A64002:546
The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessels of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entitled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two books, the first being a refutation of the said book, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hord's discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceals his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twice ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twice from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeans ...The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...
Oxford: printed by L.L. and H.H. for Tho. Robinson, 1653
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
To this I answer.
1. Is it so indeed, Better to derive the necessity of unhappy events, from an evil God, or from course of nature, then from the decree of God? Is not God then to be accounted the author of evil in the way of punishment? Is there any evil in the City, and the Lord hath not done it? Or doth it less become him to be the author 1of affliction then of prosperity? Doth not the Lord in the same place, and in the same manner profess, that he delights in the execution of judgement, as well as of mercy?
1. Is it so indeed, Better to derive the necessity of unhappy events, from an evill God, or from course of nature, then from the decree of God? Is not God then to be accounted the author of evill in the way of punishment? Is there any evill in the Citty, and the Lord hath not done it? Or doth it lesse become him to be the author 1of affliction then of prosperity? Doth not the Lord in the same place, and in the same manner professe, that he delights in the execution of judgement, as well as of mercy?
2. As touching the necessity he speaks of, whether in good, or in evil actions; consider I pray his carriage, He did not object unto us, that we made all the actions of men absolutely necessary, but either so, or the ends of men unavoidable. Yet here he supposeth the former to serve his own turn in this present crimination, he holds it up, as it were contrary to his own conscience. We acknowledge the actions of men to be free, not one being performed by any, but in such sort, that they had power to forbear it, and still have to forbear the like: But upon supposition of Gods decree, either to work in us any thing, that is pleasing in his sight (which to be his gracious course, the Apostle expressly professeth, Heb. 13. 20.) or to permit any particular evil, we willingly profess, that as well upon this, as upon Gods foreknowledge, it followeth consequently that necesse est, that such a thing come to pass; but how? not necessarily, but agreeable to the condition of our reasonable natures, contingently and freely. And this Arminius in plain terms professeth in the point of evil, to wit, supposing God permits a man to will this or that evill; Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, Exam. pag. 153. But I will farther display the doctrine of these Arminians, and prove, First, that no evil comes to pass, but that God did will it. Secondly, that never was there any greater necessity known to the World, then that which these men bring upon good and evil actions, a necessity that binds the Lord himself.
2. As touching the necessity he speaks of, whether in good, or in evill actions; consider I pray his carriage, He did not object unto us, that we made all the actions of men absolutely necessary, but either so, or the ends of men unavoidable. Yet here he supposeth the former to serve his own turne in this present crimination, he holds it up, as it were contrary to his own conscience. We acknowledge the actions of men to be free, not one being performed by any, but in such sort, that they had power to forbear it, and still have to forbear the like: But upon supposition of Gods decree, either to work in us any thing, that is pleasing in his sight (which to be his gracious course, the Apostle expresly professeth, Heb. 13. 20.) or to permit any particular evill, we willingly professe, that as well upon this, as upon Gods foreknowledge, it followeth consequently that necesse est, that such a thing come to passe; but how? not necessarily, but agreeable to the condition of our reasonable natures, contingently and freely. And this Arminius in plain termes professeth in the poynt of evill, to wit, supposing God permits a man to will this or that evill; Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, Exam. pag. 153. But I will farther display the doctrine of these Arminians, and prove, First, that no evill comes to passe, but that God did will it. Secondly, that never was there any greater necessity known to the World, then that which these men bring upon good and evill actions, a necessity that binds the Lord himselfe.
