Chapter 4
pp. 135–17993 passagespart 1 of 3
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CHAP. IV.
Generally all supposable perfection, asserted of this Being, where, First, a Being absolutely perfect, is endeavoured to be evinced from the (already proved) necessary Being. Which is shown to import, in the general, The utmost fullness of Being. Also divers things, in particular that tend to evince that general. As that it is, at the remotest distance from no Being. Most purely actual. Most abstracted Being. The productive and conserving cause of all things else. Undiminishable. Uncapable of addition. Secondly, hence is more expressly deduced the infiniteness of this Being. An enquiry whether it be possible the Creature can be actually infinite? Difficulties concerning the absolute fullness, and Infiniteness of God considered. 2. The onliness of his Being. The Trinity not thereby excluded.
Generally all supposable perfection, asserted of this Being, where, First, a Being absolutely perfect, is endeavoured to be evinced from the (already proved) necessary Being. Which is shewn to import, in the general, The utmost fulness of Being. Also divers things, in particular that tend to evince that general. As that it is, at the remotest distance from no Being. Most purely actual. Most abstracted Being. The productive and conserving cause of all things else. Undiminishable. Uncapable of addition. Secondly, hence is more expresly deduced the infiniteness of this Being. An enquiry whether it be possible the Creature can be actually infinite? Difficulties concerning the absolute fulness, and Infiniteness of God considered. 2. The onliness of his Being. The Trinity not thereby excluded.
Some account hath been thus far given of 1that Being, whereunto we have been designing to assert the honour of a Temple. Each of the particulars having been severally insisted on, that concur to make up that notion of this Being, which was at first laid down. And more largely, what hath been more opposed, by persons of an atheistical or irreligious temper. But, because in that forementioned account of God, there was added to the particulars ⟨p. 136⟩there enumerated (out of a just consciousness of humane inability to comprehend every thing that may possibly belong to him) this general supplement.
SOme account hath been thus far given of 1that Being, whereunto we have been designing to assert the honour of a Temple. Each of the particulars having been severally insisted on, that concur to make up that notion of this Being, which was at first laid down. And more largely, what hath been more oppos'd, by persons of an atheistical or irreligious temper. But, because in that forementioned account of God, there was added to the particulars ⟨p. 136⟩there enumerated (out of a just consciousness of humane inability to comprehend every thing that may possibly belong to him) this general suppliment.
- 11.
[That all other supposable excellencies whatsoever do in the highest perfection appertain also originally, unto this Being] It is requisite that somewhat be said concerning this addition. Especially in as much as it comprehends in it, or may infer, somethings (not yet expressly mentioned) which may be thought necessary to the evincing the reasonableness of Religion, or our self-dedication as a Temple to him.
[That all other supposable excellencies whatsoever do in the highest perfection appertain also originally, unto this Being] It is requisite that somewhat be said concerning this addition. Especially in as much as it comprehends in it, or may infer, somethings (not yet expresly mentioned) which may be thought necessary to the evincing the reasonableness of Religion, or our self-dedication as a Temple to him.
For instance, it may possibly be alleged, that, if it were admitted there is somewhat that is eternal, uncaused, independent, necessarily existent, that is self-active, living, powerful, wise, and good. Yet all this will not infer upon us an universal obligation to Religion, unless it can also be evinced.
For instance, it may possibly be alledged, that, if it were admitted there is somewhat that is eternal, uncaused, independent, necessarily existent, that is self-active, living, powerful, wise, and good. Yet all this will not infer upon us an universal obligation to Religion, unless it can also be evinced.
1. That this Being is every way sufficient to supply and satisfy all our real wants and just desires.
1. That this Being is every way sufficient to supply and satisfie all our real wants and just desires.
2. And that this Being is but one, and so that all be at a certainty where their Religion ought to terminate. And that the worship of every Temple must concenter and meet in the same object.
