The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…

But come we to the consideration of the particulars delivered by this Author.

1. As touching the opinion of the Stoics and Manichees. 2. As touching the Parallel he makes, between their opinion and ours, in the point of Predestination.

1. As touching the opinion of the Stoicks and Manichees. 2. As touching the Parallell he makes, between their opinion and ours, in the poynt of Predestination.

1. The Chaldeans and Astrologers, did altogether place Fate, in the influencies of the stars, and because those glorious bodies, did infatuate the World with a show of Divinity (which the Lord Laboured to prevent in the Jews. Deutr. 4.) no marvel if the vulgar sort did acknowledge no other fate, but that. As Austin saith, De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 1. Id (Fatum) homines quando audiunt usitatâ loquendi confuetudine non intelligunt, nisi vim positionis syderum, qualis est quando quis nascitur sive concipitur. But I do not find that the Stoics did thus distinguish, but by their Series Causarum, they comprehended all causes celestial or sublunary. Ramus indeed conceived such a difference between Possidonius and Chrysippus both Stoics, but Turnebus makes bold to tell him, that herein he erred. Quod autem Possidonium dicis studio Astrologiae oblectatum, Fatum syderibus attribuisse in eo peccas, quod aliam ejus quam Chrysippi sententiam putas, nec eam totam complecteris. Nam si in simul aegrotantibus fratribus causam esse dicebat in syderum & caeli constitutione & affectione, non tamen idcircò in aliis rebus Fatum non esse judicabat. Nay he professeth that according to all the Stoics, Fatum was God himself and nature; and that by Fatum they understood, omnem naturae contagionem, which was Cicero's phrase. As indeed the whole frame of nature is knit together per contactum, which Cicero called Naturae contagionem. And he proves as much of Possidonius out of Cicero De Divinatione. For Quintus therein professing according to the opinion of Possidonius, that all force and course of Divination, was derived from God, from destiny, and from nature, he concludes therehence, that all kind of artificial and natural Divination, were in his opinion comprehended under the notion of Fate. And out of Cicero's second Book of Divination shows, that whereas Possidonius his opinion was, Vim quandam sentientem & divinam quae tota confusa sit mundo, ad hostiam deligendam ducere. He concludes thus; Satis ut opinor, significat Possidonium non in syderibus tantum Fatum posuisse, sed per omnem mundi continuationem & naturae conjunctionem, ordinem seriemque causarum permanare credidisse. Idem Possidonius (saith he) [Greek or Hebrew] scripserat, quod non fecisset, si in syderibus tantum Fatum esse sensisset.

1. The Chaldeans and Astrologers, did altogether place Fate, in the influencies of the starres, and because those glorious bodies, did infatuate the World with a shew of Divinity (which the Lord Laboured to prevent in the Jewes. Deutr. 4.) no marvail if the vulgar sort did acknowledge no other fate, but that. As Austin saith, De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 1. Id (Fatum) homines quando audiunt usitatâ loquendi confuetudine non intelligunt, nisi vim positionis syderum, qualis est quando quis nascitur sive concipitur. But I doe not find that the Stoicks did thus distinguish, but by their Series Causarum, they comprehended all causes caelestiall or sublunary. Ramus indeed conceived such a difference between Possidonius and Chrysippus both Stoicks, but Turnebus makes bold to tell him, that herein he erred. Quod autem Possidonium dicis studio Astrologiae oblectatum, Fatum syderibus attribuisse in eo peccas, quod aliam ejus quam Chrysippi sententiam putas, nec eam totam complecteris. Nam si in simul aegrotantibus fratribus causam esse dicebat in syderum & caeli constitutione & affectione, non tamen idcircò in aliis rebus Fatum non esse judicabat. Nay he professeth that according to all the Stoicks, Fatum was God himselfe and nature; and that by Fatum they understood, omnem naturae contagionem, which was Cicero's phrase. As indeed the whole frame of nature is knit together per contactum, which Cicero called Naturae contagionem. And he proves as much of Possidonius out of Cicero De Divinatione. For Quintus therein professing according to the opinion of Possidonius, that all force and course of Divination, was derived from God, from destiny, and from nature, he concludes therehence, that all kind of artificiall and naturall Divination, were in his opinion comprehended under the notion of Fate. And out of Cicero's second Book of Divination shewes, that whereas Possidonius his opinion was, Vim quandam sentientem & divinam quae tota confusa sit mundo, ad hostiam deligendam ducere. He concludes thus; Satis ut opinor, significat Possidonium non in syderibus tantum Fatum posuisse, sed per omnem mundi continuationem & naturae conjunctionem, ordinem seriemque causarum permanare credidisse. Idem Possidonius (saith he) 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 scripserat, quod non fecisset, si in syderibus tantum Fatum esse sensisset.

