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Let it 2. be considered to what purpose they say it. Is it to exclude a necessary self-active being? But it can signify nothing to that purpose. For such a Being they will be forced to acknowledge, let them do what they can (besides putting out their own eyes) notwithstanding. For why will they acknowledge any necessary Being at all, that was ever of it self? Is it not because they cannot otherwise for their hearts tell how it was ever possible that any thing at all could come into being? But finding that something is, they are compelled to acknowledge that something hath ever been, necessarily, and of it self. No other account could be given how other things came to be. But what? doth it signify any thing towards the giving an account of the original of all other things, to suppose only an eternal, self-subsisting, unactive Being? Did that cause other things to be? Will not their own breath choke them if they attempt to utter the self-contradicting words, an unactive cause, (i. e. Efficient or Author) of any thing. And do they not see they are as far from their mark, or do no more towards the assigning the original of ⟨p. 37⟩all other things, by supposing an eternal, unactive Being only, than if they supposed none at all. That what can do nothing, can no more be the productive cause of another, than that which is nothing? Wherefore by the same Reason that hath constrained us to acknowledge an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being, we are also unavoidably led to acknowledge this Being to be self-active, or such as hath the power of action in and of it self. Or that there is certainly such a Being, that is the cause of all the things which our sense tells us are besides existent in the world.
Let it 2. be considered to what purpose they say it. Is it to exclude a necessary self-active being? But it can signifie nothing to that purpose. For such a Being they will be forced to acknowledge, let them do what they can (besides putting out their own eyes) notwithstanding. For why will they acknowledge any necessary Being at all, that was ever of it self? Is it not because they cannot otherwise for their hearts tell how it was ever possible that any thing at all could come into being? But finding that something is, they are compell'd to acknowledge that something hath ever been, necessarily, and of it self. No other account could be given how other things came to be. But what? doth it signifie any thing towards the giving an account of the original of all other things, to suppose only an eternal, self-subsisting, unactive Being? Did that cause other things to be? Will not their own breath choak them if they attempt to utter the self-contradicting words, an unactive cause, (i. e. Efficient or Author) of any thing. And do they not see they are as far from their mark, or do no more towards the assigning the original of
all other things, by supposing an eternal, unactive Being only, than if they supposed none at all. That what can do nothing, can no more be the productive cause of another, than that which is nothing? Wherefore by the same Reason that hath constrained us to acknowledge an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being, we are also unavoidably led to acknowledge this Being to be self-active, or such as hath the power of action in and of it self. Or that there is certainly such a Being, that is the cause of all the things which our sense tells us are besides existent in the world.
For what else is left us to say or think? will 1we think fit to say that all things we behold were as they are necessarily existent from all eternity? That were to speak against our own eyes, which continually behold the rise and fall of living things, of whatsoever sort or kind, that can come under their notice. And it were to speak against the thing it self that we say, and to say and unsay the same thing in the same breath. For all the things we behold are in some respect or other (internal, or external) continually changing, and therefore could never long be beheld as they are. And to say then, they have been continually changing from eternity, and yet have been necessarily, is unintelligible, and flat non-sense. For what is necessarily, is always the same; and what is in this or that posture necessarily (that is by an intrinsic simple and absolute necessity, which must be here meant) must be ever so. Wherefore ⟨p. 38⟩to suppose the world in this or that state necessarily; and yet that such a state is changeable, is an impossible, and self-contradicting supposition.†
For what else is left us to say or think? will 1we think fit to say that all things we behold were as they are necessarily existent from all eternity? That were to speak against our own eyes, which continually behold the rise and fall of living things, of whatsoever sort or kind, that can come under their notice. And it were to speak against the thing it self that we say, and to say and unsay the same thing in the same breath. For all the things we behold are in some respect or other (internal, or external) continually changing, and therefore could never long be beheld as they are. And to say then, they have been continually changing from eternity, and yet have been necessarily, is unintelligible, and flat non-sense. For what is necessarily, is always the same; and what is in this or that posture necessarily (that is by an intrinsick simple and absolute necessity, which must be here meant) must be ever so. Wherefore ⟨p. 38⟩to suppose the world in this or that state necessarily; and yet that such a state is changeable, is an impossible, and self-contradicting supposition.†
1XIV.
