, so he be but cheated (as it is all one whether you kill a man with a Sword, or an Axe, as they express it): and both by their Doctrine are made Venial. Sylvester inquires (l)whether to make a false show of sanctity be a sin? he answers that if is he for the Honour of God, and the profit of others, it is no sin: but if it be to palliate his own wickedness; and that he may be accounted good, then it is a sin; because it is a false ostentation of sanctity. But so is the other too, which yet with him, is no sin: either both must be acquitted, or neither. So Cajetan (m)will have it to be evil, though the end be good; because we must not do evil, that good may ensue. But they agree, and it is their common Doctrine ⟨p. 265⟩that (n)bare Hypocrisy, when one feigns he is good, and is not, or better than he is; is no mortal evil, though it hath the force of a lye, and be designed to deceive others, (o)otherwise it would not be so bad as a Venial. (p)Although he delight in thus playing the Hypocrite, it will not be worse; this is but vanity, not wickedness, unless it be for an end mortally wicked, such as will make an act, otherwise indifferent, to be criminal. But if he made this false and deceiving show, (q)for an evil end; to wit, for vain glory, so long as it is not made his last end (to wit, his God); such vain glorious Hypocrisy will be no worse: for though the sin, says Cajetan, be here doubled; yet the double sin is but a single Venial. And if he do those works, (r)which are naturally ordained for the service of God, with an intention not to serve him, but for glory from men, it is but such Hypocrisy, and that with some extenuation, it is not so bad explicitly, seeing the intention to deceive, is but implicit. They have a reverence for Hypocrisy as a holy art: they honour it and their Church with the same title, both being holy alike (so much alike, some will think, that it is hard to know the one from the other). They extol their great Saints for their holy Hypocrisy.
HItherto, thus much of deceit and lyes, in word and promises, &c. Hypocrisie is a lye indeed, both are equally sinful. (k)Aquinas after some of the Antients asserts, that it is all alike to lye in deeds, as in words: as that is a composing of words, so this of acts, to signifie and make one believe what is false: both are used as instruments of deceit, and it is all one which way you cozen another, so he be but cheated (as it is all one whether you kill a man with a Sword, or an Axe, as they express it): and both by their Doctrine are made Venial. Sylvester inquires (l)whether to make a false shew of sanctity be a sin? he answers that if is he for the Honour of God, and the profit of others, it is no sin: but if it be to palliate his own wickedness; and that he may be accounted good, then it is a sin; because it is a false ostentation of fanctity. But so is the other too, which yet with him, is no sin: either both must be acquitted, or neither. So Cajetan (m)will have it to be evil, though the end be good; because we must not do evil, that good may ensue. But they agree, and it is their common Doctrine ⟨p. 265⟩that (n)bare Hypocrisie, when one feigns he is good, and is not, or better than he is; is no mortal evil, though it hath the force of a lye, and be design'd to deceive others, (o)otherwise it would not be so bad as a Venial. (p)Although he delight in thus playing the Hypocrite, it will not be worse; this is but vanity, not wickedness, unless it be for an end mortally wicked, such as will make an act, otherwise indifferent, to be criminal. But if he made this false and deceiving shew, (q)for an evil end; to wit, for vain glory, so long as it is not made his last end (to wit, his God); such vain glorious Hypocrisie will be no worse: for though the sin, says Cajetan, be here doubled; yet the double sin is but a single Venial. And if he do those works, (r)which are naturally ordained for the service of God, with an intention not to serve him, but for glory from men, it is but such Hypocrisie, and that with some extenuation, it is not so bad explicitely, seeing the intention to deceive, is but implicite. They have a reverence for Hypocrisy as a holy art: they honour it and their Church with the same title, both being holy alike (so much alike, some will think, that it is hard to know the one from the other). They extol their great Saints for their holy Hypocrisie.
(k)Paria esse factis aut verbis mentiri, Vid. Navarre. cap. 18. n. 8. Non solum in verbo sed etiam in facto mendacium consistit, cum in utroque sit eadem intentio fallendi, uterque aequaliter peccat, quia verbum & factum assumuntur ut instrumentum fallendi: nec refert quantum ad peccatum, verbo, nutu, vel facto mentiri; sicut nec quantum ad homicidium, uti gladio vel securi. Sylvest. sum. v. mendacium. n. 5.Paria esse factis aut verbis mentiri, Vid. Navar. cap. 18. n. 8. Non solum in verbo sed etiam in facto mendacium consistit, cum in utroque sit eadem intentio fallendi, uterque aequaliter peccat, quia verbum & factum assumuntur ut instrumentum fallendi: nec refert quantum ad peccatum, verbo, nutu, vel facto mentiri; sicut nec quantum ad homicidium, uti gladio vel securi. Sylvest. sum. v. mendacium. n. 5.
