For either such a Being as hath been already evinced is of it self active or unactive, or either hath the power of action of it self or not. If we will say the latter, let it be considered what we say, and to what purpose we say it. First, we are to weigh what it is we affirm, when we speak of an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being, that is of it self totally unactive, or destitute of any active power. If we will say there is some such thing, we will confess when we have called it something, it is a very silly, despicable, idle something, and a something, (if we look upon it alone) as good as nothing. For there is but little odds between ⟨p. 35⟩being nothing, and being able to do nothing. We will again confess, eternity, self-origination, independency, necessity of existence, to be very great and highly dignifying 1attributes; and that import a most unconceivable excellency. For what higher glory can we ascribe to any being, than to acknowledge it to have been from eternity of it self; without being beholden to any other, and to be such as that it can be, and cannot but be in the same state, self-subsisting, and self-sufficient to all eternity? And what unconceivable myriads of little senseless Deities must we upon that supposition admit (as would appear if it were fit to trouble the Reader with an explication of the nature and true notion of matter, which the being now supposed, must be found to be!) But what can our reason either direct, or endure, that we should so uncongruously misplace so magnificent attributes as these? and ascribe ⟨p. 36⟩the prime glory of the most excellent Being, unto that which is next to nothing? What might further be said to demonstrate the impossibility of a self-subsisting, and self-original, unactive being, will be here unseasonable, and pre-occupying. But if any in the mean time will be so sullen as to say such a thing,
For either such a Being as hath been already evinced is of it self active or unactive, or either hath the power of action of it self or not. If we will say the latter, let it be considered what we say, and to what purpose we say it. First, we are to weigh what it is we affirm, when we speak of an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being, that is of it self totally unactive, or destitute of any active power. If we will say there is some such thing, we will confess when we have called it something, it is a very silly, despicable, idle something, and a something, (if we look upon it alone) as good as nothing. For there is but little odds between ⟨p. 35⟩being nothing, and being able to do nothing. We will again confess, eternity, self-origination, independency, necessity of existence, to be very great and highly dignifying 1attributes; and that import a most unconceivable excellency. For what higher glory can we ascribe to any being, than to acknowledge it to have been from eternity of it self; without being beholden to any other, and to be such as that it can be, and cannot but be in the same state, self-subsisting, and self-sufficient to all eternity? And what unconceivable myriads of little sensless Deities must we upon that supposition admit (as would appear if it were fit to trouble the Reader with an explication of the nature and true notion of matter, which the being now supposed, must be found to be!) But what can our reason either direct, or endure, that we should so uncongruously misplace so magnificent attributes as these? and ascribe ⟨p. 36⟩the prime glory of the most excellent Being, unto that which is next to nothing? What might further be said to demonstrate the impossibility of a self-subsisting, and self-original, unactive being, will be here unseasonable, and pre-occupying. But if any in the mean time will be so sullen as to say such a thing,
- 1We will acknowledge an Impropriety in this word, & its conjugate Self-Originate, sometimes hereafter used, which yet is recompensed by their conveniency; as they may perhaps find who shall make trial how to express the sense intended by them in other words. And they are used without suspicion, that it can be thought they are meant to signify as if ever God gave original to himself; but in the negative sense that he never received it from any other; yea, and that he is, what is more than equivalent to his Being, self-caused, viz. a Being of himself so excellent as not to need or be capable to admit any cause. Vid. c. 4. Sect. 3. And with the expectation of the same allowance which hath been given to [Greek or Hebrew], or other like words. We also take it for granted (which it may suffice to hint here once for all) that when we use here the word Self-subsistent, it will be understood we intend by it (without Logical or Metaphysical nicety) not the mere exclusion of dependence on a subject, but on a cause.We will acknowledge an Impropriety in this word, & its conjugate Self-Originate, sometimes hereafter used, which yet is recompenced by their conveniency; as they may perhaps find who shall make trial how to express the sense intended by them in other words. And they are used without suspicion, that it can be thought they are meant to signifie as if ever God gave original to himself; but in the negative sense that he never received it from any other; yea, and that he is, what is more than equivalent to his Being, self-caused, viz. a Being of himself so excellent as not to need or be capable to admit any cause. Vid. c. 4. Sect. 3. And with the expectation of the same allowance which hath been given to 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, or other like words. We also take it for granted (which it may suffice to hint here once for all) that when we use here the word Self-subsistent, it will be understood we intend by it (without Logical or Metaphysical nicety) not the meer exclusion of dependence on a subject, but on a cause.