Now the eviction of an absolutely perfect Being would include each of these; and answer both the purposes which may seem hitherto not so fully satisfied. It is therefore requisite that we endeavour
First, to show that the Being hitherto described is absolutely or every way perfect.
First, to shew that the Being hitherto described is absolutely or every way perfect.
Secondly, To deduce, from the same grounds, the absolute infinity, and the unity (or the onliness) thereof.
And for the former part of this undertaking, 1It must be acknowledged absolute or universal perfection, cannot be pretended to have been expressed in any or in all the works of God together. Neither in number, for ought we know (for as we cannot conceive, nor consequently speak of Divine perfections, but under the notion of many, whatsoever their real identity may be, so we do not know, but that within the compass of universal perfection, there may be some particular ones of which there is no footstep in the creation, and whereof we have never formed any thought.) Nor (more certainly) in degree; For surely the world, and the particular creatures in it, are not so perfect in correspondence to those attributes of its great Architect which we have mentioned, viz. his Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, as he might have made them, if he had pleased. And indeed, to say the world were absolutely and universally perfect, were to make that God.
And for the former part of this undertaking, 1It must be acknowledged absolute or universal perfection, cannot be pretended to have been exprest in any or in all the works of God together. Neither in number, for ought we know (for as we cannot conceive, nor consequently speak of Divine perfections, but under the notion of many, whatsoever their real identity may be, so we do not know, but that within the compass of universal perfection, there may be some particular ones of which there is no footstep in the creation, and whereof we have never formed any thought.) Nor (more certainly) in degree; For surely the world, and the particular creatures in it, are not so perfect in correspondence to those attributes of its great Architect which we have mentioned, viz. his Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, as he might have made them, if he had pleased. And indeed, to say the world were absolutely and universally perfect, were to make that God.
- 1II.
Wherefore it must also be acknowledged that an absolutely perfect Being cannot be immediately demonstrated from its effects, as whereto they neither do, nor is it within the capacity of created nature that they can, adequately, correspond. Whence therefore, all ⟨p. 138⟩that can be done for the evincing of the absolute and universal perfection of God, must be in some other way or method of discourse.
And though it be acknowledged that it cannot be immediately evidenced from the Creation, yet it is to be hoped that mediately it may. For from thence (as we have seen) a necessary self-originate Being, such as hath been described, is with the greatest certainty to be concluded; and, from thence, if we attentively consider, we shall be led to an absolutely perfect one. That is, since we have the same certainty of such a necessary self-originate Being as we have that there is any thing existent at all. If we seriously weigh what kind of Being this must needs be, or what its notion must import, above what hath been already evinced: We shall not be found, in this way, much to fall short of our present aim (though we have also other evidence that may be produced in its own fitter place.)
Here therefore let us a while make a stand, and more distinctly consider how far we are already advanced, that we may, with the better order and advantage, make our further progress.
These two things then are already evident.
[First, That there is a necessary Being that hath been eternally of it self, without dependence upon any thing, either as a productive or conserving cause. And of it self full of activity and vital energy, so as to be a productive and sustaining cause to other things.]
Of this any the most confused and indistinct view of this world, or a mere taking notice, that there is any thing in Being, that lives and moves, and withal that alters and changes, (which it is impossible the necessary Being it self should do) cannot but put us out of doubt.
Of this any the most confused and indistinct view of this world, or a meer taking notice, that there is any thing in Being, that lives and moves, and withal that alters and changes, (which it is impossible the necessary Being it self should do) cannot but put us out of doubt.