(l)Sum. v. simulatio n. 4. ut pallietur iniquitas, & ipso bonus putetur, quod est peccatum—ad honorem Dei, & proximorum aedificationem—& hoc non est peccatum.
(m)Si f•nis ille sit bonus (puta, ad aedificationem aliorum) nihilominus peccatum est, quia non sunt facienda mala ut-bona eveniant. Sum. v. hypocris p. 340.
(n)Solummodo intendit simulare se bonum seu meliorem quam sit, & hoc hypocrisis si nuda sit, licet non sit peccatum mortale, est tamen peccatum quia mendacii vim haber. Cajetan. ibid. Sylvest. ibid. Navarre. c. 18. n. 8.Solummodo intendit simulare se bonum seu meliorem quam sit, & hoc hypocrisis si nuda sit, licet non sit peccatum mortale, est tamen peccatum quia mendacii vim haber. Cajetan. ibid. Sylvest. ibid. Navar. c. 18. n. 8.
(o)Facere opera quibus, bonus appareat, cum non sit, sine intentione ostendendi se bonum, non est etiam veniale, juxta mentem omnium. Idem ibid.
(p)Alias erit veniale, puta, cum in ipsa fictione delectetur,—magis vanus videtur quam malus. Sylvest. ibid.
(q)Si a•m finis ille sit vana gloria, non tamen ita quod in ea ponatur ultimus finis, peccatum est veniale quidem sed duplicatum. Cajetan. ibid.
(r)Qui opera ad Dei, servitium naturaliter ordinata (•ut sunt jejunium oratio eleemosyna) facit ex intentione non serviendi Deo, sed ob gloriam humanam, hypocrisis peccatum incurrit formaliter, implicite tamen. Cajetan. ibid. p. 341. Nonnunquam etiam fratres suos admonuisse, ut aliquam ostenderent virtutis, apparentiam in abstinentiis, vigiliis, verborum ac gestorum disciplina, quum apud saeculares essent; & sic eos sancta quadam hypocrisi, ad fidei reverentiam, & virtutis amorem propensius invitarent. Specul. histor. l. 29. c. 105.
It is amongst the commendations of Saint Dominic himself. Vincentius Bishop of Beauvais, in his praises, spends one Chapter upon this Subject de sancta ejus Hypocrisy, showing that it was not only ⟨p. 266⟩the practice of their Saint, but that he commended the holy thing to his Brethren (the Fryers Praedicaut). Hypocrisy being such a holy quality in their account, and a special ornament of their greatest Saints; no wonder if they be so far, from branding it as a crime, that they declare it meritorious. A Religious person that feigns himself to have more holiness than he hath, that others may be edified, sins not, but rather merits (so Rosella v. Hypoer. n. 1.) Thus they give us warning not to trust any shows of sanctity or mortification amongst them; since they are so far from counting it a sin, that they conclude it meritorious, even for their Religious to deceive others with Hypocritical ostentation of what holiness they have not. Indeed the Romanists are concerned to speak favourably of Hypocrisy, and treat it with kindness; for since they require no more truth and sincerity in their dealings with men, and make no more than exterior shows of piety, (if so much) needful in the worship of God; and yet would be accounted the best, or only true Christians on earth: if they should condemn Hypocrisy as a mortal sin, that Religion and Righteousness; which their Church counts sufficient, would be branded by themselves, as damnably criminal.
It is amongst the commendations of Saint Deminick himself. Vincentius Bishop of Beauvois, in his praises, spends one Chapter upon this Subject de sancta ejus Hypoerisie, shewing that it was not only ⟨p. 266⟩the practice of their Saint, but that he commended the holy thing to his Brethren (the Fryers Praedicaut). Hypocrisie being such a holy quality in their account, and a special ornament of their greatest Saints; no wonder if they be so far, from branding it as a crime, that they declare it meritorious. A Religious person that feigns himself to have more holiness than he hath, that others may be edified, sins not, but rather merits (so Rosella v. Hypoer. n. 1.) Thus they give us warning not to trust any shews of sanctity or mortification amongst them; since they are so far from counting it a sin, that they conclude it meritorious, even for their Religious to deceive others with Hypocritical ostentation of what holiness they have not. Indeed the Romanists are concern'd to speak favourably of Hypocrisie, and treat it with kindness; for since they require no more truth and sincerity in their dealings with men, and make no more than exterior shews of piety, (if so much) needful in the worship of God; and yet would be accounted the best, or only true Christians on earth: if they should condemn Hypocrisie as a mortal sin, that Religion and Righteousness; which their Church counts sufficient, would be branded by themselves, as damnably criminal.
