A48160:48
A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defence of Dr. Sherlock's…A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defense of Dr. Sherlock's…
A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defence of Dr. Sherlock's notion of the Trinity in unity, relating to the Calm and sober enquiry upon the same subjectA letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defense of Dr. Sherlock's notion of the Trinity in unity, relating to the Calm and sober enquiry upon the same subject
London: printed by J. Astwood for Tho. Parkhurst, 1694
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But wherein doth the Enquirer own it? because such a Similitude is used (as 'tis often in that discourse) of the union between soul and body (declared ⟨p. 41⟩elsewhere to be unexpressibly defective) that therefore the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are each of them by himself no more truly Lord or God, according to the Athanasian Creed, or otherwise than in as improper a sense, as the Body of a Man, excluding the Soul, is a Man, or an Humane Person. Or as if Deity were no more in one of the Persons, than humanity in a Carcass! who that looks upon all this with equal Eyes, but will rather choose as doubtful a notion, than so apparently ill a Spirit! Are similitudes ever wont to be alike throughout, to what they are brought to illustrate? It might as well be said, because he mentions with Approbation such as illustrate the Doctrine of the Trinity by a Tree and its Branches, that, therefore, there we are to expect Leaves and Blossoms. Is it strange the Created Universe should not afford us an exact Representation of uncreated Being? How could he but think of that; ⟨p. 42⟩To whom do ye liken me? At least one would have thought he should not have forgot what he had so lately said himself. We must grant we have no perfect Example of any such union in nature. What Appetite in him is it,1 that now seeks what Nature doth not afford? A very unnatural One, we may conclude. 'Twere trifling to repeat what was said, and was so plain, before, that the union between Soul and Body was never brought to illustrate personal union but essential. The former is here imagined without pretence, there being no mention or occasion for the the mentioning of Persons in the place he alleges.2 But to make out his violent Consequence he foists in a supposition, that never came into any man's Imagination but a Socinians and his own. (Which I say, contradistinguishing him to them, that the matter may (as it ought) appear the more strange.3) If God be a person, he can ⟨p. 43⟩be but one. Is God the appropriate Name of a Person? then indeed there will be but one person; but who here says so but himself? The name God is the name of the Essence, not the distinguishing name of a Person. But if three intelligent Natures be united in one Deity, each will be Persons, and each will be God, and all will be one God; not by parts, other than conceptible, undivided, and inseparable, as the Soul and Body of a Man are not.