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There is not any thing in the world which they count more inviolable than their Vow of Religion; yet he may dispense with this, and the reason is considerable, Because Religion derived its being from the Authority of the Roman Bishop; he therefore who gave it, may take it away: So P. Innocent and their Canonists generally, ibid. n. 4. Hostiensis and others, seem to speak extravagantly, when they say, the Pope can do as much in a manner as God himself: But this may pass for a modest speech, if they will have him to do more; and more he can do, if he can make contradictions to be consistent. One instance of it we have in the question, whether the Pope can dispense with a Monk to have secular propriety. Rich. de S. Victore says, it is essential to a Monk to want it; and so a contradiction to be a Monk; and have it: yet others say the Pope can do it, and render those consistent enough, and so make one to be a Monk, while he is none. Idem. ibid.
There is not any thing in the world which they count more inviolable than their Vow of Religion; yet he may dispense with this, and the reason is considerable, Because Religion derived its being from the Authority of the Roman Bishop; he therefore who gave it, may take it away: So P. Innocent and their Canonists generally, ibid. n. 4. Hostiensis and others, seem to speak extravagantly, when they say, the Pope can do as much in a manner as God himself: But this may pass for a modest speech, if they will have him to do more; and more he can do, if he can make contradictions to be consistant. One instance of it we have in the question, whether the Pope can dispense with a Monk to have secular propriety. Rich. de S. Victore says, it is essential to a Monk to want it; and so a contradiction to be a Monk; and have it: yet others say the Pope can do it, and render those consistent enough, and so make one to be a Monk, while he is none. Idem. ibid.
So for Sanctifying of the Lords day, there can be no doubt of the Papal power herein, since they count the command for it (s)positive; for that he can dispense in all (t)
positives, is with them unquestionable. Nothing is necessarily required by the Precept for Sanctifying of this day, but the hearing of Mass, and abstaining from servile works:
⟨p. 371⟩
The Pope, if he please, may turn these into working days, for he can Abrogate them. And since the people, by their Divinity, are not obliged to any other public worship, but the Mass, and that only on these days, he may discharge them from all Conscience of public
worship, and disengage them from tendering any unto God, for he can dispense with the Mass. They make it indeed, sometimes, a character of Antichrist, to put down the Mass: But it is not fit the Pope should want power to be Antichrist at pleasure; and why should they be angry with us for thinking him so already? since with them, herein, he may lawfully be Antichrist when he list. And he may do as much for the Clergy and Monastics: All the solemn worship necessary and proper for them, is that of their Canonical hours; but
So Sylvester after others concludes; he adds indeed, that though the Pope can discharge them from this Service, yet he cannot disoblige them from making some recompense to their Benefactors for not praying for them;
but for this (he says) they need not trouble themselves for the least prayer that can be, will suffice for that. So an Ave Mary may serve (that serves generally on all occasions) a prayer (if it may be so accounted) of one petition to the Virgin, and not a word to God, not a syllable for their Benefactors; they may be as well without it. And so others leave them determining without any reserve, that the Pope may dispense
⟨p. 372⟩
with their divine Service, and may do so validly, without any cause too. So that the Pope, when he list, may leave no public worship of God in the whole Roman world; and when he does this, it will be no sin wholly to neglect it. He can dispense against the universal state of the Church, so the Law of their Church will have it. Only says Panormitan, he should not deface it; but there's no danger of that, though he should destroy it (as he has done indeed;
So for Sanctifying of the Lords day, there can be no doubt of the Papal power herein, since they count the command for it (s)positive; for that he can dispense in all (t)positives, is with them unquestionable. Nothing is necessarily required by the Precept for Sanctifying of this day, but the hearing of Mass, and abstaining from servile works: ⟨p. 371⟩The Pope, if he please, may turn these into working days, for he can Abrogate them. And since the people, by their Divinity, are not obliged to any other publick worship, but the Mass, and that only on these days, he may discharge them from all Conscience of publick (u)worship, and disingage them from tendering any unto God, for he can dispense with the Mass. They make it indeed, sometimes, a character of Antichrist, to put down the Mass: But it is not fit the Pope should want power to be Antichrist at pleasure; and why should they be angry with us for thinking him so already? since with them, herein, he may lawfully be Antichrist when he list. And he may do as much for the Clergy and Monasticks: All the solemn worship necessary and proper for them, is that of their Canonical hours; but (x)the Pope can order that they shall not be obliged to say their Service. 5So Sylvester after others concludes; he adds indeed, that though the Pope can discharge them from this Service, yet he cannot disoblige them from making some recompence to their Benefactors for not praying for them; 6but for this (he says) they need not trouble themselves for the least prayer that can be, will sufficē for that. So an Ave Mary may serve (that serves generally on all occasions) a prayer (if it may be so accounted) of one petition to the Virgin, and not a word to God, not a syllable for their Benefactors; they may be as well without it. And so others leave them determining without any reserve, that the Pope may dispense ⟨p. 372⟩with their divine Service, and may do so validly, without any cause too. So that the Pope, when he list, may leave no publick worship of God in the whole Roman world; and when he does this, it will be no sin wholly to neglect it. He can dispense against the universal state of the Church, so the Law of their Church will have it. Only says Panormitan, he should not deface it; but there's no danger of that, though he should destroy it (as he has done indeed;
(s)Dicimus omnia Christianorum festa, etiam dies dominicos solo humano jure—id quod etiam sent it, Turrecrementa, Archidiaconus, S. Thomas, Waldensis, Navarre. c. 13. n. 1.Dicimus omnia Christianorum festa, etiam dies dominicos solo humano jure—id quod etiam sent it, Turrecrementa, Archidiaconus, S. Thomas, Waldensis, Navar. c. 13. n. 1.
(t)Quae sunt de jure positivo, potest summus Pontifex, etiam sine causa tollere & abrogare, & quamvis male faciat, factum tamen validum sit, Canus. ibid. p. 972. Sylvest. juxta mentem, S. Thom. v. papa. n. 15. vid. Angel. Sum. v. papa. n. 3. Universaliter potest dispansere—contra statum universalem Ecclesiae.