Disgracing and defaming others to their face by contumelies, or behind their backs by detraction; reproaching them with charges true or false, to the impairing or ruining of their esteem or credit (though some of them say this is worse than theft or robbery, and others make it worse than adultery; and in the Canon Law, such are called murderers; yet) is allowed under the notion of a Venial, in so many cases, that he who is addicted thereto, may satisfy his humour fully in the practice of it without scruple. 'Tis a Maxim with them, that the (s)quality of sins in words, is regulated ⟨p. 267⟩by the intention. 'Tis this that gives this sin, and others besides, their formality, (which Cajetan often inculcates) and without that, they are no sins, or but Venial. Hence he tells us, that the contempt (t)of our Neighbour is a mortal sin, speaking formally, that is, with an intention of contemning him: for no man formally contemns another, but he that despises him, that he may despise him; so no man is a detractor formally, but he that back-bites, that he may back-bite; and no man is formally contumelious, but he that speaks reproachfully, that he may reproach. So that if he intend not thus to sin, let him say what he will against his Neighbour, he is not guilty of the sin formally, and in deed. Accordingly he tells us, that (u)materially, (i. e. without intention of dishonouring another) contumelious words may be spoken, either without any sin, or any but what is Venial. 'Tis true, some of them say, words may be a crime, if they grievously defame a person, though they be uttered without a design to do it; but then withal they allow of such reproaches as Venial, which are of no better consequence, but tend to disgrace him effectually. To reproach him with natural defects of mind, or body, or birth, is regularly but Venial; all agree in this says (x)Sairus: To charge him with ignorance, to say he has little wit, and small judgment, to call him a fool, or an Hermaphrodite, or a Bastard, though the charge be false. To report one to be infected with the French-disease is but Venial, because that is no great disgrace. Pet. Navarre. Sairus, & alii communiter in Bonacin. ⟨p. 268⟩ibid. n. 9. 5Also to charge him falsely with any wickedness, which they count Venial.
DIsgracing and defaming others to their face by contumelies, or behind their backs by detraction; reproaching them with charges true or false, to the impairing or ruining of their esteem or credit (though some of them say this is worse than theft or robbery, and others make it worse than adultery; and in the Canon Law, such are called murderers; yet) is allowed under the notion of a Venial, in so many cases, that he who is addicted thereto, may satisfie his humour fully in the practice of it without scruple. 'Tis a Maxime with them, that the (s)quality of sins in words, is regulated ⟨p. 267⟩by the intention. 'Tis this that gives this sin, and others besides, their formality, (which Cajetan often inculcates) and without that, they are no sins, or but Venial. Hence he tells us, that the contempt (t)of our Neighbour is a mortal sin, speaking formally, that is, with an intention of contemning him: for no man formally contemns another, but he that despises him, that he may despise him; so no man is a detractor formally, but he that back-bites, that he may back-bite; and no man is formally contumelious, but he that speaks reproachfully, that he may reproach. So that if he intend not thus to sin, let him say what he will against his Neighbour, he is not guilty of the sin formally, and in deed. Accordingly he tells us, that (u)materially, (i. e. without intention of dishonouring another) contumelious words may be spoken, either without any sin, or any but what is Venial. 'Tis true, some of them say, words may be a crime, if they grievously defame a person, though they be uttered without a design to do it; but then withall they allow of such reproaches as Venial, which are of no better consequence, but tend to disgrace him effectually. To reproach him with natural defects of mind, or body, or birth, is regularly but Venial; all agree in this saies (x)Sairus: To charge him with ignorance, to say he has little wit, and small jugment, to call him a fool, or an Hermaphrodite, or a Bastard, though the charge be false. To report one to be infected with the French-disease is but Venial, because that is no great disgrace. Pet. Navar. Sairus, & alii communiter in Bonacin. ⟨p. 268⟩ibid. n. 9. 5
(s)Aquinas, & Alexander, Alensis, in Sylv, sum. v. contumel. n. 2.
(t)Hinc patet quod contemptus proximi est peccatum mortale formaliter loquendo, hoc est ex intentione contemnendi. Nullus enim formaliter contemnit proximum, nisi qui speruit proximum ut spermat proximum: sicut nullus detrahit formaliter, nisi qui detrahit ut detrahat. &c. Cajetan. sum. v. contemptus.
(u)Materialiter (hoc est non ex intentione dehonorandi) possunt verba contumeliosà etiam absque ullo peccato dici. Ibid. v. contumelia, Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 10. art. 2.
(x)Lib. 11, c. 6. n. 4. Detegere falsos defectus naturales, puta quod▪ est Luscus, Claudus, Mancus, Gibbosus, Ignarus, & alia hujusmodi, que non pertinent ad bonam famam morum, non est suo genere, nec regulariter mortale. Navarre. cap. 18. n. 23. Vid. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 2.Lib. 11, c. 6. n. 4. Detegere falsos defectus naturales, puta quod▪ est Luscus, Claudus, Mancus, Gibbosus, Ignarus, & alia hujusmodi, que non pertinent ad bonam famam morum, non est suo genere, nec regulariter mortale. Navar. cap. 18. n. 23. Vid. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 2.
