Chapter 2
pp. 17–4450 passagespart 1 of 2
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CHAP. II.
The two more principal grounds which a Temple supposes. 1. The existence of God. 2. His Conversableness with men: Both argued from common consent. The former doubtful if ever wholly denied in former days. The latter also implied in the known general practice of some or other Religion. Evidenced, in that some, no strangers to the world, have thought it the difference of man. The immodesty and rashness of the persons from whom any opposition can be expected. These two grounds proposed to be more strictly considered apart. And first the existence of God. Where first the notion of God is assigned. The parts whereof are proposed to be evinced severally of some existent Being. 1. Eternity. 2. Self-origination. 3. Independency. 4. Necessity of existence. 5. Self-activity. The impossibility this world should be this necessary self-active Being. The inconsistency of necessary alterable matter, more largely deduced in a marginal digression. 6. Life. 7. Vast and mighty power. A Corollary.
The two more principal grounds which a Temple supposes. 1. The existence of God. 2. His Conversableness with men: Both argued from common consent. The former doubtful if ever wholly deny'd in former days. The latter also implied in the known general practice of some or other Religion. Evidenc'd, in that some, no strangers to the world, have thought it the difference of man. The immodesty and rashness of the persons from whom any opposition can be expected. These two grounds proposed to be more strictly considered apart. And first the existence of God. Where first the notion of God is assigned. The parts whereof are proposed to be evinc'd severally of some existent Being. 1. Eternity. 2. Self-origination. 3. Independency. 4. Necessity of existence. 5. Self-activity. The impossibility this world should be this necessary self-active Being. The inconsistency of necessary alterable matter, more largely deduced in a marginal digression. 6. Life. 7. Vast and mighty power. A Corollary.
NOW the grounds more necessary to be laid down, and which are supposed 1in the most general notion of a Temple, are especially these two;
- 11.
The existence of God, and His conversableness with men,
For no notion of a Temple can more easily occur to any ones thoughts, or is more agreeable to common acceptation; than that it is an habitation wherein God is pleased to dwell among men.
Therefore to the designation and use of it, or (which is all one) to the intention and exercise of Religion, the belief or persuasion is necessary of those two things (the same which we find made necessary on the same account) That God is, and that he is a rewarder of them 1that diligently seek him; as will appear when the manner and design of that his abode with men shall be considered.
Therefore to the designation and use of it, or (which is all one) to the intention and exercise of Religion, the belief or perswasion is necessary of those two things (the same which we find made necessary on the same account) That God is, and that he is a rewarder of them 1that diligently seek him; as will appear when the manner and design of that his abode with men shall be considered.
These are the grounds upon which the sacred frame of a Temple ought to stand, and without which it must be acknowledged an unsupported, airy fabric. And since it were vain to discourse what a Temple is, or whereto the notion of it may be applied; unless it be well resolved that there is, or ought to be any such thing. The strength and firmness of this its double ground should be tried and searched, and of its pretensions thereto.
These are the grounds upon which the sacred frame of a Temple ought to stand, and without which it must be acknowledged an unsupported, airy fabrick. And since it were vain to discourse what a Temple is, or whereto the notion of it may be applied; unless it be well resolved that there is, or ought to be any such thing. The strength and firmness of this its double ground should be tried and searcht, and of its pretensions thereto.
And though it be not necessary in a matter that is so plain, and wherein so much is to be 1said otherwise; yet it will not be impertinent to consider, First, what Prescription (which in clearing of titles is not wont to signify nothing) will signify in the present case. And,
And though it be not necessary in a matter that is so plain, and wherein so much is to be 1said otherwise; yet it will not be impertinent to consider, First, what Prescription (which in clearing of titles is not wont to signifie nothing) will signifie in the present case. And,
- 1II.
