OF FREE-WILL.
pp. 75–9981 passagespart 1 of 3
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
pp. 75–9981 passagespart 1 of 3
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1THE principal scope and question of this disputation is, Whether as man averted himself from God; so on the other side he be able by his own strength to return to God, to receive grace offered by God, and to amend himself. And further, Whether the Will of man be the first and principal cause why others are converted, others persist in their sins: and as well of the converted, as not converted, others are more, others less good or evil; and in a word, do either good or evil, some after one manner, some after another. To this question the Pelagians and the like adversaries make answer, That so much grace is both given of, and left by nature to all men, that they are able to return unto God, and obey him: neither ought we to seek any other cause before, or above mans Will, for which others receive or retain, others refuse or cast away divine succour and aide in avoiding sin, and do after this or that manner order and institute their counsels and actions. Contrariwise, we have learned out of the sacred Scriptures, That no work pleasing to God can be undertaken or performed by any man without regeneration, and the s•••all grace of the holy Spirit; neither can more or less good be in any mans counsels or actions, then God of his free goodness doth cause in them; neither any other way can the will of any creature be inclined, then whither it shall seem good to the eternal and good counsel of God: and yet all the actions of the created will, both good and bad, are wrought freely. For the clearing hereof we are to consider: 1 What the liberty of the will, or free-will is. 2 What difference there is of the free-will which is in God, and that which is in reasonable creatures, Angels and Man. 3 Whether there be any liberty of mans will. 4 What manner of liberty of will is in man; or how many are the degrees of free-will, according to the four estates of man.
1THE principall scope and question of this disputation is, Whether as man averted himselfe from God; so on the other side hee be able by his owne strength to returne to God, to receive grace offered by God, and to amend himselfe. And further, Whether the Will of man be the first and principall cause why others are converted, others persist in their sinnes: and as well of the converted, as not converted, others are more, others lesse good or evill; and in a word, doe either good or evill, some after one manner, some after another. To this question the Pelagians and the like adversaries make answer, That so much grace is both given of, and left by nature to all men, that they are able to returne unto God, and obey him: neither ought wee to seeke any other cause before, or above mans Will, for which others receive or retaine, others refuse or cast away divine succour and aide in avoiding sinne, and doe after this or that manner order and institute their counsels and actions. Contrariwise, we have learned out of the sacred Scriptures, That no worke pleasing to God can be undertaken or performed by any man without regeneration, and the s•••all grace of the holy Spirit; neither can more or lesse good be in any mans counsels or actions, then God of his free goodnesse doth cause in them; neither any other way can the will of any creature be inclined, then whither it shall seeme good to the eternall and good counsell of God: and yet all the actions of the created will, both good and bad, are wrought freely. For the clearing hereof we are to consider: 1 What the liberty of the will, or free-will is. 2 What difference there is of the free-will which is in God, and that which is in reasonable creatures, Angels and Man. 3 Whether there be any liberty of mans will. 4 What manner of liberty of will is in man; or how many are the degrees of free-will, according to the foure estates of man.
1Liberty sometime signifieth a relation or respect, to wit, the power or right, that is, the ordering either of person or thing, made either by ones will, or by nature, to deal at his own arbitrement or motion, according to honest laws, or order agreeable to his nature, and to enjoy commodities convenient for him, without inhibition or impediment, and not to sustain the defects and burdens or encumbrances which are not proper to his nature. This liberty may be termed a liberty from bond and misery, and it is opposed unto slavery. So God is most free, because he is bound to no man: So the Romans and the Jews were free, that is, stood not charged with foreign governments and burdens: So a City is free from tyranny and servitude after a civill kind of freedom: So we, being justified by faith, are by Christ freed from the wrath of God, the curse of the Law, and Moses Ceremonies. But this signification of liberty appertaineth not to this present disputation of free-will; because it is agreed upon on all sides, that we all are the servants of God, and are obliged by his Law, either to obey him, or to suffer punishment. Our Will also willeth many things freely, the liberty or power of performing whereof notwithstanding it hath not.
1LIberty sometime signifieth a relation or respect, to wit, the power or right, that is, the ordering either of person or thing, made either by ones will, or by nature, to deale at his own arbitrement or motion, according to honest lawes, or order agreeable to his nature, and to enjoy commodities convenient for him, without inhibition or impediment, and not to sustaine the defects and burdens or encombrances which are not proper to his nature. This liberty may be termed a liberty from bond and misery, and it is opposed unto slavery. So God is most free, because he is bound to no man: So the Romans and the Jewes were free, that is, stood not charged with forraigne governments and burdens: So a Citie is free from tyranny and servitude after a civill kind of freedome: So we, being justified by faith, are by Christ freed from the wrath of God, the curse of the Law, and Moses Ceremonies. But this signification of liberty appertaineth not to this present disputation of free-will; because it is agreed upon on all sides, that we all are the servants of God, and are obliged by his Law, either to obey him, or to suffer punishment. Our Will also willeth many things freely, the liberty or power of performing whereof notwithstanding it hath not.
1Secondly, liberty is opposed unto constraint, and is a quality of the Will, or a natural power of a reasonable creature, concurring with the Will: that is, a faculty of choosing or refusing any object or action represented unto it by the Understanding, by it own proper motion, without any constraint, the nature of the Will remaining still entire and free to do this or that, or also to suspend, forbear, and defer any action: as, a man may be willing to walk, or not to walk. And this is to put any thing in action upon mature deliberation, which is the proper manner of the working of the Will.
1Secondly, liberty is opposed unto constraint, and is a quality of the Will, or a naturall power of a reasonable creature, concurring with the Will: that is, a faculty of chusing or refusing any object or action represented unto it by the Ʋnderstanding, by it owne proper motion, without any constraint, the nature of the Will remaining still entire and free to doe this or that, or also to suspend, forbeare, and deferre any action: as, a man may be willing to walk, or not to walk. And this is to put any thing in action upon mature deliberation, which is the proper manner of the working of the Will.
This liberty of Will is in God, Angels, and men; and their free-will is called free Arbitrement. That thing is called free, which is endowed with this faculty and liberty of willing or nilling: But Arbitrement is the Will it self, as far as it followeth ⟨p. 76⟩or refuseth in her choice the judgement of the Understanding; for it compriseth both faculties of the mind: to wit, both the judgement of the mind, or understanding of the object,1 & the Will either receiving or refusing it. Free Arbitrement therefore is a faculty or power of willing, or nilling, or of choosing, or refusing any object represented unto it by the Understanding, by proper motion without constraint. And this faculty or power of the soul is called Arbitrement, 2in respect of the mind, showing unto the Will an object to be chosen or refused: and it is called free, in respect of the Will following of her own accord, and without constraint, the judgement of the mind or understanding.3 For that is called free which is voluntary, and which is opposed to that which is involuntary and constrained; not which is opposed to that which is necessary: For that which is voluntary may well stand with that which is necessary, but not with that which is involuntary. As God and the holy Angels are necessarily good, yet not involuntarily and constrainedly against their will, but with most free will; because they have the beginning and cause of their goodness within themselves, I mean,4 free-will. But that is said to be constrained, which hath only an external beginning and cause of motion, and not also an internal, whereby it may move it self to do on this or that manner.5 Wherefore, there is such a difference between necessary and constrained, as is between a general and a special: For, whatsoever is constrained is necessary; but not contrariwise, whatsoever is necessary is constrained. Whence there ariseth a double necessity: 6A necessity of Unchangeableness, and a necessity of Constraint. The former may stand with that which is voluntary: the latter cannot.7 The like difference is between things contingent and free. For, Whatsoever is free is contingent; but not contrariwise, all that is contingent is free.
This liberty of Will is in God, Angels, and men; and their free-will is called free Arbitremen. That thing is called free, which is endowed with this faculty and liberty of willing or nilling: But Abitrement is the Will it selfe, as far as it followeth ⟨p. 76⟩or refuseth in her choice the judgement of the Understanding; for it compriseth both faculties of the mind: to wit, both the judgement of the mind, or understanding of the object,1 & the Will either receiving or refusing it. Free Arbitrement therefore is a faculty or power of willing, or nilling, or of chusing, or refusing any object represented unto it by the Ʋnderstanding, by proper motion without constraint. And this faculty or power of the soule is called Arbitrement, 2in respect of the mind, shewing unto the Will an object to be chosen or refused: and it is called free, in respect of the Will following of her own accord, and without constraint, the judgement of the mind or understanding.3 For that is called free which is voluntary, and which is opposed to that which is involuntary and constrained; not which is opposed to that which is necessary: For that which is voluntary may well stand with that which is necessary, but not with that which is involuntary. As God and the holy Angels are necessarily good, yet not involuntarily and constrainedly against their will, but with most free will; because they have the beginning and cause of their goodnesse within themselves, I mean,4 free-will. But that is said to be constrained, which hath only an externall beginning and cause of motion, and not also an internall, whereby it may move it self to do on this or that manner.5 Wherefore, there is such a difference between necessary and constrained, as is between a generall and a speciall: For, whatsoever is constrained is necessary; but not contrariwise, whatsoever is necessary is constrained. Whence there ariseth a double necessity: 6A necessity of Ʋnchangeablenesse, and a necessity of Constraint. The former may stand with that which is voluntary: the latter cannot.7 The like difference is between things contingent and free. For, Whatsoever is free is contingent; but not contrariwise, all that is contingent is free.
1Two things there are common to God and reasonable creatures, as touching the liberty of Will: 1. That God and reasonable creatures do things upon deliberation and advice; that is, they choose or refuse whatsoever objects, with an understanding going before the action, and a will accompanying the action of choosing or refusing. 2. They choose or refuse any thing of their proper and inward motion without constraint: that is, the Will being fit in it own nature to will the contrary of that which it willeth, or to suspend the action it intendeth, of it own accord inclineth to the one part, Psal. 104.24. & 115.3. Gen. 3.6. Isa. 1.19. Mat. 23.37.