5(y) Imponere vel detegire veniale, non est de se mortale. Idem Navarre. ibid. n. 24: Sylvest. sum. v. detractio n. 2. non esse mortale in his quae sunt modicae importantiae, ut venialia quae communiter non infamant secundum Antoninum, & Angelus sum. v. detract. n. 2. Pet. Navarre. Aragon. in Bonacin. ibid. n. 6. alii communiter.(y) Imponere vel detegire veniale, non est de se mortale. Idem Navar. ibid. n. 24: Sylvest. sum. v. detractio n. 2. non esse mortale in his quae sunt modicae importantiae, ut venialia quae communiter non infamant secundum Antoninum, & Angelus sum. v. detract. n. 2. Pet. Navar. Arragon. in Bonacin. ibid. n. 6. alii communiter.
Thus they may calumniate any man, and without crime charge him falsely, as a Blasphemer, a Thief, a Liar, a Perjured Person, a Cheat, &c, since they count these, in many degrees, Venial: and if they be consistent with the Honour and reputation of Roman Catholics, yet others, either Christian or Heathen, will think their credit blasted with such imputations. Likewise to (z)revile one in such terms as may signify either great or lesser crimes, to accuse him as one greatly proud, covetous, wrathful: or any thing whatsoever, which may denote either the natural inclination, and first motions, or the outward acts; this is not mortal; because the hearers are to put the better construction on it. And here is liberty enough, to calumniate in such terms as may ruin any persons reputation; upon a presumption, that all who hear the slander will be always so wise, and good, as any rarely are. Or, (a)if a man be noted for wickedness already, you may charge him with crimes that are not known, and yet offend but Venially: because you cannot hurt his reputation, which is hurt already. As if when a man has dangerously wounded himself, you might give him more wounds, and dispatch him; when life and same are of like account. Or you (b)may charge those falsely ⟨p. 269⟩for committing a crime, when they did it not; if it hath been their practice before. Or you (c)may charge them with any crimes that are secret, if they be less than those that are known; as if one had been guilty of murder, you may accuse him of theft, and if he hath stolen, you may accuse him of fornication, and if he be a Heretic, you may charge him with any thing, since with them nothing is worse than what they count Heresy. Or you may accuse others of any (d)wickedness, which such sort of persons seem to make nothing of: as some young men, of fornication, and others of adulteries. Further, any terms tending to defame others may be used in passion, such as hinders full deliberation: for these will excuse blasphemy against God, much more the worst reproaches of men. Or you may do it in jest (e)with moderate facetiousness, when the reproach is set off neatly, then it is a virtue with those, who learn their Divinity of Aristotle rather then the Apostle: and think if a man have wit, he needs herein have no conscience. Or you may do (f)it out of levity, or pleasure in tattling;
Thus they may calumniate any man, and without crime charge him falsly, as a Blasphemer, a Thief, a Lyar, a Perjur'd Person, a Cheat, &c, since they count these, in many degrees, Venial: and if they be consistent with the Honour and reputation of Roman Catholicks, yet others, either Christian or Heathen, will think their credit blasted with such imputations. Likewise to (z)revile one in such terms as may signifie either great or lesser crimes, to accuse him as one greatly proud, covetous, wrathful: or any thing whatsoever, which may denote either the natural inclination, and first motions, or the outward acts; this is not mortal; because the hearers are to put the better construction on it. And here is liberty enough, to calumniate in such terms as may ruine any persons reputation; upon a presumption, that all who hear the slander will be always so wise, and good, as any rarely are. Or, (a)if a man be noted for wickedness already, you may charge him with crimes that are not known, and yet offend but Venially: because you cannot hurt his reputation, which is hurt already. As if when a man has dangerously wounded himself, you might give him more wounds, and dispatch him; when life and same are of like account. Or you (b)may charge those falsly ⟨p. 269⟩for committing a crime, when they did it not; if it hath been their practice before. Or you (c)may charge them with any crimes that are secret, if they be less than those that are known; as if one had been guilty of murder, you may accuse him of theft, and if he hath stollen, you may accuse him of fornication, and if he be a Heretick, you may charge him with any thing, since with them nothing is worse than what they count Heresie. Or you may accuse others of any (d)wickedness, which such sort of persons seem to make nothing of: as some young men, of fornication, and others of adulteries. Further, any terms tending to defame others may be used in passion, such as hinders full deliberation: for these will excuse blasphemy against God, much more the worst reproaches of men. Or you may do it in jest (e)with moderate facetiousness, when the reproach is set off neatly, then it is a vertue with those, who learn their Divinity of Aristotle rather then the Apostle: and think if a man have wit, he needs herein have no conscience. Or you may do
(z)Qui ex loquacitate profert ea, quae & pro mortali & pro veniali possunt accipi, ut dicendo talis est magnus superbus avarus iracundus, vel hususmodi quae sumi possunt & pro naturali inclination & motu primo, non peccet mortaliter quia audientes debent in meliorem partem interpraetari. Sylvest. secundum Antoninum ibid. Angelus, ibid. Graft. l. 2. cap. 137. n. 26. Pet. Navarre. Sayrus, Aragon, & alii communiter in Bonacin. ibid.Qui ex loquacitate profert ea, quae & pro mortali & pro veniali possunt accipi, ut dicendo talis est magnus superbus avarus iracundus, vel hususmodi quae sumi possunt & pro naturali inclinatione & motu primo, non peccet mortaliter quia audientes debent in meliorem partem interpraetari. Sylvest. secundum Antoninum ibid. Angelus, ibid. Graff. l. 2. cap. 137. n. 26. Pet. Navar. Sayrus, Arragon, & alii communiter in Bonacin. ibid.