First, For the existence of God, we need ⟨p. 19⟩not labour much to show how constantly and generally it hath been acknowledged through the whole world; it being so difficult to produce an uncontroverted instance of any that ever denied it in more ancient times. For as for them whose names have been infamous amongst men heretofore upon that account, there 1hath been that said that, at least, wants not probability for the clearing them of so foul an imputation: That is, that they were maliciously represented as having denied the existence of a Deity, because they impugned and derided the vulgar conceits, and poetical fictions of those days concerning the multitude, and the ridiculous attributes of their imaginary Deities. Of which sort Cicero mentions not a few; 2Their being inflamed with Anger, and mad with Lust, their Wars, Fights, Wounds, their Hatreds, Discords, their Births and Deaths, &c. Who though he speak less favourably of some 3of these men, and mentions one as doubting whether there were any Gods or no; (for which cause his Book in the beginning whereof he had intimated that doubt, (as Cotta is brought in, informing us) was publicly burnt at Athens, and himself banished his Country) and two others *as expressly denying them; yet the more generally decried †Patron of Atheism (as he hath been accounted) he ⟨p. 20⟩makes Velleius highly vindicate from this imputation, and say of him that he was the first that took notice that even nature it self had impressed the notion of God upon the minds of all men: who also gives us these as his words, What Nation is there or sort of men that hath not without teaching, a certain anticipation of the Gods, which he calls a prolepsis, a certain preventive, or fore-conceived information of a thing in the mind, without which nothing can be understood, or sought, or disputed of. Unto which purpose the same Author (as is commonly observed) elsewhere speaks; That there is no Nation so barbarous, no one of all men so savage,
But in every matter the consent of all Nations is to be reckoned a law of Nature.
And whatever the apprehensions of those few (and some others that are wont to be mentioned under the same vile character) were in this matter, yet so inconsiderable hath the dissent been; that, as another most ingenious Pagan Author writes, In so great a contention 1and variety of opinions (that is concerning ⟨p. 21⟩what God is) herein you shall see the law and reason of every Country to be harmonious and one. That there is one God the 2King and Father of all—That the many are but the servants and co-rulers unto God. That herein the Greek and the Barbarian 3says the same thing, The Islander and the Inhabitant of the Continent, The Wise and the foolish: Go to the utmost bounds of the Ocean, and you find God there. But if 4(says he) in all time there have been two or three, an atheistical, vile, senseless sort of persons, whose own eyes and ears deceive them, and who are maimed in their very soul, an irrational and sterile sort, as monstrous creatures, as a Lion without courage, an Ox without horns, or a bird without wings. Yet out of those you shall understand somewhat of God. For they know and confess him whether they will or no. 3. Yea, and 5the use of a Temple, and the exercise of Religion (which suppose the second ground also as well as the first) have been so very common (though not altogether equally common with the former, that it is the observation of that famed moralist, That if one travel the world, 6'tis possible to find Cities without Walls, without Letters, without Kings, without Wealth, without Coin, without Schools and Theatres. But a City without a Temple, or that useth no Worship, Prayers, &c. no one ever saw. And he believes a City may more easily be built without a foundation (or ⟨p. 22⟩ground to set it on) than any community of men have or keep a consistency
4. And it is no mean argument of the 1commonness of Religion, that there have been some in the world (and those no Idiots neither) that have accounted it the most constituent and distinguishing thing in humane nature. So that Platonic Jew judgeth in vocation of God with hope towards him to be, if we 2will speak the truth, the only genuine property of Man, and saith that only he who is acted by such an hope is a man, and he that is destitute of this hope is no man, preferring this account to the common definition (which he says is only of the concrete of man) that he is a reasonable and mortal living creature. And yet he extends not reason further, that is, to the inferior creatures, for he had expressly said above That they who have no hope towards God, have no part or share in the rational nature.
4. And it is no mean argument of the 1commonness of Religion, that there have been some in the world (and those no Idiots neither) that have accounted it the most constituent and distinguishing thing in humane nature. So that Platonick Jew judgeth in vocation of God with hope towards him to be, if we 2will speak the truth, the only genuine property of Man, and saith that only he who is acted by such an hope is a man, and he that is destitute of this hope is no man, preferring this account to the common definition (which he says is only of the concrete of man) that he is a reasonable and mortal living creature. And yet he extends not reason further, that is, to the inferior creatures, for he had expresly said above That they who have no hope towards God, have no part or share in the rational nature.
- 1IV.
- 2Philo. libr. de eo quod Deterius potiori insid. [Greek or Hebrew], p. 180.Philo. libr. de eo quod Deterius potiori insid. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, p. 180.
And a noble person of our own says, That 1upon accurate search, Religion and Faith appear the only ultimate differences of man; whereof neither Divine perfection is capable, nor brutal imperfection. Reason in his account descending low among the inferior creatures. But these agreeing more peculiarly to man, and so universally that he affirms, There is no man well, and entirely in his wits that doth not worship some Deity.
And a noble person of our own says, That 1upon accurate search, Religion and Faith appear the only ultimate differences of man; whereof neither Divine perfection is capable, nor brutal imperfection. Reason in his account descending low among the inferiour creatures. But these agreeing more peculiarly to man, and so universally that he affirms, There is no man well, and entirely in his wits that doth not worship some Deity.
