The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…

1. Their Consequence should be this, If the permission of Infidelity followeth the decree of damnation, then God cannot in justice damn them for Infidelity. Now here is no colour of good Consequence.

1. Their Consequence should be this, If the permission of Infidelity followeth the decree of damnation, then God cannot in justice damne them for Infidelity. Now here is no colour of good Consequence.

2. If they reply, That in case infidelity followeth necessarily upon Gods permitting of it, the Consequence is as good as in case infidelity followed upon reprobation. For even hereby it appears, that infidelity followeth upon reprobation though not ⟨p. 70⟩immediately, but by the mediation of the divine permission thereof; but whether it followeth mediately or immediately all is one, as touching the force of the Consequence.

2. If they reply, That in case infidelity followeth necessarily upon Gods permiting of it, the Consequence is as good as in case infidelity followed upon reprobation. For even hereby it appears, that infidelity followeth upon reprobation though not ⟨p. 70⟩immediately, but by the mediation of the divine permission thereof; but whether it followeth mediately or immediately all is one, as touching the force of the Consequence.

Resp. Now to this I Reply, Granting that all is one, as touching the force of the Consequence: but then consider.

2. In this case all the force of the Consequence depends upon the necessary consequution of sin in general, or infidelity in special, upon Gods permitting of it.

2. In this case all the force of the Consequence depends upon the necessary consequution of sinne in generall, or infidelity in speciall, upon Gods permitting of it.

So that whether Gods decree to permit the sin of infidelity, be antecedent or consequent to the decree of damnation all is one. Yet these Remonstrants make the force of their argument, to consist only in the subordinating of the decree divine, as touching the permission of infidelity to the decree of damnation, which yet appears by this to be of no force.

So that whether Gods decree to permit the sinne of infidelity, be antecedent or consequent to the decree of damnation all is one. Yet these Remonstrants make the force of their argument, to consist only in the subordinating of the decree divine, as touching the permission of infidelity to the decree of damnation, which yet appears by this to be of no force.

3. But if they hereupon take a new course of argumentation, and dispute thus; If Infidelity followeth necessarily upon Gods permitting of it, then God cannot in justice damn a man for Infidelity; pretending no injustice to be greater, then to damn a man for that which followeth necessarily upon permission, which is Gods work.

3. But if they hereupon take a new course of argumentation, and dispute thus; If Infidelity followeth necessarily upon Gods permitting of it, then God cannot in justice damne a man for Infidelity; pretending no injustice to be greater, then to damne a man for that which followeth necessarily upon permission, which is Gods work.

Resp. I answer.

1. That thus their former argumentation is cashiered as unprofitable.

1. That thus their former argumentation is cashierd as unprofitable.

2. We deny this Consequence; and call in no meaner name then Arminius himself to bear us out in this our denial. Who expressly professeth, That in case God permits a man, Veil peccatum, necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum. Exam. pag. 153. I could add Vorstius also, herein concurring with Piscator, Perkins, and Navarrettus the Dominican is as expressly in this as any other; as also in subordinating it to the decree of reprobation. Arminius likewise professeth faith and repentance, Nisi Deo dante haberi non posse. Exam. 57. and that both of them are denied to the reprobates by the decree of reprobation. See his own words, At Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare. Concedo lubens, illam assumptionem, sed rectè intellectam: He laboureth to charm this inconvenient grant of his, but no charm will serve to keep this adder, from stinging and wounding their doctrine of reprobation unto death. He saith, Faith is given by way of suasion. We say, that matters nothing; for so it be given by God wheresoever it be found, and so it be denied to reprobates by the decree of reprobation, we desire no more. We our selves acknowledge, that faith is not given to the elect, but by way of suasion, the Word working faith, running in this manner; Repent and believe the Gospel; and whosoever believeth shall be saved. For God hath set forth his Son to be a Propitiation for our sins, through faith in his blood.