Secondly,] That this necessary self-originate, vital, active Being hath very vast Power, admirable Wisdom, and most free and large goodness belonging to it.] And of this, our nearer and more deliberate view and contemplation of the world do equally ascertain us. For of these things we find the manifest prints and footsteps in it. Yea, we find the (derived) things themselves [Power, Wisdom, Goodness] in the creatures. And we are most assured they have not sprung from nothing; nor from any thing that had them not. And that which originally had them, or was their first fountain must have them necessarily, and essentially (together with whatsoever else belongs to its Being) in and of it self. So that the asserting of any other necessary being that is in it self destitute of these things, signifies no more towards the giving any account how these things came to be in the world, than if no Being, necessarily existing, were asserted at all. We are therefore, by the exigency of the case it self, constrained to acknowledge, not only that there is a necessary Being, but that there is such a one, as could be, and was the fountain and cause of all those several kinds and degrees ⟨p. 140⟩of being and perfection that we take notice of in the world besides. Another sort of necessary Being should not only be asserted to no purpose, there being nothing to be gained by it, no imaginable use to be made of it, as a principle that can serve any valuable end. (For suppose such a thing as necessary matter, it will as hath been shown be unalterable; and therefore another sort of matter must be supposed besides it, that may be the matter of the universe, raised up out of nothing for that purpose, unto which this so unwieldy and unmanageable an entity can never serve.) But also it will be impossible to be proved. No man can be taken with any plausible thew of reason to make it out. Yea, and much may be said (I conceive with convincing evidence) against it. As may perhaps be seen in the sequel of this discourse.
Secondly,] That this necessary self-originate, vital, active Being hath very vast Power, admirable Wisdom, and most free and large goodness belonging to it.] And of this, our nearer and more deliberate view and contemplation of the world do equally ascertain us. For of these things we find the manifest prints and footsteps in it. Yea, we find the (derived) things themselves [Power, Wisdom, Goodness] in the creatures. And we are most assured they have not sprung from nothing; nor from any thing that had them not. And that which originally had them, or was their first fountain must have them necessarily, and essentially (together with whatsoever else belongs to its Being) in and of it self. So that the asserting of any other necessary being that is in it self destitute of these things, signifies no more towards the giving any account how these things came to be in the world, than if no Being, necessarily existing, were asserted at all. We are therefore, by the exigency of the case it self, constrained to acknowledge, not only that there is a necessary Being, but that there is such a one, as could be, and was the fountain and cause of all those several kinds and degrees
In the mean time, that there is, however, a necessary Being, unto which all the perfections, whereof we have any foot-steps or resemblances in the Creation, do originally and essentially belong, is undeniably evident.
Now, that we may proceed, what can felfessentiate, underived, Power, Wisdom, Goodness be, but most perfect Power, Wisdom, Goodness? Or such as than which there can never be more perfect?
For, since there can be no Wisdom, Power, or Goodness, which is not either original and self-essentiate, or derived and participated from thence? Who sees not that the former ⟨p. 141⟩must be the more perfect. Yea; and that it comprehended all the other (as what was from it) in it self. And consequently that it is simply the most perfect? And the reason will be the same, concerning any other perfection, the stamps and characters whereof we find signed upon the creatures.
But that the Being unto which these belong is absolutely and universally perfect in every kind, must be further evidenced by considering more at large the notion and import of such a self-originate necessary Being.
Some indeed, both more anciently, *and of late have inverted this course; and from the supposition of absolute perfection have gone about to infer necessity of existence, as being contained in the Idea of the former. But of this latter we are otherwise assured, upon clearer and less exceptionable terms. And being so, are to consider what improvement may be made of it to our present purpose.
Some indeed, both more anciently, *and of late have inverted this course; and from the supposition of absolute perfection have gone about to infer necessity of existence, as being contained in the Idaea of the former. But of this latter we are otherwise assured, upon clearer and less exceptionable terms. And being so, are to consider what improvement may be made of it to our present purpose.
- *So that whatever there is of strength in that way of arguing, the glory of it cannot be without injury appropriated to the present age, much less to any particular person therein: It having, since Anselm, been ventilated by divers others heretofore D. Scot. Dist. 2. Q. 2. Th. Aquin. P. 1. Q. 2 art 1. contra Gentil. l. 1. c. 10. Bradwarden, l. 1. c. 1. And by divers of late, as is sufficiently known, some rejecting, others much confiding in it, both of these former, and of modern Writers.)