(a)Si ille cui dicit habebat eum pro scelerato: quia jam infamatus erat apud eum de alîis, & si non de isto. Angelus, ibid. Idem est in mortalibus notoriis secundum Archiepiscopum quia non laeditur fama jam laesa. Sylvest. ibid.
(b)Mentitus es meretricem tali nocte admisisse lenonem, eo casu non restituere famam, non est peccatum mortale. Graft. ibid. n. 22. secundum Cajetanum. Excusatur à peccato mortali, qui aliquem infamavit cum secundum suum existimationem illa non esset infamia. ibid.Mentitus es meretricem tali nocte admisisse lenonem, eo casu non restituere famam, non est peccatum mortale. Graff. ibid. n. 22. secundum Cajetanum. Excusatur à peccato mortali, qui aliquem infamavit cum secundum suum existimationem illa non esset infamia. ibid.
(c)Idem esset in criminibus mortalibus etiam occultis, si sunt minora notoriis, sicut non est infamia notorio homicidae & furi, quod sit fornicatus. Sylvest. ibid.
(d)Si sunt personae quarum famam simplex fornicatio in nullo laedit, ut juvenes saeculares—quod simile est de adulterio apud multos. Graff. ibid. (juxta Cajetanum) n. 28.
(e)Respondetur quod convitiari, secundum Arist. 4. Ethic. c. 8. eatenus est vertutis Eatrapeliae, quatenus intra limits moderatae facetiae continetur: quando scil urbanitatis venustas in convitio adest. Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 9. art. 2. p. 172.Respondetur quod convitiari, secundum Arist. 4. Ethic. c. 8. eatenus est vertutis Eatrapeliae, quatenus intra limites moderatae facetiae continetur: quando scil urbanitatis venustas in convitio adest. Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 9. art. 2. p. 172.
unless the words be so exasperating, as to occasion some other deadly evil. Or it may be done (g)by way of recital, suggesting what tends to blast them, as reported by others. Or when the defamer (h)is not believed ⟨p. 270⟩or gives no just cause of belief. Or (i)for correction; for they may defame others to amend them; and reform them, by making them worse than they are. Or (k)through some want of cautiousness, as amongst women and persons of inferiors rank, who vent what reproachful language comes next, how injurious soever. Or when their reputation does hurt, and may seduce others; to defame them, is absolutely lawful eos defamare esse licitum, absolute respondet. Adrianus. in Soto. ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Or (to add no more) if one accuse others, whom they think he ought not, though he impute nothing to them but what is true; they may charge him with false crimes, this will be no worse then a Venial fault. Bannes 22. q. 70. art. 3. p. 2. Thus as in other cases, so when any thing is said or writ, to the disparagement of their Church or themselves, how justly and truly soever: if they fix upon the Authors the most odious imputations that can be invente• (such as Bolsec and Cochleus would have fastened upon Luther and Calvin) and divulge them with a design to delude the world into a belief thereof, though their own consciences tell them there is not a syllable of truth therein; yet they incur no fault thereby, that a good Catholic need fear, or make conscience of. This is not only the opinion of the Jesuits, but the common Doctrine of Aquinas his Disciples, as Ledesma a Dominican assures us; and so we may spare those more then 20 Doctors, which Caramuel says, assert it. Hereby they give warning to mankind, that they are no more to be trusted in their charges against their opposers, to vindicate the reputation of themselves or their Church, than such persons will be trusted in a Court, which openly sentenced them to the pillory for false testimony; yea, in this maxim they have as good as set themselves upon a Pillory, and done that justice to the world, as to fix this Inscription upon their own Foreheads: We are they who declare it no crime to calumniate ⟨p. 271⟩most odiously and falsely, who ever speak ill (how truly soever) of us and our Church. These are some of their methods for destroying, the honour and reputation of others without any fault which they regard;
