A48160:22
A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defence of Dr. Sherlock's…A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defense of Dr. Sherlock's…
A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defence of Dr. Sherlock's notion of the Trinity in unity, relating to the Calm and sober enquiry upon the same subjectA letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defense of Dr. Sherlock's notion of the Trinity in unity, relating to the Calm and sober enquiry upon the same subject
London: printed by J. Astwood for Tho. Parkhurst, 1694
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
2. Be examined whether the Dean has said as much for salving the Unity of the Godhead as the Enquirer, or as much as is requisite to that purpose. And here our Business will be short, for it all turns upon that one single point, whether mutual Consciousness be that Union which must be acknowledged, or suppose it only. For which we need only appeal to common Reason, whether Being do not in the natural Order precede even the Power of working, and consequently whether being united vitally, precede not the possibility of acting agreeably to that united state, whereupon the Enquiry is not concerning actual conscience only, but (as he speaks) Consciousness. Is it possible any three Persons or Intelligent ⟨p. 14⟩Subsistences, should naturally have vital Perception of each others internal Motions and Sensations, without being vitally preunited? I say naturally, for that God might give to three created Spirits a temporary Perception of each other without bringing them into a stated Union each with other, is little to be doubted; as a Spirit may assume a Body and animate it pro tempore without being substantially united with it. And if that Body were also a Spirit they might pro tempore for ought we know by extraordinary Divine Disposition (for within the ordinary course of Nature we know of no such intimacy of created Spirits to another) be quasi animae to one another. But if naturally they were so to mingle and transfuse Sensations mutually into each other, they must be naturally, first, in vital union with one another. Nor therefore did the Enquirer mistake the Dean's Notion as the Defender fancies in the passage he quotes p. 104. as if ⟨p. 15⟩he took mutual Consciousness for mere mutual Perspection. For tho' scire abstractly taken doth not signify more than perspicere, yet the Enquirer in that passage speaking of a never so perfect mutual perspection properly enough expressed thereby as great a feeling such Spirits were supposed to have of each other, in themselves, as mutual consciousness is apt to signify, or as the Dean can yet be supposed to have meant, that perspection being more perfect which produces gusts and relishes suitable to the Object, than that which stays in mere speculation only.
2. Be examin'd whether the Dean has said as much for salving the Unity of the Godhead as the Enquirer, or as much as is requisite to that purpose. And here our Business will be short, for it all turns upon that one single point, whether mutual Consciousness be that Union which must be acknowledged, or suppose it only. For which we need only appeal to common Reason, whether Being do not in the natural Order precede even the Power of working, and consequently whether being united vitally, precede not the possibility of acting agreeably to that united state, whereupon the Enquiry is not concerning actual conscience only, but (as he speaks) Consciousness. Is it possible any three Persons or Intelligent