But since he expressly says (and I think for the most part truly) that1 ⟨p. 54⟩the three Persons or subsistences, in the ever blessed Trinity are three real, substantial subsistences, each of which hath entirely, all the Perfections of the Divine Nature, Divine Wisdom, Power, and Goodness; and therefore each of them is eternal, Infinite mind, as distinct from each other as any other three Persons; and this he believes, the Dean will no more recant, than he will renounce a Trinity; for all the wit of man, can not find a medium, between a substantial Trinity, and a Trinity of names, or a Trinity of mere modes, Respects and Relations in the same single essence, which is no Trinity at all. As also he had said much to the same purpose before, that to talk of three subsistences in the abstract, without three that subsist, or of one single nature which hath three subsistences, when it's impossible that in singularity there can be more than one subsistence, &c. I believe he will find no small difficulty to name what it is, that with the peculiar distinct manner of subsistence makes a person; not the very same common nature, ⟨p. 55⟩for the Persons can not be distinguished from each other by that which is common to them all. Therefore the Divine Nature which is common to the three, must according to him comprehend three single natures, and not be absolutely simple. Hither must be his resort at last, after all his earnest disputation against it. And these he will have to be parts, which because they are undivided, impartible, inseparable, everlastingly and necessarily united. I do reckon the Enquirer did with very sufficient reason, and with just decency (and doth still continue very peremptorily to) deny.
But since he expresly saies (and I think for the most part truly) that1 ⟨p. 54⟩the three Persons or subsistences, in the ever blessed Trinity are three real, substantial subsistances, each of which hath entirely, all the Perfections of the Divine Nature, Divine Wisdom, Power, and Goodness; and therefore each of them is eternal, Infinite mind, as distinct from each other as any other three Persons; and this he believes, the Dean will no more recant, than he will renounce a Trinity; for all the wit of man, can not find a medium, between a substantial Trinity, and a Trinity of names, or a Trinity of meer modes, Respects and Relations in the same single essence, which is no Trinity at all. As also he had said much to the same purpose before, that to talk of three subsistences in the abstract, without three that subsist, or of one single nature which hath three subsistences, when it's impossible that in singularity there can be more than one subsistence, &c. I believe he will find no small difficulty to name what it is, that with the peculiar distinct manner of subsistence makes a person; not the very same common nature, ⟨p. 55⟩for the Persons can not be distinguished from each other by that which is common to them all. Therefore the Divine Nature which is common to the three, must according to him comprehend three single natures, and not be absolutely simple. Hither must be his resort at last, after all his earnest disputation against it. And these he will have to be parts, which because they are undivided, impartible, inseparable, everlastingly and necessarily united. I do reckon the Enquirer did with very sufficient reason, and with just decency (and doth still continue very peremptorily to) deny.
- 1Defence p. 30.
