First, Consider his Disputation as levelled against the Hypothesis or supposition of such distinct essences, natures, minds, spirits, in necessary, eternal Union in the Divine Being. And one of his arguments against it, is in those words of his One principal argument against it (here put out parts and composition which are his own, and we have no more to do with them) is, that God is eternal and unmade, and whatsoever (hath parts, says he) hath such essences in it, must have a maker. And here let him prove his consequence, and his business is done, viz. both ways, as will be seen by and by. But let him show the inconsistency between a things having such distinct essences naturally and necessarily united in it, (as the supposition to be argued against is, and before ought to have been justly stated) and it's being eternal and unmade. But how that is to be evinced I can not so much as ⟨p. 34⟩guess; confident affirmation, against the most obvious Tenor of Gods own Word, is of little account, who shall ascend into the heavens? or fathom the depths? or can have that perspection of God's incomprehensible nature, as without (and visibly against) his own revelation to be able, without great rashness, to pronounce so concerning him? But so toyish an Argument as here follows, is worse than the Position; i. e. when one shall say, that for ought we know there may be three distinct Essences by an eternal unmade union, united into one, in the Being of God; any man should say, and be so vain as to expect to be regarded, that because they are united by an eternal and unmade union, therefore they are not united by an eternal and unmade union! If there be not a Contradiction in the terms to disprove a thing, by it self, is to say nothing, or is all one with proving a thing by it self. He proceeds, to what ⟨p. 35⟩hath no thing in it like an Argument, but against his own Conceit of parts, and that very trifling too. There can be but one eternal nature in God: But if there be three — there must be three. This 'tis now come to, proving his Point by its self. Here he makes sure work to have nothing denied, but then nothing is proved, no advance is made; if there be three, there must be three. But if there be three what? eternal parts: There must be three different Natures, or else they — would be the same. (What? tho' distinct?) But this supposes some body said the first: And who? himself;
First, Consider his Disputation as levell'd against the Hypothesis or supposition of such distinct essences, natures, minds, spirits, in necessary, eternal Union in the Divine Being. And one of his arguments against it, is in those words of his One principal argument against it (here put out parts and composition which are his own, and we have no more to do with them) is, that God is eternal and unmade, and whatsoever (hath parts, saies he) hath such essences in it, must have a maker. And here let him prove his consequence, and his business is done, viz. both ways, as will be seen by and by. But let him shew the inconsistency between a things having such distinct essences naturally and necessarily united in it, (as the supposition to be argued against is, and before ought to have been justly stated) and it's being eternal and unmade. But how that is to be evinced I can not so much as ⟨p. 34⟩guess; confident affirmation, against the most obvious Tenour of Gods own Word, is of little account, who shall ascend into the heavens? or fathom the depths? or can have that perspection of God's incomprehensible nature, as without (and visibly against) his own revelation to be able, without great rashness, to pronounce so concerning him? But so toyish an Argument as here follows, is worse than the Position; i. e. when one shall say, that for ought we know there may be three distinct Essences by an eternal unmade union, united into one, in the Being of God; any man should say, and be so vain as to expect to be regarded, that because they are united by an eternal and unmade union, therefore they are not united by an eternal and unmade union! If there be not a Contradiction in the terms to disprove a thing, by it self, is to say nothing, or is all one with proving a thing by it self. He proceeds, to what ⟨p. 35⟩hath no thing in it like an Argument, but against his own Conceit of parts, and that very trifling too. There can be but one eternal nature in God: But if there be three — there must be three. This 'tis now come to, proving his Point by its self. Here he makes sure work to have nothing deny'd, but then nothing is prov'd, no advance is made; if there be three, there must be three. But if there be three what? eternal parts: There must be three different Natures, or else they — would be the same. (What? tho' distinct?) But this supposes some body said the first: And who? himself;