†And whether by the way this will not afford us (though that be none of our present business) plain evidence that there can be no such thing as necessary alterable matter, may be examined by such as think fit to give themselves the diversion. For let it be considered, if every part and particle that makes up the matter of this universe, were it self a necessary being, and of it self from all eternity, it must have not only its simple being, but its being such or such, of it self necessarily, or rather every thing of it, or any way belonging to it, must be its very simple being it self. For whence should it receive any accession to it self when it is supposed equally independent upon its fellows, as any of them upon it? Suppose then only their various intercurrent motion among themselves, requisite to prepare them to, and unite them in the composition of particular bodies, and no other change of any other individual particle needful thereto, but only of their figure, place, and situation, till they shall come aptly to be disposed in the now attempted composition. How is even this change possible) For suppose one of these particles from eternity of such or such a figure, as triangular, hooked, &c. How can it lose any thing from it self, or suffer any alteration of its figure which essentially and necessarily belonged to it from eternity? That to which 'tis necessary to be such, 'tis impossible to it not to be such. Or suppose no alteration of figure (which Epicurus admits not) were necessary; but of situation and motion till it become conveniently situate. Even this change also will be simply impossible. Because you can frame no imagination of the existence of this or that particle, but you must suppose it in some or other ubi, or point of space, and if it be necessarily, it is here necessarily; for what is simply no where is nothing. But if it be here necessarily (that is in this or that point of space, for in some or other it must be, and it cannot be here and there at once) it must be here eternally, and can never not be here. Therefore we can have no notion of necessary alterable or movable matter, which is not inconsistent and repugnant to it self. Therefore also motion must proceed from an immovable mover, as hath been (though upon another ground) concluded of old. But how action ad extra stands with the immutability of the Deity must be fetched from the consideration of other perfections belonging thereto. Of which Metaphysicians and Schoolmen may be consulted, discoursing at large: See Suarez: Ledesma de divina perfectione, with many more at leisure. Whatsoever difficulty we may apprehend in this case. Or if we cannot so easily conceive how an eternal mind, foreseeing perfectly all futurity, together with an eternal efficacious determition of will concerning the existence of such and such things to such an instant or point of time, can suffice to their production without a super-added efflux of power at that instant: which would seem to infer somewhat of mutation; yet as the former of these cannot be demonstrated insufficient (nor shall we ever reckon our selves pinched in this matter till we see that plainly and fully done.) So they are very obstinately blind that cannot see upon the addition of the latter the vast difference of these two cases, viz. the facile silent egress of a sufficient power in pursuance to a calm, complacential, eternal purpose; for the production of this creation, by which the Agent acts not upon it self, but upon its own creature made by its own action; and the eternal blind ungovern'd action of matter upon it self, by which it is perpetually changing it self, while yet it is supposed necessarily what it was before: And how much more easily conceivable that is than this. How also liberty of action consists with necessity of existence, divers have shown: to which purpose somewhat not inconsiderable may be seen, Fioin. lib. 2. cap. 12. de immortal &c. But in this there can be little pretence to imagine a difficulty. For our own being, though not simply, yet as to us is necessary, i. e. it is impos'd upon us; for we come not into being by our own choice; and yet are conscious to our selves of no prejudice hereby to our liberty of acting. Yea and not only doth the former consist with this latter, but is inferr'd by it. Of which see Gibbeuf de libert. Dei, & creat.
And to say any thing is changing from eternity, signifies it is always undergoing a change which is never past over, that is, that it is eternally unchanged, and is ever the same. For the least imaginable degree of change, is some change. What is in any the least respect changed, is not in every respect the same, suppose ⟨p. 40⟩then any thing in this present state or posture, and that it is eternally changing in it; either a new state and posture is acquired, or not. If it be, the former was temporary, and hath an end; and therefore the just and adequate measure of it was not eternity, which hath no end; much less of the change of it, or the transition from the one state to the other. But if no new state or posture be acquired (which any the least gradual alteration would make) then it is eternally unchanged in any the least degree. Therefore eternal changing is a manifest contradiction.