1TWo things there are common to God and reasonable creatures, as touching the liberty of Will: 1. That God and reasonable creatures do things upon deliberation and advice; that is, they chuse or refuse whatsoever objects, with an understanding going before the action, and a will accompanying the action of chusing or refusing. 2. They chuse or refuse any thing of their proper and inward motion without constraint: that is, the Will being fit in it owne nature to will the contrary of that which it willeth, or to suspend the action it intendeth, of it owne accord inclineth to the one part, Psal. 104.24. & 115.3. Gen. 3.6. Isa. 1.19. Mat. 23.37.
1But the differences also of this liberty in God and in the creatures are three:2 In the Understanding; because God understandeth and knoweth all things of himself perfectly and from all eternity, without any ignorance or error of judgment: but the creatures know neither of themselves, neither all things, neither the same at all times; but they understand of God his will and works, so much, and at such time, how much, and when it pleaseth God to reveal unto them: And therefore many things they are ignorant of, and err in many. The testimonies of this difference are:3 Of that day and hour knoweth no man, no not the Angels of heaven, but my Father only. He giveth wisdom unto the wise, and understanding to those that understand: Who hath instructed the Spirit of the Lord? Neither is there any creature which is not manifest in his sight. 4He lighteneth every man that cometh into the world. §25In the Will. The will of God is governed by no other, nor dependeth of any other cause but of it self. But the wills of Angels and men, are so the causes of their actions, that nevertheless they are carried by the secret counsel of God and his providence to the choosing or refusing of any object; & that either immediately by God, or mediately by instruments, some good, some bad, which it seemeth good unto God to use; so that it is impossible for them to do any thing beside the eternal decree and counsel of God. And therefore the word [Greek or Hebrew], (that is, to be absolutely his own, at his own will, and in his own power,) whereby the Greek Divines express Free-will, agreeth more properly unto God, who perfectly and simply is his own, and at his own will. But of the creatures more rightly is used [Greek or Hebrew], (that ⟨p. 77⟩is, voluntary and free) which word the Apostle useth to Philemon, Ver. 14. Hebr. 10.26. 1 Pet. 5.2. The testimonies and arguments of this difference are laid down in the doctrine of Providence. And, that God indeed is the first cause of his counsels, these and the like sayings of Scripture do testify:6 He hath done what soever he would. Who, according to his will, worketh in the army of heaven, and in the inhabitants of the earth. But that the wills and counsels of the creatures depend on Gods beck and permission, these and the like speeches do prove:7 The Lord shall send his Angel before thee, &c.
1But the differences also of this liberty in God and in the creatures are three:2 In the Ʋnderstanding; because God understandeth and knoweth all things of himself perfectly and from all eternity, without any ignorance or errour of judgment: but the creatures know neither of themselves, neither all things, neither the same at all times; but they understand of God his will and works, so much, and at such time, how much, and when it pleaseth God to reveale unto them: And therefore many things they are ignorant of, and erre in many. The testimonies of this difference are:3 Of that day and houre knoweth no man, no not the Angels of heaven, but my Father only. He giveth wisdome unto the wise, and understanding to those that understand: Who hath instructed the Spirit of the Lord? Neither is there any creature which is not manifest in his sight. 4He lightneth every man that cometh into the world. §25In the Will. The will of God is governed by no other, nor dependeth of any other cause but of it selfe. But the wils of Angels and men, are so the causes of their actions, that neverthelesse they are carried by the secret counsel of God and his providence to the chusing or refusing of any object; & that either immediatly by God, or mediately by instruments, some good, some bad, which it seemeth good unto God to use; so that it is impossible for them to do any thing beside the eternall decree and counsell of God. And therefore the word 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, (that is, to be absolutely his own, at his owne will, and in his own power,) whereby the Greek Divines expresse Free-will, agreeth more properly unto God, who perfectly and simply is his owne, and at his owne will. But of the creatures more rightly is used 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, (that ⟨p. 77⟩is, voluntary and free) which word the Apostle useth to Philemon, Ver. 14. Hebr. 10.26. 1 Pet. 5.2. The testimonies and arguments of this difference are laid down in the doctrine of Providence. And, that God indeed is the first cause of his counsels, these and the like sayings of Scripture doe testifie:
Go and gather the Elders of Israel together, &c. Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God, ye have slain: But God hath fulfilled these things. Herod and Pontius Pilate gathered themselves together, to do whatsoever thine hand, and thy counsel had determined before to be done. I know, 1that the way of a man is not in himself, neither is it in man to walk, and to direct his steps. The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord: Therefore the wills of Angels and men,2 and all other second causes, as they were created of God their first supreme and sovereign cause, so are they ruled of him; but the will of God is ruled by no one of his creatures: because as God hath no efficient cause without, and besides himself, so neither hath he any moving or inclining cause; otherwise he were not God, that is, the supreme and sovereign cause of all his works, and the creatures should be invested in Gods room.3 Moreover God ruleth and bendeth the wills of his creatures, and doth not draw or enforce them; that is, by objects represented to the mind he effectually moveth, affecteth, and allureth the Will to will that which then the mind judgeth good, and refuse that which seemeth evil.
Goe and gather the Elders of Israel together, &c. Him, being delivered by the determinate counsell and fore-knowledge of God, ye have slaine: But God hath fulfilled these things. Herod and Pontius Pilate gathered themselves together, to doe whatsoever thine hand, and thy counsell had determined before to be done. I know, 1that the way of a man is not in himselfe, neither is it in man to walke, and to direct his steps. The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord: Therefore the wils of Angels and men,2 and all other second causes, as they were created of God their first supreme and soveraigne cause, so are they ruled of him; but the will of God is ruled by no one of his creatures: because as God hath no efficient cause without, and besides himselfe, so neither hath hee any moving or inclining cause; otherwise hee were not God, that is, the supreme and soveraigne cause of all his workes, and the creatures should be invested in Gods room.3 Moreover God ruleth and bendeth the wils of his creatures, and doth not draw or enforce them; that is, by objects represented to the mind hee effectually moveth, affecteth, and allureth the Will to will that which then the mind judgeth good, and refuse that which seemeth evill.
1In the Understanding and Will both together: because God, as he unchangeably knoweth all things so also he hath determined from everlasting, and will unchangeably all things which are done, as they are good; and permitteth them, as they are sins. Now, as the creatures notions and judgements of things, so also their wills are changeable: so that they will that, which before they would not: and will not that, which before they would. For, seeing that all the counsels of God are most good, most just and most wise; he never disliketh, correcteth, or changeth them, as oftentimes men do, when as they do perceive themselves to have determined any thing unadvisedly before. Hither appertain those sayings, God is not as man, 2that he should lye. I am the Lord and change not. Object.3 He that cannot change his counsel and purpose, hath not free-will; but God cannot change his counsel and purpose. which he hath once appointed: Therefore his will is not free. First, we deny the Major: For not he which doth not change his purpose which he hath once appointed, hath no liberty of will; but he which could not purpose any other thing, being let by some external cause: But the liberty of God consisteth not in the change of his will or purpose, but in this, that God will all things (whatsoever he will) altogether with his will, and of himself, and could have had otherwise decreed, or not decreed all things, which he decreed from everlasting, of the creation, preservation, and government of things, according to these sayings: With men this is impossible, 4but with God all things are possible. These and the like sayings show, that God hath so appointed from everlasting with himself the creation of things, and the gathering and saving of his Church, not as if he could not have not done this, or not have appointed it otherwise; but because so it seemed good to him: neither must men seek any superior cause then his will, of all his divine works which he exerciseth in his creatures; neither is there any other necessity to be found in them, then which dependeth of the most free appointment of God himself. For, as to resolve of such a purpose as is to be changed; so also to change it either to better or to worse, is rather servitude or bondage, then freedom & liberty: for it proceedeth of ignorance or impotency.
1In the Ʋnderstanding and Will both together: because God, as hee unchangeably knoweth all things so also he hath determined from everlasting, and will unchangeab•y all things which are done, as they are good; and permitteth them, as they are sins. Now, as the creatures notions and judgements of things, so also their wils are changeable: so that they will that, which before they would not: and will not that, which before they would. For, seeing that all the counsels of God are most good, most just and most wise; he never disliketh, correcteth, or changeth them, as oftentimes men do, when as they do perceive themselves to have determined any thing unadvisedly before. Hither appertain those sayings, God is not as man, 2that hee should lye. I am the Lord and change not. Object.3 Hee that cannot change his counsell and purpose, hath not free-will; but God cannot change his counsell and purpose. which he hath once appointed: Therefore his will is not free. First, we deny the Major: For not he which doth not change his purpose which he hath once appointed, hath no liberty of will; but he which could not purpose any other thing, being let by some external cause: But the liberty of God consisteth not in the change of his will or purpose, but in this, that God will all things (whatsoever he will) altogether with his will, and of himself, and could have had otherwise decreed, or not decreed all things, which he decreed from everlasting, of the creation, preservation, and government of things, according to these sayings: With men this is impossible, 4but with God all things are possible. These and the like sayings shew, that God hath so appointed from everlasting with himselfe the creation of things, and the gathering and saving of his Church, not as if he could not have not done this, or not have appointed it otherwise; but because so it seemed good to him: neither must men seek any superiour cause then his will, of all his divine works which he exerciseth in his creatures; neither is there any other necessity to be found in them, then which dependeth of the most free appointment of God himselfe. For, as to resolve of such a purpose as is to be changed; so also to change it either to better or to worse, is rather servitude or bondage, then freedome & liberty: for it proceedeth of ignorance or impotency.
