Section 1
pp. 116–12218 passages
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Section 1.
The second inconvenience is the overthrow of true religion and good government among men. To this, this opinion seemeth to tend for these reasons.1 1. Because it maketh sin to be no sin indeed, but only in opinion. We use to say necessity hath no law; creatures or actions in which necessity bears sway are without saw; Lyons are not forbidden to prey, birds to fly, fishes to swim, or any brute creatures to do according to their kinds, because their actions are natural and necessary; they cannot upon any admonition do otherwise. Among creatures endued with reason and liberty, laws are given to none, but such as can use their principles of reason and freedom: Fools, mad-men, and children are subject to no law, because they have no liberty. To men that can use their liberty, laws are not given neither, but in those actions which are voluntary. No man is forbidden to be hungry, thirsty, weary, sleepy, to weep, to laugh, to love or to hate; because these actions and affections are natural and necessary; the will may govern them, but it cannot suppress them. And so, if to deal justly, to exercise charity &c. with their contraries, be absolutely, and antecedently necessary too, whether this necessity flow from a principal within, or a mover without, we are as lawless in these and in the other. Now if necessity hath no law•, then actions in themselves evil, if under the dominion of absolute ⟨p. 117⟩necessity are transgressions of no law and consequently no sins. For sin is a transgression of the law. This that I say hath been said long ago. For Justin Martyr speaking against destiny hath these words, 2If it be by destiny (that is by absolute necessity; For that the Fathers do generally call by the name of destiny;) that men are good or bad, they are indeed neither good nor bad. A speech like to this he hath a little 3after. It would seem, if this be so, that virtue and vice are nothing, but things are judged to be good or bad by opinion only, which, as good reason teacheth, is very great injustice and impiety. And surely well might he say so. For to what purpose was the Son of God made man, and being man made a sacrifice for sin? Why was the ministry of the word and Sacraments ordained? To what end are heaven and hell propounded? Why are exhortations, dissuasions, or any other means to hinder men from sin applied, if sin be nothing, but a mere opinion?