The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…

And like as Possidonius did not insist only in the stars, for the confirmation of Fate, so neither did Chrysippus in inferior causes. Necessitatem nature acutus interpres (he taxeth Ramus) ad Chrysippum pertinere astrorum ad Possidonium credidisti; errorem error cumulasti. Nam nec Possidonius in solis astris Fatum ponebat sed in totâ naturae contagione, ut suprà docui: & Chrysippus in eâdem naturae contagione, quâ etiam astra continentur, quod non intellexisti. And that he proves out of Cicero answering Chrysippus in this manner. Ut igitur ad quasdam res natura loci pertinet, ad quasdam autem nihil: sie affectio astrorum valeat, sivis ad quasdam res; ad omnes certè non valebit. Chrysippum enim alloquitur (saith Turnebus) ut vel puero notum est, ut me tui pudeat & pigeat, qui Possidonium intelligis. Thus he disciplines Ramus, and proceed farther, saying, Chrysippum autem in astrorum constitution, & affection Fatum posuisse, audi ex Cicerone; si quis, verbi causâ oriente Caniculâ natus est, is in mari non morietur. Vigila Chrysippe &c. Nihil istud argumentum (thus Turnebus concludes herehence) nisi etiam in astris Fatum poneret. So that the four opinions concerning Fate, related by Ludovicus Vives in 4. lib. August. De Civit. Dei cap. 8. and that out of Picus Mirandula, lib. 2. Contra Astrologos; The first whereof is said to be Nature; The second, a Series of causes ⟨p. 94⟩necessary knit together, the Third the Stars, the Fourth the Execution of Divine Decree. I say all these make but one Fatum with the Stoics, yea with all the Stoics in the judgement of Turnebus. And Austin De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 8. expressly includes the will of God within that Series of causes, which was accounted Fatum in the Opinion of the Stoics, and upon that ground approves of it. As for necessitation by reason of disposition of the Matter Prime, whereby things were brought to pass in despite of God; I find no such thing, neither in Austin, nor in those that comment upon him, Ludovicus Vives and Coqueus, nor in Ramus or Turnebus; but rather to the contrary in Ludovicus Vives, who distinguisheth out of the opinion of Plato, as touching one God whom he made Principem Parentemque caeterorum; the Caeteri belike were such spirits as we call Angels.

And like as Possidonius did not insist only in the starres, for the confirmation of Fate, so neither did Chrysippus in inferior causes. Necessitatem nature acutus interpres (he taxeth Ramus) ad Chrysippum pertinere astrorum ad Possidonium credidisti; errorem errore cumulasti. Nam nec Possidonius in solis astris Fatum ponebat sed in totâ naturae contagione, ut suprà docui: & Chrysippus in eâdem naturae contagione, quâ etiam astra continentur, quod non intellexisti. And that he proves out of Cicero answering Chrysippus in this manner. Ut igitur ad quasdam res natura loci pertinet, ad quasdam autem nihil: sie affectio astrorum valeat, sivis ad quasdam res; ad omnes certè non valebit. Chrysippum enim alloquitur (saith Turnebus) ut vel puero notum est, ut me tui pudeat & pigeat, qui Possidonium intelligis. Thus he disciplines Ramus, and proceed farther, saying, Chrysippum autem in astrorum constitutione, & affectione Fatum posuisse, audi ex Cicerone; si quis, verbi causâ oriente Caniculâ natus est, is in mari non morietur. Vigila Chrysippe &c. Nihil istud argumentum (thus Turnebus concludes herehence) nisi etiam in astris Fatum poneret. So that the foure opinions concerning Fate, related by Ludovicus Vives in 4. lib. August. De Civit. Dei cap. 8. and that out of Picus Mirandula, lib. 2. Contra Astrologos; The first whereof is said to be Nature; The second, a Series of causes ⟨p. 94⟩necessary knit together, the Third the Starres, the Fourth the Execution of Divine Decree. I say all these make but one Fatum with the Stoicks, yea with all the Stoicks in the judgement of Turnebus. And Austin De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 8. expresly includes the will of God within that Series of causes, which was accounted Fatum in the Opinion of the Stoicks, and upon that ground approves of it. As for necessitation by reason of disposition of the Matter Prime, whereby things were brought to passe in despite of God; I find no such thing, neither in Austin, nor in those that comment upon him, Ludovicus Vives and Coqueus, nor in Ramus or Turnebus; but rather to the contrary in Ludovicus Vives, who distinguisheth out of the opinion of Plato, as touching one God whom he made Principem Parentemque caeterorum; the Caeteri belike were such spirits as wee call Angells.