(u)Sequitur posse pontisicem in hoc praecepto (de missa audienda) dispensare, cum Ecclesiasticum sit, he adds only dispensare cum aliquo ut nunquam in toto vita missam audiat, etiamsi possit, neque ulla rationabili causa impediatur, non potest esse expediens, Suarez. tom. 3. disp. 88. Sect. 2. p. 1140. Hinc patet summum Pontisicem posse dispensare in praecepto audiendi missam, Tom. 1. disp. 4. q. ult. punct. 11. n. 6. Bonacina. aiunt communiter Doctores posse consuetudine vel humana potestate abrogari, Idem. in 3. precept. q. 5. n. 4.Sequitur posse pontisicem in hoc praecepto (de missa audienda) dispensare, cum Ecclesiasticum sit, he adds only dispensare cum aliquo ut nunquam in toto vita missam audiat, etiamsi possit, neque ulla rationabili causa impediatur, non potest esse expediens, Suarez. tom. 3. disp. 88. Sect. 2. p. 1140. Hinc patet summum Pontisicem posse dispensare in praecepto audiendi missam, Tom. 1. disp. 4. q. ult. punct. 11. n. 6. Bonacina. aiunt communiter Doctores posse consuetudine vel humana potestate abrogari, Idem. in 3. praecept. q. 5. n. 4.
(x)Quarta causa (a recitando divinum officium excusans) est dispensatio papae juxta Cardinalem Turrecrematam, neque aliud sentit Cardinalis Florentinus. Navarre. c. 25. n. 102.Quarta causa (a recitando divinum officium excusans) est dispensatio papae juxta Cardinalem Turrecrematam, neque aliud sentit Cardinalis Florentinus. Navar. c. 25. n. 102.
5Utrum papa facere possit quod praedicti non teneatur ad horas? Laud. & Jo. de Lig. senserunt quod papa hoc potest, &c. Sum. v. hor. n. 9.
6(y) Sed circa istam suppletionem non oportet esse multum scrupulosum, quia consurgit ex naturali lege potius quam Ecclesiae praecepto; ut reompensetur benefactoribus: quod etiam per minimam orationem fieri potest, ibid. n. 5.
they ascribe no power to him in this, but what he has given the world proof of effectually) for he cannot deface it, unless he change the universal state of it, without reason; and this he can never want, so long as his will is good reason, as they say it is.12
1(*) Bonacin. Divin. Offic. disp. 1. q. 6. p. 3. n. 1.
He can as easily discharge them from all Righteousness towards men; he can make it lawful for a Son to calumniate his Father, or covet all he has, or to wrest it from him by force, yea to attempt his life; and when he hath reduced him to want and misery, to leave him perishing for want of relief: this office he did for the Emperors heretofore, and is (z)commended for it. He can take away any (a)mans right, and dissolve all Bonds, Contracts, Obligations, whereby one man is bound to another(b); and so can make it lawful to act against all Faith, Truth, Justice, and common Honesty. Further, those whom God hath joined together in lawful Matrimony, the Pope (they say) hath power to separate, and sometimes, so, as to Marry others, and so live in Adultery without sin, as he did with the Son of the Conde D'Olivares.
He can as easily discharge them from all Righteousness towards men; he can make it lawful for a Son to calumniate his Father, or covet all he has, or to wrest it from him by force, yea to attempt his life; and when he hath reduced him to want and misery, to leave him perishing for want of relief: this office he did for the Emperours heretofore, and is (z)commended for it. He can take away any (a)mans right, and dissolve all Bonds, Contracts, Obligations, whereby one man is bound to another(b); and so can make it lawful to act against all Faith, Truth, Justice, and common Honesty. Further, those whom God hath joyned together in lawful Matrimony, the Pope (they say) hath power to separate, and sometimes, so, as to Marry others, and so live in Adultery without sin, as he did with the Son of the Conde D'Olivares.
(z)So the Emperor Henry 4. was used by his own Son, excited by the Pope; and Baronius will have it past denial, an eminent work of Piety, Annal. tom. 12. an. •1•6. n. 14.So the Emperour Henry 4. was used by his own Son, excited by the Pope; and Baronius will have it past denyal, an eminent work of Piety, Annal. tom. 12. an. •1•6. n. 14.
(a)In omnibus & per omnia potest facere & dicere quicquid placet auferendo etiam jus suum cui vult. Specul. Guliel. Durand. l. 1. par. 1. de legit. Sect. 6. n. 51.
(b)Utrum possit aliquem absolvere ab obligatione, qua tenitur alteri homini? & dico secundum Innocentium quod hoc potest, de plenitadine potestatis, Sylvest. v, papa. n. 13.
If there have been no Carnal knowledge they make no bones at all of the Popes dissolving Marriages, how firmly soever contracted, or solemnly celebrated: No, nor if they have had that full consummation with reluctancy. But there is one rarer feat that the Pope can do, he ⟨p. 373⟩has power to dispense with persons to Marry and continue so, not during life, but for such time as they desire, a year or two, or till they can have a Child, and then be Unmarried again, and freed from all bonds of that state, without any Divorce or occasion for it. Jo. Andreas (a principle Rabbi of their Church Talmud) says, he had disputed this question, whether the Pope might not dispense with a Kings only Son, being a Monk, to Marry for a while, till he could get a Boy, and after return to his Monastery and Unmarried condition? He answers, That the Pope, whose power is disputed, may resolve it himself, yet he may be advised to forbear: but many maintain, that if he should dispense, the dispensation would stand good, (according to whom, the Pope is not forbidden to dispense against the Gospel, when he sees cause, but only not to destroy it, as before,) and this holds especially, if the party would be content to be Married for a while, rather than for ever. So Andreas, and the same, it seems, is defended by Jo. Antonius, Bishop of Alexandria (in Milan) by Baldus, by Fulgosius, and Baptista Toruamala, Our Author will not grant, that the Pope cannot dispense with a Religious person to be Married a little, but makes it a question whether he can let him Marry during life(*).(*)
If there have been no Carnal knowledge they make no bones at all of the Popes dissolving Marriages, how firmly soever contracted, or solemnly celebrated: No, nor if they have had that full consummation with reluctancy. But there is one rarer feat that the Pope can do, he ⟨p. 373⟩has power to dispense with persons to Marry and continue so, not during life, but for such time as they desire, a year or two, or till they can have a Child, and then be Unmarryed again, and freed from all bonds of that state, without any Divorce or occasion for it. Jo. Andreas (a principle Rabbi of their Church Talmud) says, he had disputed this question, whether the Pope might not dispense with a Kings only Son, being a Monk, to Marry for a while, till he could get a Boy, and after return to his Monastery and Unmarryed condition? He answers, That the Pope, whose power is disputed, may resolve it himself, yet he may be advised to forbear: but many maintain, that if he should dispense, the dispensation would stand good, (according to whom, the Pope is not forbidden to dispense against the Gospel, when he sees cause, but only not to destroy it, as before,) and this holds especially, if the party would be content to be Marryed for a while, rather than for ever. So Andreas, and the same, it seems, is defended by Jo. Antonius, Bishop of Alexandria (in Millain) by Baldus, by Fulgosius, and Baptista Toruamala, Our Author will not grant, that the Pope cannot dispense with a Religious person to be Marryed a little, but makes it a question whether he can let him Marry during life(*).(*)
(*)Sum. Rosell. v. papa. n. 3. &. 4.
