A53733:200
Truth and innocence vindicated in a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and…
Truth and innocence vindicated in a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and the authority of the civil magistrate over the consciences of subjects in matters of religion.
London : s.n., 1669
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
These things being premised, the Argument it self pleaded in this Chap. is capable of a speedy dispatch. It is to this purpose. The Magistrate hath power over the consciences of men in reference to Morals, or Moral Virtues, which are the principal things in Religion, and therefore much more hath so in reference to the Worship of God, which is of less importance. We have complained before of the ambiguity of these general terms, but it is to no purpose to do so any more, seeing we are not like to be relieved in this discourse. Let us then take things as we find them, and satisfy our selves in the intention of the Author, by that Declaration which he makes of it up and down the Chap. But yet here we ⟨p. 231⟩are at a loss also. When he speaks, or seems to speak to this purpose, whether in the confirmation of the Proposition, or the Inference, whereof his Argument consists, what he says is cast into such an inter-texture with invectives and reproaches, and expressed in such a loose declamatory manner, as it is hard to discover or find out what it is that he intends. Suppose therefore in the first place, that a Man should call his consequent into question; namely that because the Magistrate hath power over the Consciences of his subjects in morals, that therefore he hath so also in matters of Instituted Worship? how will he confirm and vindicate it? Two things are all I can observe that are offered in the confirmation of it. First, That these things of morality, moral Virtues, are of more importance in Religion than the outward worship of God, which the amplitude of power before asserted, is now reducing to a respect unto. Secondly, That there is much more danger of his erring and mistaking in things of morality, than in things of outward Worship, because of their great weight and importance. These things are pleaded, p. 28. And elsewhere up and down. That any thing else is offered, in the confirmation of this consequent I find ⟨p. 232⟩not. And it may be some will think these proofs to be very weak and feeble, unable to sustain the weight that is laid upon them. For it is certain that the first Rule, that he that hath power over the Greater, hath so over the Lesser, doth not hold unless it be in things of the same nature and kind;
These things being premised, the Argument it self pleaded in this Chap. is capable of a speedy dispatch. It is to this purpose. The Magistrate hath power over the consciences of men in reference to Morals, or Moral Vertues, which are the principal things in Religion, and therefore much more hath so in reference to the Worship of God, which is of less importance. We have complained before of the ambiguity of these general terms, but it is to no purpose to do so any more, seeing we are not like to be relieved in this discourse. Let us then take things as we find them, and satisfie our selves in the intention of the Author, by that Declaration which he makes of it up and down the Chap. But yet here we