And in the general, this seems manifestly imported in the notion of the necessary Being we have already evinced, that it have in it (some way or other, in what way there will be occasion to consider hereafter) the entire sum ⟨p. 142⟩and utmost fullness of Being, beyond which or without the compass whereof, no perfection is conceivable, or indeed (which is of the same import) nothing.
And in the general, this seems manifestly imported in the notion of the necessary Being we have already evinced, that it have in it (some way or other, in what way there will be occasion to consider hereafter) the entire sum ⟨p. 142⟩and utmost fulness of Being, beyond which or without the compass whereof, no perfection is conceivable, or indeed (which is of the same import) nothing.
Let it be observed that we pretend not to argue this from the bare terms necessary Being, only, but from hence, that it is such, as we have found it. Though indeed, these very terms import not a little to this purpose. For that which is necessarily, of it self, without being beholden to any thing, seems as good as all things, and to contain in it self an immense fullness; being indigent of nothing. Nor by indigence is here meant cravingness, or a sense of want only, in opposition whereto, every good and virtuous man hath or may attain, a sort of [Greek or Hebrew] or self-fullness and be satisfied from himself (which yet is a stamp of Divinity, and a part of the image of God, or such a participation of the Divine Nature, as is agreeable to the state and condition of a creature,) But we understand by it (what is naturally before that) want it self really, and not in opinion (as the covetous is said to be poor.) On the other hand we here intend not a merely rational (much less an imaginary) but a real self-fullness. And so we say, what is of that nature, that it is, and subsists wholly, and only of it self, without depending on any other, must owe this absoluteness, to so peculiar an excellency of its own nature, as we cannot well conceive to be less, than whereby it comprehends in it self, the most boundless and unlimited ⟨p. 143⟩fullness of Being, life, power, or whatsoever can be conceived under the name of a perfection. For taking notice of the existence of any thing whatsoever, some reason must be assignable, whence it is that this particular Being doth exist? and hath such and such powers and properties belonging to it, as do occur to our notice therein? when we can now resolve its existence into some cause, that put it into Being, and made it what it is; we cease so much to admire the thing, how excellent soever it be, and turn our admiration upon its cause, concluding that to have all the perfection in it which we discern in the effect, whatsoever unknown perfection (which we may suppose is very great) it may have besides. And upon this ground we are led, when we behold the manifold excellencies that lie dispersed among particular Beings, in this universe, with the glory of the whole, resulting thence, to resolve their existence into a common cause, which we design by the name of God.
Let it be observed that we pretend not to argue this from the bare terms necessary Being, only, but from hence, that it is such, as we have found it. Though indeed, these very terms import not a little to this purpose. For that which is necessarily, of it self, without being beholden to any thing, seems as good as all things, and to contain in it self an immense fulness; being indigent of nothing. Nor by indigence is here meant cravingness, or a sense of want only, in opposition whereto, every good and virtuous man hath or may attain, a sort of or self-fulness and be satisfied from himself (which yet is a stamp of Divinity, and a part of the image of God, or such a participation of the Divine Nature, as is agreeable to the state and condition of a creature,) But we understand by it (what is naturally before that) want it self really, and not in opinion (as the covetous is said to be poor.) On the other hand we here intend not a meerly rational (much less an imaginary) but a real self-fulness. And so we say, what is of that nature, that it is, and subsists wholly, and only of it self, without depending on any other, must owe this absoluteness, to so peculiar an excellency of its own nature, as we cannot well conceive to be less, than whereby it comprehends in it self, the most boundless and unlimited
And now considering him as a wise Agent, (which hath been proved) and consequently a free one, that acted not from any necessity of nature, but his mere good pleasure herein, we will not only conclude him to have all that perfection and excellency in him, which we find him to have displayed in so vast and glorious a work; but will readily believe him (supposing we have admitted a conviction concerning what hath been discoursed before) to have a most unconceivable treasure of hidden excellency and ⟨p. 144⟩perfection in him, that is not represented to our view in this work of his. And account, that, he who could do all this which we see is done, could do unspeakably more. For though, speaking of natural and necessitated Agents, which always act to their uttermost, it would be absurd to argue from their having done some lesser thing, to their power of doing somewhat that is much greater. Yet as to free Agents, that can choose their own act, and guide themselves by wisdom and judgment therein, the matter is not so: As when some great Prince bestows a rich largess upon some mean person, especially that deserved nothing from him, or was recommended by nothing to his royal favour, besides his poverty and misery; we justly take it for a very significant demonstration of that princely munificence, and bounty, which would incline him to do much greater things, when he should see a proportionable cause.
