An assertion of the government of the Church of Scotland in the points of…

That two Courts of judgement are appointed in one sentence. 3. That a Judge (the Priest) may give out a sentence which he cannot execute. 4. That the civill Judges do in vain inquire concerning the fact which was before certain by the Law, nam ex facto jus oritur. 5. That the civill ⟨p. 171⟩Judges are dumb Images, which must pronounce according to the sentence of others. To the 1. we say that our distinction doth not import that the Judges were ignorant of the Law, but that it pertained not to them to judge the meaning of the Law, when the same was controverted among the Inferior civill Judges: this pertained to the Court of the Priests. 2. It is no absurdity to expound a disjunctive sentence of two several Courts. 3. He who answereth meerely, de jure, hath nothing to do with execution of persons more then theory hath to do with practice, or abstracts with concretes. 4. The fact can never be certain by the sentence, de jure. It is not the probation, but the supposition of the fact whereupon the exposition of the sense of the Law is grounded. 5. The cognition of the fact, not of the law, doth belong to an Inquest in Scotland, they are Judic•s fact•, non Juris. Yet no dumb Im••es I suppose. 6. He hath followed the Popish Interpreters, in making the Judge to be the High Priest for so they expound it for the Popes cause; yet they themselves acknowledge the distinction of Jus and factum. See Corn. a lapide. in Deut. 17.7. If error had not blinded this mans eyes with whom I deal, I should believe he had been ⟨p. 172⟩slumbering when these things fell from his pen.

That two Courts of judgement are appointed in one sentence. 3. That a Judge (the Priest) may give out a sentence which he cannot execute. 4. That the civill Judges doe in vaine inquire concerning the fact which was before certaine by the Law, nam ex facto jus oritur. 5. That the civill ⟨p. 171⟩Judges are dumbe Images, which must pronounce according to the sentence of others. To the 1. we say that our distinction doth not import that the Judges were ignorant of the Law, but that it pertained not to them to judge the meaning of the Law, when the same was controverted among the Infeferiour civill Judges: this pertained to the Court of the Priests. 2. It is no absurdity to expound a disjunctive sentence of two severall Courts. 3. He who answereth meerely, de jure, hath nothing to doe with execution of persons more then theory hath to doe with practice, or abstracts with concrets. 4. The fact can never be certaine by the sentence, de jure. It is not the probation, but the supposition of the fact whereupon the exposition of the sence of the Law is grounded. 5. The cognition of the fact, not of the law, doh belong to an Inquest in Scotland, they are Iudics fact, non Iuris. Yet no dumbe Imes I suppose. 6. Hee hath followed the Popish Interpreters, in making the Judge to be the High Priest forso they expound it for the Popes cause; yet they themselves acknowledge the distinction of Ius and factum. See Corn. a lapide. in