The sum of Christian religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus first, by way of catechism,…The summe of Christian religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus first, by way of catechism,…

2. What difference there is of the free-will which is in God, and that which is in reasonable creatures, Angels and men.

¹Two things there are common to God and reasonable creatures, as touching the liberty of Will: 1. That God and reasonable creatures do things upon deliberation and advice; that is, they choose or refuse whatsoever objects, with an understanding going before the action, and a will accompanying the action of choosing or refusing. 2. They choose or refuse any thing of their proper and inward motion without constraint: that is, the Will being fit in it own nature to will the contrary of that which it willeth, or to suspend the action it intendeth, of it own accord inclineth to the one part, Psal. 104.24. & 115.3. Gen. 3.6. Isa. 1.19. Mat. 23.37.

¹TWo things there are common to God and reasonable creatures, as touching the liberty of Will: 1. That God and reasonable creatures do things upon deliberation and advice; that is, they chuse or refuse whatsoever objects, with an understanding going before the action, and a will accompanying the action of chusing or refusing. 2. They chuse or refuse any thing of their proper and inward motion without constraint: that is, the Will being fit in it owne nature to will the contrary of that which it willeth, or to suspend the action it intendeth, of it owne accord inclineth to the one part, Psal. 104.24. & 115.3. Gen. 3.6. Isa. 1.19. Mat. 23.37.

1. 1Two things common to God and creatures in their will.

Go and gather the Elders of Israel together, &c. Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God, ye have slain: But God hath fulfilled these things. Herod and Pontius Pilate gathered themselves together, to do whatsoever thine hand, and thy counsel had determined before to be done. I know, ¹that the way of a man is not in himself, neither is it in man to walk, and to direct his steps. The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord: Therefore the wills of Angels and men,² and all other second causes, as they were created of God their first supreme and sovereign cause, so are they ruled of him; but the will of God is ruled by no one of his creatures: because as God hath no efficient cause without, and besides himself, so neither hath he any moving or inclining cause; otherwise he were not God, that is, the supreme and sovereign cause of all his works, and the creatures should be invested in Gods room.³ Moreover God ruleth and bendeth the wills of his creatures, and doth not draw or enforce them; that is, by objects represented to the mind he effectually moveth, affecteth, and allureth the Will to will that which then the mind judgeth good, and refuse that which seemeth evil.

Goe and gather the Elders of Israel together, &c. Him, being delivered by the determinate counsell and fore-knowledge of God, ye have slaine: But God hath fulfilled these things. Herod and Pontius Pilate gathered themselves together, to doe whatsoever thine hand, and thy counsell had determined before to be done. I know, ¹that the way of a man is not in himselfe, neither is it in man to walke, and to direct his steps. The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord: Therefore the wils of Angels and men,² and all other second causes, as they were created of God their first supreme and soveraigne cause, so are they ruled of him; but the will of God is ruled by no one of his creatures: because as God hath no efficient cause without, and besides himselfe, so neither hath hee any moving or inclining cause; otherwise hee were not God, that is, the supreme and soveraigne cause of all his workes, and the creatures should be invested in Gods room.

¹In the Understanding and Will both together: because God, as he unchangeably knoweth all things so also he hath determined from everlasting, and will unchangeably all things which are done, as they are good; and permitteth them, as they are sins. Now, as the creatures notions and judgements of things, so also their wills are changeable: so that they will that, which before they would not: and will not that, which before they would. For, seeing that all the counsels of God are most good, most just and most wise; he never disliketh, correcteth, or changeth them, as oftentimes men do, when as they do perceive themselves to have determined any thing unadvisedly before. Hither appertain those sayings, God is not as man, ²that he should lye. I am the Lord and change not. Object.³ He that cannot change his counsel and purpose, hath not free-will; but God cannot change his counsel and purpose. which he hath once appointed: Therefore his will is not free. First, we deny the Major: For not he which doth not change his purpose which he hath once appointed, hath no liberty of will; but he which could not purpose any other thing, being let by some external cause: But the liberty of God consisteth not in the change of his will or purpose, but in this, that God will all things (whatsoever he will) altogether with his will, and of himself, and could have had otherwise decreed, or not decreed all things, which he decreed from everlasting, of the creation, preservation, and government of things, according to these sayings: With men this is impossible, ⁴but with God all things are possible. These and the like sayings show, that God hath so appointed from everlasting with himself the creation of things, and the gathering and saving of his Church, not as if he could not have not done this, or not have appointed it otherwise; but because so it seemed good to him: neither must men seek any superior cause then his will, of all his divine works which he exerciseth in his creatures; neither is there any other necessity to be found in them, then which dependeth of the most free appointment of God himself. For, as to resolve of such a purpose as is to be changed; so also to change it either to better or to worse, is rather servitude or bondage, then freedom & liberty: for it proceedeth of ignorance or impotency.