And to say any thing is changing from eternity, signifies it is always undergoing a change which is never past over, that is, that it is eternally unchang'd, and is ever the same. For the least imaginable degree of change, is some change. What is in any the least respect changed, is not in every respect the same, suppose ⟨p. 40⟩then any thing in this present state or posture, and that it is eternally changing in it; either a new state and posture is acquired, or not. If it be, the former was temporary, and hath an end; and therefore the just and adequate measure of it was not eternity, which hath no end; much less of the change of it, or the transition from the one state to the other. But if no new state or posture be acquired (which any the least gradual alteration would make) then it is eternally unchanged in any the least degree. Therefore eternal changing is a manifest contradiction.
But if it be said though eternity be not the measure of one change; it may be of infinite changes endlessly succeeding one another. Even this also will be found contradictions and impossible. For (not to trouble the Reader with the more intricate controversy of the possibility or impossibility of infinite or eternal succession, about which they who have a mind may consult others.*
But if it be said though eternity be not the measure of one change; it may be of infinite changes endlesly succeeding one another. Even this also will be found contradictions and impossible. For (not to trouble the Reader with the more intricate controversie of the possibility or impossibility of infinite or eternal succession, about which they who have a mind may consult others.*
If this signify any thing to the present purpose, it must mean the infinite or eternal changes of a necessary being. And how these very terms do clash with one another, methinks any sound mind might apprehend at the first mention of them; And how manifestly repugnant the things are, may be collected from what hath been said; and especially from what was thought more fit to be annexed in the Margin.
If this signifie any thing to the present purpose, it must mean the infinite or eternal changes of a necessary being. And how these very terms do clash with one another, methinks any sound mind might apprehend at the first mention of them; And how manifestly repugnant the things are, may be collected from what hath been said; and especially from what was thought more fit to be annexed in the Margin.
But now since we find that the present state ⟨p. 41⟩of things is changeable, and actually changing, and that what is changeable is not necessarily, and of it self.
But now since we find that the present state ⟨p. 41⟩of things is changeable, and actually changing, and that what is changable is not necessarily, and of it self.
And since it is evident that there is some necessary Being, otherwise nothing could ever have been, and that without action nothing could be from it. Since also all change imports somewhat of passion, and all passion supposes action, and all action, active power, and active power an original seat or subject, that is self-active, or that hath the power of action in and of it self. For there could be no derivation of it from that which hath it not, and no first derivation, but from that which hath it originally of it self. And a first derivation there must be, since all things that are or ever have been furnished with it, and not of themselves must either mediately or immediately have derived it from that which had it of it self. It is therefore manifest, that there is a necessary self-active Being, The cause and Author of this perpetually variable state and frame of things. And hence,
And since it is evident that there is some necessary Being, otherwise nothing could ever have been, and that without action nothing could be from it. Since also all change imports somewhat of passion, and all passion supposes action, and all action, active power, and active power an original seat or subject, that is selfactive, or that hath the power of action in and of it self. For there could be no derivation of it from that which hath it not, and no firstderivation, but from that which hath it originally of it self. And a first derivation there must be, since all things that are or ever have been furnisht with it, and not of themselves must either mediately or immediately have derived it from that which had it of it self. It is therefore manifest, that there is a necessary selfactive Being, The cause and Author of this perpetually variable state and frame of things. And hence,
6. Since we can frame no notion of life which self-active power doth not, at least, comprehend 1(as upon trial we shall find that we cannot) it is consequent that this Being is also originally vital, and the root of all vitality, such as hath life in or of it self, and from whence it is propagated to every other living thing.†
1XV.