For they change their counsels and purposes, who either err in taking them, or are not able to perform the counsel which they have taken. But to resolve of such a purpose, as might alike either have been decreed, or not decreed; and which after it is decreed, is neither changed, nor to be changed at any time, this is perfect and divine liberty. Now God, whatsoever he hath decreed, could either not have decreed it at all, or have decreed it otherwise. And that he changeth not that which he hath ⟨p. 78⟩once decreed, the perfectness of his nature, even his infinite wisdom and goodness is cause thereof. For most wisely and rightly doth he decree all things, and constantly persisteth in that which is good and right. Wherefore the immutability in God doth as well not diminish his liberty as his immortality, and other things which are proper unto his divinity. Secondly, if any man urge, That it is a point of liberty, not only to resolve of any advice what he will, but after he hath resolved, to be able either to follow it, or change it: We understand by those things which have been already spoken, that this doth agree to the creatures, which may err in their purposes, and therefore stand in need of changes and alterations; but not to God, who can never err, and therefore requires no change of his purpose. Lastly, if they reply, That not to be able to alter a purpose once undertaken, is a defect of ability or power; and therefore against the liberty of God: We answer, That the Antecedent of this reply is true, if the change of it be impossible by reason of some impediment, coming from some external cause, or by reason of defect of nature or ability; but the Antecedent is most false, if the impossibility of change proceed from a perfection of that nature, which is not changed, and from a wisdom and rightness of that purpose which is unchangeable, and from a perseverance and constancy of the will in that which is good and right: after which sort it is apparent to be in God.
For they change their counsels and purposes, who either erre in taking them, or are not able to perform the counsell which they have taken. But to resolve of such a purpose, as might alike either have been decreed, or not decreed; and which after it is decreed, is neither changed, nor to be changed at any time, this is perfect and divine liberty. Now God, whatsoever he hath decreed, could either not have decreed it at all, or have decreed it otherwise. And that he changeth not that which he hath ⟨p. 78⟩once decreed, the perfectnesse of his nature, even his infinite wisdome and goodnesse is cause thereof. For most wisely and rightly doth hee decree all things, and constantly persisteth in that which is good and right. Wherefore the immutability in God doth as well not diminish his liberty as his immortality, and other things which are proper unto his divinity. Secondly, if any man urge, That it is a point of liberty, not only to resolve of any advice what he will, but after he hath resolved, to be able either to follow it, or change it: We understand by those things which have been already spoken, that this doth agree to the creatures, which may erre in their purposes, and therefore stand in need of changes and alterations; but not to God, who can never erre, and therefore requires no change of his purpose. Lastly, if they reply, That not to be able to alter a purpose once undertaken, is a defect of ability or power; and therefore against the liberty of God: We answer, That the Antecedent of this reply is true, if the change of it be impossible by reason of some impediment, coming from some externall cause, or by reason of defect of nature or ability; but the Antecedent is most false, if the impossibility of change proceed from a perfection of that nature, which is not changed, and from a wisdome and rightnesse of that purpose which is unchangeable, and from a perseverance and constancy of the will in that which is good and right: after which sort it is apparent to be in God.
1But against that, where it was said, That the wills of all creatures are so guided by God, that neither they are able to will what he from everlasting hath not decreed, neither not to will what he hath decreed for them to will, more question is used to be made: 1. That which is ruled by the unchangeable will of God, doth not work freely; the will of Angels and men is ruled by the unchangeable will of God: Therefore either it hath no liberty, or the choice which it maketh is not tied to the will of God. Answer we make to the Major by a distinction: It is not a free agent which is so ruled by God, as it hath no deliberation and election of his own. But that which God so ruleth, as he showeth the object unto the understanding, and by it effectually moveth and affecteth the will to choose it; that doth notwithstanding freely work, albeit it be inclined at the beck and will of God, whither he will have it. For to work freely in the creatures, is not to work without any ones government, but with deliberation, and with a proper and self-motion of the will, although this motion be else-whence raised and ruled. Wherefore, it is not the immutability and operation of the divine will and providence, which is against this liberty, but a privation and constraint of judgement; which is an impulsion, or a motion proceeding not from an inward cause or faculty, but only from an outward cause, beside or against the nature of that which is moved. Now, such an impulsion falleth not into the will; but God moveth it, leading and bringing it on as it were by objects, to choose that which he will. For the faculty or ability and power of the will cannot be brought into act, that is, to show and express it self without an object; and,2 We are, live, and move in God: But, to be moved of no other cause but of himself only, this is exceeding and infinite perfection and liberty, agreeing to God alone, which the creature cannot desire, much less arrogate and challenge unto it self, without notorious blasphemy.
1But against that, where it was said, That the wils of all creatures are so guided by God, that neither they are able to will what he from everlasting hath not decreed, neither not to will what he hath decreed for them to will, more question is used to be made: 1. That which is ruled by the unchangeable will of God, doth not worke freely; the will of Angels and men is ruled by the unchangeable will of God: Therefore either it hath no liberty, or the choice which it maketh is not tied to the will of God. Answer we make to the Major by a distinction: It is not a free agent which is so ruled by God, as it hath no deliberation and election of his owne. But that which God so ruleth, as he sheweth the object unto the understanding, and by it effectually moveth and affecteth the will to chuse it; that doth notwithstanding freely work, albeit it be inclined at the beck and will of God, whither hee will have it. For to work freely in the creatures, is not to work without any ones government, but with deliberation, and with a proper and selfe-motion of the will, although this motion be else-whence raised and ruled. Wherefore, it is not the immutability and operation of the divine will and providence, which is against this liberty, but a privation and constraint of judgement; which is an impulsion, or a motion proceeding not from an inward cause or faculty, but only from an outward cause, beside or against the nature of that which is moved. Now, such an impulsion falleth not into the will; but God moveth it, leading and bringing it on as it were by objects, to chuse that which he will. For the faculty or ability and power of the will cannot be brought into act, that is, to shew and expresse it self without an object; and,2 We are, live, and move in God: But, to be moved of no other cause but of himselfe only, this is exceeding and infinite perfection and liberty, agreeing to God alone, which the creature cannot desire, much lesse arrogate and challenge unto it selfe, without notorious blasphemy.
1Further, it may easily be showed, That the necessity or immutability which ariseth not from constraint, but from the nature of the will, or from the commotion of it, stirred by other causes, to choose or refuse an object thought of by the mind, doth not at all withstand or hinder the liberty of will: 1. Because this necessity doth not take away, but effectuateth and persuadeth the judgement of the mind, and free or voluntary assent of the will, inasmuch as God doth cause and work in men both the notions & election of objects. 2. Because God, albeit he is by nature, that is, by exceeding and absolute necessity, good, and hath begotten his Son, and had his holy Spirit from all eternity: yet will he not by a constrained, but most free will, be, live, be blessed, and good, have his Son and holy Spirit, and will all his purposes and works to be good and just, although it be impossible that he should will any thing contrary to these which he hath already determined. If then this absolute necessity of willing things in God, doth not take away even the greatest liberty; there is no ⟨p. 79⟩doubt but that necessity, which is but only conditional, that is according to the decree and government of God, doth not take away that liberty, which agreeth unto the creatures, that is, judgment and election, free and voluntary.2 3. The holy Angels and blessed men in the celestial life, even by our adversaries own confession, are endued with greater liberty of Will, then we are in this life: But they necessarily will those things only which are right and just, and hate & abhor all things whatsoever are evil and unjust, because they are made such of God, and established by him, and are so illuminated and guided by the holy Ghost, that they cannot other wise will or work: neither by this necessity of Willing those things which are good and pleasing to God, is the liberty of Will taken away or diminished in them; but rather is increased, and confirmed, as who with all willingness choose and do those things only which are just.
1Further, it may easily be shewed, That the necessity or immutability which ariseth not from constraint, but from the nature of the will, or from the commotion of it, stirred by other causes, to chuse or refuse an object thought of by the mind, doth not at all withstand or hinder the liberty of will: 1. Because this necessity doth not take away, but effectuateth and perswadeth the judgement of the mind, and free or voluntary assent of the will, inasmuch as God doth cause and work in men both the notions & election of objects. 2. Because God, albeit he is by nature, that is, by exceeding and absolute necessity, good, and hath begotten his Son, and had his holy Spirit from all eternity: yet will he not by a constrained, but most free will, be, live, be blessed, and good, have his Son and holy Spirit, and will all his purposes and works to be good and just, although it be impossible that he should will any thing contrary to these which he hath already determined. If then this absolute necessity of willing things in God, doth not take away even the greatest liberty; there is no ⟨p. 79⟩doubt but that necessity, which is but only conditionall, that is according to the decree and government of God, doth not take away that liberty, which agreeth unto the creatures, that is, judgment and election, free and voluntary.2 3. The holy Angels and blessed men in the celestiall life, even by our adversaries owne confession, are indued with greater liberty of Wil, then we are in this life: But they necessarily will those things only which are right and just, and hate & abhorre al things whatsoever are evil and unjust, because they are made such of God, and establihed by him, and are so illuminated and guided by the holy Ghost, that they cannot other wise will or work: neither by this necessity of Willing those things which are good and pleasing to God, is the liberty of Wil taken away or diminished in them; but rather is increased, and confirmed, as who with all willingnesse choose and doe those things only which are just.