And now considering him as a wise Agent, (which hath been proved) and consequently a free one, that acted not from any necessity of nature, but his meer good pleasure herein, we will not only conclude him to have all that perfection and excellency in him, which we find him to have display'd in so vast and glorious a work; but will readily believe him (supposing we have admitted a conviction concerning what hath been discoursed before) to have a most unconceivable treasure of hidden excellency and ⟨p. 144⟩perfection in him, that is not represented to our view in this work of his. And account, that, he who could do all this which we see is done, could do unspeakably more. For though, speaking of natural and necessitated Agents, which always act to their uttermost, it would be absurd to argue from their having done some lesser thing, to their power of doing somewhat that is much greater. Yet as to free Agents, that can choose their own act, and guide themselves by wisdom and judgment therein, the matter is not so: As when some great Prince bestows a rich largess upon some mean person, especially that deserved nothing from him, or was recommended by nothing to his royal favour, besides his poverty and misery; we justly take it for a very significant demonstration of that princely munificence, and bounty, which would encline him to do much greater things, when he should see a proportionable cause.
But now, if taking notice of the excellencies that appear in caused Beings, and enquiring how they come to exist and be what they are, we resolve all into their cause; which, considering as perfectly free and arbitrary in all his communications; We do thence rationally conclude, that if he had thought fit, he could have made a much more pompous display of himself; and that there is in him, besides what appears, a vast and most abundant store of undiscovered perfection.
When next, we turn our enquiry and contemplation, more entirely, upon the cause. And bethink our selves: But how came he to exist and be what he is? Finding this cannot be refunded upon any superior cause; And our utmost enquiry can admit of no other result, but this, that he is of himself what he is. We will surely say then, he is all in all. And that perfection, which before we judged vastly great, we will now conclude altogether absolute, and such beyond which no greater can be thought.
When next, we turn our enquiry and contemplation, more entirely, upon the cause. And bethink our selves: But how came he to exist and be what he is? Finding this cannot be refunded upon any superiour cause; And our utmost enquiry can admit of no other result, but this, that he is of himself what he is. We will surely say then, he is all in all. And that perfection, which before we judged vastly great, we will now conclude alltogether absolute, and such beyond which no greater can be thought.
Adding I say to what pre-conceptions we had of his greatness, from the works which we see have been done by him (for why should we lose any ground we might esteem our selves to have gained before?) the consideration of of this necessary self-subsistence: And that no other reason is assignable of his being what he is, but the peculiar and incommunicable excellency of his own nature. Whereby he was not only able to make such a world, but did possess eternally and invariably in himself all that he is and hath: We cannot conceive that all to be less than absolutely universal, and comprehensive of whatsoever can lie within the whole compass of Being.
Adding I say to what pre-conceptions we had of his greatness, from the works which we see have been done by him (for why should we lose any ground we might esteem our selves to have gain'd before?) the consideration of of this necessary self-subsistence: And that no other reason is assignable of his being what he is, but the peculiar and incommunicable excellency of his own nature. Whereby he was not only able to make such a world, but did possess eternally and invariably in himself all that he is and hath: We cannot conceive that all to be less than absolutely universal, and comprehensive of whatsoever can lie within the whole compass of Being.
