A44670:163
A calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead…
A calm and sober enquiry concerning the possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead in a letter to a person of worth : occasioned by the lately published considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the Trinity by Dr. Wallis, Dr. Sherlock, Dr. S--th, Dr. Cudworth, &c. ...
London: printed by J. Astwood for Tho. Parkhurst, 1694
Postscript › LETTERS TO Dr. WALLIS, Sent in 1691. › Letter 1: LETTER I.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
For the Schools themselves suppose themselves not to admit a composition prejudicial to the Perfection of the Godhead, when they admit three modes of subsistence, which are distinct from one another, and from the Godhead, which they must admit. For if each of them were the very Godhead, each of them (as is urged against us by you know who) must have three Persons belonging to it, as the Godhead hath. And ⟨p. 121⟩your self acknowledge three somewhats in the Godhead distinct, or else they could not be three: I will not here urge that if they be three somewhats, they must be three things, not three nothings; for however uneasy it is to assign a Medium between something and nothing, I shall wave that Metaphysical contest. But yet collect, that simplicity in the very strictest sense that can be conceived, is not, in your account, to be ascribed to God, either according to his own word, or the reason of things.
For the Schools themselves suppose themselves not to admit a composition prejudicial to the Perfection of the Godhead, when they admit three modes of subsistence, which are distinct from one another, and from the Godhead, which they must admit. For if each of them were the very Godhead, each of them (as is urged against us by you know who) must have three Persons belonging to it, as the Godhead hath. And ⟨p. 121⟩your self acknowledge three somewhats in the Godhead distinct, or else they could not be three: I will not here urge that if they be three somewhats, they must be three things, not three nothings; for however uneasie it is to assign a Medium between something and nothing, I shall wave that Metaphysical contest. But yet collect, that simplicity in the very strictest sense that can be conceiv'd, is not, in your account, to be ascribed to God, either according to his own word, or the reason of things.
It may here be urged, how can we conceive this Natural Union (as I have adventured to Phrase it) of the three Persons, supposing them distinct things, substances, or Spirits? Is such an Union conceivable, as shall make them be but one God, and not be such, as shall make them cease to be three distinct things, substances, or Spirits? We find indeed the mentioned unions of Soul and Body in our selves, and of the two Natures in Christ consistent enough with manifest