unless the words be so exasperating, as to occasion some other deadly evil. Or it may be done (g)by way of recital, suggesting what tends to blast them, as reported by others. Or when the defamer (h)is not believed ⟨p. 270⟩or gives no just cause of belief. Or (i)for correction; for they may defame others to amend them; and reform them, by making them worse than they are. Or (k)through some want of cautiousness, as amongst women and persons of inferious rank, who vent what reproachful language comes next, how injurious soever. Or when their reputation does hurt, and may seduce others; to defame them, is absolutely lawful eos defamare esse licitum, absolute respondet. Adrianus. in Soto. ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Or (to add no more) if one accuse others, whom they think he ought not, though he impute nothing to them but what is true; they may charge him with false crimes, this will be no worse then a Venial fault. Bannes 22. q. 70. art. 3. p. 2. Thus as in other cases, so when any thing is said or writ, to the disparagement of their Church or themselves, how justly and truly soever: if they fix upon the Authors the most odious imputations that can be invente• (such as Bolsec and Cochleus would have fastned upon Luther and Calvin) and divulge them with a design to delude the world into a belief thereof, though their own consciences tell them there is not a syllable of truth therein; yet they incur no fault thereby, that a good Catholick need fear, or make conscience of. This is not only the opinion of the Jesuites, but the common Doctrine of Aquinas his Disciples, as Ledesma a Dominican assures us; and so we may spare those more then 20 Doctors, which Caramuel says, assert it. Hereby they give warning to mankind, that they are no more to be trusted in their charges against their opposers, to vindicate the reputation of themselves or their Church, than such persons will be trusted in a Court, which openly sentenced them to the pillory for false testimony; yea, in this maxime they have as good as set themselves upon a Pillory, and done that justice to the world, as to fix this Inscription upon their own Foreheads: We are they who declare it no crime to caluminate ⟨p. 271⟩most odiously and falsly, who ever speak ill (how truly soever) of us and our Church. These are some of their methods for destroying, the honour and reputation of others without any fault which they regard;
(g)Idem esse (veniale) secundum Scotum, quum ex loquacitate dicuntur infamatoria recitative. Sylvest. ibid. Cajetan. in 22. q. 73. art. 2.
(h)Quoties non dedit justam causam credendi, vel non fuit ei adhibita sides. Graft. ibid. n. 23.Quoties non dedit justam causam credendi, vel non fuit ei adhibita sides. Graff. ibid. n. 23.
(i)Nec qui per fraternam correctionem aliquem infamavit, & ad majorem emendam, &c. Idem ibid. n. 24. Soto, ibid. q. 9. art. 2.
(k)Ubi vero nonnullus est cautelae defectus, plurimum consuevit esse veniale, ut saepe inter mulierculas contingit, & homines infimae Classis, qui invicem se convitiis conspergunt, ut in buccam veniunt. Soto, ibid. Graft. ibid. n. 9.Ubi vero nonnullus est cautelae defectus, plurimum consuevit esse veniale, ut saepe inter mulierculas contingit, & homines infimae Classis, qui invicem se convitiis conspergunt, ut in buccam veniunt. Soto, ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 9.
they deliver them in great variety, so that every one so disposed, may serve himself of such as suit his humour. And as a man may defame others, so he may do the same good office for himself; (l)not only by blazoning his secret wickedness, but by charging himself falsely with crimes he never acted: thus to impair, or utterly ruin his own credit, is but regularly a Venial fault according to Adrian, and Sotus, and others; for prodigality is but a Venial, and this is but to be prodigal of ones credit.
they deliver them in great variety, so that every one so disposed, may serve himself of such as suit his humour. And as a man may defame others, so he may do the same good office for himself; (l)not only by blazoning his secret wickedness, but by charging himself falsly with crimes he never acted: thus to impair, or utterly ruine his own credit, is but regularly a Venial fault according to Adrian, and Sotus, and others; for prodigality is but a Venial, and this is but to be prodigal of ones credit.
(l)Detegere propria peccata vera & secreta, & imponere sibi falsa suo genere & regulariter non est nisi veniale quamvis per illud notabiliter fama laedatur, aut omnino amittetur, ut Magister Sotus explicuit, & multo ante Adrianus sensit Navarre. cap. 18. n. 27. & 24. & 28. prodigalitas regulariter non est peccatum mortale, ut S. Thom. & detectio proprii peccati non est injustitia, sed prodigalitas samae. ibid.Detegere propria peccata vera & secreta, & imponere sibi falsa suo genere & regulariter non est nisi veniale quamvis per illud notabiliter fama laedatur, aut omnino amittetur, ut Magister Sotus explicuit, & multo ante Adrianus sensit Navar. cap. 18. n. 27. & 24. & 28. prodigalitas regulariter non est peccatum mortale, ut S. Thom. & detectio proprii peccati non est injustitia, sed prodigalitas samae. ibid.
