Again we might further add, that it is the most abstracted Being, or is Being in the very 1abstract. A thing much insisted on by some of the School-men. And the notion which with much obscurity they pursue (after their manner) may carry some such sense as this (if it may throughout be called sense) That whereas no created nature is capable of any other, than mere mental abstraction, but exists all ways in concretion with some subject, that, be it never so refined, is grosser and less perfect than it self; so that we can distinguish the mentally abstracted essence, and the thing which hath that essence, by which concretion essence is limited, and is only the particular essence of this or that thing, which hath or possesses that essence. The necessary Being is, in strict propriety, not so truly said to have essence, as to be it; and exist separately by it self; not as limited to this or that thing. Whence it is, in it self universal essence, containing therefore (not formally, but eminently) the being of all things in perfect simplicity. ⟨p. 153⟩Whence all its own attributes are capable of being affirmed of it in the abstract, *that it is Wisdom, Power, Goodness, and not only hath these, and that, upon this account, that it is a Being which is necessarily and of it self. For that which is necessarily and of it self, is not whatsoever it is by the accession of any thing to it self; whereof necessary Being is uncapable. But by its own simple and unvariable essence. Other Being is upon such terms powerful, wise, yea, and existent, as that it may cease to be so. Whereas to necessary Being it is manifestly repugnant and impossible either simply not to be, or to be any thing else, but what and as it is. And though other things may have properties belonging to their essence not separable from it, yet they are not their very essence it self: And, whereas they are in a possibility to loose their very existence, the knot and ligament of whatsoever is most intimate to their actual being, all then falls from them together: Here essence, properties, and existence are all one simple thing that can never cease, decay, or change, because the whole being is necessary. Now, all this being supposed, of the force of that form of speech, when we affirm any thing in the abstract of another, we may admit the common sense of men to be the interpreter.
Again we might further add, that it is the most abstracted Being, or is Being in the very 1abstract. A thing much insisted on by someof the School-men. And the notion which with much obscurity they pursue (after their manner) may carry some such sense as this (if it may throughout be called sense) That whereas no created nature is capable of any other, than meer mental abstraction, but exists al ways in concretion with some subject, that, be it never so refined, is grosser and less perfect than it self; so that we can distinguish the mentally abstracted essence, and the thing which hath that essence, by which concretion essence is limited, and is only the particular essence of this or that thing, which hath or possesses that essence. The necessary Being is, in strict propriety, not so truly said to have essence, as to be it; and exist separately by it self; not as limited to this or that thing. Whence it is, in it self universal essence, containing therefore (not formally, but eminently) the being of all things in perfect simplicity. ⟨p. 153⟩Whence all its own attributes are capable of being affirmed of it in the abstract, *that it is Wisdom, Power, Goodness, and not only hath these, and that, upon this account, that it is a Being which is necessarily and of it self. For that which is necessarily and of it self, is not whatsoever it is by the accession of any thing to it self; whereof necessary Being is uncapable. But by its own simple and unvariable essence. Other Being is upon such terms powerful, wise, yea, and existent, as that it may cease to be so. Whereas to necessary Being it is manifestly repugnant and impossible either simply not to be, or to be any thing else, but what and as it is. And though other things may have properties belonging to their essence not separable from it, yet they are not their very essence it self: And, whereas they are in a possibility to loose their very existence, the knot and ligament of whatsoever is most intimate to their actual being, all then falls from them together: Here essence, properties, and existence are all one simple thing that can never cease, decay, or change, because the whole being is necessary. Now, all this being supposed, of the force of that form of speech, when we affirm any thing in the abstract of another, we may admit the common sense of men to be the interpreter.
- 1VI.
- *To which purpose we may take notice of the words of one, not the less worthy to be named, for not being reckoned of that forementioned order. Si enim denominative de eo quippiam praedicaretur abstractum esset tum aliud ab ipso, tum ipso prius. Quod same impium est quare neque ens est led essentia, neque bonus sed bonitas est. Jul. Scal. Exerc. 365.