And that Maximi Dei leges were inevitabiles, and this was called Necessity, and such a Necessity, cui ne Deos quidem (that is inferior spirits) resistere posse. Quae verò ab Astris geruntur, talia interdum esse ut evitari sapientiâ, industriâ, labour queant, in quo sua est Fortuna. Quae verò certis causis progrederentur ac permanerent fixa, id dici Fatum quod tamen necessitatem non afferat electioni.

And that Maximi Dei leges were inevitabiles, and this was called Necessity, and such a Necessity, cui ne Deos quidem (that is inferior spirits) resistere posse. Quae verò ab Astris geruntur, talia interdum esse ut evitari sapientiâ, industriâ, labore queant, in quo sua est Fortuna. Quae verò certis causis progrederentur ac permanerent fixa, id dici Fatum quod tamen necessitatem non afferat electioni.

That the Manichees maintained two supreme and coeternal causes of all things, we read; the one the cause of Good, the other of Evil: and that every creature was a substantial part of one or both; and that man in his nature was compounded of both, and that his corruption was essential from the supreme Author of evil, and not such as accrued to him of disobedience, We read. But of their opinion that all things were determined by them, both good, and evil, I no where read, but in this Authors Legend. Danaeus hath commented upon Austin de Haeresibus, and to every Head of Heresy draws what he hath read thereof in other Authors. But I find no mention at all of this Article amongst 21 shameful errors of theirs which he reckons up. The 19th is this, Voluntatem malè agendi, quod vocant liberum arbitrium, nob is à naturâ ipsâ insitam, non rebellione nostrâ accersitam, vel ex inobedientiâ natam; Quanquam homines propriâ voluntate peccant. And where Austin answereth the criminations against the Catholics made by the Pelagians, I find no mention at all of this. He should have showed from whom he takes this, that understanding their Opinion aright, we might the better judge of the reproachful comparison which he makes.

That the Manichees maintained two supreme and coëternall causes of all things, we read; the one the cause of Good, the other of Evill: and that every creature was a substantiall part of one or both; and that man in his nature was compounded of both, and that his corruption was essentiall from the supream Author of evill, and not such as acrewed to him of disobedience, We read. But of their opinion that all things were determined by them, both good, and evill, I no where read, but in this Authors Legend. Danaeus hath commented upon Austin de Haeresibus, and to every Head of Heresy draws what he hath read thereof in other Authors. But I find no mention at all of this Article amongst 21 shamefull errours of theirs which he reckons up. The 19th is this, Voluntatem malè agendi, quod vocant liberum arbitrium, nob is à naturâ ipsâ insitam, non rebellione nostrâ accersitam, vel ex inobedientiâ natam; Quanquam homines propriâ voluntate peccant. And where Austin answereth the criminations against the Catholiques made by the Pelagians, I find no mention at all of this. He should have shewed from whom he takes this, that understanding their Opinion aright, we might the better judge of the reproachfull comparison which he makes.

The First whereof is this; That all actions natural and Moral, good and evil, and all events likewise, are absolutely necessary.

The First whereof is this; That all actions naturall and Morall, good and evill, and all events likewise, are absolutely necessary.