Flattery also (that falseness of every sort, even the vilest, may not miss of their favour and encouragement) is reconciled to common practice under the notion of a Venial. To (m)praise one for the virtue which he has not, or the good that he does not; is little or no fault. To extol the good he does above measure and desert, is as innocent, yea (n)when a man is to to be praised for a good work, though you ⟨p. 272⟩know he will thereby be transported with deadly pride, such as will destroy his Soul; yet you should not desist, hut may and ought to lay aside the sense of his future ruin: because (says Cardinal Cajetan) there are twelve hours in the day, and a man may in an instant be illuminated and changed by Divine mercy. To (o)applaud one for his sins, if they be not mortal, is as harmless; when it is out of a design to please the sinner, without ruining him; or to gain some advantage by such flattery. So that when it is both wicked and sordid at once, yet will they scarce count it a fault. There's no more hurt in giving flatterers reward, and encouragement. Sylvester inquires if this be (p)a mortal sin? and in him Aquinas answers, no, unless a man affect, as Herod, to be extolled as a God; or design and desire to be magnified for mortal crimes. But (q)it is a virtue to give consent to false flattery, as when a woman who is secretly an adulteress, is praised for faithfulness to her Husband, that scandal may be avoided, and others deluded, by a good opinion of her. And so we may understand how the praises of the Church of Rome for her faithfulness to Christ, come to be a virtue. Or if one be not in so complacent a humour as to flatter others; he may curse them at as easy a rate, for, for it is but a Venial fault (r)to curse in words (if ⟨p. 273⟩not from the heart) any thing, any person (ones own Father not excepted); to imprecate any mischief or misery to them; to (s)wish Gods curse on them, or an ill end might befall them, or the Devil might have them. And when he is at it, he may curse the Devil too. (t)'Tis no sin at all, if it be for his fault, and gives the Devil but his due. Cursing (u)may be ones usual practice as innocently. It is scarce so bad as a Venial, (x)when cursing is used for honest recreation. And he may (y)curse the irrational creatures, or the Elements, and if he do it with his mouth only, or with both mouth and heart, without respect either to God or man:
FLattery also (that falsness of every sort, even the vilest, may not miss of their favour and incouragement) is reconciled to common practice under the notion of a Venial. To (m)praise one for the vertue which he has not, or the good that he does not; is little or no fault. To extoll the good he does above measure and desert, is as innocent, yea (n)when a man is to to be praised for a good work, though you ⟨p. 272⟩know he will thereby be transported with deadly pride, such as will destroy his Soul; yet you should not desist, hut may and ought to lay aside the sense of his future ruine: because (saies Cardinal Cajetan) there are twelve hours in the day, and a man may in an instant be illuminated and changed by Divine mercy. To (o)applaud one for his sins, if they be not mortal, is as harmless; when it is out of a design to please the sinner, without ruining him; or to gain some advantage by such flattery. So that when it is both wicked and sordid at once, yet will they scarce count it a fault. There's no more hurt in giving flatterers reward, and incouragement. Sylvester inquires if this be (p)a mortal sin? and in him Aquinas answers, no, unless a man affect, as Herod, to be extolled as a God; or design and desire to be magnified for mortal crimes. But (q)it is a virtue to give consent to false flattery, as when a woman who is secretly an adulteress, is praised for faithfulness to her Husband, that scandal may be avoided, and others deluded, by a good opinion of her. And so we may understand how the praises of the Church of Rome for her faithfulness to Christ, come to be a virtue. Or if one be not in so complacent a humour as to flatter others; he may curse them at as easie a rate, for, for it is but a Venial fault (r)to curse in words (if ⟨p. 273⟩not from the heart) any thing, any person (ones own Father not excepted); to imprecate any mischief or misery to them; to (s)wish Gods curse on them, or an ill end might befall them, or the Devil might have them. And when he is at it, he may curse the Devil too.
(m)Est adul•tio prima, quando quis adulatur, vel attribuit alicui bonum virtutis, quod ille non habet. Secunda quando nimium vel ultra debitum extollit bonum, quod habet, & utrumque istorum est veniale. Graff. decis, pars 2. l. 3. c. 3. n. 5.
(n)Quam aliquis debet ex officio aliquem de bono aliquo opere laudare etiamsi si stiat laudatum in superbiam mortalem se elaturum, non tenetur propterea desistere à debito officio: potest tamen & debet deponere hujusmodi scientiam de futura ruina illius, quia 12 horae su•t diei, & potest in instanti homo illuminari, & mutari à divina miserecordia. Cajet. Sum. v. adulatio.
