A calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead…

To the former of these, I only say, further than the asserting, in very deed, but one Hypostasis in the Godhead, distinguished no otherwise into three, than by certain relative capacities, like those which may among men be sustained by one and the same man; and which distinction, as you after add, is analogous to what, in created beings, is called distinctio modalis.

To the former of these, I only say, further than the asserting, in very deed, but one Hypostasis in the Godhead, distinguished no otherwise into three, than by certain relative capacities, like those which may among men be sustain'd by one and the same man; and which distinction, as you after add, is analogous to what, in created beings, is called distinctio modalis.

To the latter, I desire you to observe what I generally propose, not that we may positively assert any further determinate distinction as certain and known; but only whether we may not admit some further distinction to be possible, in consistency with the Unity of the Godhead. I do equally detest and dread to speak with rash and peremptory confidence about things both so ⟨p. 109⟩Mysterious and so Sacred. But may we not modestly say, that if to that Economy which God hath represented himself in his Word, to bear, and keep afoot, towards his Creatures, any further distinction than hath been assigned is necessary, it is also possible, and may be, for ought we know (if indeed we know nothing to the contrary.) What is impossible we are sure cannot be necessary. But God himself best, and only knows his own nature, and what his own meaning is in the representation he hath made to us. If we sincerely aim to understand his meaning, that we may bear our selves towards him accordingly, he will with merciful indulgence consider our short or mis-apprehensions. But we need not say there is not this or that distinction, if really we do not know there is not. While we know so little of natures inferior to our own, and even of our own nature, and how things are distinguished that belong to our ⟨p. 110⟩