Concerning which, I say First; I have cause to doubt that this Author understands not aright, the very notions of absolute necessity, and necessity not absolute. There is no greater necessity, then necessity of nature. And this necessity is twofold; either in Essendo, in being, or in Operando, in working. God alone is necessary in being, and his being is absolutely necessary; it being impossible he should not be, as not only we believe, but School Divines demonstrate, and that with great variety, of evident, and curious conclusions. As for the other necessity, which is in respect of operation: First, this is no way incident unto God, speaking of operation ad extrà, and secluding the mysterious emanations within the Divine Nature; such as are the Generation of the Son by the Father, and the wonderful Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Sonne. But ad extra this necessity of operation is only found in the creature, and that only in such creatures, as by necessity of nature are determined one way: as fire to burn; heavy things to move downwards, and light things upwards; the Sun, Moon, and stars to give light; and the heavens to turn round; all natural Agents in a word distinct from rational are thus determined, to wit, to work that, whereunto they are inclined by necessity of nature; but yet so that being finite, they are subject to superior powers, and thereby obnoxious to impediment most of them, even to powers create; all of them to power increate. Whence it comes pass that no work of theirs is absolutely necessary, especially in respect of God, who can either set an end to all when he will, or restrain their operations at his pleasure. We know the Three Noble Children, when they came forth of the fiery oven, had not so much as any smell of the fire upon them. And therefore Durand professeth that these things which are commonly accounted to come to pass most necessarily, do indeed come to pass merely contingently, in respect of the will of God.

Concerning which, I say First; I have cause to doubt that this Author understands not aright, the very notions of absolute necessity, and necessity not absolute. There is no greater necessity, then necessity of nature. And this necessity is twofold; either in Essendo, in being, or in Operando, in working. God alone is necessary in being, and his being is absolutely necessary; it being impossible he should not be, as not only we believe, but Schoole Divines demonstrate, and that with great variety, of evident, and curious conclusions. As for the other necessity, which is in respect of operation: First, this is no way incident unto God, speaking of operation ad extrà, and secluding the mysterious emanations within the Divine Nature; such as are the Generation of the Sonne by the Father, and the wonderfull Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Sonne. But ad extra this necessity of operation is only found in the creature, and that only in such creatures, as by necessity of nature are determined one way: as fire to burne; heavy things to move downwards, and light things upwards; the Sunne, Moone, and starres to give light; and the heavens to turne round; all naturall Agents in a word distinct from rationall are thus determined, to wit, to work that, whereunto they are inclined by necessity of nature; but yet so that being finite, they are subject to superiour powers, and thereby obnoxious to impediment most of them, even to powers create; all of them to power increate. Whence it comes passe that no work of theirs is absolutely necessary, especially in respect of God, who can either set an end to all when he will, or restraine their operations at his pleasure. We know the Three Noble Children, when they came forth of the fiery oven, had not so much as any smell of the fire upon them. And therefore Durand professeth that these things which are commonly accounted to come to passe most necessarily, doe indeed come to passe meerely contingently, in respect of the will of God.

Nevertheless we willingly profess, that upon supposition of the will of God, that this or that shall come to pass, it followeth necessarily that such a thing shall come ⟨p. 95⟩to pass; like as upon supposition, that God knows such a thing shall come to pass, it followeth necessarily, that such a thing shall come to pass; but how? not necessarily: but either necessarily according as some things are brought to pass by natural agents, working necessarily after the manner aforesaid; or contingently and freely according as some things are brought to pass, by rational agents, working contingently and freely. And therefore as touching the Question of the Schools about the root of contingency, Aquinas and Scotus concur in resolving it into the Will of God, but with this difference; Scotus relates it into the will of God as a free agent. Aquinas resolves it into the Will of God, as an efficacious agent. For the will of God is so efficacious, that he can effectually procure, both that things necessary shall be brought to pass necessarily, and things contingent, contingently; and according he hath provided congruous causes hereof, to wit, both agents natural for the producing of necessary things necessarily, and agents rational for the producing of contingent things, contingently and freely. Thus God preordained that Josiah should burn the Prophets bones upon the Altar, that Cyrus should proclaim liberty to the Jews, to return into their Country; yet what sober Divine hath made doubt, whether Josiah and Cyrus did not herein, that which they did freely. And as in doing, so in abstaining from doing. For God ordained that Christs bones should not be broken; as also that when the Jews, all the Males, came up to the Lord thrice in the year to Jerusalem, None of their neighbours should desire their land. Exod. 34. 24. Yet what sober man should make question, whether the Soldiers did non as freely abstain from breaking Christs bones, as from ought else, and so likewise the bordering Nations did as freely abstain, from invading the land of Israel. And how often is this phrase used in Scripture, Necesse est, of some things coming to pass, which yet came to pass as contingently and freely, as ought else.

