A53733:203
Truth and innocence vindicated in a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and…
Truth and innocence vindicated in a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and the authority of the civil magistrate over the consciences of subjects in matters of religion.
London : s.n., 1669
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Nor is the latter consideration suggested to enforce this consequent of any more validity; namely, that there is more danger of the Magistrates erring or mistakes about Moral Virtue, than about Rites of Worship; because that is of most concernment in Religion. For it is true, that suppose a Man to walk on the top of an high house or Tower, on a plain floor with battlements or Walls round about him, there will be more danger of breaking his neck, if he should fall from thence, than if he should fall from the top of a narrow wall that had not the fourth part of the height of the house. But there would not be so much danger of falling. For from the top of the house as circumstantiated, he cannot fall, unless he will wilfully and violently cast himself down headlong; and ⟨p. 234⟩on the top of the Wall, it may be, he cannot stand, with the utmost of his heed and endeavours. The Magistrate cannot mistake about Moral Virtues unless he will do it wilfully. They have their station fixed in the world, on the same ground and evidence with Magistracy it self. The same evidence, the same common consent and suffrage of mankind is given unto Moral Virtues, as is to any Government in the World. And to suppose a supreme Magistrate, a Law-giver, to mistake in these things, in judging whether Justice, and Temperance, or Fortitude, be Virtues or no, and that in their Legislative capacity, is ridiculous. Neither Nero nor Caligula were ever in danger of any such mis-adventure. All the Magistrates in the World at this day, are agreed about these things. But as to what concerns the Worship of God, they are all at variance. There is no such Evidence in these things, no such common suffrage about them, as to free any absolutely from failings and mistakes; so that in respect of them, and not of the other, lies the principal danger of miscarrying, as to their determination and administration. Supposing therefore the Premises our Author lays down to be true, his Inference from them is feeble, and obnoxious ⟨p. 235⟩to various impeachments, whereof I have given some few Instances only, which shall be increased if occasion require.
Nor is the latter consideration suggested to inforce this consequent of any more validity; namely, that there is more danger of the Magistrates erring or mistakes about Moral Vertue, than about Rites of Worship; because that is of most concernment in Religion. For it is true, that suppose a Man to walk on the top of an high house or Tower, on a plain floor with battlements or Walls round about him, there will be more danger of breaking his neck, if he should fall from thence, than if he should fall from the top of a narrow wall that had not the fourth part of the heighth of the house. But there would not be so much danger of falling. For from the top of the house as circumstantiated, he cannot fall, unless he will wilfully and violently cast himself down headlong; and