Fourthly,1 it is showed by many testimonies of Scripture, that the Wills and voluntary Actions of good and wicked men, which our adversaries maintain to be and have been free, and we also, according to the right meaning of this word Liberty, do willingly confess, are so guided by the secret and unchangeable purpose of God, that they neither can or could either do, or be otherwise. Wherefore either so many manifest places of Scripture must be denied, or openly corrupted: or it must be granted, that one and the same Action of the Will is free & contingent in respect of the Will, and necessary in respect of Gods government. Fifthly, it is declared by many places of Scripture,2 that all contingent effects do retain their contingency, which they have from the nature of their causes, although they be done by the unchangeable determination of the purpose or providence of God: But all voluntary effects or motions are contingent in respect of the Will, which by nature was alike able to have done the plain contrary unto them. They therefore retain their contingency, that is, their liberty (for this is the contingency of the actions of the Will) although they be so determined of by Gods Will, that there can be no other. The reason of the Major in this argument is, for that God so moveth the second causes, and by them bringeth to pass what he will, that in the mean season by this providence he doth not destroy or abolish their nature wch he gave them at their creation, but rather preserveth and nourisheth it: so that as concerning their nature, some work contingently, some necessarily, although in respect of the liberty of Gods purpose, all work contingently, and in respect of the unchangeableness of his decree, all work necessarily, so as they do. For when God by the rising of the Sun lighteneth the world, he maketh not the Sun so, as if being risen it did not necessarily lighten, or were apt by nature not to lighten: and yet it is in the power of God, either to change the nature of the Sun, or that remaining as it is, not to lighten the world: as he showed in Egypt, and at the passion of Christ. In like manner, when the Quails light at the Tents of the Israelites, and the Ravens carry meat to Elijah, and one sparrow falleth on the ground, God doth not make the nature of these living creatures such, as could not be carried elsewhere:
Fourthly,1 it is shewed by many testimonies of Scripture, that the Wils and voluntary Actions of good and wicked men, which our adversaries maintaine to be and have been free, and we also, according to the right meaning of this word Liberty, doe willingly confesse, are so guided by the secret and unchangeable purpose of God, that they neither can or could either doe, or be otherwise. Wherefore either so many manifest places of Scripture must be denied, or openly corrupted: or it must be granted, that one and the same Action of the Wil is free & contingent in respect of the Wil, and necessary in respect of Gods government. Fiftly, it is declared by many places of Scripture,2 that al contingent effects doe retain their contingency, which they have from the nature of their causes, although they be done by the unchangable determination of the purpose or providence of God: But al voluntary effects or motions are contingent in respect of the Wil, which by nature was alike able to have done the plaine contrary unto them. They therefore retain their contingency, that is, their liberty (for this is the contingency of the actions of the Wil) although they be so determined of by Gods Wil, that there can be no other. The reason of the Major in this argument is, for that God so moveth the second causes, and by them bringeth to passe what he wil, that in the mean season by this providence he doth not destroy or abolish their nature wch he gave them at their creation, but rather preserveth and nourisheth it: so that as concerning their nature, some work contingently, some necessarily, although in respect of the liberty of Gods purpose, al work contingently, and in respect of the unchangeablenesse of his decree, all work necessarily, so as they doe. For when God by the rising of the Sun lightneth the world, hee maketh not the Sun so, as if being risen it did not necessarily lighten, or were apt by nature not to lighten: and yet it is in the power of God, either to change the nature of the Sun, or that remaining as it is, not to lighten the world: as he shewed in Egypt, and at the passion of Christ. In like manner, when the Quailes light at the Tents of the Israelites, and the Ravens carry meat to Elias, and one sparrow falleth on the ground, God doth not make the nature of these living creatures such, as could not be carried elsewhere:
and yet that they can have no other motion then that which they have, by reason of the will of God interposed & coming between, the Scripture plainly affirmeth. Whereof it is manifest, that as in other things, which work contingently, their contingency; so in the will, the liberty wch is given it of God, is not taken away, but rather preserved by Gods government. Now then, if our adversaries in their argument understand that Liberty which consisteth in the deliberation of the mind and free assent of the will; we do not only grant, but also better maintain then they the liberty of will in all actions thereof: and so the Major of their argument shall be false, to wit, that those things which are done by the unchangeable decree of God, are not done by the free-will of men and Angels. For this liberty the providence of God doth so not hinder, but rather establish and confirm, that without this, that liberty cannot so much as be: for God both keepeth his order which he appointed at the creation by his perpetual efficacy and operation, and doth inspire into all by his virtue true notions and right election. But if they challenge a liberty unto the creature depending of no other cause whereby it is guided, we deny their whole argument, as knowing such a liberty of creatures to stand against ⟨p. 80⟩the whole Scripture, and that it only agreeth unto God. For him alone do all things serve: In him we live, and move, and have our being: he giveth unto all not only life or power of moving themselves, but even breathing too, that is, very moving it self.
and yet that they can have no other motion then that which they have, by reason of the wil of God interposed & coming betweene, the Scripture plainly affirmeth. Whereof it is manifest, that as in other things, which work contingently, their contingency; so in the will, the liberty wch is given it of God, is not taken away, but rather preserved by Gods government. Now then, if our adversaries in their argument understand that Liberty which consisteth in the deliberation of the mind and free assent of the wil; we do not only grant, but also better maintaine then they the liberty of wil in all actions thereof: and so the Major of their argument shal be false, to wit, that those things which are done by the unchangeable decree of God, are not done by the free-wil of men and Angels. For this liberty the providence of God doth so not hinder, but rather establish and confirm, that without this, that liberty cannot so much as be: for God both keepeth his order which he appointed at the creation by his perpetuall efficacy and operation, and doth inspire into al by his vertue true notions and right election. But if they challenge a liberty unto the creature depending of no other cause wherby it is guided, we deny their whole argument, as knowing such a liberty of creatures to stand against ⟨p. 80⟩the whole Scripture, and that it onely agreeth unto God. For him alone doe all things serve: In him we live, and move, and have our being: he giveth unto all not onely life or power of moving themselves, but even breathing too, that is, very moving it selfe.
1Object. 2. If the will when it is converted by God, or turned and inclined to other objects, cannot withstand, it is even mere passive, and so worketh not at all. Answ. This consequence deceiveth them, because in the Antecedent there is not a sufficient enumeration of those actions which the will may have, when it is moved of God: For it is able not only to withstand God moving it, but also of it own proper motion to assent and obey him. And when it doth this, it is not idle, neither doth it only suffer or is moved, but it self exerciseth and moveth her own actions; and yet this is to be understood of the actions of the Will, not of the new qualities or inclinations which it hath to obey God. For these the Will receiveth not by her own operation, but by the working of the holy Ghost.
1Object. 2. If the will when it is converted by God, or turned and inclined to other objects, cannot withstand, it is even meere passive, and so worketh not at all. Answ. This consequence deceiveth them, because in the Antecedent there is not a sufficient ennumeration of those actions which the will may have, when it is moved of God: For it is able not onely to withstand God moving it, but also of it owne proper motion to assent and obey him. And when it doth this, it is not idle, neither doth it onely suffer or is moved, but it selfe exerciseth and moveth her owne actions; and yet this is to be understood of the actions of the Will, not of the new qualities or inclinations which it hath to obey God. For these the Will receiveth not by her owne operation, but by the working of the holy Ghost.
1Object. 3. That which withstandeth the will of God is not guided by it: But the will of men in many actions withstandeth the will of God: It is not therefore always guided by the will of God. Answ. The consequence here faileth, because there are four terms. For the Major is true, if both the revealed and the secret will of God be understood, so that simply and in all respects it be withstood, and that be done which simply and by no means it would have done: that which is impossible to come to pass, because of the omnipotency and liberty of God. But in the Minor, the will of God must be understood, as it is revealed. For the secret decrees of Gods will and providence are ever ratified, and are performed in all, even in those who most of all withstand Gods commandments. Neither yet are there contrary wills in God: for nothing is found in his secret purposes, which disagreeth with his nature revealed in his word: and God openeth unto us in his law what he approveth and liketh, and what agreeth with his nature and the order of his mind; but he doth not promise or reveal how much grace he will, or purposeth to give to every one to obey his commandments.
1Object. 3. That which withstandeth the will of God is not guided by it: But the will of men in many actions withstandeth the will of God: It is not therefore alwayes guided by the will of God. Answ. The consequence here faileth, because there are four termes. For the Major is true, if both the revealed and the secret will of God be understood, so that simply and in all respects it bee withstood, and that bee done which simply and by no meanes it would have done: that which is impossible to come to passe, because of the omnipotency and liberty of God. But in the Minor, the will of God must bee understood, as it is revealed. For the secret decrees of Gods will and providence are ever ratified, and are performed in all, even in those who most of all withstand Gods commandements. Neither yet are there contrary wils in God: for nothing is found in his secret purposes, which disagreeth with his nature revealed in his word: and God openeth unto us in his law what he approveth and liketh, and what agreeth with his nature and the order of his mind; but hee doth not promise or reveale how much grace hee will, or purposeth to give to every one to obey his commandements.
1Object. 4. If all motions, even of wicked wills, are raised and ruled by the will of God, and many of these disagree from the law of God, and are sins; God seemeth to be made the causer of sins. The answer is, That it is a Paralogism of the Accident. For, they disagree from the law, not as they are ordained by, or proceed from the will of God (for thus far they agree very well with the justice and law of God) but as they are done by men, or Devils: and that by reason of this defect; because either they do not know the will of God when they do it, or are not moved by the sight and knowledge thereof to do it; that is, they do it not to that end, that they may obey God, who will so have it. For whatsoever is done to this end, it disagreeeth not from the law, seeing the law doth not, but with this condition, either command or forbid any thing, if God hath not commanded a man to do otherwise. So doth the Law of God forbid to kill any man, except whom God had commanded any to kill. Whosoever then killeth a man, God not commanding it, he out of doubt doth sin, and offendeth against the Law. Neither doth God dissent from himself or his Law, when he will have some thing done either by his revealed or secret will, otherwise then according to the general rule prescribed by himself in the law. For he hath such ends and causes of all his purposes, as that they cannot but most exactly agree with his nature and justice.
