A48160:65
A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defence of Dr. Sherlock's…A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defense of Dr. Sherlock's…
A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defence of Dr. Sherlock's notion of the Trinity in unity, relating to the Calm and sober enquiry upon the same subjectA letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defense of Dr. Sherlock's notion of the Trinity in unity, relating to the Calm and sober enquiry upon the same subject
London: printed by J. Astwood for Tho. Parkhurst, 1694
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Upon the whole matter I see not what service it can do him, to put intelligent person instead of mind. For I thought every Person had been intelligent. Boethius his definition which he alleges plainly implies so much, and one would think he must know that it is the usual notion of Person to understand by it suppositum rationale or intelligents. Therefore methinks he should not reckon it necessary to distinguish Persons (as he doth by this addition of intelligent) into such as are Persons and such as are no Persons.
Upon the whole matter I see not what service it can do him, to put intelligent person instead of mind. For I thought every Person had been intelligent. Boethius his definition which he alledges plainly implies so much, and one would think he must know that it is the usual notion of Person to understand by it suppositum rationale or intelligents. Therefore methinks he should not reckon it necessary to distinguish Persons (as he doth by this addition of intelligent) into such as are Persons and such as are no Persons.
But since he expressly says (and I think for the most part truly) that1 ⟨p. 54⟩the three Persons or subsistences, in the ever blessed Trinity are three real, substantial subsistences, each of which hath entirely, all the Perfections of the Divine Nature, Divine Wisdom, Power, and Goodness; and therefore each of them is eternal, Infinite mind, as distinct from each other as any other three Persons; and this he believes, the Dean will no more recant, than he will renounce a Trinity; for all the wit of man, can not find a medium, between a substantial Trinity, and a Trinity of names, or a Trinity of mere modes, Respects and Relations in the same single essence, which is no Trinity at all. As also he had said much to the same purpose before, that to talk of three subsistences in the abstract, without three that subsist, or of one single nature which hath three subsistences, when it's impossible that in singularity there can be more than one subsistence, &c. I believe he will find no small difficulty to name what it is, that with the peculiar distinct manner of subsistence makes a person; not the very same common nature,