A41331:541
The real Christian, or, A treatise of effectual calling wherein the work of God…
The real Christian, or, A treatise of effectual calling wherein the work of God is drawing the soul to Christ ... : to which is added, in the epistle to the reader, a few words concerning Socinianism ... / by Giles Firmin ...The real Christian, or, A treatise of effectual calling wherein the work of God is drawing the soul to Christ ... : to which is added, in the epistle to the reader, a few words concerning Socinianisme ... / by Giles Firmin ...
London: printed for Dorman Newman, 1670
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Sixthly, God offers Christ, a Person with Redemption: Do we receive a thing offered with our understandings or wills? With the will sure.
As to that Objection, One Grace cannot be seated in two distinct faculties; I intend not to trouble my self about it, since it must first be proved, that these faculties are so really distinct, which Scaliger*, Durandus, with many others, deny: Hence blessed Pemble, being of the same opinion, against the distinction of these faculties (as was Mr. Jackson) saith, We do not appropriate Faith either to the understanding or the will, nor yet refer it to both as unto two distinct faculties; but we place it immediately in the whole intellectual nature, whether of mans Soul, or of Angels. If these faculties be found and proved by Philosophy to be ⟨p. 175⟩distinct, whence is the impossibility of one grace being in two faculties proved? Not from Scripture I am sure, for that gives faith to the whole Soul. And why must it be thought absurd in Philosophy to say, the same thing may in divers respects be referred to divers subjects, as these subjects are not altogether separated, but conjoined among themselves? What saith Bonaventure, quoted by Vasquez, of consent? Bonavent. existimat consensum esse, concordiam quandam actus intellectus judicantis, & voluntatis praeoptantis, & adutramque facultatem intellectus & voluntatis pertinere. If consent may belong to two faculties, why may not faith as well? 2Vasquez concludes well of consent: Consensus denotare videtur, concursum voluntatis cum intellectu, ad sentiendum idem, quod intellectus sentit. Nor doth Aquinas deny, but that one virtue may be in two faculties, or powers, accordingly he tells us how it may be*. B. Austin saith of Liberum arbi•ium, that it is, Facultas voluntatis & rationis: So it belongs to both faculties.