(o)Est autem peccatum veniale quando vel laudatur aliquis de malis venialibus, vel de bonis, sola complacendi intentione absque ruina, vel etiam ob aliquem utilitatem consequundam, vel non impediendam, ut de se patet. Cajetan. ibid. Graft. p. 1. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 1. 161. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 115. art. 2. Sylv. v. adulat. n. 4.Est autem peccatum veniale quando vel laudatur aliquis de malis venialibus, vel de bonis, sola complacendi intentione absque ruina, vel etiam ob aliquem utilitatem consequundam, vel non impediendam, ut de se patet. Cajetan. ibid. Graff. p. 1. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 1. 161. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 115. art. 2. Sylv. v. adulat. n. 4.
(p)Utrum dare adulatoribus sit peccatum mortal? & dicit S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 168: quod non: nisi nimius appetitus vanae gloriae—sicut delectabatur Herodes, quum ei Dei & non hominis, laudes dabantur: vel nisi intendat quis & cupiat laudationem de peccatis—Et hoc est quod dicit Alexand. de Alis, quod tale peccatum est ista datio, quaele adulatio propter quam dat, id est si venialis venial, &c. Sum. v. adulatio. n. 6.Utrum dare adulatoribus sit peccatum mortale? & dicit S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 168: quod non: nisi nimius appetitus vanae gloriae—sicut delectabatur Herodes, quum ei Dei & non hominis, laudes dabantur: vel nisi intendat quis & cupiat laudationem de peccatis—Et hoc est quod dicit Alexand. de Alis, quod tale peccatum est ista datio, quaele adulatio propter quam dat, id est si venialis veniale, &c. Sum. v. adulatio. n. 6.
(q)Imo virtus est consentire laudi, sive se false laudanti, de virtute tamen suo statui necessaria, exemplum de uxore occulte adultera, quae de fidelitate laudatur, non eo intuitu ut laudetur, sed ut per bonam opinionem, quam alii habent scandalum evitetur. Graft. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 2. Navarre. cap. 23. n. 13.
(f)Si autem ex animi levitate loquendive libidine ore labatur in summa propter aliquam causam non necessariam fiat: peccatum est plurimum ucniale. Idem ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Cajetan. sum. v. contumel.Si autem ex animi levitate loquendive libidine ore labatur in summa propter aliquam causam non necessariam fiat: peccatum est plurimum vcniale. Idem ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Cajetan. sum. v. contumel.
curse the irrational creatures, or the Elements, and if he do it with his mouth only, or with both mouth and heart, without respect either to God or man:
Imo virtus est consentire laudi, sive se false laudanti, de virtute tamen suo statui necessaria, exemplum de uxore occulte adultera, quae de fidelitate laudatur, non eo intuitu ut laudetur, sed ut per bonam opinionem, quam alii habent scandalum evitetur. Graff. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 2. Navar. cap. 23. n. 13.
(r)Ore tantum maledicere non est mortale, ut communiter maledicunt parents siliis, & colon•, & mullions bobus, & mulis. Idem ibid. n. 117.Ore tantum maledicere non est mortale, ut communiter maledicunt parentes siliis, & colon•, & muliones bobus, & mulis. Idem ibid. n. 117.
(s)Vid. Soto de Just. l. 5. 5. q. 12. art. 3. Navarre. ibid.Vid. Soto de Just. l. 5. 5. q. 12. art. 3. Navar. ibid.
(t)Peccat qui maledicit diabolo ratione suae naturae quia illa bona est & a Deo facta secus si ratione suae culpae, & tradit S. Thom. modo nec plus nec aliter quam meretur. Idem. ibid. Cajetan. sum. v. maledictio.
(u)(Quum) malo usu bujusmodi profert & est veniale peccatum. Cajetan. ibid.
(x)Contingit tamen inquit (S. Tho.) quod aliquando sit veniale—vel propter affectum proferentis, dum ex levi motu vel ludo—talia verba profert, quia peccata verborum ex affecta pensantur. Sylvest. v. maledict. n. 3. sit veniale—quod ex levi motu seu lusu. Soto, ibid. Aliquando etiam culpa veniali carere possit, ut si fiat joco & ludo, vel causa recreationis honestae.
(y)Si paenitens dicat see maledixisse creaturam irrationalem vel elementa interrogare debet confessarius maledixerit ne ore tantum, vel ore & animo, nulla ratione Dei vel proximi habita, quia in his casibus est tantum veniale peccatum. Graft. l. 2. c. 72. n. 3. Navarre. ibid. n. 117.Si paenitens dicat se maledixisse creaturam irrationalem vel elementa interrogare debet confessarius maledixerit ne ore tantum, vel ore & animo, nulla ratione Dei vel proximi habita, quia in his casibus est tantum veniale peccatum. Graff. l. 2. c. 72. n. 3. Navar. ibid. n. 117.