And that Maximi Dei leges were inevitabiles, and this was called Necessity, and such a Necessity, cui ne Deos quidem (that is inferior spirits) resistere posse. Quae verò ab Astris geruntur, talia interdum esse ut evitari sapientiâ, industriâ, labour queant, in quo sua est Fortuna. Quae verò certis causis progrederentur ac permanerent fixa, id dici Fatum quod tamen necessitatem non afferat electioni.

And that Maximi Dei leges were inevitabiles, and this was called Necessity, and such a Necessity, cui ne Deos quidem (that is inferior spirits) resistere posse. Quae verò ab Astris geruntur, talia interdum esse ut evitari sapientiâ, industriâ, labore queant, in quo sua est Fortuna. Quae verò certis causis progrederentur ac permanerent fixa, id dici Fatum quod tamen necessitatem non afferat electioni.

That the Manichees maintained two supreme and coeternal causes of all things, we read; the one the cause of Good, the other of Evil: and that every creature was a substantial part of one or both; and that man in his nature was compounded of both, and that his corruption was essential from the supreme Author of evil, and not such as accrued to him of disobedience, We read. But of their opinion that all things were determined by them, both good, and evil, I no where read, but in this Authors Legend. Danaeus hath commented upon Austin de Haeresibus, and to every Head of Heresy draws what he hath read thereof in other Authors. But I find no mention at all of this Article amongst 21 shameful errors of theirs which he reckons up. The 19th is this, Voluntatem malè agendi, quod vocant liberum arbitrium, nob is à naturâ ipsâ insitam, non rebellione nostrâ accersitam, vel ex inobedientiâ natam; Quanquam homines propriâ voluntate peccant. And where Austin answereth the criminations against the Catholics made by the Pelagians, I find no mention at all of this. He should have showed from whom he takes this, that understanding their Opinion aright, we might the better judge of the reproachful comparison which he makes.

That the Manichees maintained two supreme and coëternall causes of all things, we read; the one the cause of Good, the other of Evill: and that every creature was a substantiall part of one or both; and that man in his nature was compounded of both, and that his corruption was essentiall from the supream Author of evill, and not such as acrewed to him of disobedience, We read. But of their opinion that all things were determined by them, both good, and evill, I no where read, but in this Authors Legend. Danaeus hath commented upon Austin de Haeresibus, and to every Head of Heresy draws what he hath read thereof in other Authors. But I find no mention at all of this Article amongst 21 shamefull errours of theirs which he reckons up. The 19th is this, Voluntatem malè agendi, quod vocant liberum arbitrium, nob is à naturâ ipsâ insitam, non rebellione nostrâ accersitam, vel ex inobedientiâ natam; Quanquam homines propriâ voluntate peccant. And where Austin answereth the criminations against the Catholiques made by the Pelagians, I find no mention at all of this. He should have shewed from whom he takes this, that understanding their Opinion aright, we might the better judge of the reproachfull comparison which he makes.

2 To the consideration of which comparison of his, I now address my self. He proposeth two things, one whereof he saith, must needs be maintained.

2 To the consideration of which comparison of his, I now addresse my selfe. He proposeth two things, one whereof he saith, must needs be maintained.

The First whereof is this; That all actions natural and Moral, good and evil, and all events likewise, are absolutely necessary.

The First whereof is this; That all actions naturall and Morall, good and evill, and all events likewise, are absolutely necessary.