1. As touching the first; These words of Arminius are well known, Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum sucrum implere. But I will prove it by their Doctrine of scientia Media: For hereby they maintain, that God foreseeth by what motives sin will be hindered, or not hindered, without any prejudice to the liberty of the creatures will; As also that God in the storehouse of his wisdom, hath such store of moral impediments, as that he knows thereby, how to hinder any sin if it pleased him. His words are these, Praeter illa sufficientia impedimenta, etiam efficacia habet in suo sapientiae & potentiae promptuario, quibus productis certò & infallibiliter peccatum impediretur. And this is the difference with him, between a sufficient impediment of sin, and impediment effectual. Effectual is that upon the use whereof, he knows full well, that sin will be hindered. Sufficient is that upon the use whereof, sin will not be hindered, and this is known to the Lord from everlasting. Now let them tell me, why would not God make choice to use such an impediment, which he knew would prove effectual, but such rather, as he knew would prove ineffectual. Doth it not manifestly appear hereby, that it is Gods will, that sin shall come to pass by his permission? Like as the Scripture is express to this purpose, as where it is said, that Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered together against the holy Son of God, to do that which Gods hand, and his counsel, had foredetermined to be done. Now this is well known to have been no less then the ignominious handling and crucifying of the Son of God. Acts 4. 28. And Revel. 17. 17. God put into the hearts of the Kings to do his will, and to give their Kingdoms to the Beast, as much as to say, to use their Regal power, to the supporting of Antichrist, which we know was in part by Massacring the Saints of God.
1. As touching the first; These words of Arminius are well known, Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum sucrum implere. But I will prove it by their Doctrine of scientia Media: For hereby they maintain, that God foreseeth by what motives sinne will be hindered, or not hindered, without any prejudice to the liberty of the creatures will; As also that God in the storehouse of his wisdome, hath such store of morall impediments, as that he knows thereby, how to hinder any sinne if it pleased him. His words are these, Praeter illa sufficientia impedimenta, etiam efficacia habet in suo sapientiae & potentiae promptuario, quibus productis certò & infallibiliter peccatum impediretur. And this is the difference with him, between a sufficient impediment of sinne, and impediment effectuall. Effectuall is that upon the use whereof, he knows full well, that sinne will be hindered. Sufficient is that upon the use whereof, sinne will not be hindered, and this is known to the Lord from everlasting. Now let them tell me, why would not God make choyce to use such an impediment, which he knew would prove effectuall, but such rather, as he knew would prove ineffectuall. Doth it not manifestly appear hereby, that it is Gods will, that sinne shall come to passe by his permission? Like as the Scripture is expresse to this purpose, as where it is said, that Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered together against the holy Sonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand, and his counsell, had foredetermined to be done. Now this is well known to have been no lesse then the ignominious handling and crucifying of the Sonne of God.
2. Now to discover the strange necessity, that these men bring in upon all things: It cannot be denied, but that God knoweth all future things, before they come to pass. Therefore they are presupposed to be future in order of reason before God, knows them to be future; therefore all things future, are either such by necessity of ⟨p. 101⟩nature, or by some cause; not by any cause, for if there were any cause hereof, to wit, to make them pass out of the condition of things merely possible of their own nature, into the condition of things future, then this cause should be found either within God or without God. Not without God can any cause hereof be found. For this passage of things, out of the condition of things merely possible, into the condition of things future, was from everlasting, therefore the cause hereof must have existence from everlasting. But nothing was everlasting, Extra Deum, out of God; Therefore if any cause hereof be to be found, it must be within God; otherwise it must be confessed, that all things became future by absolute necessity of nature. If to help this, they will devise something within the nature of God, to be the cause hereof, let them tell us what that is. Not the Science of God, for all confess, that secluding the divine will, Gods knowledge is the cause of nothing. If they say, the will of God, they concur with us in embracing the same Opinion, which they so much abhor. Nothing remains to fly unto, but the Essence of God; If they plead, that I demand, whether the Essence of God working freely, be the cause of the futurition of all things, or as working necessarily? If as working freely, that is as much as to confess in express terms, that Gods will is the cause thereof: But if they say the divine Essence is the cause hereof, as working necessarily, hence it follows, that all things good and evil come from God, as working by necessity of nature. See I pray and consider the abominable, and Atheistical opinions, that these Arminians do improvidently cast themselves upon, when they stretch their wits to overthrow Gods providence, as it is carried in the 11th Article of Ireland, which is this, God from all Eternity, did by his unchangeable Counsel ordain whatsoever in time should come to pass;
2. Now to discover the strange necessity, that these men bring in upon all things: It cannot be denied, but that God knoweth all future things, before they come to passe. Therefore they are presupposed to be future in order of reason before God, knows them to be future; therefore all things future, are either such by necessity of
yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather.