(*)So Aquinas (in Dian. v. matrim. n. 56). Bonaventur, Scotus, Durand. Alensis, Richard. Augustinus Triumph. Cajetan, Roffensis, (in Victorell. ad Tol. l. 7. c. 9.)
1Moreover, he cannot only legitimate Adultery, but Incest; for they teach that he can dispense with Marriages in those degrees which Gods Law forbids, even such as are acknowledged to be against the dictate of Nature. They except no degree of Consanguinity, but only the first in a direct line, viz. Marriage betwixt Parent and Child; they say he can license it in the first degree in the collateral line, viz. betwixt Brother and Sister.
1(c) Fere omnes gradus Mosaica lege prohibiti, sunt etiam prohibiti naturali, Sylv. v. papa. n. 17.
1Some indeed stick at this, because they observe not that the Pope has dispensed in this case. But the credit of their, St. Antoninus will not be questioned, who tells us, that Pope Martin the fifth, dispensed with one who had Married his own Sister. Yea, he takes upon him to dispense ⟨p. 374⟩with Sodomy. Sixtus the Fourth, (e)gave License to the whole Family of Cardinal St. Lucy, that they should use Sodomy in the three hotter Months, June, July, and August. And Alexander the Sixth, (f)gave the Cardinal De Valentia leave to Bugger the Marquis De Zaneta, his own natural Son.
1Some indeed stick at this, because they observe not that the Pope has dispensed in this case. But the credit of their, St. Antoninus will not be questioned, who tells us, that Pope Martin the fifth, dispensed with one who had Marryed his own Sister. Yea, he takes upon him to dispense ⟨p. 374⟩with Sodomy. Sixtus the Fourth, (e)gave License to the whole Family of Cardinal St. Lucy, that they should use Sodomy in the three hotter Months, June, July, and August. And Alexander the Sixth, (f)gave the Cardinal De Valentia leave to Buggar the Marquis De Zaneta, his own natural Son.
1(d) Reperitur tamen Martinus 5. ut Archiepiscopus, (viz. Antoninus) resert dispensasse cum eo, qui cum sua germana contraxerat, & consummaverat, habito consilio cum peritis theologi, & Canonistis. Idem. ibid. & Angelus. v. papa. n. 1.
The most modest opinion at first, blush (which yet ends little better than the worst) that I have observed amongst them, concerning the Popes power, i• reference to the Laws of God, is that of Richard De Sancto Victore, as Angelus reports it, (g)That the Pope can dispense with the divine Precepts, when the reason of them ceaseth; otherwise, says he, God (if he had not so empowered him) would not seem to be a good Master of his Household (not wise, say some; not diligent say others; for this is a common Argument for the Papal prerogative). We must take heed how we question the Popes power herein, for if we do, they may question the Government of God. And herein he is followed by (h)Sylvester a Dominican, and Angelus (i)a Franciscan (though in other things they often clash) who tell us that besides Divines, (k)all the Canonists agree in it, if well understood. And this, the former (l)extends to particular cases, whether in the natural or divine Law, and the latter concludes it, (m)not only as to to the Precepts of the second Table; but as to all the commands, both in the Old and New Testament. All the question is, (n)how one may know when the reason of Gods Law ceaseth in any case? to which he answers, that this we sometimes may learn by the examples of God himself, who many times dispensed with his ⟨p. 375⟩own Law. So that in such cases, it seems, the Pope may do as much as God himself. But this may not prove enough to serve the Popes turn. So he adds, (o)When we have not an example of that, or the like dispensation in Scripture, the declaration of it (that is, when the reason of the Law fails) in any other case, belongs to the Pope alone. Accordingly (p)Sylvester, He may, when there is any doubt, Authoritatively explain whether or no in any certain case the reason of the divine or natural Precept takes place. The Pope, if he were God (as they too often call him) needs not herein, desire more power than this; he may declare that the reason of the divine Law ceases when he pleases, and so he may dispense with it when he list. Thus the Pope might discern the reason of the Law for Marriage to cease, when Olivares had declared Julian Valeasor his Heir, & so gave him leave to Marry another Wife, when he had one already, lawfully Married: (yet his Holiness might be hastier herein than some Doctors would have him, who though they hold the Pope can dispense with one to have two, or more Wives at once;
The most modest opinion at first, blush (which yet ends little better than the worst) that I have observed amongst them, concerning the Popes power, i• reference to the Laws of God, is that of Richard De Sancto Victore, as Angelus reports it, (g)That the Pope can dispense with the divine Precepts, when the reason of them ceaseth; otherwise, says he, God (if he had not so impowered him) would not seem to be a good Master of his Houshold (not wise, say some; not diligent say others; for this is a common Argument for the Papal prerogative). We must take heed how we question the Popes power herein, for if we do, they may question the Government of God. And herein he is followed by (h)Sylvester a Dominican, and Angelus (i)a Franciscan (though in other things they often clash) who tell us that besides Divines, (k)all the Canonists agree in it, if well understood. And this, the former (l)extends to particular cases, whether in the natural or divine Law, and the latter concludes it, (m)not only as to to the Precepts of the second Table; but as to all the commands, both in the Old and New Testament. All the question is, (n)how one may know when the reason of Gods Law ceaseth in any case? to which he answers, that this we sometimes may learn by the examples of God himself, who many times dispensed with his ⟨p. 375⟩own Law. So that in such cases, it seems, the Pope may do as much as God himself. But this may not prove enough to serve the Popes turn. So he adds, (o)When we have not an example of that, or the like dispensation in Scripture, the declaration of it (that is, when the reason of the Law fails) in any other case, belongs to the Pope alone. Accordingly (p)Sylvester, He may, when there is any doubt, Authoritatively explain whether or no in any certain case the reason of the divine or natural Precept takes place. The Pope, if he were God (as they too often call him) needs not herein, desire more power than this; he may declare that the reason of the divine Law ceases when he pleases, and so he may dispense with it when he list. Thus the Pope might discern the reason of the Law for Marriage to cease, when Olivares had declared Julian Valeasor his Heir, & so gave him leave to Marry another Wife, when he had one already, lawfully Marryed: (yet his Holiness might be hastier herein than some Doctors would have him, who though they hold the Pope can dispense with one to have two, or more Wives at once;
(g)Si occurreret casus particularis in quo deficeret ratio legis—tunc papa posset dispensare aliter ut dicit Ricar. non videretur Deus fuisse bonus pater-familias. v. papa. n. 1.