†Which will also prove it to be a Spirit; unto which order of Beings essential vitality, or that life be essential to them, seems as distinguishing a property between it and a body, as any other we can fasten upon, that is, that though a body may be truly said to live; yet it lives by a life that is accidental, and separable from it. So as that it may cease to live, and yet be a body still; whereas a Spirit lives by its own essence; so that it can no more cease to live than to be. And as, where that essence is borrowed and derived only, as 'tis with all created Spirits, so its life must needs be therewithal. So the eternal self-subsisting Spirit, lives necessarily, and of it self, according as, necessarily and of it self, it is, or hath its being. Which is only annoted, with a design not to trouble this discourse with any disquisition concerning the nature and other properties of a spiritual Being. Of which enough hath been, with great evidence, said, by the incomparable Dr. More.
And so as we plainly see that this sensible world did sometime begin to be, 'tis also evident it took its beginning from a Being essentially vital, and active, that had it self no beginning. Nor can we make a difficulty to conclude that this Being, (which now we have shown, is active, and all action implies some power) is
And so as we plainly see that this sensible world did sometime begin to be, 'tis also evident it took its beginning from a Being essentially vital, and active, that had it self no beginning. Nor can we make a difficulty to conclude that this Being, (which now we have shewn, is active, and all action implies some power) is
7. Of vast and mighty Power (we will not 1say infinite, lest we should step too far at once; not minding now to discuss whether creation require infinite power) when we consider and contemplate the vastness of the work performed by it. Unto which (if we were to make our estimate by nothing else) we must, at least, judge this power to be proportionable. For when our eyes behold an effect exceeding the power of any cause which they can behold, our mind must step in and supply the defect of our feebler sense; so as to make a judgment there is a cause we see not, equal to this effect. As when we behold a great and magnificent fabric, and entering in we see not the master or ⟨p. 43⟩any living thing (which was Cicero's Observation 2in reference to this present purpose) besides Mice or Weasels, we will not think that Mice or Weasels built it. Nor need we, in a matter so obvious, insist further. But only when our severer Reason hath made us confess, our further contemplation should make us admire a power which is at once both so apparent, and so stupendous.
7. Of vast and mighty Power (we will not 1say infinite, lest we should step too far at once; not minding now to discuss whether creation require infinite power) when we consider and contemplate the vastness of the work performed by it. Unto which (if we were to make our estimate by nothing else) we must, at least, judge this power to be proportionable. For when our eyes behold an effect exceeding the power of any cause which they can behold, our mind must step in and supply the defect of our feebler sense; so as to make a judgment there is a cause we see not, equal to this effect. As when we behold a great and magnificent fabrick, and entring in we see not the master or ⟨p. 43⟩any living thing (which was Cicero's Observation 2in reference to this present purpose) besides Mice or Weasles, we will not think that Mice or Weasels built it. Nor need we, in a matter so obvious, insist further. But only when our severer Reason hath made us confess, our further contemplation should make us admire a power which is at once both so apparent, and so stupendous.
Corollary. And now from what hath been hitherto discoursed, it seems a plain and necessary consectary, That this world had a cause divers from the matter whereof it is composed.
For otherwise matter that hath been more generally taken to be of it self altogether unactive, must be stated the only cause and fountain of all the action and motion that is now to be found in the whole Universe. Which is a conceit wild and absurd enough; not only as it opposes the common judgment of such as have with the greatest diligence enquired into things of this nature, But as being in it self manifestly impossible to be true.
And also that otherwise all the great and undeniable changes which continually happen in it must proceed from its ⟨p. 44⟩own constant and eternal action upon it self, while it is yet feigned to be a necessary being; with the notion whereof they are notoriously inconsistent. Which therefore we taking to be most clear, may now the more securely proceed to what follows.