Neverthelesse we willingly professe, that upon supposition of the will of God, that this or that shall come to passe, it followeth necessarily that such a thing shall come ⟨p. 95⟩

And unless this be granted, that Gods determination is nothing prejudicial to the freedom of the creatures will, either we must deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, or that they are works produced freely, and so every action pleasing in the sight of God. For the Scripture expressly professeth, that God it is, who worketh in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight. And whatsoever God works in us, or bestows upon us in time, the same he determined, to work in us, and to bestow upon us from everlasting. For he worketh all things according to the counsel of his will Ephes. 1. 11. and the counsel of his Will was everlasting, it being the same with God himself.

And unlesse this be granted, that Gods determination is nothing prejudiciall to the freedome of the creatures will, either we must deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, or that they are works produced freely, and so every action pleasing in the sight of God. For the Scripture expressely professeth, that God it is, who worketh in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight. And whatsoever God workes in us, or bestows upon us in time, the same he determined, to work in us, and to bestow upon us from everlasting. For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his will Ephes. 1. 11. and the counsell of his Will was everlasting, it being the same with God himselfe.

Now I come to the second.

2. And that is this. That all mens ends are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their Wills; and this he saith is upon the matter all one.

1. Now this is most untrue, there being a vast difference between the actions of men, and the ends of men; The ends of men being the works of God. And what a monster shall he be in the Church of God, that with Vorstius shall dare to affirm, that all the works of God, were not determined from everlasting; or being determined, they are alterable, and that in such sort, as to be otherwise determinable by the wills of men; especially considering that the very acts of mens wills, being wrought by God, (as all sides now a days confess) it consequently follows that they were also determined from everlasting, by the Will and Counsel of God. What should I allege the 11th Article of Ireland for this? God from all eternity did by his unchangeable Counsel ordain, whatsoever in time should come to pass: yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. There is no Arminian that I know dares deny, either that every act of man is wrought by God, or that, look what God doth work in time, the same he did before all time decree, and that from everlasting. I know there is a main, and a most Atheistical difference between us on one part, but I do not find them willing to show their horns directly therein, but carry the matter so, as if they would obtrude upon us the acknowledgement, either of the temporal (not eternal) condition of decrees divine, or at least of their alterable nature; whereas themselves dare not plainly manifest themselves, to be of any such Atheistical belief. Let us instance in particular: Let the salvation of some, and damnation of others, be the ends this Author meaneth. Now dare any of them with open ⟨p. 96⟩face profess, that the salvation of the elect, and damnation of the reprobate was not from everlasting determined by God. Be the supreme ends of God concerning man, the manifestation of his glory in the way of mercy on some, in the way of vindicative justice on others. Dare any of them profess, that any of these ends are not from everlasting determined by God; or being so determined, dare they profess, that these divine decrees are alterable, or possible to be undetermined by the will of the creature? What a prodigious assertion were either of these?

1. Now this is most untrue, there being a vast difference between the actions of men, and the ends of men; The ends of men being the works of God. And what a monster shall he be in the Church of God, that with Vorstius shall dare to affirme, that all the works of God, were not determined from everlasting; or being determined, they are alterable, and that in such sort, as to be otherwise determinable by the wills of men; especially considering that the very acts of mens wills, being wrought by God, (as all sides now a daies confesse) it consequently followes that they were also determined from everlasting, by the Will and Counsell of God. What should I alleage the 11th Article of Ireland for this? God from all eternity did by his unchangeable Counsell ordaine, whatsoever in time should come to passe: yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. There is no Arminian that I know dares deny, either that every act of man is wrought by God, or that, look what God doth work in time, the same he did before all time decree, and that from everlasting. I know there is a main, and a most Atheisticall difference between us on one part, but I doe not find them willing to shew their hornes directly therein, but carry the matter so, as if they would obtrude upon us the acknowledgement, either of the temporall (not eternall) condition of decrees divine, or at least of their alterable nature; whereas themselves dare not plainly manifest themselves, to be of any such Atheisticall beliefe. Let us instance in particular: Let the salvation of some, and damnation of others, be the ends this Author meaneth. Now dare any of them with open