In the Conclusion, that which he vaunts of, as touching the Fathers, is mere wind; for he gives you nothing but his word for it; which of what credit it deserves to be, I leave to the indifferent to judge. And as for the plucking up of the roots of virtue which he fables of: Consider I pray, what Sect of Philosophers were ever known to be more virtuous then the Stoics; and how was Zeno himself honoured by the Athenians, for his grave and virtuous conversation? Hath not Erasmus delivered it, as out of the mouth of Hierome, that Secta Stoicorum was Secta simillima Christianae? Yet I no where find, that they brought in any necessity, that was not subordinate to the Will of the supreme God: But these Arminians bring in a necessity of nature from without God, to make him to do this, or that, if he doth any thing; or at least, to make God himself a necessary Agent, devoid of all liberty and freedom, contrary to that of Ambrose concerning the manner of Gods working, namely, that it is, Nullo necessitatis obsequio, but solo libertatis arbitrio. But according to these Divines it must be quite contrary, Nullo •ibertatis arbitrio, solo necessitatis obsequio.
In the Conclusion, that which he vaunts of, as touching the Fathers, is meer wind; for he gives you nothing but his word for it; which of what credit it deserves to be, I leave to the indifferent to judge. And as for the plucking up of the rootes of vertue which he fables of: Consider I pray, what Sect of Philosophers were ever known to be more vertuous then the Stoicks; and how was Zeno himselfe honoured by the Athenians, for his grave and vertuous conversation? Hath not Erasmus delivered it, as out of the mouth of Hierome, that Secta Stoicorum was Secta simillima Christianae? Yet I no where find, that they brought in any necessity, that was not subordinate to the Will of the supream God: But these Arminians bring in a necessity of nature from without God, to make him to doe this, or that, if he doth any thing; or at least, to make God himselfe a necessary Agent, devoyd of all liberty and freedome, contrary to that of Ambrose concerning the manner of Gods working, namely, that it is, Nullo necessitatis obsequio, but solo libertatis arbitrio. But according to these Divines it must be quite contrary, Nullo •ibertatis arbitrio, solo necessitatis obsequio.
And thus much as touching the first sort of this Authors Reasons, which he accounts only Inducing; I come to the other sort, which he esteems convincing.
And thus much as touching the first sort of this Authors Reasons, which he accounts only Inducing; I come to the other sort, which he esteemes convincing.
THE SECOND PART OF THE FIRST BOOK, Wherein are Examined those Arguments against the Absoluteness of DIVINE REPROBATION, WHICH Mr HORD Took to be of a CONVINCING NATURE.
THE SECOND PART OF THE FIRST BOOK, Wherein are Examined those Arguments against the Absolutenesse of DIVINE REPROBATION, WHICH Mr HORD Took to be of a CONVINCING NATURE.
OXFORD, Printed by Leonard Lichfield Printer to the University. M. D. C. LIII.
OXFORD, Printed by Leonard Lichfield Printer to the Vniversity. M. D. C. LIII.
THOSE of the Second sort, by which for the present I stand convinced, that absolute reprobation is no part of Gods truth, are drawn from these five following heads,
1. Pregnant Testimonies of Scripture directly opposite unto it. 2. Some principal attributes of God not compatible with it. 3. The end of the Word and Sacraments, with other excellent gifts of God to men, quite thwarted by it. 4. Holy and pious endeavours much hindered by it, if not wholly subversed. 5. The grounds of comfort, whereby distressed consciences are to be relieved, are all overthrown by it.
1. Pregnant Testimonies of Scripture directly opposite unto it. 2. Some principall attributes of God not compatible with it. 3. The end of the Word and Sacraments, with other excellent gifts of God to men, quite thwarted by it. 4. Holy and pious endeavours much hindered by it, if not wholly subversed. 5. The grounds of comfort, whereby distressed consciences are to be relieved, are all overthrown by it.