(h)V. papa. n. 16.
(i)Ibid.
(k)Et in praedicta opinione concurrunt omnes Canonistae, si been intelligantur. Idem. ibid.Et in praedicta opinione concurrunt omnes Canonistae, si bene intelligantur. Idem. ibid.
(l)Potest ea interpretari in dubio authoritative, scil. utrum in aliquo determinato casu, habeat locuni ratio divini, aut naturalis statuti, vel non, Sylvest. ibid.
(m)Et quod dico de praeceptis secundae tabulae, idem dic de omnibus praeceptis veteris & novi Testamenti, Angelus. ibid.
(n)Sed quis poter it scire quando ratio legis deficit in aliquo casu? Resp. quod istud aliquando habemus ex exemplo Dei, qui multoties dispensavit in sua lege.
(o)Sed quum talis dispensationis vel similis non habemus exemplum i• scriptu•a, tunc ad solum pnpam pertinet ipsius declaratio. Idem. ibid.
yet think it not so very fit to be done, whole Catholics are so plentiful(*). And he would have seen something more in Harry the Eights case, than he let the world know, if the Emperor Charles the Fifth had not stood in his light. And so in that against Perjury, Clement the Seventh saw the reason of it cease, when he saw it his interest, that Francis the First should break his Oath. And Sixtus the Fourth could well see that the reason of that Law against Sodomy, ceased in the hotter months, and so dispensed with it then, though not in cooler seasons.
yet think it not so very fit to be done, whole Catholicks are so plentiful(*). And he would have seen something more in Harry the Eights case, than he let the world know, if the Emperour Charles the Fifth had not stood in his light. And so in that against Perjury, Clement the Seaventh saw the reason of it cease, when he saw it his interest, that Francis the First should break his Oath. And Sixtus the Fourth could well see that the reason of that Law against Sodomy, ceased in the hotter months, and so dispensed with it then, though not in cooler seasons.
But what if the Pope should mistake in his Declaration about the Law, and the reason of it, and so err in dispensing with it? this must not easily be supposed. I firmly believe says Angelus (q)that if any one seeking a dispensation, in any case against the Law of God, not interposing the importunity of gifts and solicitations; do put himself simply into the Pope's hands, with a Declaration of his case: that God will not ⟨p. 376⟩suffer his Vicar to err, in dispensing. Yet if the worst should come to the worst, and the Pope should err herein, that will make no alteration in the case, before us: for though it may be a fault to dispense, yet the crime he dispenses with, may be no sin to him, who has his holinesses leave to commit it. (r)I judge, says Navarre, that though the dispenser may be in fault, yet he that is dispensed with, is excused; if relying honestly upon the Authority of his Superior, he thinks it was granted upon just cause: till he be convinced, that it was not justly granted. For all this, Bellarmine has the confidence to affirm, that no Catholic ever held, that the Pope could dispense any way, with the Divine commands; and yet what is it less that himself ascribes to the Pope, when he says, by his Indulgences, (s)we are disobliged from the command of bringing forth fruits worthy of Repentance? These fruits are by their own account; all good works. And so in fine, the Pope can make it to be no sin, to live without the worship of God, righteousness towards men, and good works, which respect either.
But what if the Pope should mistake in his Declaration about the Law, and the reason of it, and so err in dispensing with it? this must not easily be supposed. I firmly believe says Angelus (q)that if any one seeking a dispensation, in any case against the Law of God, not interposing the importunity of gifts and solicitations; do put himself simply into the Pope's hands, with a Declaration of his case: that God will not ⟨p. 376⟩suffer his Vicar to err, in dispensing. Yet if the worst should come to the worst, and the Pope should err herein, that will make no alteration in the case, before us: for though it may be a fault to dispense, yet the crime he dispenses with, may be no sin to him, who has his holinesses leave to commit it. (r)I judge, says Navar, that though the dispenser may be in fault, yet he that is dispensed with, is excused; if relying honestly upon the Authority of his Superiour, he thinks it was granted upon just cause: till he be convinced, that it was not justly granted. For all this, Bellarmine has the confidence to affirm, that no Catholick ever held, that the Pope could dispense any way, with the Divine commands; and yet what is it less that himself ascribes to the Pope, when he says, by his Indulgencies, (s)we are disobliged from the command of bringing forth fruits worthy of Repentance? These fruits are by their own account; all good works. And so in fine, the Pope can make it to be no sin, to live without the worship of God, righteousness towards men, and good works, which respect either.
(q)Ibid. n. 2.
(r)Arbitror autem, quod licet dispensator peccet: tamen dispensatus, si bona fide nixus authoritate super joris, putat eam justa de causa esse datam, excusatur donec satis noverit, eam non fuisse sic datam. Ibid. praelud. 9. n. 13. 14.Arbitror autem, quod licet dispensator peccet: tamen dispensatus, si bona fide nixus authoritate super ioris, putat eam justa de causa esse datam, excusatur donec satis noverit, eam non fuisse sic datam. Ibid. praelud. 9. n. 13. 14.
(s)Indulgentiae—faciunt tamen, ut pro ijs paenis, quae nobis per indulgentiam condonantur, non teneamur praecepto illo de faciendis dignis paenitentiae fructibus. De paeni•. l. 4. c. 13. p. 1068.
Sect. 14. But they need not make use of the Pope's Authority for this purpose; there are other expedients nearer hand, will serve, to make any sin lawful. One is probable ignorance, and that, when upon a probable ground, error is conceived to be truth; and that which is sin indeed is taken to be no sin. When upon such a ground one ventures upon a crime, it will not be criminal. Now they give an account of several things, each of which will serve them herein for a probable ground.