- 1Herbert de verit.
Who therefore accounted it a less absurdity to admit such a thing as a rational Beast, than ⟨p. 23⟩an irreligious man. Now if these have taken notice of any instances that seemed to claim an exemption from this notion of Man; they have rather thought fit to let them pass as an anomalous sort of creatures, reducible to no certain rank or order in the Creation; than that any should be admitted into the account, or be acknowledged of the Society of Men, that were found destitute of an inclination to worship the common Author of our beings. And according to this opinion; By whatsoever steps any should advance in the denial of a Deity; they should proceed by the same, to the abandoning their own humanity; and by saying there is no God, should proclaim themselves no men.
Who therefore accounted it a less absurdity to admit such a thing as a rational Beast, than ⟨p. 23⟩an irreligious man. Now if these have taken notice of any instances that seem'd to claim an exemption from this notion of Man; they have rather thought fit to let them pass as an anomalous sort of creatures, reducible to no certain rank or order in the Creation; than that any should be admitted into the account, or be acknowledged of the Society of Men, that were found destitute of an inclination to worship the common Author of our beings. And according to this opinion; By whatsoever steps any should advance in the denial of a Deity; they should proceed by the same, to the abandoning their own humanity; and by saying there is no God, should proclaim themselves no men.
However it discovers (which is all that is at present intended by it) the commonness, not to say absolute universality, of Religion, in the observation of these Persons, whom we must suppose no strangers to the world in their own and former times. And if it afford any less ground for such an observation in our present time, we only see as the world grows older it grows worse, and sinks into a deeper oblivion of its original, as it recedes further from it.
And (notwithstanding) this so common a consent is yet not without its weight and significancy to our present purpose. If we consider
And (notwithstanding) this so common a consent is yet not without its weight and signicancy to our present purpose. If we consider
How impossible it is to give or imagine any tolerable account of its original, if we do not confess it natural, and refer it to that common ⟨p. 24⟩Author of all nature whom we are enquiring about: (of which so much is said by *divers others, that nothing more needs here to be said about it. 5. And at least so much is gained by it to a Temple, that unless some very plain and ungainsayable demonstration be brought against the grounds of it (which will be time enough to consider when we see it pretended to) no opposition, fit to be regarded, can ever be made to it. That is, none at all can possibly be made; but what shall proceed from the most immodest and rash confidence, animated and born up only by a design of being most licentiously wicked, and of making the world become so. Immodest confidence it must be, for it is not a Man, or a Nation, or an Age that such have to oppose, but Mankind; upon which they shall cast, not some lighter reflection, but the vilest and most opprobrious contumely, and scorn that can be imagined. That is the imputation of so egregious folly and dotage, as all this while to have worshipped a shadow as the Author of their being; and a figment for their common parent. And this not the ruder only, and uninquisitive vulgar, but the wisest and most considering persons in all times. Surely less than clear and pregnant demonstration (at least not wild incoherent self-confounding suppositions and surmises, of which more hereafter) will ever be thought sufficient to justify the boldness of an attempt that shall carry this signification with it. And it will be a confidence equally rash as immodest. ⟨p. 25⟩For what can be the undertakers hope, either of success or reward? Do they think it an easy enterprise? and that a few quirks of malapert wit will serve the turn to baffle the Deity into nothing? and unteach the world Religion? and raze out impressions renewed and transmitted through so many ages? and persuade the race of men to descend a peg lower, and believe they ought to live and shall die like the perishing beast. Or do they expect to find men indifferent in a matter that concerns their common Practice and Hope? and wherein their zeal hath been wont to be such as that it hath obtained to be proverbial, to strive as for the very Altars.
How impossible it is to give or imagine any tolerable account of its original, if we do not confess it natural, and refer it to that common
And what should their reward be, when the natural tendency of their undertaking is to exclude themselves from the expectation of any in another world? And what will they expect in this from them whose Temples and Altars they go about to subvert? Besides, that if they be not hurried by a blind impetuous rashness, they would consider their danger, and apprehend themselves concerned to strike very sure: For if there remain but the least possibility that the matter is otherwise, and that the being doth exist whose honour and worship they contend against, they must understand his favour to be of some concernment to them; which they take but an ill course to entitle themselves unto. Much more have they reason to be solicitous, when their horrid cause not only wants evidence; nor hath hitherto pretended to more ⟨p. 26⟩than a bare possibility of truth on their side; but hath so clear (and as yet altogether unrefuted) evidence lying against it; that quite takes away that very possibility, and all ground for that miserable languishing hope, that it could ever have afforded them. Therefore is it left also wholly unimaginable, what principle can animate their design, other than a sensual humour, impatient of restraints, or of any obligation to be sober, just and honest, beyond what their own inclination, and (much mistaken) interest, or conveniency would lead them to.