For they change their counsels and purposes, who either err in taking them, or are not able to perform the counsel which they have taken. But to resolve of such a purpose, as might alike either have been decreed, or not decreed; and which after it is decreed, is neither changed, nor to be changed at any time, this is perfect and divine liberty. Now God, whatsoever he hath decreed, could either not have decreed it at all, or have decreed it otherwise. And that he changeth not that which he hath ⟨p. 78⟩once decreed, the perfectness of his nature, even his infinite wisdom and goodness is cause thereof. For most wisely and rightly doth he decree all things, and constantly persisteth in that which is good and right. Wherefore the immutability in God doth as well not diminish his liberty as his immortality, and other things which are proper unto his divinity. Secondly, if any man urge, That it is a point of liberty, not only to resolve of any advice what he will, but after he hath resolved, to be able either to follow it, or change it: We understand by those things which have been already spoken, that this doth agree to the creatures, which may err in their purposes, and therefore stand in need of changes and alterations; but not to God, who can never err, and therefore requires no change of his purpose. Lastly, if they reply, That not to be able to alter a purpose once undertaken, is a defect of ability or power; and therefore against the liberty of God: We answer, That the Antecedent of this reply is true, if the change of it be impossible by reason of some impediment, coming from some external cause, or by reason of defect of nature or ability; but the Antecedent is most false, if the impossibility of change proceed from a perfection of that nature, which is not changed, and from a wisdom and rightness of that purpose which is unchangeable, and from a perseverance and constancy of the will in that which is good and right: after which sort it is apparent to be in God.

For they change their counsels and purposes, who either erre in taking them, or are not able to perform the counsell which they have taken. But to resolve of such a purpose, as might alike either have been decreed, or not decreed; and which after it is decreed, is neither changed, nor to be changed at any time, this is perfect and divine liberty. Now God, whatsoever he hath decreed, could either not have decreed it at all, or have decreed it otherwise. And that he changeth not that which he hath ⟨p. 78⟩

¹But against that, where it was said, That the wills of all creatures are so guided by God, that neither they are able to will what he from everlasting hath not decreed, neither not to will what he hath decreed for them to will, more question is used to be made: 1. That which is ruled by the unchangeable will of God, doth not work freely; the will of Angels and men is ruled by the unchangeable will of God: Therefore either it hath no liberty, or the choice which it maketh is not tied to the will of God. Answer we make to the Major by a distinction: It is not a free agent which is so ruled by God, as it hath no deliberation and election of his own. But that which God so ruleth, as he showeth the object unto the understanding, and by it effectually moveth and affecteth the will to choose it; that doth notwithstanding freely work, albeit it be inclined at the beck and will of God, whither he will have it. For to work freely in the creatures, is not to work without any ones government, but with deliberation, and with a proper and self-motion of the will, although this motion be else-whence raised and ruled. Wherefore, it is not the immutability and operation of the divine will and providence, which is against this liberty, but a privation and constraint of judgement; which is an impulsion, or a motion proceeding not from an inward cause or faculty, but only from an outward cause, beside or against the nature of that which is moved. Now, such an impulsion falleth not into the will; but God moveth it, leading and bringing it on as it were by objects, to choose that which he will. For the faculty or ability and power of the will cannot be brought into act, that is, to show and express it self without an object; and,² We are, live, and move in God: But, to be moved of no other cause but of himself only, this is exceeding and infinite perfection and liberty, agreeing to God alone, which the creature cannot desire, much less arrogate and challenge unto it self, without notorious blasphemy.

