JEANS.IEANES.
pp. 203–21048 passagespart 1 of 2
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
JEANS.
IEANES.
DR Twice doth grant, that Gods permission in a complicate notion, as it takes in other acts of Gods providence, doth infer the things permitted: And what he saith of Gods actual permission in time, is appliable unto his permissive decrees before all time; for as his workings are agreeable unto his effective, so his permissions are suitable unto his permissive decrees. But now that he any where affirmeth, that the decrees of God, which are simply, purely, and barely permissive, 1or that the bare, single, and sole permission of God, do import any necessity at all of the perpetration, or coming to pass, of what is only so decreed, and permitted, I utterly deny. And if you had been so well versed in D. Twice, as it was fit for him, that undertakes a refutation of him, you would never have charged him with that, which he, in a whole digression, professedly impugneth; for which, you may see, how he is taxed (though very modestly) by M. Rutherford, in a Scholastical disputation of his, De Divinâ providentiâ cap. 8. D. Twice in the third Digression of the second Book of his Vindiciae &c. examineth that proposition of Perkins: Quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit. That which God doth not hinder, doth therefore come to pass, because God doth not hinder it, (i.) because he doth permit it: where he not only professeth his dislike of it, but also refutes it. This Section then might very well have been spared for in it you fight but with your own shadow, and do not at all oppose the opinion of D. Twice, who fully accords with you in this particular; That Gods simple and sole permissions, and consequently his decrees, that are simply, purely, and barely permissive, are not illative of those things which are only so decreed, and permitted.
DR Twisse doth grant, that Gods permission in a complicate notion, as it takes in other acts of Gods providence, doth inferre the things permitted: And what he saith of Gods actuall permission in time, is applyable unto his permissive decrees before all time; for as his workings are agreeable unto his effective, so his permissions are suitable unto his permissive decrees. But now that he any where affirmeth, that the decrees of God, which are simply, purely, and barely permissive,