For when we find that among all other Beings (which is most certainly true not only of actual, but all possible Beings also) how perfect soever they are or may be in their own kinds; none of them, nor all of them together, are, or ever can be, of that perfection, as to be of ⟨p. 146⟩themselves, without dependence on somewhat else, as their productive, yea and sustaining cause; we see, besides that their cause hath all the perfection, some way, in it that is to be found in them all: There is also that appropriate perfection belonging thereto, that it could be; and eternally is (yea and could not but be) only of it self, by the underived and incommunicable excellency of its own Being. And surely, what includes in it all the perfection of all actual and possible Beings, besides its own (for there is nothing possible which some cause, yea and even this, cannot produce) & unconceivably more; must needs be absolutely and every way perfect. Of all which perfections this is the radical one, that belongs to this common Cause and Author of all things, that he is necessarily, and only self-subsisting. For if this high Prerogative in point of Being had been wanting, nothing at all had ever been. Therefore we attribute to God the greatest thing that can be said or thought, (and not what is wholly divers from all other perfection, but which contains all others in it) when we affirm of him that he is necessarily of himself. For, though when we have bewildered and lost our selves (as we soon may) in the contemplation of this amazing subject, we readily indulge our wearied minds the case and liberty of resolving this high excellency of self or necessary existence in a mere negation, and say that we mean by it nothing else, than that he was not from another: Yet surely if we ⟨p. 147⟩would take some pains with our selves, and keep our slothful shifting thoughts to some exercise in this matter; though we can never comprehend that vast fullness of perfection which is imported in it (for it were not what we plead for, if we could comprehend it.) Yet we should soon see and confess, that it contains unspeakably more than a negation, even some great thing that is so much beyond our thoughts, that we shall reckon we have said but a little in saying we cannot conceive it.
For when we find that among all other Beings (which is most certainly true not only of actual, but all possible Beings also) how perfect soever they are or may be in their own kinds; none of them, nor all of them together, are, erver can be, of that perfection, as to be of
And that, when we have stretched our understandings to the utmost of their line and measure, though we may suppose our selves to have conceived a great deal, there is infinitely more that we conceive not.
And that, when we have stretcht our understandings to the utmost of their line and measure, though we may suppose our selves to have conceived a great deal, there is infinitely more that we conceive not.
Wherefore that is a sober and most important truth which is occasionally drawn forth (as is supposed) from the so admired D. Cartes, by the urgent objections of this very acute (friendly) adversary, That the inexhaustible 1power of God is the reason for which he needed no cause; And that since that unexhausted power, or the immensity of his essence is most highly positive, therefore he may be said to be of himself positively, i. e. not as if he did ever by any positive efficiency cause himself (which is most manifestly impossible) but that the positive excellency of his own being was such, as could never need, nor admit of being caused.
- 1Ad ob. in Med. resp. quartae.
And that seems highly eternal (which is so 1largely insisted on by Doctor Jackson and divers ⟨p. 148⟩others) that what is without cause must also be without limit of being. Because all limitation proceeds from the cause of a thing, which imparted to it so much and no more; which argument, though it seem neglected by Des Cartes, and is opposed by his Antagonist: Yet I cannot but judge that the longer one meditates the less he shall understand, how any thing can be limited ad intra or from it self, &c. As the Author of the Tentam. Phys. Theol. speaks.
- 1Of the Essence and Attributes of God.
