5. There is nothing of any dangerous or had consequence in this whole controversy, ⟨p. 323⟩but what lies in the imposition on mens practices of the Observation of uncommanded Rites, making them necessary unto them in their observation. The things themselves are said in their own nature, antecedent to their injunction for practice, to be indifferent, and indifferent as unto practice. What hurt would it be to leave them so? They cannot, say some, be omitted for such and such Reasons. Are there then Reasons: for their observation besides their Injunction, and such as on the account whereof they are enjoined? Then are they indeed necessary in some degree before their Injunction. For all Reason for them must be taken from themselves. And things wholly indifferent have nothing in themselves one more than another, why one should be taken, and another left. For if one have the advantage of another in the Reasons for its practice, it is no more indifferent: at least it is not comparatively so. Granting therefore, things enjoined to be antecedently to their injunction, equally indifferent in their own nature, with all other things of the same or the like kind, which yet are rejected or not enjoined; and then to give reasons taken from themselves, their decency, their conducingness to edification, their tendency ⟨p. 324⟩to the increase of devotion, their significancy of this or that; is to speak daggers and contradictions; and to say, a thing is indifferent before the injunction of its practice; but yet if we had thought so, we would never have enjoined it; seeing we do so upon reasons. And without doubt this making necessary the practice of things in the worship of God, proclaimed to be indifferent in themselves, and no way called for by any antecedent Reason, is an act of power.
5. There is nothing of any dangerous or had consequence in this whole controversie, ⟨p. 323⟩but what lyes in the imposition on mens practices of the Observation of uncommanded Rites, making them necessary unto them in their observation. The things themselves are said in their own nature, antecedent to their injunction for practice, to be indifferent, and indifferent as unto practice. What hurt would it be to leave them so? They cannot, say some, be omitted for such and such Reasons. Are there then Reasons: for their observation besides their Injuction, and such as on the account whereof they are injoyned? Then are they indeed necessary in some degree before their Injunction. For all Reason for them must be taken from themselves. And things wholly indifferent have nothing in themselves one more than another, why one should be taken, and another left. For if one have the advantage of another in the Reasons for its practice, it is no more indifferent: at least it is not comparatively so. Granting therefore, things injoyned to be antecedently to their injunction, equally indifferent in their own nature, with all other things of the same or the like kind, which yet are rejected or not injoyned; and then to give reasons taken from themselves, their decency, their conducingness to edification, their tendency ⟨p. 324⟩to the increase of devotion, their significancy of this or that; is to speak daggers and contradictions; and to say, a thing is indifferent before the injuction of its practice; but yet if we had thought so, we would never have enjoyned it; seeing we do so upon reasons. And without doubt this making necessary the practice of things in the worship of God, proclaimed to be indifferent in themselves, and no way called for by any antecedent Reason, is an act of power.