1Object. 4. If all motions, even of wicked wils, are raised and ruled by the will of God, and many of these disagree from the law of God, and are sinnes; God seemeth to bee made the causer of sinnes. The answer is, That it is a Paralogisme of the Accident. For, they disagree from the law, not as they are ordained by, or proceed from the will of God (for thus farre they agree very well with the justice and law of God) but as they are done by men, or Divels: and that by reason of this defect; because either they doe not know the will of God when they doe it, or are not moved by the sight and knowledge thereof to doe it; that is, they doe it not to that end, that they may obey God, who wil so have it. For whatsoever is done to this end, it disagreeeth not from the law, seeing the law doth not, but with this condition, either command or forbid any thing, if God hath not commanded a man to doe otherwise. So doth the Law of God forbid to kill any man, except whom God had commanded any to kill. Whosoever then killeth a man, God not commanding it, he out of doubt doth sin, and offendeth against the Law. Neither doth God dissent from himselfe or his Law, when he wil have some thing done either by his revealed or secret will, otherwise then according to the generall rule prescribed by himselfe in the law. For he hath such ends and causes of all his purposes, as that they cannot but most exactly agree with his nature and justice.
Object. 5. Liberty which is guided of another, cannot be an image of that liberty which dependeth on no other, which is in God. But the liberty of mans will is the image of the liberty which is in God: Therefore the liberty of mans will dependeth not, or is not guided by the will of God. We deny the Major. For seeing that every thing which is like, is not the same with that unto which it is like; to conceive in some sort the liberty of God, it is enough that reasonable creatures do work upon deliberation and free election of will, albeit this election in the creatures is both guided by themselves and others; in God, by no other then by his own divine wisdom. The image of a thing is not the thing it self: and the inequality of degrees taketh not ⟨p. 81⟩away the image, as neither the likeness and similitude of some parts taketh away the dissimilitude of others. Wherefore the liberty of reasonable creatures both is governed of God, and is notwithstanding a certain image of the liberty which is in God, because it chooseth things once known unto it, by her own, and free, or voluntary motion. For as of other faculties or properties, so also of liberty, it is impossible that the degrees should be equal in God and his creatures; whereas all things are infinite in God, and finite in his creatures. Seeing therefore wisdom, righteousness, and strength in the creatures, is the image of the unmeasurable wisdom, righteousness, and power which is in God; a portion also of liberty agreeable and competent for the creatures may be the image of liberty which is in God.
Object. 5. Liberty which is guided of another, cannot be an image of that liberty which dependeth on no other, which is in God. But the liberty of mans will is the image of the liberty which is in God: Therefore the liberty of mans will dependeth not, or is not guided by the will of God. Wee deny the Major. For seeing that every thing which is like, is not the same with that unto which it is like; to conceive in some sort the liberty of God, it is enough that reasonable creatures doe worke upon deliberation and free election of wil, albeit this election in the creatures is both guided by themselves and others; in God, by no other then by his owne divine wisedome. The image of a thing is not the thing it selfe: and the inequality of degrees taketh not ⟨p. 81⟩away the image, as neither the likenesse and similitude of some parts taketh away the dissimilitude of others. Wherefore the liberty of reasonable creatures both is governed of God, and is notwithstanding a certain image of the liberty which is in God, because it chuseth things once known unto it, by her own, and free, or voluntary motion. For as of other faculties or properties, so also of liberty, it is impossible that the degrees should be equall in God and his creatures; whereas all things are infinite in God, and finite in his creatures. Seeing therefore wisdome, righteousnesse, and strength in the creatures, is the image of the unmeasurable wisdome, righteousnesse, and power which is in God; a portion also of liberty agreeable and competent for the creatures may be the image of liberty which is in God.
Object. 6. If the creature cannot but do that which God will have done, and cannot do what God will not have done; the will hath no active force, but is wholly passive, especially in our conversion, which is the work of God: Likewise there is no use of laws, doctrine, discipline, exhortation, threatenings, punishments, examples, promises, and lastly, of our study and endeavour. We deny the consequence,1 We deny the consequence, because the first or principal cause being put, the second or instrumental cause is not thereby taken away: For as God lighteneth the world and doth quicken the earth, bringeth forth corn, nourisheth living creatures, and yet are not the instruments of Gods working idle, as the sun, the rain, the earth, husbandmen and food: So God converteth men, ruleth their purposes, wills and actions, that is, teacheth and moveth them to approve and choose what he will, by laws, by magistrates, by doctrines, by rewards, by punishments, and lastly, by their own will, all which he useth as instruments, not as if he could not without these enlighten the mind with notions, and incline the will; but because it so seemeth good to him to exercise his power by these. If they reply, that that would necessarily come to pass so which is done, and even without them, and therefore they are in vain used. We deny the Antecedent:2 For although God were able to move mens wills without these, and if he had so decreed to do, men doubtless should do without these, what now they do being moved by these: yet whereas God hath once so decreed the effects, as he hath also appointed their second instrumental and impulsive causes; that verily shall be done which God will have done, but yet not without middle and second causes, by whose means and working coming between and interposed, God will bring his purposes and decrees to pass.3 He will give his holy Spirit to those who ask him. Whom he hath predestinated, 4them hath he also called. If they reply again, Although it be granted that these are not in vain in those in whom God will show his force, and be effectual by them; yet in others who are not moved by them there is no use of them: Ans. 1. Although there were no use, yet because that it is not known unto us whom God will move or not move, we are to labour in teaching and urging all, and to commit the event and fruit of our labour to God.
Object. 6. If the creature cannot but do that which God will have done, and cannot doe what God will not have done; the will hath no active force, but is wholly passive, especially in our conversion, which is the work of God: Likewise there is no use of lawes, doctrine, discipline, exhortation, threatnings, punishments, examples, promises, and lastly, of our study and endeavour. We deny the consequence,1 We deny the consequence, because the first or principall cause being put, the second or instrumentall cause is not thereby taken away: For as God lightneth the world and doth quicken the earth, bringeth forth corn, nourisheth living creatures, and yet are not the instruments of Gods working idle, as the sun, the rain, the earth, husbandmen and food: So God converteth men, ruleth their purposes, wils and actions, that is, teacheth and moveth them to approve and chuse what he will, by lawes, by magistrates, by doctrines, by rewards, by punishments, and lastly, by their owne will, all which he useth as instruments, not as if he could not without these enlighten the minde with notions, and incline the will; but because it so seemeth good to him to exercise his power by these. If they reply, that that would necessarily come to passe so which is done, and even without them, and therefore they are in vain used. Wee deny the Antecedent:2 For although God were able to move mens wils without these, and if hee had so decreed to doe, men doubtlesse should doe without these, what now they do being moved by these: yet whereas God hath once so decreed the effects, as he hath also appointed their second instrumentall and impulsive causes; that verily shall be done which God will have done, but yet not without middle and second causes, by whose means and working coming between and interposed, God will bring his purposes and decrees to passe.3 He will give his holy Spirit to those who ask him. Whom he hath predestinated, 4them hath hee also called. If they reply again, Although it be granted that these are not in vain in those in whom God will shew his force, and be effectuall by them; yet in others who are not moved by them there is no use of them: Ans. 1. Although there were no use, yet because that it is not known unto us whom God will move or not move, wee are to labour in teaching and urging all, and to commit the event and fruit of our labour to God.
Preach the word, be instant in season, &c. 1If thou warn the wicked, and he turn not from his wickedness, he shall die in his iniquity, but thou hast delivered thy soul. Ans. 2. The consequence followeth not from the denial of one particular, to the denial of the general, or from an unsufficient enumeration: For although many obey not teaching and admonition, neither are moved with rewards and punishments; yet this use is great, that by this means their naughtiness and stubbornness is opened, and so the justice of God made more manifest in their punishment.2 If I had not done works among them which none other man did, they had not had sin. 3God hath showed it unto them, to the intent that they might be without excuse. We are to God the sweet savour of Christ in them that are saved, and in them who perish. Repl.4 External discipline is called the righteousness of the flesh; Therefore it dependeth on mans will. The consequence of this reason is to be denied: which doth not hold from the position or putting of the second cause, to the removing of the first cause. For as it followeth not, The Sun causeth day, therefore God doth not: so neither doth this follow, The unregenerate perform outward discipline; therefore they do it, God not causing it in them, nor ruling and directing them.
Preach the word, be instant in season, &c. 1If thou warn the wicked, and he turn not from his wickednesse, he shall die in his iniquity, but thou hast delivered thy soul. Ans. 2. The consequence followeth not from the denyall of one particular, to the denyall of the generall, or from an unsufficient ennumeration: For although many obey not teaching and admonition, neither are moved with rewards and punishments; yet this use is great, that by this means their naughtinesse and stubbornesse is opened, and so the justice of God made more manifest in their punishment.2 If I had not done works among them which none other man did, they had not had sin. 3God hath shewed it unto them, to the intent that they might be without excuse. Wee are to God the sweet savour of Christ in them that are saved, and in them who perish. Repl.4 Externall discipline is called the righteousnesse of the flesh; Therefore it dependeth on mans will. The consequence of this reason is to be denied: which doth not hold from the position or putting of the second cause, to the removing of the first cause. For as it followeth not, The Sun causeth day, therefore God doth not: so neither doth this follow, The unregenerate perform outward discipline; therefore they do it, God not causing it in them, nor ruling and directing them.
Object. 8. They allege testimonies also, Which confirm that men do evil or good with free will: As, The children of Israel offered free gifts unto the Lord. I have set ⟨p. 82⟩before thee life and death, 1good and evil, blessings and cursings: Therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live. But in these and all the like places, only that liberty of mans will is affirmed, which hath been spoken of before that is, that the Will obeyeth or withstandeth the precedent judgement of the understanding, with free and voluntary motion, without any constraint; but the government of God is not at all removed from voluntary actions: For it was showed before, that this liberty of Will doth not stand against that necessity, which by the providence of God doth accompany it.
Object. 8. They alledge testimonies also, Which confirme that men doe evill or good with free will: As, The children of Israel offered free gifts unto the Lord. I have set ⟨p. 82⟩before thee life and death, 1good and evill, blessings and cursings: Therefore chuse life, that both thou and thy seed may live. But in these and all the like places, only that liberty of mans will is affirmed, which hath been spoken of before that is, that the Will obeyeth or withstandeth the precedent judgement of the understanding, with free and voluntary motion, without any constraint; but the government of God is not at all removed from voluntary actions: For it was shewed before, that this liberty of Will doth not stand against that necessity, which by the providence of God doth accompany it.