And what should their reward be, when the natural tendency of their undertaking is to exclude themselves from the expectation of any in another world? And what will they expect in this from them whose Temples and Altars they go about to subvert? Besides, that if they be not hurried by a blind impetuous rashness, they would consider their danger, and apprehend themselves concern'd to strike very sure: For if there remain but the least possibility that the matter is otherwise, and that the being doth exist whose honour and worship they contend against, they must understand his favour to be of some concernment to them; which they take but an ill course to entitle themselves unto. Much more have they reason to be solicitous, when their horrid cause not only wants evidence; nor hath hitherto pretended to more ⟨p. 26⟩than a bare possibility of truth on their side; but hath so clear (and as yet altogether unrefuted) evidence lying against it; that quite takes away that very possibility, and all ground for that miserable languishing hope, that it could ever have afforded them. Therefore is it left also wholly unimaginable, what principle can animate their design, other than a sensual humour, impatient of restraints, or of any obligation to be sober, just and honest, beyond what their own inclination, and (much mistaken) interest, or conveniency would lead them to.
By all which we have a sufficient measure of the persons from whom any opposition unto Religion can be expected, and how much their authority, their example or their scorn ought to signify with us. And that a more valuable opposition can never be made; our experience, both that hitherto it hath not been, and that it would have been if it could, might render us tolerably secure. For surely it may well be supposed, that in a world so many ages lost in wickedness, all imaginable trials would have been made to disburden it of Religion; and somewhat that had been specious, at least, to that purpose, had been hit upon; if the matter had been any way possible. And the more wicked the world hath been, a so directly contrary, and so continually assaulted principle, not yet vanquished, appears the more plainly invincible: And that the assaults have been from the lusts of men, rather than ⟨p. 27⟩their reason, shows the more evidently, that their reason hath only wanted a ground to work upon; which if it could have been found, their lusts had certainly pressed it to their service in this warfare; and not have endured rather, the molestation of continual checks and rebukes from it.
By all which we have a sufficient measure of the persons from whom any opposition unto Religion can be expected, and how much their authority, their example or their scorn ought to signifie with us. And that a more valuable opposition can never be made; our experience, both that hitherto it hath not been, and that it would have been if it could, might render us tolerably secure. For surely it may well be supposed, that in a world so many ages lost in wickedness, all imaginable trials would have been made to disburthen it of Religion; and somewhat that had been specious, at least, to that purpose, had been hit upon; if the matter had been any way possible. And the more wicked the world hath been, a so directly contrary, and so continually assaulted principle, not yet vanquished, appears the more plainly invincible: And that the assaults have been from the lusts of men, rather than ⟨p. 27⟩their reason, shews the more evidently, that their reason hath only wanted a ground to work upon; which if it could have been found, their lusts had certainly prest it to their service in this warfare; and not have endured rather, the molestation of continual checks and rebukes from it.
Nor need we yet to let our minds hang in suspense, or be in a dubious expectation, that possibly some or other great Wit may arise that shall perform some great thing in this matter, and discover the groundlessness and folly of Religion by plain and undeniable reasons, that have not as yet been thought on: But betake our selves to a stricter and closer consideration of our own grounds, which if we can once find to be certainly true, we may be sure they are of eternal truth, and no possible contrivance or device can ever make them false.
Nor need we yet to let our minds hang in suspence, or be in a dubious expectation, that possibly some or other great Wit may arise that shall perform some great thing in this matter, and discover the groundlesness and folly of Religion by plain and undeniable reasons, that have not as yet been thought on: But betake our selves to a stricter and closer consideration of our own grounds, which if we can once find to be certainly true, we may be sure they are of eternal truth, and no possible contrivance or device can ever make them false.
Having therefore seen what common consent may contribute to the establishing of them 1jointly; we may now apply our selves to consider and search into each of them (so far as they are capable of a distinct consideration) severally and apart. Having still this mark in our eye, our own confirmation and excitation in reference to what is the proper work and business of a Temple, Religion and conversation with God: How little soever any endeavour in this kind may be apt to signify with the otherwise minded.
