A53733:204
Truth and innocence vindicated in a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and…
Truth and innocence vindicated in a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and the authority of the civil magistrate over the consciences of subjects in matters of religion.
London : s.n., 1669
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But the Assertion it self which is the foundation of these consequences, is utterly remote from Accuracy and Truth. It is said that the Magistrate hath power over the Consciences of Men in reference unto Moral Duties, which are the principal parts of Religion. Our first and most difficult inquiry, is after the meaning of this Proposition, the later after its truth. I ask then, first whether he hath power over the Consciences of men with respect unto Moral Virtue, and over Moral Virtue it self, as Virtue, and as a part of Religion, or on some other account; If his power respect Virtue as a part of Religion, then it equally extends it self to all that is so, by Virtue of a Rule which will not be easily everted. But it doth not appear that it so extends it self as to plead an obliging Authority in reference unto all Duties. For let but the Scheme of Moral Duties, especially those whose Object is God, given us by our Author be considered, and it will quickly be discerned how many of them are exempted from all humane cognizance and Authority; and that from ⟨p. 236⟩and by their nature as well as their use in the World. And it is in vain to ascribe an authority to Magistrates which they have no power to exert, or take cognizance whether it be obeyed or no. And what can they do therein with respect unto Gratitude to God, which holds the first place in the Scheme of Moral Virtues here given in unto us. We are told also, p. 83. That in matters both of Moral Virtue, and Divine Worship, there are some rules of Good and Evil that are of an Eternal and unchangeable obligation, and these can never be prejudiced or altered by any humane power, because the reason of their Obligation arises from a necessity and constitution of nature, and therefore must be […] perpetual as that; but then there are other rules of Duty that are alterable according to the various accidents changes and conditions of humane life, and depend chiefly upon contracts and positive Laws of Kingdoms. It would not be unworthy our inquiry to consider what rules of Moral Duty they are, which are alterable and depend on accidents and contracts. But we might easily find work enough, should we call all such fond Assertions to a just examination. Neither doth the distinction here given us between various Rules of Moral Virtue, very well answer what we are told, p. 69.
But the Assertion it self which is the foundation of these consequences, is utterly remote from Accuracy and Truth. It is said that the Magistrate hath power over the Consciences of Men in reference unto Moral Duties, which are the principal parts of Religion. Our first and most difficult inquiry, is after the meaning of this Proposition, the later after its truth. I ask then, first whether he hath power over the Consciences of men with respect unto Moral Vertue, and over Moral Vertue it self, as Vertue, and as a part of Religion, or on some other account; If his power respect Vertue as a part of Religion, then it equally extends it self to all that is so, by Vertue of a Rule which will not be easily everted. But it doth not appear that it so extends it self as to plead an obliging Authority in reference unto all Duties. For let but the Scheme of Moral Duties, especially those whose Object is God, given us by our Author be considered, and it will quickly be discerned how many of them are exempted from all humane cognizance and Authority; and that from