Object. 9. They bring forth testimonies also, in which necessity is removed and taken away from voluntary actions.1 Of these ye shall offer willingly. Whiles it remained, appertained it not to thee? 2And after it was sold, was it not in thine own power? He that standeth firm in his heart, that he hath no necessity, but hath power over his own will, &c. As every man wisheth in his heart, 3so let him give. Feed the flock of God, caring for it not by constraint, but willingly. But these sayings speak of obligation or binding, which sometimes is signified by the name of necessity, as the freeing from any bond by the name of liberty, as Levit. 22. Act. 5. partly of coaction or constraint, as 2 Cor. 9. and 1 Pet. 5. or also of need, as 1 Cor. 7. which yet may be referred to obligation or bond, by which the Parents are bound to have regard of the infirmity of their children. So also the power of Will in the same place signifieth the right or power of determining any thing, no obligation or bond hindering it. But the removing of any obligation or coaction doth not at all take away the unchangeableness of voluntary actions, which unchangeableness hangeth on the decree of God. For as well his will, who is not bound, neither by any need or want constrained, is guided and moved by the purpose and counsel of Gods providence; as his, whom either bond or need constraineth to resolve of any purpose. Wherefore the Scripture denieth not, that the will is moved and ruled by God, when it is not driven by bond, or want, or fear, to do any thing: for there are besides these, many other reasons and causes by which God can move it, either to will, or not to will.
Object. 9. They bring forth testimonies also, in which necessity is removed and taken away from voluntary actions.1 Of these ye shall offer willingly. Whiles it remained, appertained it not to thee? 2And after it was sold, was it not in thine owne power? Hee that standeth firme in his heart, that he hath no necessity, but hath power over his owne will, &c. As every man wisheth in his heart, 3so let him give. Feed the flocke of God, caring for it not by constraint, but willingly. But these sayings speak of obligation or binding, which sometimes is signified by the name of necessity, as the freeing from any bond by the name of liberty, as Levit. 22. Act. 5. partly of coaction or constraint, as 2 Cor. 9. and 1 Pet. 5. or also of need, as 1 Cor. 7. which yet may be referred to obligation or bond, by which the Parents are bound to have regard of the infirmity of their children. So also the power of Will in the same place signifieth the right or power of determining any thing, no obligation or bond hindering it. But the removing of any obligation or coaction doth not at all take away the unchangeablenesse of voluntary actions, which unchangeablenesse hangeth on the decree of God. For as wel his will, who is not bound, neither by any need or want constrained, is guided and moved by the purpose and counsell of Gods providence; as his, whom either bond or need constraineth to resolve of any purpose. Wherefore the Scripture denieth not, that the will is moved and ruled by God, when it is not driven by bond, or want, or feare, to do any thing: for there are besides these, many other reasons and causes by which God can move it, either to will, or not to will.
1Object. 10. They bring places of Scripture which testify, that men will, or do somewhat, God bidding and willing otherwise. Because I have called you, and ye have not answered, I will do unto this house as I have done to Silo. Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thy children, even as the hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not? If then they did that which God would not, their actions did depend only on their own will, and not of Gods. Answ. It is a fallacy, concluding that which is in some sort so, to be in all respects and simply so: For God will not the actions of sinners as they are sins; but he will them as they are punishments of sins, and the execution of his just judgement. Wherefore this consequence holdeth not, God will not the actions of the wicked, as they are sins; Therefore simply he will not have them to be done, but they depend only on the will of the wicked: For if God simply would them not, they could by no means be done. And except there were somewhat in them, which did agree with his justice and nature, he would not by reason of his goodness, infinite and passing measure, suffer them to be done. If they reply, That God would things contrary to these which men do, as it is said, How often would I have gathered thee? and therefore it is done only by the will of men whatsoever men do: the same answer serveth, that God would the obedience of all his reasonable creatures towards his Law, as concerning his commanding and approving it: For he requireth it of all, and bindeth all to it, and approveth it in all, as being agreeable to his nature and purity; but neither will he always it, nor in all, as concerning his working and grace, whereby they who are directed and guided, do that which God approveth and requireth. The Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, and eyes to see, 2and ears to hear, unto this day.
1Object. 10. They bring places of Scripture which testifie, that men will, or doe somewhat, God bidding and willing otherwise. Because I have called you, and ye have not answered, I will doe unto this house as I have done to Silo. Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thy children, even as the hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not? If then they did that which God would not, their actions did depend only on their owne will, and not of Gods. Answ. It is a fallacy, concluding that which is in some sort so, to be in all respects and simply so: For God will not the actions of sinners as they are sins; but hee will them as they are punishments of sins, and the execution of his just judgement. Wherefore this consequence holdeth not, God will not the actions of the wicked, as they are sinnes; Therefore simply he will not have them to be done, but they depend only on the will of the wicked: For if God simply would them not, they could by no meanes be done. And except there were somewhat in them, which did agree with his justice and nature, he would not by reason of his goodnesse, infinite and passing measure, suffer them to be done. If they reply, That God would things contrary to these which men doe, as it is said, How often would I have gathered thee? and therefore it is done onely by the will of men whatsoever men doe: the same answer serveth, that God would the obedience of all his reasonable creatures towards his Law, as concerning his commanding and approving it: For he requireth it of all, and bindeth all to it, and approveth it in all, as being agreeable to his nature and purity; but neither will he alwaies it, nor in all, as concerning his working and grace, whereby they who are directed and guided, doe that which God approveth and requireth. The Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, and eyes to see, 2and eares to heare, unto this day.
That there is liberty of will in men it is proved: 1. Because man was made to the Image of God; and free-will is part of the Image of God. 2. By places of Scripture: ⟨p. 83⟩Let us make man in our Image, according to our likeness. 1God made man from the beginning, and left man in the hand of his counsel. 3. By the definition of that liberty, which agreeth to man; for man worketh upon deliberation, that is, freely, knowing, desiring, and refusing this or that object. And because the definition agreeth unto man, therefore also doth the thing which is defined agree to him.
THat there is liberty of will in men it is proved: 1. Because man was made to the Image of God; and free-will is part of the Image of God. 2. By places of Scripture: ⟨p. 83⟩Let us make man in our Image, according to our likenesse. 1God made man from the beginning, and left man in the hand of his counsell. 3. By the definition of that liberty, which agreeth to man; for man worketh upon deliberation, that is, freely, knowing, desiring, and refusing this or that object. And because the definition agreeth unto man, therefore also doth the thing which is defined agree to him.
1Object. 1. If there be in man liberty of will, the doctrine of Original sin is overthrown; for these are contrary: Not to be able to obey God, and, To have liberty of will. Ans. They are not contrary, because we have liberty to will and do good only in part, to wit, as we are regenerated by the holy Spirit; but not in whole and full, neither in that degree in which before the fall we had it, and shall have it in the life to come. Again, although the unregenerate are only able to will those things which are evil; yet they will them upon deliberation, without constraint, even by their own proper and inward motion; and therefore freely.
1Object. 1. If there be in man liberty of will, the doctrine of Originall sin is overthrowne; for these are contrary: Not to be able to obey God, and, To have liberty of will. Ans. They are not contrary, because we have liberty to will and do good only in part, to wit, as we are regenerated by the holy Spirit; but not in whole and full, neither in that degree in which before the fall we had it, and shall have it in the life to come. Again, although the unregenerate are only able to will those things which are evill; yet they will them upon deliberation, without constraint, even by their owne proper and inward motion; and therefore freely.
1Object. 2. He that hath not ability to choose as well good as bad, hath not free-will and arbitrement; but man hath not ability to choose as well good as evil: Therefore he hath not free-will. Ans. The Major consisteth of a bad definition of free-will: For the liberty of reasonable creatures consisteth in the judgement and deliberation of the mind or understanding, and in the free assent of the Will; not in a power to will as well good as evil, or contrary. The good Angels, by reason of the wisdom and rightness of their judgement, and of the great and constant propension or readiness of their will to that which they know to be good and right, cannot will evil and unjust things, but only things good and honest; and yet notwithstanding they most freely choose and do those things which are just: Right so, men by reason of their in bred ignorance, and corrupt judgement of those things which are to be done, and of the end, as also by reason of the stubbornness & frowardness of their will, can will only those things which are evil, which also they follow and pursue with exceeding willingness and pleasure, until they are regenerated by Gods Spirit. Object. 3. That is free, which is ruled of none other but of it self only, or which is bound to none; Mans will is not ruled of it self only, but of another, and is bound to the Law: Therefore it is not free. Answ. The Major is true, if it be meant of that liberty which is in God; but false, being meant of mans liberty: For, man to be ruled of none, is not liberty, but a shameful barbarity, and a wretched slavery. But the true liberty of the creature is to be subject unto honest and just laws, and to obey them: It is a power of living as thou wilt, according unto the Law of God. Object. 4. That which is a servant, and in bondage, is not free; but our will is a servant, and in bondage: 2Therefore our will is not free. Answ. There is an ambiguity in this reason; for it affirmeth that to be simply so, which is but in some respect and sort so: or the conclusion fetcheth in more then was in the premisses. That which is in bondage, is not free, that is, not in that respect or consideration as it is in bondage: Our arbitrement or will is in bondage, to wit, under sin:
1Object. 2. He that hath not ability to chuse as well good as bad, hath not free-will and arbitrement; but man hath not ability to chuse as well good as evill: Therefore hee hath not free-will. Ans. The Major consisteth of a bad definition of free-will: For the liberty of reasonable creatures consisteth in the judgement and deliberation of the mind or understanding, and in the free assent of the Will; not in a power to will as well good as evill, or contrary. The good Angels, by reason of the wisdome and rightnesse of their judgement, and of the great and constant propension or readiness of their will to that which they know to be good and right, cannot will evill and unjust things, but only things good and honest; and yet notwithstanding they most freely chuse and doe those things which are just: Right so, men by reason of their in bred ignorance, and corrupt judgement of those things which are to be done, and of the end, as also by reason of the stubbornnesse & frowardnesse of their will, can will only those things which are evill, which also they follow and pursue with exceeding willingnesse and pleasure, untill they are regenerated by Gods Spirit. Object. 3. That is free, which is ruled of none other but of it selfe only, or which is bound to none; Mans will is not ruled of it self only, but of another, and is bound to the Law: Therefore it is not free. Answ. The Major is true, if it be meant of that liberty which is in God; but false, being meant of mans liberty: For, man to be ruled of none, is not liberty, but a shamefull barbarity, and a wretched slavery. But the true liberty of the creature is to be subject unto honest and just lawes, and to obey them: It is a power of living as thou wilt, according unto the Law of God. Object. 4. That which is a servant, and in bondage, is not free; but our will is a servant, and in bondage: 2Therefore our will is not free. Answ. There is an ambiguity in this reason; for it affirmeth that to be simply so, which is but in some respect and sort so: or the conclusion fetcheth in more then was in the premisses. That which is in bondage, is not free, that is, not in that respect or consideration as it is in bondage: Our arbitrement or will is in bondage, to wit, under sin:
Therefore it is not free, that is, from sin, which it is not able to shake off by any force which it self hath, except it be freed and delivered by the grace of God. But thereof it followeth not; therefore simply no way it is free. For it is free, as touching the objects represented unto it by the understanding: because it chooseth or refuseth them being once known; or suspendeth and forbeareth her action by her own and proper motion, without constraint. The sum of all is: We grant the conclusion, if free be taken for that which hath ability to do those things which are good and pleasing to God: (for so far is it in servitude under sin, and hath power only to sin) but we deny the whole, if free be taken for voluntary, or deliberative, which chooseth the objects represented unto it by voluntary motion, not constrained or forced thereto by any external agent.