¹But against that, where it was said, That the wils of all creatures are so guided by God, that neither they are able to will what he from everlasting hath not decreed, neither not to will what he hath decreed for them to will, more question is used to be made: 1. That which is ruled by the unchangeable will of God, doth not worke freely; the will of Angels and men is ruled by the unchangeable will of God: Therefore either it hath no liberty, or the choice which it maketh is not tied to the will of God. Answer we make to the Major by a distinction: It is not a free agent which is so ruled by God, as it hath no deliberation and election of his owne. But that which God so ruleth, as he sheweth the object unto the understanding, and by it effectually moveth and affecteth the will to chuse it; that doth notwithstanding freely work, albeit it be inclined at the beck and will of God, whither hee will have it. For to work freely in the creatures, is not to work without any ones government, but with deliberation, and with a proper and selfe-motion of the will, although this motion be else-whence raised and ruled. Wherefore, it is not the immutability and operation of the divine will and providence, which is against this liberty, but a privation and constraint of judgement; which is an impulsion, or a motion proceeding not from an inward cause or faculty, but only from an outward cause, beside or against the nature of that which is moved. Now, such an impulsion falleth not into the will; but God moveth it, leading and bringing it on as it were by objects, to chuse that which he will. For the faculty or ability and power of the will cannot be brought into act, that is, to shew and expresse it self without an object; and,

¹Further, it may easily be showed, That the necessity or immutability which ariseth not from constraint, but from the nature of the will, or from the commotion of it, stirred by other causes, to choose or refuse an object thought of by the mind, doth not at all withstand or hinder the liberty of will: 1. Because this necessity doth not take away, but effectuateth and persuadeth the judgement of the mind, and free or voluntary assent of the will, inasmuch as God doth cause and work in men both the notions & election of objects. 2. Because God, albeit he is by nature, that is, by exceeding and absolute necessity, good, and hath begotten his Son, and had his holy Spirit from all eternity: yet will he not by a constrained, but most free will, be, live, be blessed, and good, have his Son and holy Spirit, and will all his purposes and works to be good and just, although it be impossible that he should will any thing contrary to these which he hath already determined. If then this absolute necessity of willing things in God, doth not take away even the greatest liberty; there is no ⟨p. 79⟩doubt but that necessity, which is but only conditional, that is according to the decree and government of God, doth not take away that liberty, which agreeth unto the creatures, that is, judgment and election, free and voluntary.² 3. The holy Angels and blessed men in the celestial life, even by our adversaries own confession, are endued with greater liberty of Will, then we are in this life: But they necessarily will those things only which are right and just, and hate & abhor all things whatsoever are evil and unjust, because they are made such of God, and established by him, and are so illuminated and guided by the holy Ghost, that they cannot other wise will or work: neither by this necessity of Willing those things which are good and pleasing to God, is the liberty of Will taken away or diminished in them; but rather is increased, and confirmed, as who with all willingness choose and do those things only which are just.

¹Further, it may easily be shewed, That the necessity or immutability which ariseth not from constraint, but from the nature of the will, or from the commotion of it, stirred by other causes, to chuse or refuse an object thought of by the mind, doth not at all withstand or hinder the liberty of will: 1. Because this necessity doth not take away, but effectuateth and perswadeth the judgement of the mind, and free or voluntary assent of the will, inasmuch as God doth cause and work in men both the notions & election of objects. 2. Because God, albeit he is by nature, that is, by exceeding and absolute necessity, good, and hath begotten his Son, and had his holy Spirit from all eternity: yet will he not by a constrained, but most free will, be, live, be blessed, and good, have his Son and holy Spirit, and will all his purposes and works to be good and just, although it be impossible that he should will any thing contrary to these which he hath already determined. If then this absolute necessity of willing things in God, doth not take away even the greatest liberty; there is no