2. We deny this Consequence; and call in no meaner name then Arminius himselfe to beare us out in this our deniall. Who expressely professeth, That in case God permits a man, Velle peccatum, necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum. Exam. pag. 153. I could adde Vorstius also, herein concurring with Piscator, Perkins, and Navarrettus the Dominican is as expressely in this as any other; as also in subordinating it to the decree of reprobation. Arminius likewise professeth faith and repentance, Nisi Deo dante haberi non posse. Exam. 57. and that both of them are denied to the reprobates by the decree of reprobation. See his own words, At Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare. Concedo lubens, illam assumptionem, sed rectè intellectam: He laboureth to charme this inconvenient grant of his, but no charme will serve to keep this adder, from stinging and wounding their doctrine of reprobation unto death. He saith, Faith is given by way of suasion. We say, that matters nothing; for so it be given by God wheresoever it be found, and so it be denied to reprobates by the decree of reprobation, we desire no more. We our selves acknowledge, that faith is not given to the elect, but by way of swasion, the Word working faith, running in this manner; Repent and believe the Gospel; and whosoever believeth shall be saved. For God hath set forth his Sonne to be a Propitiation for our sinnes, through faith in his bloud.

3. At length he proceeds in his charming course, but most unsuccessfully, as whereby his former saying is nothing charmed. His care rather seems to be to eat his own words, as Satan devoured his own children. For distinguishing suasion into that which is sufficient, and that which is effectual: this effectual suasion, he confesseth to be administered by the decree of election; but as for that sufficient suasion, though withal he accounts it always ineffectual, yet he saith it is administered by the decree of providence, not by the decree of reprobation. At length he confesseth, that by the decree of reprobation is denied grace effectual, that is such a grace as whereupon he foresaw they would believe. Now herein I appeal to the judgement of every sober man. Take we two men into consideration, the one elect as Paul, the other reprobate as Esau. Of two sufficient graces, the Lord foreseeth which of them will prove effectual with Paul, and which ineffectual; and he makes choice to give him such a grace, as he foreseeth will prove effectual. Again he foreseeth of two sufficient graces, which of them will prove effectual with Esau and which ineffectual, and makes choice to afford him only that which he knows will prove ineffectual. Now what can be the reason hereof, but because he purposeth to show his mercy in the salvation of the one, and his justice in the damnation of another. Before Arminius came to this resolution, as expressly to profess, That by the decree of reprobation is denied grace effectual, he found himself in a strait upon his distinction of grace ⟨p. 71⟩sufficient and effectual, and the description of each; he drew his breath very short; and therefore to get, as it were, more liberty of air, he concluded that discourse with, Haec ex Augustini sententiâ dicuntur. pag. 58. and in the next page. Hisce autem ita explicatis ex mente Augustini & fortè Scripturae sensu. But, What, a mischief, doth this great Doctor mean to tell us? First, that he willingly grants that, Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare (provided it be well understood) and after all this explication, tells us, that all this explication of his is delivered ex sententiâ & mente Augustini, and but perchance, ex Scripturae sensu, concealing all the while what is his own Opinion.

3. At length he proceeds in his charming course, but most unsuccessefully, as whereby his former saying is nothing charmed. His care rather seems to be to eat his own words, as Satan devoured his own children. For distinguishing suasion into that which is sufficient, and that which is effectuall: this effectuall suasion, he confesseth to be administred by the decree of election; but as for that sufficient suasion, though withall he accounts it allwaies ineffectuall, yet he saith it is administred by the decree of providence, not by the decree of reprobation. At length he confesseth, that by the decree of reprobation is denied grace effectuall, that is such a grace as whereupon he foresaw they would believe. Now herein I appeale to the judgement of every sober man. Take we two men into consideration, the one elect as Paul, the other reprobate as Esau. Of two sufficient graces, the Lord foreseeth which of them will prove effectuall with Paul, and which ineffectuall; and he makes choice to give him such a grace, as he foreseeth will prove effectuall. Again he foreseeth of two sufficient graces, which of them will prove effectuall with Esau and which ineffectuall, and makes choice to afford him only that which he knowes will prove ineffectuall. Now what can be the reason hereof, but because he purposeth to shew his mercy in the salvation of the one, and his justice in the damnation of another. Before Arminius came to this resolution, as expressely to professe, That by the decree of reprobation is denyed grace effectuall, he found himselfe in a streit upon his distinction of grace