Having therefore seen what common consent may contribute to the establishing of them 1joyntly; we may now apply our selves to consider and search into each of them (so far as they are capable of a distinct consideration) severally and apart. Having still this mark in our eye, our own confirmation and excitation in reference to what is the proper work and business of a Temple, Religion and conversation with God: How little soever any endeavour in this kind may be apt to signifie with the otherwise minded.
- 1VI.
And, first for the existence of God; that 1we may regularly and with evidence make it ⟨p. 28⟩out to our selves, that he is, or doth exist, and may withal see what the belief of his existence will contribute towards the evincing of the reasonableness of erecting a Temple to him. It is requisite that we first settle a true notion of him in our minds; or be at an agreement with our selves, what is that we mean, or would have to be signified by the name of God: otherwise we know not what we seek, nor when we have found him,
- 1VII.
And though we must beforehand professedly avow that we take him to be such a one as we can never comprehend in our thoughts. That this knowledge is too excellent for us, or he is more excellent than that we can perfectly know him; yet it will be sufficient to guide us in our search after his existence, if we can give such a description, or assign such certain characters of his being as will severally or together distinguish him from all things else. For then we shall be able to call him by his own name, and say this is God. Whatever his being may contain more; or whatsoever other properties may belong to it beyond what we can as yet compass in our present thoughts of him.
And such an account we shall have 1of what we are enquiring after; if we have the conception in our minds of an eternal uncaused, independent, necessary Being that hath active power, life, wisdom, goodness, and whatsoever other supposable excellency, in the highest perfection originally, in and of it self.
- 1VIII.
Such a Being we would with common consent ⟨p. 29⟩express by the name of God. Even they that would profess to deny or doubt of his existence, yet must acknowledge this to be the notion of that which they deny or doubt of. Or if they should say this is not it, or (which is all one) that they do not deny or doubt of the existence of such a Being as this; they on the other hand that would argue for his existence, may conclude the cause is yielded them. This being that which they designed to contend for.
It must indeed be acknowledged, that some things belonging to the notion of God might have been more expressly named: But it was not necessary they should, being sufficiently included here, as will afterwards appear. Nor perhaps so convenient; some things, the express mention whereof is omitted, being such as more captious persons might be apt at first to startle at; which yet may, possibly as they are insinuated under other expressions become by degrees more inclinable to receive them afterwards. And however if this be not a full and adequate notion (as who can ever tell when we have an express, distinct particular notion of God, which we are sure is adequate and full?) it may however suffice, that it is a true one, as far as it goes, and such as cannot be mistaken for the notion of any thing else. And it will be more especially sufficient to our present purpose; if enough be comprehended in it to recommend him to us as a fit and worthy object of Religion; and whereto a Temple ⟨p. 30⟩ought to be designed. As it will appear there is, when also we shall have added what is intended concerning his conversableness with men. The ground whereof is also in great part included in this account of him; so that the consideration of it cannot be wholly severed from that of his existence: as hath been intimated above. That is, that if such a Being exist, unto which this notion belongs; it will sufficiently appear, he is such as that he can converse with men; though it doth not thence certainly follow that he will. For it were a rash and bold adventure to say he could not be God, if he did not condescend to such terms of reconciliation and converse with apostate creatures. Whereof therefore more is to be said than the mere manifesting his existence in its own place.
It must indeed be acknowledg'd, that some things belonging to the notion of God might have been more expresly named: But it was not necessary they should, being sufficiently included here, as will afterwards appear. Nor perhaps so convenient; some things, the express mention wherof is omitted, being such as more captious persons might be apt at first to startle at; which yet may, possibly as they are insinuated under other expressions become by degrees more inclinable to receive them afterwards. And however if this be not a full and adequate notion (as who can ever tell when we have an express, distinct particular notion of God, which we are sure is adequate and full?) it may however suffice, that it is a true one, as far as it goes, and such as cannot be mistaken for the notion of any thing else. And it will be more especially sufficient to our present purpose; if enough be comprehended in it to recommend him to us as a fit and worthy object of Religion; and whereto a Templea
And as to this, that we may proceed gradually, and in the most familiar and intelligible way that we can; we may
1. Be most assured, that there hath been somewhat or other from all eternity, or that 1looking backward, somewhat of real being must be confessed eternal. Let such, as have not been used to think of any thing more than what they could see with their eyes; and to whom reasoning only seems difficult, because they have not tried what they can do in it; but use their thoughts a little, and by moving them a few easy steps, they will soon find themselves as sure of this, as that they see or hear, or understand, or are any thing.