Fourthly,¹ it is showed by many testimonies of Scripture, that the Wills and voluntary Actions of good and wicked men, which our adversaries maintain to be and have been free, and we also, according to the right meaning of this word Liberty, do willingly confess, are so guided by the secret and unchangeable purpose of God, that they neither can or could either do, or be otherwise. Wherefore either so many manifest places of Scripture must be denied, or openly corrupted: or it must be granted, that one and the same Action of the Will is free & contingent in respect of the Will, and necessary in respect of Gods government. Fifthly, it is declared by many places of Scripture,² that all contingent effects do retain their contingency, which they have from the nature of their causes, although they be done by the unchangeable determination of the purpose or providence of God: But all voluntary effects or motions are contingent in respect of the Will, which by nature was alike able to have done the plain contrary unto them. They therefore retain their contingency, that is, their liberty (for this is the contingency of the actions of the Will) although they be so determined of by Gods Will, that there can be no other. The reason of the Major in this argument is, for that God so moveth the second causes, and by them bringeth to pass what he will, that in the mean season by this providence he doth not destroy or abolish their nature wch he gave them at their creation, but rather preserveth and nourisheth it: so that as concerning their nature, some work contingently, some necessarily, although in respect of the liberty of Gods purpose, all work contingently, and in respect of the unchangeableness of his decree, all work necessarily, so as they do. For when God by the rising of the Sun lighteneth the world, he maketh not the Sun so, as if being risen it did not necessarily lighten, or were apt by nature not to lighten: and yet it is in the power of God, either to change the nature of the Sun, or that remaining as it is, not to lighten the world: as he showed in Egypt, and at the passion of Christ. In like manner, when the Quails light at the Tents of the Israelites, and the Ravens carry meat to Elijah, and one sparrow falleth on the ground, God doth not make the nature of these living creatures such, as could not be carried elsewhere:

Fourthly,

and yet that they can have no other motion then that which they have, by reason of the will of God interposed & coming between, the Scripture plainly affirmeth. Whereof it is manifest, that as in other things, which work contingently, their contingency; so in the will, the liberty wch is given it of God, is not taken away, but rather preserved by Gods government. Now then, if our adversaries in their argument understand that Liberty which consisteth in the deliberation of the mind and free assent of the will; we do not only grant, but also better maintain then they the liberty of will in all actions thereof: and so the Major of their argument shall be false, to wit, that those things which are done by the unchangeable decree of God, are not done by the free-will of men and Angels. For this liberty the providence of God doth so not hinder, but rather establish and confirm, that without this, that liberty cannot so much as be: for God both keepeth his order which he appointed at the creation by his perpetual efficacy and operation, and doth inspire into all by his virtue true notions and right election. But if they challenge a liberty unto the creature depending of no other cause whereby it is guided, we deny their whole argument, as knowing such a liberty of creatures to stand against ⟨p. 80⟩the whole Scripture, and that it only agreeth unto God. For him alone do all things serve: In him we live, and move, and have our being: he giveth unto all not only life or power of moving themselves, but even breathing too, that is, very moving it self.

and yet that they can have no other motion then that which they have, by reason of the wil of God interposed & coming betweene, the Scripture plainly affirmeth. Whereof it is manifest, that as in other things, which work contingently, their contingency; so in the will, the liberty wch is given it of God, is not taken away, but rather preserved by Gods government. Now then, if our adversaries in their argument understand that Liberty which consisteth in the deliberation of the mind and free assent of the wil; we do not only grant, but also better maintaine then they the liberty of wil in all actions thereof: and so the Major of their argument shal be false, to wit, that those things which are done by the unchangeable decree of God, are not done by the free-wil of men and Angels. For this liberty the providence of God doth so not hinder, but rather establish and confirm, that without this, that liberty cannot so much as be: for God both keepeth his order which he appointed at the creation by his perpetuall efficacy and operation, and doth inspire into al by his vertue true notions and right election. But if they challenge a liberty unto the creature depending of no other cause wherby it is guided, we deny their whole argument, as knowing such a liberty of creatures to stand against

¹Object. 2. If the will when it is converted by God, or turned and inclined to other objects, cannot withstand, it is even mere passive, and so worketh not at all. Answ. This consequence deceiveth them, because in the Antecedent there is not a sufficient enumeration of those actions which the will may have, when it is moved of God: For it is able not only to withstand God moving it, but also of it own proper motion to assent and obey him. And when it doth this, it is not idle, neither doth it only suffer or is moved, but it self exerciseth and moveth her own actions; and yet this is to be understood of the actions of the Will, not of the new qualities or inclinations which it hath to obey God. For these the Will receiveth not by her own operation, but by the working of the holy Ghost.

¹Object. 2. If the will when it is converted by God, or turned and inclined to other objects, cannot withstand, it is even meere passive, and so worketh not at all. Answ. This consequence deceiveth them, because in the Antecedent there is not a sufficient ennumeration of those actions which the will may have, when it is moved of God: For it is able not onely to withstand God moving it, but also of it owne proper motion to assent and obey him. And when it doth this, it is not idle, neither doth it onely suffer or is moved, but it selfe exerciseth and moveth her owne actions; and yet this is to be understood of the actions of the Will, not of the new qualities or inclinations which it hath to obey God. For these the Will receiveth not by her owne operation, but by the working of the holy Ghost.

