Secondly,] That this necessary self-originate, vital, active Being hath very vast Power, admirable Wisdom, and most free and large goodness belonging to it.] And of this, our nearer and more deliberate view and contemplation of the world do equally ascertain us. For of these things we find the manifest prints and footsteps in it. Yea, we find the (derived) things themselves [Power, Wisdom, Goodness] in the creatures. And we are most assured they have not sprung from nothing; nor from any thing that had them not. And that which originally had them, or was their first fountain must have them necessarily, and essentially (together with whatsoever else belongs to its Being) in and of it self. So that the asserting of any other necessary being that is in it self destitute of these things, signifies no more towards the giving any account how these things came to be in the world, than if no Being, necessarily existing, were asserted at all. We are therefore, by the exigency of the case it self, constrained to acknowledge, not only that there is a necessary Being, but that there is such a one, as could be, and was the fountain and cause of all those several kinds and degrees ⟨p. 140⟩of being and perfection that we take notice of in the world besides. Another sort of necessary Being should not only be asserted to no purpose, there being nothing to be gained by it, no imaginable use to be made of it, as a principle that can serve any valuable end. (For suppose such a thing as necessary matter, it will as hath been shown be unalterable; and therefore another sort of matter must be supposed besides it, that may be the matter of the universe, raised up out of nothing for that purpose, unto which this so unwieldy and unmanageable an entity can never serve.) But also it will be impossible to be proved. No man can be taken with any plausible thew of reason to make it out. Yea, and much may be said (I conceive with convincing evidence) against it. As may perhaps be seen in the sequel of this discourse.
Secondly,] That this necessary self-originate, vital, active Being hath very vast Power, admirable Wisdom, and most free and large goodness belonging to it.] And of this, our nearer and more deliberate view and contemplation of the world do equally ascertain us. For of these things we find the manifest prints and footsteps in it. Yea, we find the (derived) things themselves [Power, Wisdom, Goodness] in the creatures. And we are most assured they have not sprung from nothing; nor from any thing that had them not. And that which originally had them, or was their first fountain must have them necessarily, and essentially (together with whatsoever else belongs to its Being) in and of it self. So that the asserting of any other necessary being that is in it self destitute of these things, signifies no more towards the giving any account how these things came to be in the world, than if no Being, necessarily existing, were asserted at all. We are therefore, by the exigency of the case it self, constrained to acknowledge, not only that there is a necessary Being, but that there is such a one, as could be, and was the fountain and cause of all those several kinds and degrees ⟨p. 140⟩of being and perfection that we take notice of in the world besides. Another sort of necessary Being should not only be asserted to no purpose, there being nothing to be gained by it, no imaginable use to be made of it, as a principle that can serve any valuable end. (For suppose such a thing as necessary matter, it will as hath been shewn be unalterable; and therefore another sort of matter must be supposed besides it, that may be the matter of the universe, raised up out of nothing for that purpose, unto which this so unwieldy and unmanagable an entity can never serve.) But also it will be impossible to be proved. No man can be taken with any plausible thew of reason to make it out. Yea, and much may be said (I conceive with convincing evidence) against it. As may perhaps be seen in the sequel of this discourse.