1. Be most assured, that there hath been somewhat or other from all eternity, or that 1looking backward, somewhat of real being must be confessed eternal. Let such, as have not been used to think of any thing more than what they could see with their eyes; and to whom reasoning only seems difficult, because they have not tried what they can do in it; but use their thoughts a little, and by moving them a few easie steps, they will soon find themselves as sure of this, as that they see or hear, or understand, or are any thing.
- 1IX.
For being sure that something now is (that you see, for instance, or are something.) You must then acknowledge that certainly either something always was, and hath ever been, or been from all eternity; or else you must say, that sometime nothing was; or that all being once was not. And so, since you find that something now is, that there was a time when any thing of being did begin to be, that is, that till that time there was nothing; But now at that time somewhat first began to be. For what can be plainer than that, if all being sometime was not, and now some being is, every thing of being had a beginning? And thence it would follow that some being, that is, the first that ever began to be, did of it self start up out of nothing, or made it self to be, when before, nothing was.
But now do you not plainly see that it is altogether impossible any thing should do so; that is, when it was as yet nothing, and when nothing at all as yet was, that it should make it self, or come into being of it self? For sure, making it self is doing something. But can that which is nothing do any thing? unto all doing there must be some doer. Wherefore a thing must be before it can do any thing; and therefore it would follow that it was before it was; or was and was not, was some thing and nothing at the same time. Yea, and it was divers from it self. For a cause must be a distinct thing from that which is caused by it. Wherefore it is most apparent that ⟨p. 32⟩some being hath ever been, or did never begin to be. Whence further,
2. It is also evident, that some being was uncaused, or was ever of it self, without any 1cause. For what never was from another had never any cause, since nothing could be its own cause. And somewhat, as appears from what hath been said, never was from another. Or it may be plainly argued thus; That either some being was uncaused, or all being was caused. But if all being were caused, then some one at least was the cause of it self: which hath been already shown impossible. Therefore the expression commonly used concerning the first Being that it was of it self, is only to be taken negatively, that is, that it was not of another, not positively, as if it did sometime make it self. Or, what there is positive, signified by that form of speech, is only to be taken thus, that it was a being of that nature, as that it was impossible it should ever not have been. Not that it did ever of it self step out of not being into Being: Of which more hereafter.
- 1X.
3. And now it is hence further evident that some being is independent upon any other, 1that is, whereas it already appears that some being did never depend on any other, as a productive cause. Or was not beholden to any other, that it might come into Being. It is thereupon equally evident that 'tis simply independent, or cannot be beholden to any for for its continued being. For what did never need a productive cause, doth as little need a ⟨p. 33⟩sustaining or conserving cause. And, to make this more plain, either some being is independent, or all being is dependent. But there is nothing without the compass of all being, whereon it may depend. Wherefore to say, that all being doth depend, is to say it depends on nothing, that is, that it depends not. For to depend on nothing is not to depend.
- 1XI.
It is therefore a manifest contradiction to say that all being doth depend: against which it is no relief to say, that all beings do circularly depend on one another. For so, however the whole circle or sphere of being, should depend on nothing, or one at last depend on it self; which negatively taken, as before, is true, and the thing we contend for; that one, the common support of all the rest depends not on any thing without it self. Whence also it is plainly consequent.
It is therefore a manifest contradiction to say that all being doth depend: against which it is no relief to say, that all beings do circularly depend on one another. For so, however the whole circle or sphere of being, should depend on nothing, or one at last depend on it self; which negatively taken, as before, is truc, and the thing we contend for; that one, the common support of all the rest depends not on any thing without it self. Whence also it is plainly consequent.
