A64002:2143
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessels of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entitled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two books, the first being a refutation of the said book, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hord's discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceals his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twice ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twice from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeans ...The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...
Oxford: printed by L.L. and H.H. for Tho. Robinson, 1653
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
He denieth the consequence, and he giveth this reason for his denial, because Gods permission is not so effectual unto the existence of a thing, ⟨p. 207⟩as his volition; and yet he acknowledgeth, that this kind of consequence is true in natural causes, but this is not in regard only of permission, but from the determination of a natural cause to work, unless it be hindered: as concerning rational and free agents, this consequence, a thing is permitted to come to pass, therefore it doth come to pass, is of no 1force at all.
He denyeth the consequence, and he giveth this reason for his denyall, because Gods permission is not so effectuall unto the existence of a thing, ⟨p. 207⟩as his volition; and yet he acknowledgeth, that this kind of consequence is true in naturall causes, but this is not in regard only of permission, but from the determination of a naturall cause to worke, unlesse it be hindered: as concerning rationall and free agents, this consequence, a thing is permitted to come to passe, therefore it doth come to passe, is of no 1force at all.
- 1Ad rationem vero quod attinet, eam nullius esse pretii constanter affirmamus. Nam pari rationis efficacia concludi posset, quia Deus voluit ab aeterno, sive decrevit mundum creare, ergo mundus ab aeterno creatus est, vel quia Deus ab aeterno mundum futurum praescivit, ergo mundus ab aeterno extitic. Etenim relatio nihilo minus intercedit inter volitionem & rem volitam; decretum & rem decretam; praescientiam & rem praescitam, quam inter permissionem & rem permissam; Unde quamvis sequatur, Deus voluit mundum ab aeterno, ergo ab aeterno mundus est volitus; Deus scivit mundum ab aeterno, ergo mundus ab aeterno est scitus; Deus permisit aut permittit actum fieri, ergo actus est aut fuit permissus. Attamen inde nequaquam sequetur; ergo quod volitum est, existebat, quum primum volitum erat; aut quod permissum est, existebat, quum primum permissum est. Dices, atqui quod volitum est a Deo, necesse est ut aliquando sit; ergo & quod permissum, similiter necesse erit, ut sit. Imo, inquam, nequaquam sequitur. Neque enim par est utrobique ratio, sed valde dispar; quod & cuilibet manifestum est. neque enim permissio tam efficax est ad existentiam rei, quam volitio. Nec tamen diffiteor hoc genus consequentiae procedere in causis naturalibus, sed non ex solâ vi permissionis, sed ex determinatione causae naturalis ad agendum nisi impediatur. De causis vero rationalibus & libere agentibus, nunquam obtinet hoc genus consequentiae, permittitur aliquid fieri, ergo fit. At, inquies, sunt relata; & relata sunt simul naturâ. Agnosco esse relata, & quatenus sunt relata converti ad consequentiam. Positâ ergo permission rei, necesse est ut res sit permissa; perinde atque positâ volitione rei necesse est, ut res sit volita; item positâ praescientia rei, necesse est ut res sit praescita. Sed quemadmodum non sequitur, res est volita, ergo est; aut res est praescita, ergo est; perinde etiam non sequitur, res est permissa, ergo est. Quemadmodum nec sola praescientia, aut volitio rei sufficit ad hoc, ut res existat; ita etiam neque sola permissio rei sufficit ad hoc, ut res extra causas suas constituatur. Haec tamen ratio, fateor, imposuit Piscatori, pag. 231. Ad Amic. Collat. Vorstii. Ubi sic disserit; ubi autem permissio est, ibi etiam est factum quod permittitur. Quomodo enim dici potest permitti illud, quod non fit? Certe pari ratione dici potest, permitti illud quod non fit; quemadmodum dici potest, volitum esse quod tamen non fit; licet ad existentiam rei, multo efficacior sit volitio, quam permissio. Imo quomodo non dici possit, permitti aliquid quamvis non fiat, cùm permittere nihil aliud sit, quam neque facere ut aliquid fiat, neque ne fiat impedire. Pergit Piscator, quippe, inquiens, haec sunt relata, & proinde simul natura. Quum igitur Deus decrevit permittere peccata, necesse est ut illa fiant. At jam ostendimus, ex eo quod relata sint, hoc tantum sequi, positâ pern issione, rem esse permissam; sic & positâ volition rei, sequitur rem esse volitam; & positâ praescientiâ rei, sequitur rem esse praescitam; at hinc minime sequitur propterea rem actualem aliquam existentiam sortiri: ita etiam, licet positâ permission, res merito dicatur esse permissa, at hinc non sequitur propterea rem esse simpliciter, & extra causas suas actualiter constitui; Quod si haec consecutio legitima esset, quod contendit Piscator, non modo ex permissione Dei, sequeretur rem e vestigio existere; sed & ex quavis cujusvis hominis permission; atqui manifestum est (nec Piscator credo resisteret) ex hominis permissione nequaquam sequi, quicquid permititur fieri, mox existere.