1. 1The will worketh together with God, and is not mere passive.The will worketh together with God, and is not meere passive.

¹Object. 3. That which withstandeth the will of God is not guided by it: But the will of men in many actions withstandeth the will of God: It is not therefore always guided by the will of God. Answ. The consequence here faileth, because there are four terms. For the Major is true, if both the revealed and the secret will of God be understood, so that simply and in all respects it be withstood, and that be done which simply and by no means it would have done: that which is impossible to come to pass, because of the omnipotency and liberty of God. But in the Minor, the will of God must be understood, as it is revealed. For the secret decrees of Gods will and providence are ever ratified, and are performed in all, even in those who most of all withstand Gods commandments. Neither yet are there contrary wills in God: for nothing is found in his secret purposes, which disagreeth with his nature revealed in his word: and God openeth unto us in his law what he approveth and liketh, and what agreeth with his nature and the order of his mind; but he doth not promise or reveal how much grace he will, or purposeth to give to every one to obey his commandments.

¹Object. 3. That which withstandeth the will of God is not guided by it: But the will of men in many actions withstandeth the will of God: It is not therefore alwayes guided by the will of God. Answ. The consequence here faileth, because there are four termes. For the Major is true, if both the revealed and the secret will of God be understood, so that simply and in all respects it bee withstood, and that bee done which simply and by no meanes it would have done: that which is impossible to come to passe, because of the omnipotency and liberty of God. But in the Minor, the will of God must bee understood, as it is revealed. For the secret decrees of Gods will and providence are ever ratified, and are performed in all, even in those who most of all withstand Gods commandements. Neither yet are there contrary wils in God: for nothing is found in his secret purposes, which disagreeth with his nature revealed in his word: and God openeth unto us in his law what he approveth and liketh, and what agreeth with his nature and the order of his mind; but hee doth not promise or reveale how much grace hee will, or purposeth to give to every one to obey his commandements.

1. 1

¹Object. 4. If all motions, even of wicked wills, are raised and ruled by the will of God, and many of these disagree from the law of God, and are sins; God seemeth to be made the causer of sins. The answer is, That it is a Paralogism of the Accident. For, they disagree from the law, not as they are ordained by, or proceed from the will of God (for thus far they agree very well with the justice and law of God) but as they are done by men, or Devils: and that by reason of this defect; because either they do not know the will of God when they do it, or are not moved by the sight and knowledge thereof to do it; that is, they do it not to that end, that they may obey God, who will so have it. For whatsoever is done to this end, it disagreeeth not from the law, seeing the law doth not, but with this condition, either command or forbid any thing, if God hath not commanded a man to do otherwise. So doth the Law of God forbid to kill any man, except whom God had commanded any to kill. Whosoever then killeth a man, God not commanding it, he out of doubt doth sin, and offendeth against the Law. Neither doth God dissent from himself or his Law, when he will have some thing done either by his revealed or secret will, otherwise then according to the general rule prescribed by himself in the law. For he hath such ends and causes of all his purposes, as that they cannot but most exactly agree with his nature and justice.

¹Object. 4. If all motions, even of wicked wils, are raised and ruled by the will of God, and many of these disagree from the law of God, and are sinnes; God seemeth to bee made the causer of sinnes. The answer is, That it is a Paralogisme of the Accident. For, they disagree from the law, not as they are ordained by, or proceed from the will of God (for thus farre they agree very well with the justice and law of God) but as they are done by men, or Divels: and that by reason of this defect; because either they doe not know the will of God when they doe it, or are not moved by the sight and knowledge thereof to doe it; that is, they doe it not to that end, that they may obey God, who wil so have it. For whatsoever is done to this end, it disagreeeth not from the law, seeing the law doth not, but with this condition, either command or forbid any thing, if God hath not commanded a man to doe otherwise. So doth the Law of God forbid to kill any man, except whom God had commanded any to kill. Whosoever then killeth a man, God not commanding it, he out of doubt doth sin, and offendeth against the Law. Neither doth God dissent from himselfe or his Law, when he wil have some thing done either by his revealed or secret will, otherwise then according to the generall rule prescribed by himselfe in the law. For he hath such ends and causes of all his purposes, as that they cannot but most exactly agree with his nature and justice.

