As to that Objection, One Grace cannot be seated in two distinct faculties; I intend not to trouble my self about it, since it must first be proved, that these faculties are so really distinct, which Scaliger*, Durandus, with many others, deny: Hence blessed Pemble, being of the same opinion, against the distinction of these faculties (as was Mr. Jackson) saith, We do not appropriate Faith either to the understanding or the will, nor yet refer it to both as unto two distinct faculties; but we place it immediately in the whole intellectual nature, whether of mans Soul, or of Angels. If these faculties be found and proved by Philosophy to be ⟨p. 175⟩distinct, whence is the impossibility of one grace being in two faculties proved? Not from Scripture I am sure, for that gives faith to the whole Soul. And why must it be thought absurd in Philosophy to say, the same thing may in divers respects be referred to divers subjects, as these subjects are not altogether separated, but conjoined among themselves? What saith Bonaventure, quoted by Vasquez, of consent? Bonavent. existimat consensum esse, concordiam quandam actus intellectus judicantis, & voluntatis praeoptantis, & adutramque facultatem intellectus & voluntatis pertinere. If consent may belong to two faculties, why may not faith as well? 2Vasquez concludes well of consent: Consensus denotare videtur, concursum voluntatis cum intellectu, ad sentiendum idem, quod intellectus sentit. Nor doth Aquinas deny, but that one virtue may be in two faculties, or powers, accordingly he tells us how it may be*. B. Austin saith of Liberum arbi•ium, that it is, Facultas voluntatis & rationis: So it belongs to both faculties. *Aquinas answers, that Austin saith so because, Ad Actum liberiarbitrii homo ordinatur per utramque potentiam, licet non immediate: Agreeable to what others say, Libertatis ex•r•itium & usus est radicaliter, vel directive in intellectu, formaliter in voluntate. But however this Objection hath nothing in it, of divine strength, to weaken what we have affirmed.
As to that Objection, One Grace cannot be seated in two distinct faculties; I intend not to trouble my self about it, since it must first be proved, that these faculties are so really distinct, which Scaliger*, Durandus, with many others, deny: Hence blessed Pemble, being of the same opinion, against the distinction of these faculties (as was Mr. Jackson) saith, We do not appropriate Faith either to the understanding or the will, nor yet refer it to both as unto two distinct faculties; but we place it immediately in the whole intellectual nature, whether of mans Soul, or of Angels. If these faculties be found and proved by Philosophy to be ⟨p. 175⟩distinct, whence is the impossibility of one grace being in two faculties proved? Not from Scripture I am sure, for that gives faith to the whole Soul. And why must it be thought absurd in Philosophy to say, the same thing may in divers respects be referred to divers subjects, as these subjects are not altogether separated, but conjoyned among themselves? What saith Bonaventure, quoted by Vasquez, of consent? Bonavent. existimat consensum esse, concordiam quandam actus intellectus judicantis, & voluntatis praeoptantis, & adutramque facultatem intellectus & voluntatis pertinere. If consent may belong to two faculties, why may not faith as well? 2Vasquez concludes well of consent: Consensus denotare videtur, concursum voluntatis cum intellectu, ad sentiendum idem, quod intellectus sentit. Nor doth Aquinas deny, but that one vertue may be in two faculties, or powers, accordingly he tells us how it may be*. B. Austin saith of Liberum arbi•ium, that it is, Facultas voluntatis & rationis: So it belongs to both faculties. *Aquinas answers, that Austin saith so because, Ad Actum liberiarbitrii homo ordinatur per utramque potentiam, licet non immediate: Agreeable to what others say, Libertatis ex•r•itium & usus est radicaliter, vel directive in intellectu, formaliter in voluntate. But however this Objection hath nothing in it, of divine strength, to weaken what we have affirmed.
- *Exerc. 307. sect. 3, 4, 15. Vind. Gra p. 201. 205.
- 212. q. 15. a. 1.
- *12. q. 56. a. 1. Quaest. Disput. pag. 314.
- *12. q. 56. a. 1. Quaest. Disput. pag. 314.