That 4. Such a Being is necessary, or doth 1necessarily exist: that is, that it is of such a nature as that it could not, or cannot but be. For what is in being neither by its own choice, or any others, is necessarily. But what was not made by it self (which hath been shown impossible that any thing should) nor by any other (as it hath been proved, something was not.) It is manifest it neither depended on its own choice, nor any others that it is. And therefore its existence is not owing to choice at all, but to the necessity of its own nature. Wherefore it is always by a simple, absolute, natural necessity; ⟨p. 34⟩being of such a nature, to which it is altogether repugnant, and impossible ever not to have been, or ever to cease from being. And now having gone thus far, and being assured that hitherto we feel the ground firm under us; that is, having gained a full certainty that there is an eternal, uncaused, independent necessary Being, and therefore actually, and everlastingly existing; we may advance one step further, and with equal assurance, add,
That 4. Such a Being is necessary, or doth 1necessarily exist: that is, that it is of such a nature as that it could not, or cannot but be. For what is in being neither by its own choice, or any others, is necessarily. But what was not made by it self (which hath been shewn impossible that any thing should) nor by any other (as it hath been proved, something was not.) It is manifest it neither depended on its own choice, nor any others that it is. And therefore its existence is not owing to choice at all, but to the necessity of its own nature. Wherefore it is always by a simple, absolute, natural necessity; ⟨p. 34⟩being of such a nature, to which it is altogether repugnant, and impossible ever not to have been, or ever to cease from being. And now having gone thus far, and being assured that hitherto we feel the ground firm under us; that is, having gained a full certainty that there is an eternal, uncaused, independent necessary Being, and therefore actually, and everlastingly existing; we may advance one step further, and with equal assurance, add,
- 1
5. That this eternal, independent uncaused 1Being, is self-active, that is, (which is at present meant) not such as acts upon it self, but that hath the power of acting upon other things in and of it self, without deriving it from any other. Or at least that there is such a Being as is eternal, uncaused, &c. having the power of action in and of it self.
- 1XIII.
For either such a Being as hath been already evinced is of it self active or unactive, or either hath the power of action of it self or not. If we will say the latter, let it be considered what we say, and to what purpose we say it. First, we are to weigh what it is we affirm, when we speak of an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being, that is of it self totally unactive, or destitute of any active power. If we will say there is some such thing, we will confess when we have called it something, it is a very silly, despicable, idle something, and a something, (if we look upon it alone) as good as nothing. For there is but little odds between ⟨p. 35⟩being nothing, and being able to do nothing. We will again confess, eternity, self-origination, independency, necessity of existence, to be very great and highly dignifying 1attributes; and that import a most unconceivable excellency. For what higher glory can we ascribe to any being, than to acknowledge it to have been from eternity of it self; without being beholden to any other, and to be such as that it can be, and cannot but be in the same state, self-subsisting, and self-sufficient to all eternity? And what unconceivable myriads of little senseless Deities must we upon that supposition admit (as would appear if it were fit to trouble the Reader with an explication of the nature and true notion of matter, which the being now supposed, must be found to be!) But what can our reason either direct, or endure, that we should so uncongruously misplace so magnificent attributes as these? and ascribe ⟨p. 36⟩the prime glory of the most excellent Being, unto that which is next to nothing? What might further be said to demonstrate the impossibility of a self-subsisting, and self-original, unactive being, will be here unseasonable, and pre-occupying. But if any in the mean time will be so sullen as to say such a thing,
For either such a Being as hath been already evinced is of it self active or unactive, or either hath the power of action of it self or not. If we will say the latter, let it be considered what we say, and to what purpose we say it. First, we are to weigh what it is we affirm, when we speak of an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being, that is of it self totally unactive, or destitute of any active power. If we will say there is some such thing, we will confess when we have called it something, it is a very silly, despicable, idle something, and a something, (if we look upon it alone) as good as nothing. For there is but little odds between
Let it 2. be considered to what purpose they say it. Is it to exclude a necessary self-active being? But it can signify nothing to that purpose. For such a Being they will be forced to acknowledge, let them do what they can (besides putting out their own eyes) notwithstanding. For why will they acknowledge any necessary Being at all, that was ever of it self? Is it not because they cannot otherwise for their hearts tell how it was ever possible that any thing at all could come into being? But finding that something is, they are compelled to acknowledge that something hath ever been, necessarily, and of it self. No other account could be given how other things came to be. But what? doth it signify any thing towards the giving an account of the original of all other things, to suppose only an eternal, self-subsisting, unactive Being? Did that cause other things to be? Will not their own breath choke them if they attempt to utter the self-contradicting words, an unactive cause, (i. e. Efficient or Author) of any thing. And do they not see they are as far from their mark, or do no more towards the assigning the original of ⟨p. 37⟩all other things, by supposing an eternal, unactive Being only, than if they supposed none at all. That what can do nothing, can no more be the productive cause of another, than that which is nothing? Wherefore by the same Reason that hath constrained us to acknowledge an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being, we are also unavoidably led to acknowledge this Being to be self-active, or such as hath the power of action in and of it self. Or that there is certainly such a Being, that is the cause of all the things which our sense tells us are besides existent in the world.