Concerning which, I say First; I have cause to doubt that this Author understands not aright, the very notions of absolute necessity, and necessity not absolute. There is no greater necessity, then necessity of nature. And this necessity is twofold; either in Essendo, in being, or in Operando, in working. God alone is necessary in being, and his being is absolutely necessary; it being impossible he should not be, as not only we believe, but School Divines demonstrate, and that with great variety, of evident, and curious conclusions. As for the other necessity, which is in respect of operation: First, this is no way incident unto God, speaking of operation ad extrà, and secluding the mysterious emanations within the Divine Nature; such as are the Generation of the Son by the Father, and the wonderful Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Sonne. But ad extra this necessity of operation is only found in the creature, and that only in such creatures, as by necessity of nature are determined one way: as fire to burn; heavy things to move downwards, and light things upwards; the Sun, Moon, and stars to give light; and the heavens to turn round; all natural Agents in a word distinct from rational are thus determined, to wit, to work that, whereunto they are inclined by necessity of nature; but yet so that being finite, they are subject to superior powers, and thereby obnoxious to impediment most of them, even to powers create; all of them to power increate. Whence it comes pass that no work of theirs is absolutely necessary, especially in respect of God, who can either set an end to all when he will, or restrain their operations at his pleasure. We know the Three Noble Children, when they came forth of the fiery oven, had not so much as any smell of the fire upon them. And therefore Durand professeth that these things which are commonly accounted to come to pass most necessarily, do indeed come to pass merely contingently, in respect of the will of God.

Concerning which, I say First; I have cause to doubt that this Author understands not aright, the very notions of absolute necessity, and necessity not absolute. There is no greater necessity, then necessity of nature. And this necessity is twofold; either in Essendo, in being, or in Operando, in working. God alone is necessary in being, and his being is absolutely necessary; it being impossible he should not be, as not only we believe, but Schoole Divines demonstrate, and that with great variety, of evident, and curious conclusions. As for the other necessity, which is in respect of operation: First, this is no way incident unto God, speaking of operation ad extrà, and secluding the mysterious emanations within the Divine Nature; such as are the Generation of the Sonne by the Father, and the wonderfull Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Sonne. But ad extra this necessity of operation is only found in the creature, and that only in such creatures, as by necessity of nature are determined one way: as fire to burne; heavy things to move downwards, and light things upwards; the Sunne, Moone, and starres to give light; and the heavens to turne round; all naturall Agents in a word distinct from rationall are thus determined, to wit, to work that, whereunto they are inclined by necessity of nature; but yet so that being finite, they are subject to superiour powers, and thereby obnoxious to impediment most of them, even to powers create; all of them to power increate. Whence it comes passe that no work of theirs is absolutely necessary, especially in respect of God, who can either set an end to all when he will, or restraine their operations at his pleasure. We know the Three Noble Children, when they came forth of the fiery oven, had not so much as any smell of the fire upon them. And therefore Durand professeth that these things which are commonly accounted to come to passe most necessarily, doe indeed come to passe meerely contingently, in respect of the will of God.

Nevertheless we willingly profess, that upon supposition of the will of God, that this or that shall come to pass, it followeth necessarily that such a thing shall come ⟨p. 95⟩to pass; like as upon supposition, that God knows such a thing shall come to pass, it followeth necessarily, that such a thing shall come to pass; but how? not necessarily: but either necessarily according as some things are brought to pass by natural agents, working necessarily after the manner aforesaid; or contingently and freely according as some things are brought to pass, by rational agents, working contingently and freely. And therefore as touching the Question of the Schools about the root of contingency, Aquinas and Scotus concur in resolving it into the Will of God, but with this difference; Scotus relates it into the will of God as a free agent. Aquinas resolves it into the Will of God, as an efficacious agent. For the will of God is so efficacious, that he can effectually procure, both that things necessary shall be brought to pass necessarily, and things contingent, contingently; and according he hath provided congruous causes hereof, to wit, both agents natural for the producing of necessary things necessarily, and agents rational for the producing of contingent things, contingently and freely. Thus God preordained that Josiah should burn the Prophets bones upon the Altar, that Cyrus should proclaim liberty to the Jews, to return into their Country; yet what sober Divine hath made doubt, whether Josiah and Cyrus did not herein, that which they did freely. And as in doing, so in abstaining from doing. For God ordained that Christs bones should not be broken; as also that when the Jews, all the Males, came up to the Lord thrice in the year to Jerusalem, None of their neighbours should desire their land. Exod. 34. 24. Yet what sober man should make question, whether the Soldiers did non as freely abstain from breaking Christs bones, as from ought else, and so likewise the bordering Nations did as freely abstain, from invading the land of Israel. And how often is this phrase used in Scripture, Necesse est, of some things coming to pass, which yet came to pass as contingently and freely, as ought else.