First a probable Reason, (t)when there are Arguments pro and con, all probable in his judgment that views them, if he follows that which seems to him most probable; he sins not, though it lead him into sin. ⟨p. 377⟩They lay great weight upon Authority, and think it safe to follow the herd, in a common opinion: yet one good reason (u)they say) is to be preferred, before the common judgment of their Writers; and one may venture against the stream, being backed with it. Nor is there need to be very scrupulous about the probability of a reason; 'tis enough, if it seems but probable, to him that weighs it: yea (x)though it seem but so, out of affection to him that offers it. And that may as well pass for more probable, which is more favourable to the inclination of the Inquirer; and he may be his own Judg in the case, and act against the scruples of his Conscience, when he has probable reason. But when there are more reasons against it, and but one probable for it, must not the more sway us; since that is safer, and that which is safer is to be chosen according to the common Rule? no, we are not obliged, for that rule even in matters of faith and practice, is (y)only a Counsel, not a precept: we are only enjoined to do what is safe, not to what is safer, and a practice upon a probable reason, is (z)safe enough.
First a probable Reason, (t)when there are Arguments pro and con, all probable in his judgment that views them, if he follows that which seems to him most probable; he sins not, though it lead him into sin. ⟨p. 377⟩They lay great weight upon Authority, and think it safe to follow the herd, in a common opinion: yet one good reason (u)they say) is to be preferr'd, before the common judgment of their Writers; and one may venture against the stream, being back'd with it. Nor is there need to be very scrupulous about the probability of a reason; 'tis enough, if it seems but probable, to him that weighs it: yea (x)though it seem but so, out of affection to him that offers it. And that may as well pass for more probable, which is more favourable to the inclination of the Inquirer; and he may be his own Judg in the case, and act against the scruples of his Conscience, when he has probable reason. But when there are more reasons against it, and but one probable for it, must not the more sway us; since that is safer, and that which is safer is to be chosen according to the common Rule? no, we are not obliged, for that rule even in matters of faith and practice, is (y)only a Counsel, not a precept: we are only injoyned to do what is safe, not to what is safer, and a practice upon a probable reason, is (z)safe enough.
(t)Quando homo occurrentibus rationibus in utramque partem suo judicio probabilibus, eligit •os quae sibi videntur probablliores quae tamen revera sunt contra veritatem, cui ipse alias bene aff•ctus •st: tunc isle (licetcontra veritatem erret, & sic laborei ignorantia contraria) nulla culpa errat: sic Doctores Communiter. Sancta Clara. Deus. nat. gr. problem. 15. p. 87.
(u)Navarre. cap. 3. n. 8.Navar. cap. 3. n. 8.
(x)Ignorantia excusat—etiam cum quis in affectione ad suum Doctorem, judicat probabiliter ut sibi videtur, esse verum, quod est falsum. Sylvest. sum. v. opinio. n. 1.
(y)Navarre. c. 27. n. 281.Navar. c. 27. n. 281.
(z)Hoc potest facere (viz. crebro contra scrupulos) tuta conscientia ex consi•io proprio, quando habet probabilem rationem. Sylvest. v. scrupul. n. 3. Regul. 5.
Sect. 15. Secondly, custom is another probable ground, which (with them) will secure a person from sin in doing what is unlawful. It is ordinary with their Casuists to conclude a practice innocent, when there is custom for it; though otherwise they condemn it as a sin. So Navarre (a)determines, that if it were a custom, to observe the Lord's day only till noon, or till Mass were ended in the Morning: it would be no sin, to spend the rest of it in servile works. And that of Cajetan is observable, he takes notice that it is a practice in the Church of Rome, to sing to the Organ profane and filthy Songs, when they are at Church for worship; This the Cardinal reflects upon severely, condemns it as a mortal sin, and a crime of Sacrilegious Superstition: ⟨p. 378⟩yet in the conclusion, thinks something of it (b)excusable, upon the account of custom, and probable ignorance. (c)Those who in dancing use Habit, Gesture, or Songs which are notoriously lascivious; as immodest women who wantonly lay open their Breasts; and men, who expose without due covering, their shameful parts; they sin mortally. So de Graffijs had concluded (as any person that is not past shame would do); but then he presently corrects himself; (d)yet of this, says he, we can pass no certain judgment, but must stand to the custom of the Country. Though so much wantonness seem a mortal sin, yet if it be the custom; he cannot certainly judge it any. In like manner (e)Sylvester determines of a Habit, that will not suffice to hide their shame, if it be a custom, though not laudable, and without ill intention; no general rule, can be formed against it. In (f)positive precepts, where things are evil because prohibited, custom will excuse. And so Fornication which in the judgment of (g)Durandus and some others, is of this nature: needs nothing but custom, to excuse it from being a sin. So much they ascribe to custom, that they will have the Scripture not to direct, and regulate it; but to follow it, and be conformed to it, even in its changes; so that the sense and obligation of the Divine Rule, shall be changed as the Romanists change fashions. This Cardinal ⟨p. 379⟩(b)Cusanus affirms, the Scripture (says he) is fitted to the time, and variably understood; so that at one time, it is expounded according to the currant fashion of the Church: and when that fashion is changed, the sense of Scripture is also changed;
Sect. 15. Secondly, custome is another probable ground, which (with them) will secure a person from sin in doing what is unlawful. It is ordinary with their Casuists to conclude a practice innocent, when there is custome for it; though otherwise they condemn it as a sin. So Navar (a)determines, that if it were a custome, to observe the Lord's day only till noon, or till Mass were ended in the Morning: it would be no sin, to spend the rest of it in servile works. And that of Cajetan is observable, he takes notice that it is a practice in the Church of Rome, to sing to the Organ prophane and filthy Songs, when they are at Church for worship; This the Cardinal reflects upon severely, condemns it as a mortal sin, and a crime of Sacrilegious Superstition: ⟨p. 378⟩yet in the conclusion, thinks something of it (b)excusable, upon the account of custome, and probable ignorance. (c)Those who in dancing use Habit, Gesture, or Songs which are notoriously lascivious; as immodest women who wantonly lay open their Bre•sts; and men, who expose without due covering, their shameful parts; they sin mortally. So de Graffijs had concluded (as any person that is not past shame would do); but then he presently corrects himself; (d)yet of this, says he, we can pass no certain judgment, but must stand to the custom of the Countrey. Though so much wantonness seem a mortal sin, yet if it be the custome; he cannot certainly judge it any. In like manner (e)Sylvester determines of a Habit, that will not suffice to hide their shame, if it be a custome, though not laudable, and without ill intention; no general rule, can be formed against it. In (f)positive precepts, where things are evil because prohibited, custom will excuse. And so Fornication which in the judgment of (g)Durandus and some others, is of this nature: needs nothing but custom, to excuse it from being a sin. So much they ascribe to custom, that they will have the Scripture not to direct, and regulate it; but to follow it, and be conformed to it, even in its changes; so that the sense and obligation of the Divine Rule, shall be changed as the Romanists change fashions. This Cardinal
(a)Cap. 13. n. 5.