Let it 2. be considered to what purpose they say it. Is it to exclude a necessary self-active being? But it can signifie nothing to that purpose. For such a Being they will be forced to acknowledge, let them do what they can (besides putting out their own eyes) notwithstanding. For why will they acknowledge any necessary Being at all, that was ever of it self? Is it not because they cannot otherwise for their hearts tell how it was ever possible that any thing at all could come into being? But finding that something is, they are compell'd to acknowledge that something hath ever been, necessarily, and of it self. No other account could be given how other things came to be. But what? doth it signifie any thing towards the giving an account of the original of all other things, to suppose only an eternal, self-subsisting, unactive Being? Did that cause other things to be? Will not their own breath choak them if they attempt to utter the self-contradicting words, an unactive cause, (i. e. Efficient or Author) of any thing. And do they not see they are as far from their mark, or do no more towards the assigning the original of
For what else is left us to say or think? will 1we think fit to say that all things we behold were as they are necessarily existent from all eternity? That were to speak against our own eyes, which continually behold the rise and fall of living things, of whatsoever sort or kind, that can come under their notice. And it were to speak against the thing it self that we say, and to say and unsay the same thing in the same breath. For all the things we behold are in some respect or other (internal, or external) continually changing, and therefore could never long be beheld as they are. And to say then, they have been continually changing from eternity, and yet have been necessarily, is unintelligible, and flat non-sense. For what is necessarily, is always the same; and what is in this or that posture necessarily (that is by an intrinsic simple and absolute necessity, which must be here meant) must be ever so. Wherefore ⟨p. 38⟩to suppose the world in this or that state necessarily; and yet that such a state is changeable, is an impossible, and self-contradicting supposition.†
For what else is left us to say or think? will 1we think fit to say that all things we behold were as they are necessarily existent from all eternity? That were to speak against our own eyes, which continually behold the rise and fall of living things, of whatsoever sort or kind, that can come under their notice. And it were to speak against the thing it self that we say, and to say and unsay the same thing in the same breath. For all the things we behold are in some respect or other (internal, or external) continually changing, and therefore could never long be beheld as they are. And to say then, they have been continually changing from eternity, and yet have been necessarily, is unintelligible, and flat non-sense. For what is necessarily, is always the same; and what is in this or that posture necessarily (that is by an intrinsick simple and absolute necessity, which must be here meant) must be ever so. Wherefore ⟨p. 38⟩to suppose the world in this or that state necessarily; and yet that such a state is changeable, is an impossible, and self-contradicting supposition.
And to say any thing is changing from eternity, signifies it is always undergoing a change which is never past over, that is, that it is eternally unchanged, and is ever the same. For the least imaginable degree of change, is some change. What is in any the least respect changed, is not in every respect the same, suppose ⟨p. 40⟩then any thing in this present state or posture, and that it is eternally changing in it; either a new state and posture is acquired, or not. If it be, the former was temporary, and hath an end; and therefore the just and adequate measure of it was not eternity, which hath no end; much less of the change of it, or the transition from the one state to the other. But if no new state or posture be acquired (which any the least gradual alteration would make) then it is eternally unchanged in any the least degree. Therefore eternal changing is a manifest contradiction.
And to say any thing is changing from eternity, signifies it is always undergoing a change which is never past over, that is, that it is eternally unchang'd, and is ever the same. For the least imaginable degree of change, is some change. What is in any the least respect changed, is not in every respect the same, suppose ⟨p. 40⟩then any thing in this present state or posture, and that it is eternally changing in it; either a new state and posture is acquired, or not. If it be, the former was temporary, and hath an end; and therefore the just and adequate measure of it was not eternity, which hath no end; much less of the change of it, or the transition from the one state to the other. But if no new state or posture be acquired (which any the least gradual alteration would make) then it is eternally unchanged in any the least degree. Therefore eternal changing is a manifest contradiction.
But if it be said though eternity be not the measure of one change; it may be of infinite changes endlessly succeeding one another. Even this also will be found contradictions and impossible. For (not to trouble the Reader with the more intricate controversy of the possibility or impossibility of infinite or eternal succession, about which they who have a mind may consult others.*
But if it be said though eternity be not the measure of one change; it may be of infinite changes endlesly succeeding one another. Even this also will be found contradictions and impossible. For (not to trouble the Reader with the more intricate controversie of the possibility or impossibility of infinite or eternal succession, about which they who have a mind may consult others.*
- *Parker Tentam. Physico. Theolog. Derodon. Philos. cont. Dr. More's Enchirid. Metaphys.