Sect. 16. Thirdly, another probable ground is a considerable Authority, or the opinion of one whom we may trust; hence this is their Doctrine, that he who does what is sinful following the judgment of an able Doctor, is excused from sin. This principle is without ground appropriated to the Jesuits, with the pernicious consequences of it: it was currant in the Church of Rome, before the Fathers of that Society where infants. Panormitan thus determines (m)he that follows the opinion of any Doctor, not curiously examined, which afterward appears false, is excused from sin; so long as it appears not to be false. In Sylvester, this is confirmed, and he directs to several proofs, out of their Law, for it; (n)removes what, by mistake, is alleged out of Aquinas against it; and shows, that both their great Saint, and their great Abbot agree with others, that this is safe, in points, which concern either faith or manners, when they are not evident (not clearly and manifestly determined). To him, (o)one Doctor may be sufficient. In morals we must be satisfied with probabilities, and according to the rule amongst them, (*)a man may probably follow one Doctor. And by a multitude of Authors we are not to judge, what is better, or more equal; the opinion of one, and he worse than the rest, may be preferred before many in some particular. So (p)he and Angelus (q)before him, after others. They conclude (r)in reference to Joachim, who was not accounted ⟨p. 381⟩a Heretic (though his opinions were against the faith) because not condemned by the Church: that he is much more to be excused, who follows the opinion of a Doctor, not rejected by the Church, and if he thought it not true would not adhere to it. (s)Certainly (says Angelus) in him, there can be no contempt, and so no sin of disobedience. 'Tis true, that which is maintained by more and better Authors, seems more probable; but they will not have us always bound to follow that which is more probable: for though this be more secure, yet the rule, that what (t)is safest is to be followed holds not (they tell us) but in points, that are properly dubious; and where there is opinion, we are not properly in doubt. Thus Navarre also explains it, (u)having told us, (x)that it is not always necessary to choose what is safer, because it is enough for the fulfilling of the precept, to choose that which is safe, even in those things which concern faith and manners:
Sect. 16. Thirdly, another probable ground is a considerable Authority, or the opinion of one whom we may trust; hence this is their Doctrine, that he who does what is sinful following the judgment of an able Doctor, is excused from sin. This principle is without ground appropriated to the Jesuits, with the pernicious consequences of it: it was currant in the Church of Rome, before the Fathers of that Society where infants. Panormitan thus determines (m)he that follows the opinion of any Doctor, not curiously examined, which afterward appears false, is excused from sin; so long as it appears not to be false. In Sylvester, this is confirmed, and he directs to several proofs, out of their Law, for it; (n)removes what, by mistake, is alledged out of Aquinas against it; and shews, that both their great Saint, and their great Abbot agree with others, that this is safe, in points, which concern either faith or manners, when they are not evident (not clearly and manifestly determined). To him, (o)one Doctor may be sufficient. In morals we must be satisfied with probabilities, and according to the rule amongst them, (*)a man may probably follow one Doctor. And by a multitude of Authors we are not to judge, what is better, or more equal; the opinion of one, and he worse than the rest, may be preferr'd before many in some particular. So (p)he and Angelus (q)before him, after others. They conclude (r)in reference to Joachim, who was not accounted ⟨p. 381⟩a Heretick (though his opinions were against the faith) because not condemned by the Church: that he is much more to be excused, who follows the opinion of a Doctor, not rejected by the Church, and if he thought it not true would not adhere to it. (s)Certainly (sayes Angelus) in him, there can be no contempt, and so no sin of disobedience. 'Tis true, that which is maintained by more and better Authors, seems more probable; but they will not have us alwayes bound to follow that which is more probable: for though this be more secure, yet the rule, that what
- (m)Panormitan. in C. Capillan. de feri. dicit quod sequens opinionem alicujus Doctoris non subtiliter investigatam, quae postmodum apparet f•lsa, excusatur a peccato quamdtu non apparuerit falsa. Sylv. v. opinio. n. 1. & Angel. Sum. v. opin. n. 2. Ubi Glossa cum textu. Innocentius. Gofredus, & alij.
- (n)Ibid. secundum Antoninum.
- (o)Opinio probabilis erit, si illam affirment boni nominis Doctores, imo & si unus Doc•t. Angelus. Sylvester. Navarre, &c. Jo. Sancius. disp. 44. n. 61. Bonacina. Tom. 2. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 9. n. 1. & alij ibid. For this 24 Doctors are produced by Verricelli. Q. moral. Tom. 1. tr. 2. q. 5.Opinio probabilis erit, si illam affirment boni nominis Doctores, imo & si unus Doc•t. Angelus. Sylvester. Navar, &c. Jo. Sancius. disp. 44. n. 61. Bonacina. Tom. 2. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 9. n. 1. & alij ibid. For this 24 Doctors are produced by Verricelli. Q. moral. Tom. 1. tr. 2. q. 5.
- (*)Probabiliter quis sequitur opinionem sui Doctoris: sed neque ex multitudine authorum quid melius & aequius est, judicato; cum possit unius, & forte deterioris sententia muitos in aliqua part superare.Probabiliter quis sequitur opinionem sui Doctoris: sed neque ex multitudine authorum quid melius & aequius est, judicato; cum possit unius, & forte deterioris sententia muitos in aliqua parte superare.
- (p)Ibid. n. 2.
- (q)Ibid. n. 1.
- (r)Multo mogis excusatur sequens opinionem Doctoris non reprobatam, cum voluntate non adhaerendi, si vera non apparet, uterque ibid.
- (s)Certe in isto non potest esse contem•tus, & sic nec peccatum inobedientiae. Ibid.
- (t)Nec obstat, quod in dubijs tutior pars est eligenda—ut videtur se exponere periculo, qui in diversitate opinionum non eligit tutiorem: quoniam hoc verum esset quum proprie dubium est, sed quum est opinio secus est, quia nec tunc sumus in dubio: nec consequenter exponit sè quis periculo. Angelus. ibid. n. 2. & Sylvest. n. 1.