Object. 5. Liberty which is guided of another, cannot be an image of that liberty which dependeth on no other, which is in God. But the liberty of mans will is the image of the liberty which is in God: Therefore the liberty of mans will dependeth not, or is not guided by the will of God. We deny the Major. For seeing that every thing which is like, is not the same with that unto which it is like; to conceive in some sort the liberty of God, it is enough that reasonable creatures do work upon deliberation and free election of will, albeit this election in the creatures is both guided by themselves and others; in God, by no other then by his own divine wisdom. The image of a thing is not the thing it self: and the inequality of degrees taketh not ⟨p. 81⟩away the image, as neither the likeness and similitude of some parts taketh away the dissimilitude of others. Wherefore the liberty of reasonable creatures both is governed of God, and is notwithstanding a certain image of the liberty which is in God, because it chooseth things once known unto it, by her own, and free, or voluntary motion. For as of other faculties or properties, so also of liberty, it is impossible that the degrees should be equal in God and his creatures; whereas all things are infinite in God, and finite in his creatures. Seeing therefore wisdom, righteousness, and strength in the creatures, is the image of the unmeasurable wisdom, righteousness, and power which is in God; a portion also of liberty agreeable and competent for the creatures may be the image of liberty which is in God.

Object. 5. Liberty which is guided of another, cannot be an image of that liberty which dependeth on no other, which is in God. But the liberty of mans will is the image of the liberty which is in God: Therefore the liberty of mans will dependeth not, or is not guided by the will of God. Wee deny the Major. For seeing that every thing which is like, is not the same with that unto which it is like; to conceive in some sort the liberty of God, it is enough that reasonable creatures doe worke upon deliberation and free election of wil, albeit this election in the creatures is both guided by themselves and others; in God, by no other then by his owne divine wisedome. The image of a thing is not the thing it selfe: and the inequality of degrees taketh not ⟨p. 81⟩away the image, as neither the likenesse and similitude of some parts taketh away the dissimilitude of others. Wherefore the liberty of reasonable creatures both is governed of God, and is notwithstanding a certain image of the liberty which is in God, because it chuseth things once known unto it, by her own, and free, or voluntary motion. For as of other faculties or properties, so also of liberty, it is impossible that the degrees should be equall in God and his creatures; whereas all things are infinite in God, and finite in his creatures. Seeing therefore wisdome, righteousnesse, and strength in the creatures, is the image of the unmeasurable wisdome, righteousnesse, and power which is in God; a portion also of liberty agreeable and competent for the creatures may be the image of liberty which is in God.

Object. 6. If the creature cannot but do that which God will have done, and cannot do what God will not have done; the will hath no active force, but is wholly passive, especially in our conversion, which is the work of God: Likewise there is no use of laws, doctrine, discipline, exhortation, threatenings, punishments, examples, promises, and lastly, of our study and endeavour. We deny the consequence,¹ We deny the consequence, because the first or principal cause being put, the second or instrumental cause is not thereby taken away: For as God lighteneth the world and doth quicken the earth, bringeth forth corn, nourisheth living creatures, and yet are not the instruments of Gods working idle, as the sun, the rain, the earth, husbandmen and food: So God converteth men, ruleth their purposes, wills and actions, that is, teacheth and moveth them to approve and choose what he will, by laws, by magistrates, by doctrines, by rewards, by punishments, and lastly, by their own will, all which he useth as instruments, not as if he could not without these enlighten the mind with notions, and incline the will; but because it so seemeth good to him to exercise his power by these. If they reply, that that would necessarily come to pass so which is done, and even without them, and therefore they are in vain used. We deny the Antecedent:² For although God were able to move mens wills without these, and if he had so decreed to do, men doubtless should do without these, what now they do being moved by these: yet whereas God hath once so decreed the effects, as he hath also appointed their second instrumental and impulsive causes; that verily shall be done which God will have done, but yet not without middle and second causes, by whose means and working coming between and interposed, God will bring his purposes and decrees to pass.³ He will give his holy Spirit to those who ask him. Whom he hath predestinated, ⁴them hath he also called. If they reply again, Although it be granted that these are not in vain in those in whom God will show his force, and be effectual by them; yet in others who are not moved by them there is no use of them: Ans. 1. Although there were no use, yet because that it is not known unto us whom God will move or not move, we are to labour in teaching and urging all, and to commit the event and fruit of our labour to God.