(b)Excusandos tamen illos crediderim, qui simplici corde credentes licere non turpia, sed vana, quasi pro recreatione pulsar, pro eo quod ubique sic vident fieri, erraverunt—tales enim ex ignorantia probabili erraverunt. Sum. v. Organ.Excusandos tamen illos crediderim, qui simplici corde credentes licere non turpia, sed vana, quasi pro recreatione pulsare, pro eo quod vbique sic vident fieri, erraverunt—tales enim ex ignorantia probabili erraverunt. Sum. v. Organ.
(c)Qui habitu, gestu, cantu, notabiliter lascivo, in ludo chorearum utitur, sicut faeminae inverecundae pectora lascive nudant, viri parts inverecundas indecenter coopertas ostendunt, peccant mortaliter.Qui habitu, gestu, cantu, notabiliter lascivo, in ludo chorearum utitur, sicut faeminae inverecundae pectora lascive nudant, viri partes inverecundas indecenter coopertas ostendunt, peccant mortaliter.
(d)Verum de hoc pro certo judicare non possumus, sed standum est consuetudini patriae l. 2. cap. 120. n. 16.
(e)Sum. v. Ornar. n. 7.
(f)In his quae ideo sunt mala quia prohibita, ut communiter positiva praecepta, excusat consuetudo praescripta, quia tollit legem, & est legum interpres: Imo hac ratione dico, quod excusat etiamsi non sit praescripta, modo sit rationabilis, & scienter tolerata, &c. Idem. ibid. v. scrupul. n. 4. reg. 5.
(g)Supra.
(b)Scripturasque esse ad tempus adopt atas, & varie intellectas, ita ut uno tempore secundum currentem universalem ritum exponerentur, mutato ritu iterum sententia mutaretur. Epist. 2. ad Bohem. de usu Com. Nec mirum si praxis ecclesiae uno tempore interpretatur scripturam uno modo, & alio tempore alio modo: intellectus enim currit cum praxi. Idem. epist. 7.
and again no wonder if the practice of the Church, do take the Scripture, one time one way, and another time another; for the sense of it keeps pace with the practice. This wa urged in the Council of (k)Trent, and judged to be the meaning of the Lateran-Council; when it decreed that the Scripture should be expounded according to the Doctors of the Church, or as custom has approved. Thus it must come to pass, that what the word of God, in its true meaning, did once condemn as a sin; if it become the Roman practice, the Divine precept will change its sense, and the act will be no sin. It was a sin once by the word of God, to deprive the people of the Cup in the Eucharist: but since it was the custom of Rome, the Scripture has changed its meaning, and it is now no sin. To worship Images, was a crime condemned in Scripture, as that which God most abhorred; but being once the practice of the Romanists, the Scripture renounced its former sense, and it is now far from being criminal. It has not only made a change in the word of God, but in the nature of the thing; and the same thing which was Idolatry, is now no such matter. Of (l)the Law against Idolatry (says Sylvester) nothing must be said, because now by the grace of Christ, it is not in use. It is not in use, because it is their custom: it is not the same thing, that it was to all the world besides, because they use it. And what custom has done in these instances, it may as well do in any other: when all sin is once the practice of that Church (as the worst is already) there will be no sin in it.
and again no wonder if the practice of the Church, do take the Scripture, one time one way, and another time another; for the sense of it keeps pace with the practice. This wa urged in the Council of (k)Trent, and judged to be the meaning of the Lateran-Council; when it decreed that the Scripture should be expounded according to the Doctors of the Church, or as custome has approved. Thus it must come to pass, that what the word of God, in its true meaning, did once condemn as a sin; if it become the Roman practice, the Divine precept will change its sense, and the act will be no sin. It was a sin once by the word of God, to deprive the people of the Cup in the Eucharist: but since it was the custome of Rome, the Scripture has changed its meaning, and it is now no sin. To worship Images, was a crime condemned in Scripture, as that which God most abhorred; but being once the practice of the Romanists, the Scripture renounced its former sense, and it is now far from being criminal. It has not only made a change in the word of God, but in the nature of the thing; and the same thing which was Idolatry, is now no such matter. Of (l)the Law against Idolatry (says Sylvester) nothing must be said, because now by the grace of Christ, it is not in use. It is not in use, because it is their custome: it is not the same thing, that it was to all the world besides, because they use it. And what custome has done in these instances, it may as well do in any other: when all sin is once the practice of that Church (as the worst is already) there will be no sin in it.
(k)History of Council of Trent. l. 2 •. 159.
(l)Quaeritur quid juris de idololatria? Et dico supersedendum esse hic: quia jam per gratiam Christi, non est in usu v. Superstitio. n, 3.