Neverthelesse we willingly professe, that upon supposition of the will of God, that this or that shall come to passe, it followeth necessarily that such a thing shall come ⟨p. 95⟩

And unless this be granted, that Gods determination is nothing prejudicial to the freedom of the creatures will, either we must deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, or that they are works produced freely, and so every action pleasing in the sight of God. For the Scripture expressly professeth, that God it is, who worketh in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight. And whatsoever God works in us, or bestows upon us in time, the same he determined, to work in us, and to bestow upon us from everlasting. For he worketh all things according to the counsel of his will Ephes. 1. 11. and the counsel of his Will was everlasting, it being the same with God himself.

And unlesse this be granted, that Gods determination is nothing prejudiciall to the freedome of the creatures will, either we must deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, or that they are works produced freely, and so every action pleasing in the sight of God. For the Scripture expressely professeth, that God it is, who worketh in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight. And whatsoever God workes in us, or bestows upon us in time, the same he determined, to work in us, and to bestow upon us from everlasting. For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his will Ephes. 1. 11. and the counsell of his Will was everlasting, it being the same with God himselfe.

Now I come to the second.

2. And that is this. That all mens ends are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their Wills; and this he saith is upon the matter all one.

1. Now this is most untrue, there being a vast difference between the actions of men, and the ends of men; The ends of men being the works of God. And what a monster shall he be in the Church of God, that with Vorstius shall dare to affirm, that all the works of God, were not determined from everlasting; or being determined, they are alterable, and that in such sort, as to be otherwise determinable by the wills of men; especially considering that the very acts of mens wills, being wrought by God, (as all sides now a days confess) it consequently follows that they were also determined from everlasting, by the Will and Counsel of God. What should I allege the 11th Article of Ireland for this? God from all eternity did by his unchangeable Counsel ordain, whatsoever in time should come to pass: yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. There is no Arminian that I know dares deny, either that every act of man is wrought by God, or that, look what God doth work in time, the same he did before all time decree, and that from everlasting. I know there is a main, and a most Atheistical difference between us on one part, but I do not find them willing to show their horns directly therein, but carry the matter so, as if they would obtrude upon us the acknowledgement, either of the temporal (not eternal) condition of decrees divine, or at least of their alterable nature; whereas themselves dare not plainly manifest themselves, to be of any such Atheistical belief. Let us instance in particular: Let the salvation of some, and damnation of others, be the ends this Author meaneth. Now dare any of them with open ⟨p. 96⟩face profess, that the salvation of the elect, and damnation of the reprobate was not from everlasting determined by God. Be the supreme ends of God concerning man, the manifestation of his glory in the way of mercy on some, in the way of vindicative justice on others. Dare any of them profess, that any of these ends are not from everlasting determined by God; or being so determined, dare they profess, that these divine decrees are alterable, or possible to be undetermined by the will of the creature? What a prodigious assertion were either of these?

1. Now this is most untrue, there being a vast difference between the actions of men, and the ends of men; The ends of men being the works of God. And what a monster shall he be in the Church of God, that with Vorstius shall dare to affirme, that all the works of God, were not determined from everlasting; or being determined, they are alterable, and that in such sort, as to be otherwise determinable by the wills of men; especially considering that the very acts of mens wills, being wrought by God, (as all sides now a daies confesse) it consequently followes that they were also determined from everlasting, by the Will and Counsell of God. What should I alleage the 11th Article of Ireland for this? God from all eternity did by his unchangeable Counsell ordaine, whatsoever in time should come to passe: yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. There is no Arminian that I know dares deny, either that every act of man is wrought by God, or that, look what God doth work in time, the same he did before all time decree, and that from everlasting. I know there is a main, and a most Atheisticall difference between us on one part, but I doe not find them willing to shew their hornes directly therein, but carry the matter so, as if they would obtrude upon us the acknowledgement, either of the temporall (not eternall) condition of decrees divine, or at least of their alterable nature; whereas themselves dare not plainly manifest themselves, to be of any such Atheisticall beliefe. Let us instance in particular: Let the salvation of some, and damnation of others, be the ends this Author meaneth. Now dare any of them with open