Therefore it is not free, that is, from sin, which it is not able to shake off by any force which it self hath, except it be freed and delivered by the grace of God. But thereof it followeth not; therefore simply no way it is free. For it is free, as touching the objects represented unto it by the understanding: because it chuseth or refuseth them being once knowne; or suspendeth and forbeareth her action by her owne and proper motion, without constraint. The summe of all is: We grant the conclusion, if free be taken for that which hath ability to do those things which are good and pleasing to God: (for so far is it in servitude under sin, and hath power only to sin) but we deny the whole, if free be taken for voluntary, or deliberative, which chuseth the objects represented unto it by voluntary motion, not constrained or forced thereto by any externall agent.
IT is farther questioned, and it importeth much to the knowledge of our selves to enquire, What manner of liberty, or to what actions the liberty which was in ⟨p. 84⟩mans will before the fall extended it self: and, Whether it were any or none at all; and if it were any, In what state it remaineth after the fall: and Whether it be restored; and, How, and by what means: and, How far forth it is restored. Whence it is apparent, that the degrees of free-will may most fitly be considered and distinguished according to the four estates of man: namely, of man not yet fallen into sin, or fallen; or renewed and restored, or glorified: that is, what manner, and how great the liberty of mans will was before the fall; what manner of liberty remaineth after the fall, before regeneration: of what condition it is in this life after regeneration, and what it shall be in the life to come after glorification.
IT is farther questioned, and it importeth much to the knolwedge of our selves to enquire, What manner of liberty, or to what actions the liberty which was in ⟨p. 84⟩mans will before the fall extended it selfe: and, Whether it were any or none at all; and if it were any, In what state it remaineth after the fall: and Whether it be restored; and, How, and by what meanes: and, How far forth it is restored. Whence it is apparent, that the degrees of free-will may most fitly be considered and distinguished according to the foure estates of man: namely, of man not yet fallen into sin, or fallen; or renewed and restored, or glorified: that is, what manner, and how great the liberty of mans will was before the fall; what manner of liberty remaineth after the fall, before regeneration: of what condition it is in this life after regeneration, and what it shall be in the life to come after glorification.
1The first degree of liberty in man not yet fallen, was a mind lightened with the perfect and certain knowledge of God, and a will by the proper inclination and free motion thereof yielding perfect obedience unto God; but yet not so confirmed in this knowledge and inclination, but that it could decline and defect from that obedience by her own proper and free motion, if hope or show of any good to come by defecting were offered unto it: that is, the Will of man was free to good and evil; or freely chose good, but so, that it had an ability of choosing evil: so that it might persist in good, God preserving it; and might also fall into evil, God forsaking it. The former is proved from the perfection of the Image of God in which man was created; the latter is too evident by the event of the thing it self, and by testimonies of Scripture▪ God hath made man righteous; 2but they have sought many inventions. God hath shut up all in unbelief, that he might have mercy on all. In which words Paul testifieth, that God of especial deep wisdom confirmed not the first man against the fall, nor allotted him such a portion of grace, that he might not be seduced by the Devil, and moved to sin; but that he therefore permitted him to be seduced, and fall into sin and death, that as many as were saved out of the common ruin, might be saved by his mercy alone: For, if nothing be done without the everlasting and most good counsel of God, the fall also of our first Parents may be so much the less exempted from it, by how much the more God had precisely and exactly determined from everlasting concerning his chief work, even mankind, what he would have done.
1The first degree of liberty in man not yet fallen, was a mind lightened with the perfect and certaine knowledge of God, and a will by the proper inclination and free motion thereof yeelding perfect obedience unto God; but yet not so confirmed in this knowledge and inclination, but that it could decline and defect from that obedience by her owne proper and free motion, if hope or shew of any good to come by defecting were offered unto it: that is, the Will of man was free to good and evill; or freely chose good, but so, that it had an ability of chusing evill: so that it might persist in good, God preserving it; and might also fall into evill, God forsaking it. The former is proved from the perfection of the Image of God in which man was created; the latter is too evident by the event of the thing it selfe, and by testimonies of Scripture▪ God hath made man righteous; 2but they have sought many inventions. God hath shut up all in unbeliefe, that he might have mercy on all. In which words Paul testifieth, that God of especiall deep wisdome confirmed not the first man against the fall, nor allotted him such a portion of grace, that he might not be seduced by the Divell, and moved to sin; but that hee therefore permitted him to be seduced, and fall into sin and death, that as many as were saved out of the common ruine, might be saved by his mercy alone: For, if nothing be done without the everlasting and most good counsell of God, the fall also of our first Parents may be so much the lesse exempted from it, by how much the more God had precisely and exactly determined from everlasting concerning his chief work, even mankind, what he would have done.
The creature can by no means retain that righteousness and conformity with God except God, who gave it, keep it; neither can be lose it, if God will have it kept:1 according to these sayings, Every good giving, and every perfect gift is from above, 2and cometh down from the Father of lights. In it was life, and the life was the light of men, which lighteneth every man that cometh into the world. Take not away thy holy Spirit from me. 3If thou hide thy face they are troubled. The foundation of God remaineth sure, and hath this seal: The Lord knoweth who are his. And of our confirmation and establishment in the life to come:4 In the resurrection they are as the Angels of God in heaven. As then man could not have fallen except God had withdrawn his hand, and not so forcibly and effectually affected his will, and ruled it in temptation; so neither could he persist in integrity, when he was tempted, except God had sustained and confirmed him, even as he confirmed the blessed Angels, that they should not defect and fall away together with the other Apostates. Seeing therefore such was the first mans estate, from which he wittingly and willingly fell; the crime and fault of sin neither can, nor ought to be laid on God, but on man only, albeit notwithstanding he fell by the eternal counsel and will of God.
The creature can by no meanes retain that righteousnesse and conformity with God except God, who gave it, keep it; neither can be lose it, if God will have it kept:1 according to these sayings, Every good giving, and every perfect gift is from above, 2and cometh downe from the Father of lights. In it was life, and the life was the light of men, which lightneth every man that cometh into the world. Take not away thy holy Spirit from me. 3If thou hide thy face they are troubled. The foundation of God remaineth sure, and hath this seale: The Lord knoweth who are his. And of our confirmation and establishment in the life to come:4 In the resurrection they are as the Angels of God in heaven. As then man could not have fallen except God had withdrawne his hand, and not so forcibly and effectually affected his will, and ruled it in temptation; so neither could he persist in integrity, when he was tempted, except God had sustained and confirmed him, even as he confirmed the blessed Angels, that they should not defect and fall away together with the other Apostates. Seeing therefore such was the first mans estate, from which he wittingly and willingly fell; the crime and fault of sin neither can, nor ought to be laid on God, but on man only, albeit notwithstanding he fell by the eternall counsell and will of God.