Sect. 16. Thirdly, another probable ground is a considerable Authority, or the opinion of one whom we may trust; hence this is their Doctrine, that he who does what is sinful following the judgment of an able Doctor, is excused from sin. This principle is without ground appropriated to the Jesuits, with the pernicious consequences of it: it was currant in the Church of Rome, before the Fathers of that Society where infants. Panormitan thus determines (m)he that follows the opinion of any Doctor, not curiously examined, which afterward appears false, is excused from sin; so long as it appears not to be false. In Sylvester, this is confirmed, and he directs to several proofs, out of their Law, for it; (n)removes what, by mistake, is alleged out of Aquinas against it; and shows, that both their great Saint, and their great Abbot agree with others, that this is safe, in points, which concern either faith or manners, when they are not evident (not clearly and manifestly determined). To him, (o)one Doctor may be sufficient. In morals we must be satisfied with probabilities, and according to the rule amongst them, (*)a man may probably follow one Doctor. And by a multitude of Authors we are not to judge, what is better, or more equal; the opinion of one, and he worse than the rest, may be preferred before many in some particular. So (p)he and Angelus (q)before him, after others. They conclude (r)in reference to Joachim, who was not accounted ⟨p. 381⟩a Heretic (though his opinions were against the faith) because not condemned by the Church: that he is much more to be excused, who follows the opinion of a Doctor, not rejected by the Church, and if he thought it not true would not adhere to it. (s)Certainly (says Angelus) in him, there can be no contempt, and so no sin of disobedience. 'Tis true, that which is maintained by more and better Authors, seems more probable; but they will not have us always bound to follow that which is more probable: for though this be more secure, yet the rule, that what (t)is safest is to be followed holds not (they tell us) but in points, that are properly dubious; and where there is opinion, we are not properly in doubt. Thus Navarre also explains it, (u)having told us, (x)that it is not always necessary to choose what is safer, because it is enough for the fulfilling of the precept, to choose that which is safe, even in those things which concern faith and manners:
Sect. 16. Thirdly, another probable ground is a considerable Authority, or the opinion of one whom we may trust; hence this is their Doctrine, that he who does what is sinful following the judgment of an able Doctor, is excused from sin. This principle is without ground appropriated to the Jesuits, with the pernicious consequences of it: it was currant in the Church of Rome, before the Fathers of that Society where infants. Panormitan thus determines (m)he that follows the opinion of any Doctor, not curiously examined, which afterward appears false, is excused from sin; so long as it appears not to be false. In Sylvester, this is confirmed, and he directs to several proofs, out of their Law, for it; (n)removes what, by mistake, is alledged out of Aquinas against it; and shews, that both their great Saint, and their great Abbot agree with others, that this is safe, in points, which concern either faith or manners, when they are not evident (not clearly and manifestly determined). To him, (o)one Doctor may be sufficient. In morals we must be satisfied with probabilities, and according to the rule amongst them, (*)a man may probably follow one Doctor. And by a multitude of Authors we are not to judge, what is better, or more equal; the opinion of one, and he worse than the rest, may be preferr'd before many in some particular. So (p)he and Angelus (q)before him, after others. They conclude (r)in reference to Joachim, who was not accounted ⟨p. 381⟩a Heretick (though his opinions were against the faith) because not condemned by the Church: that he is much more to be excused, who follows the opinion of a Doctor, not rejected by the Church, and if he thought it not true would not adhere to it. (s)Certainly (sayes Angelus) in him, there can be no contempt, and so no sin of disobedience. 'Tis true, that which is maintained by more and better Authors, seems more probable; but they will not have us alwayes bound to follow that which is more probable: for though this be more secure, yet the rule, that what
(m)Panormitan. in C. Capillan. de feri. dicit quod sequens opinionem alicujus Doctoris non subtiliter investigatam, quae postmodum apparet f•lsa, excusatur a peccato quamdtu non apparuerit falsa. Sylv. v. opinio. n. 1. & Angel. Sum. v. opin. n. 2. Ubi Glossa cum textu. Innocentius. Gofredus, & alij.
(n)Ibid. secundum Antoninum.
(o)Opinio probabilis erit, si illam affirment boni nominis Doctores, imo & si unus Doc•t. Angelus. Sylvester. Navarre, &c. Jo. Sancius. disp. 44. n. 61. Bonacina. Tom. 2. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 9. n. 1. & alij ibid. For this 24 Doctors are produced by Verricelli. Q. moral. Tom. 1. tr. 2. q. 5.Opinio probabilis erit, si illam affirment boni nominis Doctores, imo & si unus Doc•t. Angelus. Sylvester. Navar, &c. Jo. Sancius. disp. 44. n. 61. Bonacina. Tom. 2. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 9. n. 1. & alij ibid. For this 24 Doctors are produced by Verricelli. Q. moral. Tom. 1. tr. 2. q. 5.
(*)Probabiliter quis sequitur opinionem sui Doctoris: sed neque ex multitudine authorum quid melius & aequius est, judicato; cum possit unius, & forte deterioris sententia muitos in aliqua part superare.Probabiliter quis sequitur opinionem sui Doctoris: sed neque ex multitudine authorum quid melius & aequius est, judicato; cum possit unius, & forte deterioris sententia muitos in aliqua parte superare.
(p)Ibid. n. 2.
(q)Ibid. n. 1.
(r)Multo mogis excusatur sequens opinionem Doctoris non reprobatam, cum voluntate non adhaerendi, si vera non apparet, uterque ibid.
(s)Certe in isto non potest esse contem•tus, & sic nec peccatum inobedientiae. Ibid.
(t)Nec obstat, quod in dubijs tutior pars est eligenda—ut videtur se exponere periculo, qui in diversitate opinionum non eligit tutiorem: quoniam hoc verum esset quum proprie dubium est, sed quum est opinio secus est, quia nec tunc sumus in dubio: nec consequenter exponit sè quis periculo. Angelus. ibid. n. 2. & Sylvest. n. 1.
for in other things, it is not so much as under Counsel, to follow the safest. Accordingly Metina (in (y)Lopez) says, the opinion of expert Divines, may be held without sin, although the contrary be more clear, and more safe. In short, that an opinion which is less probable, may be followed; is asserted (we are told) both by the greater part, and the graver sort of their Divines. ⟨p. 382⟩(z)above Forty of their grave Doctors are alleged for it, and amongst them, Martin Navarre, Medina, Peter Navarre, Aragon, Bannes, Du Vallius, with others, besides Jesuits. A• present take only the words of Navarre, who speaks fully. (a)In the Court of Conscience (says he) it is enough for the avoiding of sin, to take his opinion for true, whom we probably think, to be a man of sufficient knowledge, and Conscience; and quotes their Gloss and Panormitan for it. To whom let me add Sancta Clara, who, not only tells us (as we have heard before (b)that at this day it seems to be the common opinion of their Schools and Doctors; that the people erring with their Teacher, or Pastor, are wholly excused from all fault: but also, when any has a probable ground for what he does: (c)as when a Country-man believes any thing to be lawful, induced thereto, by the testimony of the Parish-Priest, or of his Parents: although he mistake, yet his mistake is void of sin; according to the rule in Law, just and probable ignorance ought to be excused. So that to make a sin to be no sin, not only the judgment of a grave Doctor so determining, but of a Parish-Priest (who are known to be sufficiently ignorant); yea of Parents also (more ignorant than they) will suffice, and herein (says he) the Doctors generally ⟨p. 383⟩concur. In fine, if it be the common opinion, that invincible (as Divines) or probable ignorance (as the Canonists call it), is excused from all sin: and that it is an instance hereof, (d)when one is mislead by a sufficient Author; then this is the common Doctrine of the Romanists, and not the extravagancy of some particular Sect, or Order amongst them.
