The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…

But to proceed. This argument or motive is not yet at an end, but like as this doctrine, is pretended to take away all conscience of sin, which is as much as to say, all desert of sin on the one side; so it may be extended to show, how it takes away all conscience of obedience, and all desert thereupon, on the other side; to wit, in good actions. And indeed were it true, that the doctrine did bereave a man of all free will, it were true, as Hierome saith, that where such necessity is, nec damnatio, nec Corona est But Austin hath spent an whole Book in proof of this, namely; that grace consists with freedom of will, unto that which is good; and want of grace together with God's efficacious operation, even in the worst of things, doth consist also with freedom ⟨p. 31⟩of will unto that which is evil. But that in the state of nature man hath no free will to that which is good, but is a servant unto sin, I know no man that doth or can deny, unless withal he deny Original sin with the Pelagians; like as indeed it is written of Grevincovius that great Arminian, that, Grevincovius negavit peccatum Originale, quod & testibus convinci potest. And indeed this Authors discourse bears strongly this way, whatsoever Protestation in show of words he makes hereafter to the contrary. For it is apparent, that in this place, the face of his discourse stands for freedom of will in all, as well unto that which is good, as unto that which is evil. And albeit there is so little difference between this and his former motive (touching the conscience of sin) that it seems to be added only to make way for this sentence of Hierome, which yet is nothing to the purpose, unless he can prove, that Gods decrees do bereave men of liberty of their wills: yet very unhappily doth he carry himself herein and in far different manner from Hierom's expression, though he placeth Corona in opposition to damnation; one whereof, to wit, damnation, implies the merit of sin preceding: but the other, to wit, Corona, no way implies any meritorious nature of obedience precedanious thereunto. But this Author sticks not to apply a meritorious condition to good actions on the one side, as well as to evil actions on the other. And if good actions were as meritorious, and that naturally too, of the crown of righteousness, as evil actions are of damnation.

But to proceed. This argument or motive is not yet at an end, but like as this doctrine, is pretended to take away all conscience of sinne, which is as much as to say, all desert of sinne on the one side; so it may be extended to shew, how it takes away all conscience of obedience, and all desert thereupon, on the other side; to wit, in good actions. And indeed were it true, that the doctrine did bereave a man of all free will, it were true, as Hierome saith, that where such necessity is, nec damnatio, nec Corona est But Austin hath spent an whole Book in proofe of this, namely; that grace consists with freedome of will, unto that which is good; and want of grace together with God's efficacious operation, even in the worst of things, doth consist also with freedome