A treatise of miscellany questions wherein many useful questions and cases of conscience are…A treatise of miscellany questions wherein many usefull questions and cases of conscience are…

As if this (being understood of humane or natural reason) were an absurdity▪ Divine Revelation in Scripture, or thus saith the Lord, is the ground or reason of believing, or as School men speak, the Objectum formale fidei. But we are bound to believe, because of thus saith the Lord, some things which we are not able to comprehend by our reason; for instance, The Trinity of persons in the God▪ head, the incarnation of the Son of God, his conception of a Virgin, the union of two natures, of God and man in one person. It is therefore a question tending of it self to the subversion of the Christian faith, and so of piety, which that Querist there propoundeth, viz. Whether ought any man (at least in sensu comsito) to believe the deepest or highest mystery in Religion, any further or any otherwise, then as, and as far as, he hath reason to judge it to be a truth? The same writer in his Hagiomastix, sect. 90. tells us, that this is sound Divinity, that reason ought to be every mans leader, guide and director in his faith, or about what he is, or ought to believe: and that no ma• ought to leap wit• ⟨p. 165⟩his faith, till he hath looked with his reason, and discovered what is meet to be believed, what not. If this be good Divinity, then Pauls Divinity is not good, Rom. 8. 7. 1 Cor: 2. 14. 2 Cor▪ 10. 5.

As if this (being understood of humane or naturall reason) were an absurdity▪ Divine Revelation in Scripture, or thus saith the Lord, is the ground or reason of believing, or as School men speak, the Objectum formale fidei. But wee are bound to believe, because of thus saith the Lord, some things which we are not able to comprehend by our reason; for instance, The Trinity of persons in the God▪ head, the incarnation of the Sonne of God, his conception of a Virgin, the union of two natures, of God and man in one person. It is therefore a question tending of it self to the subversion of the Christian faith, and so of piety, which that Quaerist there propoundeth, viz. Whether ought any man (at least in sensu comsito) to beleeve the deepest or highest mysterie in Religion, any further or any otherwise, then as, and as farre as, hee hath reason to judge it to be a truth? The same writer in his Hagiomastix, sect. 90. tells us, that this is sound Divinitie, that reason ought to be every mans leader, guide and director in his faith, or about what he is, or ought to beleeve: and that no ma ought to leap wit