If they dare not say, Gods will is changeable, What an unshamefac'd course is this, to obtrude upon us an alterable, that is, a changeable condition of Gods decrees? But perhaps you may say, here is no mention at all made of Gods decrees, but of mans ends. And I willingly confess there is not. And I am persuaded, this Author dares not in plain terms profess, that Gods decrees are alterable. But hereby you may perceive, and have a manifest document of the illusions of Satan, and how mens carnal affections, which are more in love with error then truth, do make them to shut their eyes against the one, and open them unto the other. It were a very harsh thing to say plainly, that Gods decrees are alterable, and that being determined by him, they might be undone, or made undetermined by the wills of men. Therefore the Devil finds a means to draw us, to entertain the same blasphemous opinion, not barefaced, but hoodwickt as it were, and that is by changing the phrase. For though it be uncouth to hear of an alterable condition of Gods decrees, yet it seems nothing harsh to discourse of the alterable condition of mens ends. But give me leave to unmask the Witch, and make it appear how the Devil gulls us in this.

If they dare not say, Gods will is changeable, What an unshamefac'd course is this, to obtrude upon us an alterable, that is, a changeable condition of Gods decrees? But perhaps you may say, here is no mention at all made of Gods decrees, but of mans ends. And I willingly confesse there is not. And I am perswaded, this Author dares not in plain termes professe, that Gods decrees are alterable. But hereby you may perceive, and have a manifest document of the illusions of Satan, and how mens carnall affections, which are more in love with errour then truth, doe make them to shut their eyes against the one, and open them unto the other. It were a very harsh thing to say plainly, that Gods decrees are alterable, and that being determined by him, they might be undone, or made undetermined by the wills of men. Therefore the Devill finds a means to draw us, to entertain the same blasphemous opinion, not barefac'd, but hoodwickt as it were, and that is by changing the phrase. For though it be uncouth to heare of an alterable condition of Gods decrees, yet it seems nothing harsh to discourse of the alterable condition of mens ends. But give me leave to unmask the Witch, and make it appeare how the Devill gulls us in this.

Mens ends are either so called, as intended by man himself, or as appointed by God. If this Author speak of mens ends, as intended by man himself, we willingly grant, that they are alterable at his pleasure; as for example, Man intends one thing to day, he may intend another thing to morrow, he intends one thing this hour, he may intend another thing the next, and at his pleasure reverse his former intentions. And no marvel, considering that man partly is of a fickle disposition in respect of his affections, studious of change, and subject to innovation as the Moon; partly of an improvident disposition, he knows not what a Year, what a Month, what a Day, what an hour may bring forth. And therefore though never so wise and constant in his courses, yet may he have just cause to change his resolutions and purposes. But of such ends of man, to wit, as intended by man, it is manifest this Author speaks not.

Mens ends are either so called, as intended by man himselfe, or as appoynted by God. If this Author speak of mens ends, as intended by man himselfe, wee willingly grant, that they are alterable at his pleasure; as for example, Man intends one thing to day, he may intend another thing to morrow, he intends one thing this houre, he may intend another thing the next, and at his pleasure reverse his former intentions. And no marvail, considering that man partly is of a fickle disposition in respect of his affections, studious of change, and subject to innovation as the Moone; partly of an improvident disposition, he knows not what a Yeare, what a Month, what a Day, what an houre may bring forth. And therefore though never so wise and constant in his courses, yet may he have just cause to change his resolutions and purposes. But of such ends of man, to wit, as intended by man, it is manifest this Author speaks not.

But of ends appointed by God, these be the ends he will have to be alterable and determinable anew by the wills of men, which cannot be without the alteration and change of Gods purposes and intentions, which is as much as to say, without the change and revocation of Gods decrees. And an end not yet actually existing, but only in intention, can admit of no other alteration then in intention, which this Author considering not, though perhaps he abhors to say Gods decrees are changeable and alterable, and shuts out so uncouth an assertion at the fore-door, yet as it were by a back-door to receive it in, and in the dark and muffled, or veiled only with a different phrase, a different expression; Yet forthwith he takes a new course; For whereas by the word unalterable, he did imply that Gods decrees concerning mens ends, should be of an alterable condition; in the words following he changeth his tone, and will not have the ends of man to be determined by God at all, but left unto man to be determined; as when he saith, In vain is our freedom in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined. Whereby it is manifest, he will not have the end whereunto men drive to be determined. And this end can be no other then salvation; for that alone I take to be that whereto men drive, and which they labour to attain, every one naturally seeking after Summum bonum, after happiness. So that in the issue it comes to this, The salvation of this Author is not yet determined by God, but left to be determined by his will, and that I take to be in the way of a moving cause, and that moving cause I guess to be, his final perseverance in faith and repentance, whereupon and not till then, shall this mans salvation be determined by God, as much as to say, that Gods decrees are as merely temporal as are the executions of them. And herein this Author doth exactly agree with Doctor Jackson perhaps being so happy as to understand him, or perhaps being so happy as to light upon an interpreter of him ⟨p. 97⟩some one that breaths the same spirit of opposition to Gods truth, and that after the same way. For sometimes the Doctor pleads for a revocable condition of the divine decrees. For the Pope never binds his hands by any Grant he makes; and why should God bind his hands by any decree he makes?