Is this to give us the right understanding of that Assertion (Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare) most prejudicial to his own Tenet at first fight, and much more by the distinction following of Gratia sufficiens & efficax; which he so well perceived, that he is content to clap it upon Austins back to bear the burden of it; and puts it but upon adventure, that it may prove to be the Scripture meaning. And in like sort, when, pag. 98. having proposed two things to be necessarily unfolded by him. Primò, de Gratiâ sufficiente & efficaci. Secundo, de utriusque dispensatione, dispensationisque Causis: He leaves off there, giving it over in plain ground. What doth this argue? but that he manifestly perceived, he was not able in any tolerable manner, to shape this distinction in congruity to his own Tenet. Let this Author well consider this, that talks so much of our Divines unwillingness to come to trial in the point of reprobation; When Arminius durst not adventure upon the explicating of his own opinion, touching the distinction of grace sufficient and effectual, and in giving us the definition of each. The like to have been the course of other Arminians, I have known, declining the point of effectual grace, as a precipice and breakneck unto them: And when others have been put upon it, they have placed it in the grace subsequent, and have not been ashamed to make it consist in this, that God by effectual grace, doth work in man, [Greek or Hebrew] Veil credere, modo velit, and why not as well, that he works in man, [Greek or Hebrew] Credere, modo Credat, [Greek or Hebrew] Resipiscere modo Resipiscat. This that I speak, I can show under the hand of one of them, a great stickler for the Arminian Cause; great I say in respect of affection, not of judgement. And I have cause to conceive, that both this Authors Discourse, and that others I have had to deal withal, is but as a smoke, that for a great part, if not for the most of it, comes out of the same Chimney.

Is this to give us the right understanding of that Assertion (Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare) most prejudiciall to his own Tenent at first fight, and much more by the distinction following of Gratia sufficiens & efficax; which he so well perceived, that he is content to clap it upon Austins back to beare the burthen of it; and puts it but upon adventure, that it may prove to be the Scripture meaning. And in like sort, when, pag. 98. having proposed two things to be necessarily unfolded by him. Primò, de Gratiâ sufficiente & efficaci. Secundo, de utriusque dispensatione, dispensationisque Causis: He leaves off there, giving it over in plain ground. What doth this argue? but that he manifestly perceived, he was not able in any tollerable manner, to shape this distinction in congruity to his own Tenent. Let this Author well consider this, that talkes so much of our Divines unwillingnesse to come to tryall in the poynt of reprobation; When Arminius durst not adventure upon the explicating of his own opinion, touching the distinction of grace sufficient and effectuall, and in giving us the definition of each. The like to have been the course of other Arminians, I have known, declining the point of effectuall grace, as a precipice and breakneck unto them: And when others have been put upon it, they have placed it in the grace subsequent, and have not been ashamed to make it consist in this, that God by effectuall grace, doth work in man, Velle credere, modo velit, and why not as well, that he workes in man, Credere, modo Credat, Resipiscere modo Resipiscat. This that I speake, I can shew under the hand of one of them, a great stickler for the Arminian Cause; great I say in respect of affection, not of judgement. And I have cause to conceive, that both this Authors Discourse, and that others I have had to deale withall, is but as a smoake, that for a great part, if not for the most of it, comes out of the same Chimney.

4. Let the argument stand as it doth, let infidelity by Gods permission follow upon the decree of damnation, and that necessarily. Yet consider.

1. Gods permitting of it, is no other then the leaving of it uncured: not that hereby infidelity followeth, which was not before; but being in all before, as the fruit of that natural corruption wherein all were borne, as all confess, as many as concur against the Pelagians, in acknowledging Original sin. By Gods permission of it, it continueth to be uncured; What actual sin is there in the World, or habitual sin arising thereupon, which God cannot cure if it please him? If then he will not cure it in some, shall it not be lawful for him to punish it, where he finds the continuance of it unto the end, without breaking off by repentance?