But that we may entertain our selves with some more particular considerations of this necessary Being; which may evince that general assertion of its absolute plenitude or fullness of essence. It appears to be such
But that we may entertain our selves with some more particular considerations of this necessary Being; which may evince that general assertion of its absolute plenitude or fulness of essence. It appears to be such
As is, first, at the greatest imaginable distance from non-entity. For what can be at a 1greater, than that which is necessarily? which signifies as much as whereto not to be is utterly impossible. Now an utter impossibility not to be, or the uttermost distance from no Being, seems plainly to imply the absolute plenitude of all Being. And, if here it be said that, to be necessarily, and of it self, needs be understood to import no more than a firm possession of that being which a thing hath, be it never so scant or minute a portion of being. I answer, without insisting upon the ambiguity of the words to be it seems, indeed so; If we measure the signification of this expression by its first and more obvious appearance. But if you consider the matter more narrowly, you will find ⟨p. 149⟩here is also signified the nature and kind of the Being possessed, as well as the manner of possession, viz. that it is a Being of so excellent and noble a kind, as that it can subsist alone without being beholden: which is so great an excellency as that it manifestly comprehends all other, or is the foundation of all that can be conceived besides. Which they that fondly dream of necessary matter, not considering, unwarily make one single atom a more excellent thing, than the whole frame of heaven and earth. That being supposed simply necessary, this the merest piece of hap-hazard, the strangest chance imaginable, and beyond what any but themselves could ever have imagined. And which being considered, would give us to understand, that no minute or finite being can be necessarily.
As is, first, at the greatest imaginable distance from non-entity. For what can be at a 1greater, than that which is necessarily? which signifies as much as whereto not to be is utterly impossible. Now an utter impossibility not to be, or the uttermost distance from no Being, seems plainly to imply the absolute plenitude of all Being. And, if here it be said that, to be necessarily, and of it self, needs be understood to import no more than a firm possession of that being which a thing hath, be it never so scant or minute a portion of being. I answer, without insisting upon the ambiguity of the words to be it seems, indeed so; If we measure the signification of this expression by its first and more obvious appearance. But if you consider the matter more narrowly, you will find
And hence we may see what it is to be nearer, or at a further distance from not-being.
For these things that came contingently into being, or at the pleasure of a free cause, have all but a finite and limited being, whereof, some, having a smaller portion of being than others, approach so much the nearer to not-being. Proportionably, what hath its being necessarily and of it self, is at the farthest distance from no-being, as comprehending all being in it self. Or, to borrow the expressions, of an elegant Writer, translated into our own Language, We have much more non-essence than essence; If we have the essence of a 1man, yet not of the Heavens, or of Angels. ⟨p. 150⟩We are confined and limited within a particular essence, but God who is what he is comprehendeth all possible essences.
For these things that came contingently into being, or at the pleasure of a free cause, have all but a finite and limited being, whereof, some, having a smaller portion of being than others, approach so much the nearer to notbeing. Proportionably, what hath its being necessarily and of it self, is at the farthest distance from no-being, as comprehending all being in it self. Or, to borrow the expressions, of an elegant Writer, translated into our own Language, We have much more non-essence than essence; If we have the essence of a 1man, yet not of the Heavens, or of Angels. ⟨p. 150⟩We are confined and limited within a particular essence, but God who is what he is comprehendeth all possible essences.
- 1Causin.
Nor is this precariously spoken, or, as what may be hoped to be granted upon courtesy. But let the matter be rigidly examined and discussed, and the certain truth of it will most evidently appear. For if any thing be, in this sense, remoter than other from no-Being, it must either be, what is necessarily of it self, or what is contingently at the pleasure of the other. But since nothing is, besides that self-originate necessary Being, but what was from it; and nothing from it but what was within its productive power; it's plain all that, with its own Being, was contained in it. And therefore, even in that sense, it is at the greatest distance from no-Being; as comprehending the utmost fullness of Being in it self, and consequently absolute perfection. Which will yet further appear, in what follows. We therefore add,
Nor is this precariously spoken, or, as what may be hoped to be granted upon courtesie. But let the matter be rigidly examined and discussed, and the certain truth of it will most evidently appear. For if any thing be, in this sense, remoter than other from no-Being, it must either be, what is necessarily of it self, or what is contingently at the pleasure of the other. But since nothing is, besides that self-originate necessary Being, but what was from it; and nothing from it but what was within its productive power; it's plain all that, with its own Being, was contained in it. And therefore, even in that sense, it is at the greatest distance from no-Being; as comprehending the utmost fulness of Being in it self, and consequently absolute perfection. Which will yet further appear, in what follows. We therefore add,
That necessary Being is most unmixed or 1purest Being. Without allay. That is pure which is full of it self. Purity is not here meant in a corporeal sense (which few will think) nor in the moral; but as with Metaphysicians it signifies simplicity of essence. And in its present use is more especially intended to signify that simplicity which is opposed to the composition of act, and possibility. We say then that necessary Being imports purest actuality. Which is the ultimate and highest perfection of Being. ⟨p. 151⟩For it signifies no remaining possibility, yet unreplete, or not filled up, and consequently the fullest exuberance and entire confluence of all Being, as in its fountain and original source. We need not here look further to evince this than the native import of the very terms themselves; necessity and possibility; the latter whereof is not so fitly said to be excluded the former (as contingency is) but to be swallowed up of it; as fullness takes up all the space which were otherwise nothing but vacuity or emptiness. It is plain then that necessary Being, engrosses all possible Being, both that is, and (for the same reason) that ever was so. For nothing can be or ever was in possibility to come into Being, but what either must spring, or hath sprung, from the necessary self-subsisting Being.