If they dare not say, Gods will is changeable, What an unshamefac'd course is this, to obtrude upon us an alterable, that is, a changeable condition of Gods decrees? But perhaps you may say, here is no mention at all made of Gods decrees, but of mans ends. And I willingly confess there is not. And I am persuaded, this Author dares not in plain terms profess, that Gods decrees are alterable. But hereby you may perceive, and have a manifest document of the illusions of Satan, and how mens carnal affections, which are more in love with error then truth, do make them to shut their eyes against the one, and open them unto the other. It were a very harsh thing to say plainly, that Gods decrees are alterable, and that being determined by him, they might be undone, or made undetermined by the wills of men. Therefore the Devil finds a means to draw us, to entertain the same blasphemous opinion, not barefaced, but hoodwickt as it were, and that is by changing the phrase. For though it be uncouth to hear of an alterable condition of Gods decrees, yet it seems nothing harsh to discourse of the alterable condition of mens ends. But give me leave to unmask the Witch, and make it appear how the Devil gulls us in this.

If they dare not say, Gods will is changeable, What an unshamefac'd course is this, to obtrude upon us an alterable, that is, a changeable condition of Gods decrees? But perhaps you may say, here is no mention at all made of Gods decrees, but of mans ends. And I willingly confesse there is not. And I am perswaded, this Author dares not in plain termes professe, that Gods decrees are alterable. But hereby you may perceive, and have a manifest document of the illusions of Satan, and how mens carnall affections, which are more in love with errour then truth, doe make them to shut their eyes against the one, and open them unto the other. It were a very harsh thing to say plainly, that Gods decrees are alterable, and that being determined by him, they might be undone, or made undetermined by the wills of men. Therefore the Devill finds a means to draw us, to entertain the same blasphemous opinion, not barefac'd, but hoodwickt as it were, and that is by changing the phrase. For though it be uncouth to heare of an alterable condition of Gods decrees, yet it seems nothing harsh to discourse of the alterable condition of mens ends. But give me leave to unmask the Witch, and make it appeare how the Devill gulls us in this.

Mens ends are either so called, as intended by man himself, or as appointed by God. If this Author speak of mens ends, as intended by man himself, we willingly grant, that they are alterable at his pleasure; as for example, Man intends one thing to day, he may intend another thing to morrow, he intends one thing this hour, he may intend another thing the next, and at his pleasure reverse his former intentions. And no marvel, considering that man partly is of a fickle disposition in respect of his affections, studious of change, and subject to innovation as the Moon; partly of an improvident disposition, he knows not what a Year, what a Month, what a Day, what an hour may bring forth. And therefore though never so wise and constant in his courses, yet may he have just cause to change his resolutions and purposes. But of such ends of man, to wit, as intended by man, it is manifest this Author speaks not.

Mens ends are either so called, as intended by man himselfe, or as appoynted by God. If this Author speak of mens ends, as intended by man himselfe, wee willingly grant, that they are alterable at his pleasure; as for example, Man intends one thing to day, he may intend another thing to morrow, he intends one thing this houre, he may intend another thing the next, and at his pleasure reverse his former intentions. And no marvail, considering that man partly is of a fickle disposition in respect of his affections, studious of change, and subject to innovation as the Moone; partly of an improvident disposition, he knows not what a Yeare, what a Month, what a Day, what an houre may bring forth. And therefore though never so wise and constant in his courses, yet may he have just cause to change his resolutions and purposes. But of such ends of man, to wit, as intended by man, it is manifest this Author speaks not.