But of ends appointed by God, these be the ends he will have to be alterable and determinable anew by the wills of men, which cannot be without the alteration and change of Gods purposes and intentions, which is as much as to say, without the change and revocation of Gods decrees. And an end not yet actually existing, but only in intention, can admit of no other alteration then in intention, which this Author considering not, though perhaps he abhorres to say Gods decrees are changeable and alterable, and shuts out so uncouth an assertion at the fore-doore, yet as it were by a back-doore to receive it in, and in the dark and mufled, or veyled only with a different phrase, a different expression; Yet forthwith he takes a new course; For whereas by the word unalterable, he did imply that Gods decrees concerning mens ends, should be of an alterable condition; in the words following he changeth his tone, and will not have the ends of man to be determined by God at all, but left unto man to be determined; as when he saith, In vaine is our freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined. Whereby it is manifest, he will not have the end whereunto men drive to be determined. And this end can be no other then salvation; for that alone I take to be that whereto men drive, and which they labour to attaine, every one naturally seeking after Summum bonum, after happinesse. So that in the issue it comes to this, The salvation of this Author is not yet determined by God, but left to be determined by his will, and that I take to be in the way of a moving cause, and that moving cause I guesse to be, his finall perseverance in faith and repentance, whereupon and not till then, shall this mans salvation be determined by God, as much as to say, that Gods decrees are as meerly temporall as are the executions of them. And herein this Author doth exactly agree with Doctor Jackson perhaps being so happy as to understand him, or perhaps being so happy as to light upon an interpreter of him

especially considering that God hath more wisdom and goodness to manage such authority then the Pope. But if it be dishonesty for a man to take liberty to break his promises, I pray what goodness is required to the managing thereof? Yet that Doctor keeps his course in discoursing of an impotent immutability, and saith, it is indecent to attribute any such immutability unto God; whereas immutability is a notion which connotates no power of doing at all, but only a power of suffering, and formally denotes the negation thereof. And what madness is it to say, that the less power God hath of receiving change, the less power he hath of working? Yet this is not all; He hath another device answerable to the latter course of this Author, and that is, that Nothing, concerning any mans salvation or damnation, is determined by God before he is borne, or before his death: and to that purpose he saith that God is still decreeing, as if hitherto he had not decreed ought. And would you know of whom he learned this? Rogers in his exposition of the Articles of the Church of England, a Book dedicated to Arch-Bishop Bancroft, & allowed by the lawful authority of the Church of England, writing upon the 17th Article, and delivering his second proposition, collected therehence, in this form, Predestination hath been from everlasting; when he comes to set forth the Adversaries of this truth, Those wrangling Sophisters, saith he, are deceived, who because God is not included within the compass of any time, but hath all things to come as present before his eyes, do say, that God he did not in the time long ago past only, but still in the time present likewise doth Predestinate.