Wisdom asserted to belong to this Being. The production of this world by a mighty Agent destitute of Wisdom impossible. On consideration of, 1. What would be adverse to this production. 2. What would be wanting some effects to which a designing cause will, on all hands, be confessed necessary, as having manifest characters of skill and design upon them. Absurd here to except the works of nature. Wherein at least equal characters of Wisdom and design to be seen, as in any the most confessed pieces of Art, Instanced in the frame and Motion of heavenly bodies. A mean, unphilosophical temper to be more taken with novelties than common things of greater importance. Further instance in the composition of the bodies of Animals. Two contrary causes of mens not acknowledging the Wisdom of their Maker herein. Progress is made from the consideration of the parts and frame, to powers and functions of Terrestrial Creatures. Growth, Nutrition, Propagation of kind. ⟨p. 45⟩Spontaneous motion, Sensation. The pretence considered, that the bodies of Animals are machines. 1. How improbable it is. 2. How little to the purpose. The powers of the humane soul. It appears, notwithstanding them, it had a cause; By them, a wise and intelligent cause. It is not matter. That not capable of Reason. They not here reflected on who think reasonable souls made of refined matter by the Creator. Not being matter, nor arising from thence it must have a Cause that is intelligent. 9. Goodness also belonging to this Being.
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And whether by the way this will not afford us (though that be none of our present business) plain evidence that there can be no such thing as necessary alterable matter, may be examined by such as think fit to give themselves the diversion. For let it be considered, if every part and particle that makes up the matter of this universe, were it self a necessary being, and of it self from all eternity, it must have not only its simple being, but its being such or such, of it self necessarily, or rather every thing of it, or any way belonging to it, must be its very simple being it self. For whence should it receive any accession to it self when it is supposed equally independent upon its fellows, as any of them upon it? Suppose then only their various intercurrent motion among themselves, requisite to prepare them to, and unite them in the composition of particular bodies, and no other change of any other individual particle needful thereto, but only of their figure, place, and scituation, till they shall come aptly to be disposed in the now attempted composition. How is even this change possible) For suppose one of these particles from eternity of such or such a figure, as triangular, hooked, &c. How can it lose any thing from it self, or suffer any alteration of its figure which essentially and necessarily belonged to it from eternity? That to which 'tis necessary to be such, 'tis impossible to it not to be such. Or suppose no alteration of figure (which Epicurus admits not) were necessary; but of situation and motion till it become conveniently situate. Even this change also will be simply impossible. Because you can frame no imagination of the existence of this or that particle, but you must suppose it in some or other ubi, or point of space, and if it be necessarily, it is here necessarily; for what is simply no where is nothing. But if it be here necessarily (that is in this or that point of space, for in some or other it must be, and it cannot be here and there at once) it must be here eternally, and can never not be here. Therefore we can have no notion of necessary alterable or movable matter, which is not inconsistent and repugnant to it self. Therefore also motion must proceed from an immovable mover, as hath been (though upon another ground) concluded of old. But how action ad extra stands with the immutability of the Deity must be fetcht from the consideration of other perfections belonging thereto. Of which Metaphysicians and Schoolmen may be consulted, discoursing at large: See Suarez: Ledesma de divina perfectione, with many more at leasure. Whatsoever difficulty we may apprehend in this case. Or if we cannot so easily conceive how an eternal mind, foreseeing perfectly all futurity, together with an eternal efficacious determition of will concerning the existence of such and such things to such an instant or point of time, can suffice to their production without a super-added efflux of power at that instant: which would seem to infer somewhat of mutation; yet as the former of these cannot be demonstrated insufficient (nor shall we ever reckon our selves pincht in this matter till we see that plainly and fully done.) So they are very obstinately blind that cannot see upon the addition of the latter the vast difference of these two cases, viz. the facile silent egress of a sufficient power in pursuance to a calm, complacential, eternal purpose; for the production of this creation, by which the Agent acts not upon it self, but upon its own creature made by its own action; and the eternal blind ungovern'd action of matter upon it self, by which it is perpetually changing it self, while yet it is supposed necessarily what it was before: And how much more easily conceivable that is than this. How also liberty of action consists with necessity of existence, divers have shewn: to which purpose somewhat not inconsiderable may be seen, Fioin. lib. 2. cap. 12. de immortal &c. But in this there can be little pretence to imagine a difficulty. For our own being, though not simply, yet as to us is necessary, i. e. it is impos'd upon us; for we come not into being by our own choice; and yet are conscious to our selves of no prejudice hereby to our liberty of acting. Yea and not only doth the former consist with this latter, but is inferr'd by it. Of which see Gibbeuf de libert. Dei, & creat.