for in other things, it is not so much as under Counsel, to follow the safest. Accordingly Metina (in (y)Lopez) sayes, the opinion of expert Divines, may be held without sin, although the contrary be more clear, and more safe. In short, that an opinion which is less probable, may be followed; is asserted (we are told) both by the greater part, and the graver sort of their Divines. ⟨p. 382⟩(z)above Forty of their grave Doctors are alledged for it, and amongst them, Martin Navar, Medina, Peter Navar, Arragon, Bannes, Du Vallius, with others, besides Jesuits. A• present take only the words of Navar, who speaks fully. (a)In the Court of Conscience (says he) it is enough for the avoiding of sin, to take his opinion for true, whom we probably think, to be a man of sufficient knowledg, and Conscience; and quotes their Glosse and Panormitan for it. To whom let me add Sancta Clara, who, not only tells us (as we have heard before (b)that at this day it seems to be the common opinion of their Schools and Doctors; that the people erring with their Teacher, or Pastor, are wholly excused from all fault: but also, when any has a probable ground for what he does: (c)as when a Countrey-man believes any thing to be lawful, induced thereto, by the testimony of the Parish-Priest, or of his Parents: although he mistake, yet his mistake is void of sin; according to the rule in Law, just and probable ignorance ought to be excused. So that to make a sin to be no sin, not only the judgment of a grave Doctor so determining, but of a Parish-Priest (who are known to be sufficiently ignorant); yea of Parents also (more ignorant than they) will suffice, and herein (says he) the Doctors generally ⟨p. 383⟩concur. In fine, if it be the common opinion, that invincible (as Divines) or probable ignorance (as the Canonists call it), is excused from all sin: and that it is an instance hereof, (d)when one is mislead by a sufficient Authour; then this is the common Doctrine of the Romanists, and not the extravagancy of some particular Sect, or Order amongst them.
(y)Dicit opinionem posse teneri sine peccato, quae est peritorum virorum, licet contrarium si• planius & securius. cap. 52. p. 271.
(z)Licitum esse sectari opinionem minus probabilem, relicta probabiliori, docent Mercado, Medina, Sairus, (naming 20 besides, and adding, & alij plures) Jo. Sauc. disp 42. n. 12. Possumus ubsque peccato sequi opinionem probabilem, relicta probabiliore, & tutiare. Bonacin. Tom. 2. disp. 2. q. 4. punc. 9. n. 4. Clavis Regia, & alij communiter. ibid. n. 5. For this Barnabas Gallego a Dominican produces near Fifty of their Doctors, many of them of the same order, and says it is sententia communior inter Thomistas. tract. de conscient. dubi. de consc. probabili. So that if we may trust those whom who we see no reason to think partial to the Society, this is not a singular conceit of the Jesuits; but the opinion of their other Divines generally, and the more common Doctine of Aquinas his Disciples, otherwise most opposite to the Society.
(a)In foro tamen conscientiae ad effectum non peccandi sufficit eligere pro vera ejus opinionem, quem merito censemus esse virum idonea & scientia & conscientia praeditum. cap. 27. n. 288.
(b)Deus. nat. gr. probl. 15. p. 99. supra.
(c)Probabilis est quando quis habet fundamentum probabile; ut dum rusticus credit aliquid esse licitum, ductus testimonio sui parochi vel parentun:—tunc iste (licet contra veritatem erret) nulla culpa errat: sic Doctores communiter, secundum illud: ignorantia justa & probabilis excusare debet. ibid. p. 78.
(d)Durandus—.cum excuset probabilis ignorantia, puta, si habet aliquem Doctorem authenticum & famosum, cujus opinioni n•titur in Sylvest. v. confess. n. 2. Vervec. dubitans & consulens viros Doctos falso consul•n•s, laborat ignorantia invincibili. ibid. v. Ignor. n. 5. Justa ignorantia—qualis est, cum quis petit consilium a viris habitis pro praeditis scientia & conscientia in id sufficienti, qui falso ei consulunt, & haec omnino excuset. Navarre. c. 23. n. 46. Graft. l. 2. c. 131. n. 2•. & l. 4. c. 9. n. 8. Sancta Clara. ibid. p. 96. Herrera & Faber. ibi. •onacina. de peccat. d. 2. q. 8. p. 2 n. 9. & 16.
Cusanus affirms, the Scripture (says he) is fitted to the time, and variably understood; so that at one time, it is expounded according to the currant fashion of the Church: and when that fashion is changed, the sense of Scripture is also changed;
is safest is to be followed holds not (they tell us) but in points, that are properly dubious; and where there is opinion, we are not properly in doubt. Thus Navar also explains it,
that it is not always necessary to choose what is safer, because it is enough for the fulfilling of the precept, to choose that which is safe, even in those things which concern faith and manners:
(u)Rectus intellectus illius vulgati tutior pars est eligenda in dubio, nempe in eo quod est proprie dubium, quale non est, cum suffi•ienti authoritate, aut ratione altera pars creditur, neque cum ex multis opinionibus una pro vera eligitur. cap. 27. n. •84.
(x)Non semper esse necessarium, partem tutiorem eligere, quia satis est quoad praecep•i implementam tutam eligere, ut late probavimus, etiam in his quae ad fidem & mores pertinent: in alijs enim, nec de consilio quis tenetur eligere tutiorem. n. 281. Vid. Autoninum. Angel. Sylvest. Navarre. Gutier in Jo. Sanc. disp. 42. n. 12.Non semper esse necessarium, partem tutiorem eligere, quia satis est quoad praecep•i implementam tutam eligere, ut late probavimus, etiam in his quae ad fidem & mores pertinent: in alijs enim, nec de consilio quis tenetur eligere tutiorem. n. 281. Vid. Autoninum. Angel. Sylvest. Navar. Gutier in Jo. Sanc. disp. 42. n. 12.
Durandus—.cum excuset probabilis ignorantia, puta, si habet aliquem Doctorem authenticum & famosum, cujus opinioni n•titur in Sylvest. v. confess. n. 2. Vervec. dubitans & consulens viros Doctos falso consul•n•s, laborat ignorantia invincibili. ibid. v. Ignor. n. 5. Justa ignorantia—qualis est, cum quis petit consilium a viris habitis pro praeditis scientia & conscientia in id sufficienti, qui falso ei consulunt, & haec omnino excuset. Navar. c. 23. n. 46. Graff. l. 2. c. 131. n. 2•. & l. 4. c. 9. n. 8. Sancta Clara. ibid. p. 96. Herrera & Faber. ibi. •onacina. de peccat. d. 2. q. 8. p. 2 n. 9. & 16.