1. Gods permitting of it, is no other then the leaving of it uncured: not that hereby infidelity followeth, which was not before; but being in all before, as the fruit of that naturall corruption wherein all were borne, as all confesse, as many as concurre against the Pelagians, in acknowledging Originall sinne. By Gods permission of it, it continueth to be uncured; What actuall sinne is there in the World, or habituall sinne arising thereupon, which God cannot cure if it please him? If then he will not cure it in some, shall it not be lawfull for him to punish it, where he findes the continuance of it unto the end, without breaking off by repentance?

2. Suppose all men had power to do any good thing; if God will not give them Velle quod possunt (as Austin saith he dealt with Adam in his innocency, and gave the Angels that stood, amplius Adjutorium, then he gave the others; whereby it came to pass, that they stood in obedience when the other fell) what shall we say in this case, is it possible that they should Veil bonum, if God will not work it in them, of whom the Apostle professeth, that he works in us both the Will and the Deed? Or shall we hereupon say, they do not sin freely? What shift have they to avoid this, but either by contradicting the Apostle, and saying God doth not work in us [Greek or Hebrew] Veil, or by saying that God doth work in us [Greek or Hebrew] Veil, modò Velimus, as plain a contradiction as ever proceeded from the mouth of any, The self same act, being made before and after it self; for the condition is always before the thing conditioned. And is this to work in us the Will according to Gods pleasure, or according to mans good pleasure? What is it to say, that grace is given according unto works, if this be not?

2. Suppose all men had power to doe any good thing; if God will not give them Velle quod possunt (as Austin saith he dealt with Adam in his innocency, and gave the Angels that stood, amplius Adjutorium, then he gave the others; whereby it came to passe, that they stood in obedience when the other fell) what shall wee say in this case, is it possible that they should Velle bonum, if God will not work it in them, of whom the Apostle professeth, that he works in us both the Will and the Deed? Or shall wee hereupon say, they doe not sinne freely? What shift have they to avoyd this, but either by contradicting the Apostle, and saying God doth not work in us 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Velle, or by saying that God doth work in us 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Velle, modò Velimus, as plain a contradiction as ever proceeded from the mouth of any, The selfe same act, being made before and after it self; for the condition is allwaies before the thing conditioned. And is this to work in us the Will according to Gods pleasure, or according to mans good pleasure? What is it to say, that grace is given according unto works, if this be not?

3. We deny, that any evil act therefore comes not to pass freely, because it comes to pass necessarily, upon supposition of Gods denial of grace, to refrain from it. For like as good works, are not therefore not wrought ⟨p. 72⟩freely by us, because God by his grace works us to the performance of them; (For who dares deny that it is in Gods power to make us work this or that freely) in like sort, and much more, evil works are not done the less freely, because God denies special and effectual grace to abstain from them. For, want of grace doth not take away willingness unto that which is evil, but leaves too much rather in man of that kind. As Austin saith, that Libertas sine gratiâ non est libertas sed contumacia. Now where there is contumacy, there is rather too much will then too little. For Contumacy is Wilfulness.

3. We deny, that any evill act therefore comes not to passe freely, because it comes to passe necessarily, upon supposition of Gods denyall of grace, to refraine from it. For like as good works, are not therefore not wrought ⟨p. 72⟩freely by us, because God by his grace workes us to the performance of them; (For who dares deny that it is in Gods power to make us work this or that freely) in like sort, and much more, evill works are not done the lesse freely, because God denies speciall and effectuall grace to abstain from them. For, want of grace doth not take away willingnesse unto that which is evill, but leaves too much rather in man of that kind. As Austin saith, that Libertas sine gratiâ non est libertas sed contumacia. Now where there is contumacy, there is rather too much will then too little. For Contumacy is Wilfulnesse.