A treatise of miscellany questions wherein many useful questions and cases of conscience are…A treatise of miscellany questions wherein many usefull questions and cases of conscience are…

4. That Socinian principle, doth now pass for• good among divers Sectaries, that a man is bound to believe no more then by his reason he can comprehend. Mr. I: Goodwin, in his 38. Queries concerning the Ordinance, for the preventing of the growing and spreading of Heresies, quaest: 29. tells us, that if reason ought not to regulate, or limit men about the object, or matter of their believing, then are they bound to believe these things, concerning which there is no ground or reason at all, why they should be believed.

4. That Socinian principle, doth now passe for• good among divers Sectaries, that a man is bound to believe no more then by his reason hee can comprehend. Mr. I: Goodwin, in his 38. Quaerees concerning the Ordinance, for the preventing of the growing and spreading of Heresies, quaest: 29. tells us, that if reason ought not to regulat, or limit men about the object, or matter of their believing, then are they bound to believe these things, concerning which there is no ground or reason at all, why they should be believed.

As if this (being understood of humane or natural reason) were an absurdity▪ Divine Revelation in Scripture, or thus saith the Lord, is the ground or reason of believing, or as School men speak, the Objectum formale fidei. But we are bound to believe, because of thus saith the Lord, some things which we are not able to comprehend by our reason; for instance, The Trinity of persons in the God▪ head, the incarnation of the Son of God, his conception of a Virgin, the union of two natures, of God and man in one person. It is therefore a question tending of it self to the subversion of the Christian faith, and so of piety, which that Querist there propoundeth, viz. Whether ought any man (at least in sensu comsito) to believe the deepest or highest mystery in Religion, any further or any otherwise, then as, and as far as, he hath reason to judge it to be a truth? The same writer in his Hagiomastix, sect. 90. tells us, that this is sound Divinity, that reason ought to be every mans leader, guide and director in his faith, or about what he is, or ought to believe: and that no ma ought to leap wit