A64002:1740
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessels of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entitled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two books, the first being a refutation of the said book, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hord's discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceals his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twice ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twice from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeans ...The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...
Oxford: printed by L.L. and H.H. for Tho. Robinson, 1653
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
All this, this Author knows; yet takes no pains to disprove their tenet, or answer any one of their arguments; no nor to make good his own consequence, which is the only thing we deny in this present argument of his. As for the other part, namely that in case sin come to pass by absolute necessity, and without any free will in the creature, then sin is no sin, which no man denies; This he proves at large, or at least illustrates at large. Secondly observe he talks of things necessarily coming to pass, not only absolutely but antecedently; whereby he seems to grant that sins may come to pass necessarily, but not so absolutely as antecedently, and takes no pains to explicate these his distinctions. And in my judgment they have more need of explication, as they are accommodated to sins coming to pass in the world, then as they are accommodated to the eveniency of faith and repentance; Yet I imagine this word Antecedently is brought in of purpose in reference to good actions rather then in reference unto evil. And whether he will have this term Antecedently to be an addition to the former term Absolutely, or only of equivalent force, I know not. But it is the common course of these men to confound their Reader with terms proposed without all explication. But let us endeavour to bolt out the meaning of these perplexed discourses as well as we can. Will this Author have saith to come to pass necessarily and that absolutely, but not antecedently? Or will he have faith to come to pass necessarily, but not absolutely and antecedently? or will he have faith come to pass not necessarily at all: If not at all necessarily to what purpose doth he clog his Reader with such unnecessary complements, of absolutely and antecedently? If God decrees to bestow faith upon a man, doth it not, necessarily follow hereupon that such a one shall believe? dares this Author deny it? Yet we account not this absolutely necessary, but merely upon supposition. Neither doth God's decree impose necessity upon all things; as Aquinas hath long ago disputed and proved; but only upon some things; that is that some Agents shall work necessarily; other Agents contingently and freely. In a word God both decreeth things to come to pass & the manner of them also; that is that some things shall come to pass necessarily, other things contingently and freely.
All this, this Author knows; yet takes no paines to disprove their tenet, or answer any one of their arguments; no nor to make good his own consequence, which is the only thing we deny in this present argument of his. As for the other part, namely that in case sin come to passe by absolute necessity, and without any free will in the creature, then sinne is no sinne, which no man denies; This he proves at large, or at least illustrates at large. Secondly observe he talkes of things necessarily comming to passe, not only absolutely but antecedently; whereby he seemes to grant that sins may come to passe necessarily, but not so absolutely as antecedently, and takes no paines to explicate these his distinctions. And in my judgment they have more need of explication, as they are accommodated to sins comming to passe in the world, then as they are acommodated to the eveniency of faith and repentance; Yet I imagine this word Antecedently is brought in of purpose in reference to good actions rather then in reference unto evill. And whether he will have this terme Antecedently to be an addition to the former terme Absolutely, or only of equivalent force, I know not. But it is the common course of these men to confound their Reader with termes proposed without all explication. But let us endeavour to boult out the meaning of these perplexed discourses as well as we can. Will this Authour have saith to come to passe necessarily and that absolutely, but not antecedently? Or will he have faith to come to passe necessarily, but not absolutely and antecedently? or will he have faith come to passe not necessarily at all: If not at all necessarily to what purpose doth he clog his Reader with such unnecessary complements, of absolutely and antecedently? If God decrees to bestow faith upon a man, doth it not, necessarily follow hereupon that such a one shall believe? dares this Authour deny it? Yet we account not this absolutely necessary, but merely upon supposition. Neither doth God's decree impose necessity upon all things; as Aquinas hath long agoe disputed and proved; but only upon some things; that is that some Agents shall worke necessarily; other Agents contingently and freely. In a word God both decreeth things to come to passe & the manner of them also; that is that some things shall come to passe necessarily, other things contingently and freely.