That necessary Being is most unmixed or 1purest Being. Without allay. That is pure which is full of it self. Purity is not here meant in a corporeal sense (which few will think) nor in the moral; but as with Metaphysicians it signifies simplicity of essence. And in its present use is more especially intended to signifie that simplicity which is opposed to the composition of act, and possibility. We say then that necessary Being imports purest actuality. Which is the ultimate and highest perfection of Being. ⟨p. 151⟩For it signifies no remaining possibility, yet unreplete, or not fill'd up, and consequently the fullest exuberancy and entire confluence of all Being, as in its fountain and original scurce. We need not here look further to evince this than the native import of the very terms themselves; necessity and possibility; the latter whereof is not so fitly said to be excluded the former (as contingency is) but to be swallowed up of it; as fulness takes up all the space which were otherwise nothing but vacuity or emptiness. It is plain then that necessary Being, ingrosses all possible Being, both that is, and (for the same reason) that ever was so. For nothing can be or ever was in possibility to come into Being, but what either must spring, or hath sprung, from the necessary self-subsisting Being.
So that unto all that vast possibility, a proportionable actuality of this Being must be understood to correspond. Else the other were not possible. For nothing is possible to be produced which is not within the actual productive power of the necessary Being. I say within its actual productive power, for if its power for such production were not already actual, it could never become so, and so were none at all. Inasmuch as necessary being can never alter, and consequently can never come actually to be, what it, already, is not (upon which account it is truly said, In aeternis posse & esse sunt idem.) Wherefore in it, is nothing else but pure actuality, as profound and vast, ⟨p. 152⟩as is the utmost possibility of all created or producible Being, i. e. It can be nothing other than it is, but can do all things (of which more hereafter.) It therefore stands opposed not only (more directly) to impossibility of Being (which is the most proper notion of no-Being) but some way, even to possibility also; That is the possibility of being any thing but what it is; as being every way complete, and perfectly full already.
So that unto all that vast possibility, a proportionable actuality of this Being must be understood to correspond. Else the other were not possible. For nothing is possible to be produced which is not within the actual productive power of the necessary Being. I say within its actual productive power, for if its power for such production were not already actual, it could never become so, and so were none at all. Inasmuch as necessary being can never alter, and consequently can never come actually to be, what it, already, is not (upon which account it is truly said, In aeternis posse & esse sunt idem.) Wherefore in it, is nothing else but pure actuality, as profound and vast, ⟨p. 152⟩as is the utmost possibility of all created or producible Being, i. e. It can be nothing other than it is, but can do all things (of which more hereafter.) It therefore stands oppos'd not only (more directly) to impossibility of Being (which is the most proper notion of no-Being) but some way, even to possibility also; That is the possibility of being any thing but what it is; as being every way compleat, and perfectly full already.