especially considering that God hath more wisdome and goodnesse to manage such authority then the Pope. But if it be dishonesty for a man to take liberty to break his promises, I pray what goodnesse is required to the managing thereof? Yet that Doctor keeps his course in discoursing of an impotent immutability, and saith, it is indecent to attribute any such immutability unto God; whereas immutability is a notion which connotates no power of doing at all, but only a power of suffering, and formally denotes the negation thereof. And what madnesse is it to say, that the lesse power God hath of receiving change, the lesse power he hath of working? Yet this is not all; He hath another device answerable to the latter course of this Author, and that is, that Nothing, concerning any mans salvation or damnation, is determined by God before he is borne, or before his death: and to that purpose he saith that God is still decreeing, as if hitherto he had not decreed ought. And would you know of whom he learned this? Rogers in his exposition of the Articles of the Church of England, a Book dedicated to Arch-Bishop Bancroft, & allowed by the lawfull authority of the Church of England, writing upon the 17th Article, and delivering his second proposition, collected therehence, in this forme, Predestination hath been from everlasting; when he comes to set forth the Adversaries of this truth, Those wrangling Sophisters, saith he, are deceived, who because God is not included within the compasse of any time, but hath all things to come as present before his eyes, doe say, that God he did not in the time long agoe past only, but still in the time present likewise doth Predestinate.

2. Consider we the reason he gives for so shameful an assertion, as touching the alterable condition of Gods decrees, or as touching the ends of men, as yet undetermined by God, In vain, saith he, is freedom in the actions, if the end which they drive at, be determined. Here, First, we have a wild phrase Freedom in actions. For by freedom we understand an active power of working after a certain manner, which power is found in the will, not in the actions. Secondly, a bare avouching that unless God as yet hath left the ends of men living undetermined, or in case he hath determined them, unless these determinations of his be alterable, Freedom of Will is given in vain; as much as to say, unless we admit of such monstrous assertions, the freedom of mans Will is in vain. But we say this consequence is most untrue, and we give our reason for it. For whether salvation or damnation be the ends he meaneth, no creature is capable of either, but only creatures rational; and the one being bestowed by way of reward, and the other inflicted by way of punishment, each of these presupposeth freedom of Will in the parties thus proceeded with: Or whether the ends are the manifestation of Gods vindicative and remunerative justice, for the same reason now specified, each of these doth necessarily bespeak freedom of Will in them, who after either way are made useless on whom the glory of God is to be manifested. When he addes saying Omnis actio is propter sinem. This altogether concerns the ends intended, and proposed by the author of the action, nothing concerns the ends proposed by another. And the ends of a man proposed by himself, are either supreme or intermediate, still every action deliberate (for so alone it holds) tends to one end or other, which man himself intends. The supreme end of every one is his chief good; but as touching that wherein this consists, all do not agree. Some place it in wealth, some in pleasure, some in honour, some in virtuous life. By the light of Grace we are taught, that as we are creatures, our end, which we should propose unto our selves, is the glorifying of God our Creator, though there were neither reward nor punishment.

2. Consider we the reason he gives for so shamefull an assertion, as touching the alterable condition of Gods decrees, or as touching the ends of men, as yet undetermined by God, In vaine, saith he, is freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at, be determined. Here, First, we have a wild phrase Freedome in actions. For by freedome we understand an active power of working after a certain manner, which power is found in the will, not in the actions. Secondly, a bare avouching that unlesse God as yet hath left the ends of men living undetermined, or in case he hath determined them, unlesse these determinations of his be alterable, Freedome of Will is given in vaine; as much as to say, unlesse we admit of such monstrous assertions, the freedome of mans Will is in vaine. But we say this consequence is most untrue, and we give our reason for it. For whether salvation or damnation be the ends he meaneth, no creature is capable of either, but only creatures rationall; and the one being bestowed by way of reward, and the other inflicted by way of punishment, each of these presupposeth freedome of Will in the parties thus proceeded with: Or whether the ends are the manifestation of Gods vindicative and remunerative justice, for the same reason now specified, each of these doth necessarily bespeak freedome of Will in them, who after either way are made uselesse on whom the glory of God is to be manifested. When he addes saying Omnis actio is propter sinem. This altogether concernes the ends intended, and proposed by the author of the action, nothing concernes the ends proposed by another. And the ends of a man proposed by himselfe, are either supreame or intermediate, still every action deliberate (for so alone it holds) tends to one end or other, which man himselfe intends. The supream end of every one is his chief good; but as touching that wherein this consists, all doe not agree. Some place it in wealth, some in pleasure, some in honour, some in virtuous life. By the light of Grace we are taught, that as we are creatures, our end, which we should propose unto our selves, is the glorifying of God our Creator, though there were neither reward nor punishment.