1Humane reason fancying her own wit, deriving the blame of sin from her self, when she heareth these things, is troubled, and keepeth a stir, and feigneth many absurdities to follow, except such a liberty of doing well or evil be given to man, that his perseverance or falling depend of his own will alone: First, That God was the cause of that first sin, and by consequent, of all other sins, as which came all of the first fall. Likewise, That he was the cause of the sin of the Devil seducing man: especially seeing the first sin is not to be accounted a punishment, as other sins: for no sin had gone before, which should be punished with that sin: and therefore, seeing God would not will that as a punishment, he may seem to have willed it as a sin. Answ. But although there be nothing to the contrary why sin may not be the punishment even of it ⟨p. 85⟩self: whereas in the same action both the creature,2 depriving himself of that conformity which he had with God, might sin, and God depriving him of that good, which he of his own accord casteth away, might punish, as it is said of covetousness, There is nothing worse then when one envieth himself: and this is a reward of his wickedness. Yet notwithstanding there are other ends besides punishment,3 for which it was convenient for God to will the action both of the Devil and of man. God would the temptation of man, which was done by the Devil,4 as a trial of man, by which it might be made manifest, whether he would persevere in true piety towards God: even as God himself did tempt Abraham immediately, when he commanded him to do that which he yet would not have done. God would that assent of man, by which he did yield unto the Devil against the will of God, as a manifestation of the weakness and feebleness of the creature, which cannot keep the gifts wherewith he was adorned by God, without Gods special instinct and aide. Likewise, he would have this done as an occasion or way, to manifest his justice and severity in punishing, and his mercy in saving sinners: as Exodus 9. Romans 9. Now God, respecting and willing these things in that persuasion and enticement of Satan, and in mans assenting and yielding thereunto, did notwithstanding all this while hate the sin of both; and therefore did not will it, neither cause it, but justly permitted and suffered it to be done:
1Humane reason fancying her owne wit, deriving the blame of sin from her self, when she heareth these things, is troubled, and keepeth a stirre, and feigneth many absurdities to follow, except such a liberty of doing well or evill be given to man, that his perseverance or falling depend of his owne will alone: First, That God was the cause of that first sin, and by consequent, of all other sins, as which came all of the first fall. Likewise, That he was the cause of the sin of the Divell seducing man: especially seeing the first sinne is not to be accounted a punishment, as other sins: for no sinne had gone before, which should be punished with that sinne: and therefore, seeing God would not will that as a punishment, he may seem to have willed it as a sin. Answ. But although there be nothing to the contrary why sin may not be the punishment even of it ⟨p. 85⟩selfe: whereas in the same action both the creature,2 depriving himselfe of that conformity which he had with God, might sinne, and God depriving him of that good, which he of his owne accord casteth away, might punish, as it is said of covetousnesse, There is nothing worse then when one envieth himselfe: and this is a reward of his wickednesse. Yet notwithstanding there are other ends besides punishment,3 for which it was convenient for God to will the action both of the Divell and of man. God would the temptation of man, which was done by the Divell,4 as a triall of man, by which it might be made manifest, whether he would persevere in true piety towards God: even as God himselfe did tempt Abraham immediately, when hee commanded him to doe that which hee yet would not have done. God would that assent of man, by which he did yeeld unto the Divell against the will of God, as a manifestation of the weaknesse and feeblenesse of the creature, which cannot keep the gifts wherewith he was adorned by God, without Gods speciall instinct and aide. Likewise, he would have this done as an occasion or way, to manifest his justice and severity in punishing, and his mercy in saving sinners: as Exodus 9. Romanes 9. Now God, respecting and willing these things in that perswasion and enticement of Sathan, and in mans assenting and yeelding thereunto, did notwithstanding all this while hate the sinne of both; and therefore did not will it, neither cause it, but justly permitted and suffered it to be done:
For first, Whatsoever things God doth, they are always just. 2. He was not bound unto man to preserve and confirm him in goodness. 3. He would have man to be tempted and to fall, that he might try mans perseverance in true piety towards God. 4. That he might manifest the weakness of the creature. 5. That his fall might be an occasion and way to manifest Gods justice and mercy. These things very well agree with the nature and law of God. Now that they say, That man did not fall of his own free-will, except he had equal power as well to persist in obedience, as to fall: the consequence is not of force, because they reason from an ill definition of mans liberty, which they imagine cannot stand, if it be determined and ruled by God. But the whole Scripture witnesseth, that it sufficeth for the liberty of the creature, if the Will be inclinable of it self to the contrary of that which it chooseth, and doth of it own accord choose that which the mind either liketh, or disliketh.
For first, Whatsoever things God doth, they are alwaies just. 2. Hee was not bound unto man to preserve and confirme him in goodnesse. 3. He would have man to be tempted and to fall, that he might try mans perseverance in true piety towards God. 4. That hee might manifest the weaknesse of the creature. 5. That his fall might be an occasion and way to manifest Gods justice and mercy. These things very well agree with the nature and law of God. Now that they say, That man did not fall of his owne free-will, except hee had equall power as well to persist in obedience, as to fall: the consequence is not of force, because they reason from an ill definition of mans liberty, which they imagine cannot stand, if it be determined and ruled by God. But the whole Scripture witnesseth, that it sufficeth for the liberty of the creature, if the Will be inclinable of it selfe to the contrary of that which it chuseth, and doth of it owne accord chuse that which the mind either liketh, or disliketh.
And hence also is that dissolved that they say, That man is not justly punished of God, if he could not avoid his fall: For he that sinneth willingly, or doth draw on himself the necessity of sinning, is justly punished, his own conscience accusing him; neither is it unjust that he is forsaken of God, and deprived of the grace of the holy Ghost, who wittingly and willingly casteth it away, and that he suffer the punishment of this his ingratitude and contempt of God, although he cannot, God forsaking him, do otherwise: For none is forsaken of God, except he be willing to be forsaken: As, It must needs be that offences shall come, 1but woe be unto that man by whom the offence cometh.
And hence also is that dissolved that they say, That man is not justly punished of God, if he could not avoid his fall: For he that sinneth willingly, or doth draw on himself the necessity of sinning, is justly punished, his owne conscience accusing him; neither is it unjust that he is forsaken of God, and deprived of the grace of the holy Ghost, who wittingly and willingly casteth it away, and that he suffer the punishment of this his ingratitude and contempt of God, although he cannot, God forsaking him, doe otherwise: For none is forsaken of God, except he be willing to be forsaken: As, It must needs be that offences shall come, 1but woe be unto that man by whom the offence cometh.
1At length they say, That God is made cruel, envious, and far from bounty and mercy, if he did not bestow that grace upon man, without which he knew man could not stand or consist in temptation; and yet would have him tempted of the Devil. But these and the like tauntings and reproachings of the works and judgements of God, out of doubt are joined with great impiety, because they over-turn the ground and principle, which is the first degree and step to godliness and reverence towards God, that is, that whatsoever God doth, it is good and just, and not disagreeing from his nature and law, whether the reason thereof be known unto us, or unknown: Wherefore this answer should suffice, that it disagreeth not from the mercy and goodness of God, whatsoever he doth. But there is not want also of other answers: As, that denial of grace doth not disagree, but very well agreeth with the mercy & bounty of God, when God will have this to be an occasion of bestowing a greater grace and benefit; as it is apparent in the fall and restoring of man again, that that is not disagreeing from mercy, or any other virtue, which doth appertain to the manifesting of the glory of the chief good, which is God: For although it be mercy not to rejoice in the ruin or destruction of his creature, yet mercy ought ⟨p. 86⟩not to fight with justice: now it is just, that more regard should be had of the chief good, that is, God (both by himself, and by others) then of all creatures. Wherefore very well do agree together in God, his mercy, which will not the death of a sinner; and his justice which suffereth mankind to fall, that by his fall the severity and goodness of God may appear.
1At length they say, That God is made cruell, envious, and far from bounty and mercie, if he did not bestow that grace upon man, without which he knew man could not stand or consist in temptation; and yet would have him tempted of the Divell. But these and the like tauntings and reproachings of the workes and judgements of God, out of doubt are joyned with great impiety, because they over-turn the ground and principle, which is the first degree and step to godlinesse and reverence towards God, that is, that whatsoever God doth, it is good and just, and not disagreeing from his nature and law, whether the reason thereof be knowne unto us, or unknowne: Wherefore this answer should suffice, that it disagreeth not from the mercy and goodnesse of God, whatsoever he doth. But there is not want also of other answers: As, that deniall of grace doth not disagree, but very well agreeth with the mercy & bounty of God, when God will have this to be an occasion of bestowing a greater grace and benefit; as it is apparent in the fall and restoring of man againe, that that is not disagreeing from mercy, or any other vertue, which doth appertaine to the manifesting of the glory of the chiefe good, which is God: For although it be mercy not to rejoyce in the ruine or destruction of his creature, yet mercy ought ⟨p. 86⟩not to fight with justice: now it is just, that more regard should be had of the chiefe good, that is, God (both by himselfe, and by others) then of all creatures. Wherefore very well doe agree together in God, his mercy, which will not the death of a sinner; and his justice which suffereth mankind to fall, that by his fall the severity and goodnesse of God may appeare.
1The second degree of free-will is in man fallen, borne of corrupt parents, and as yet not regenerate. In this state the Will verily doth work freely, but it is carried to evil only, and can do nought else but sin. The reason is, because the privation of the knowledge of God in the understanding ensued on the fall, and the want of inclination in the heart and will unto obedience; in whose stead blindness and averseness from God succeeded, which man cannot shake off, unless he be regenerated by the holy Ghost. Briefly, it is the fitness and proneness in man after his fall, being unregenerate, to choose only evil. Of this blindness and corruption of mans nature after the fall it is said:2 All the thoughts of man are only evil. Can the Blackamoor change his skin? &c. Every man from his youth is given to evil, and their stony hearts cannot become flesh. A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit. We were dead in our sins: by nature the sons of wrath. We are not able of our selves to think any thing as of our selves. With these testimonies concurreth every mans experience, and the weary sense of conscience, which proclaimeth, that we have no liberty and proneness of will to do that which is good; but too great freedom and readiness to practise evil,3 unless we be regenerate: as it is said, Convert thou me, and I shall be converted: Wherefore there is no love of God in us by nature; and therefore we have by nature no readiness to obey God.
1The second degree of free-will is in man fallen, borne of corrupt parents, and as yet not regenerate. In this state the Will verily doth worke freely, but it is carried to evill only, and can doe nought else but sin. The reason is, because the privation of the knowledge of God in the understanding ensued on the fall, and the want of inclination in the heart and will unto obedience; in whose stead blindness and aversnesse from God succeeded, which man cannot shake off, unlesse he be regenerated by the holy Ghost. Briefly, it is the fitnesse and pronenesse in man after his fall, being unregenerate, to chuse only evill. Of this blindnesse and corruption of mans nature after the fall it is said:2 All the thoughts of man are only evill. Can the Blackmoore change his skin? &c. Every man from his youth is given to evill, and their stony hearts cannot become flesh. A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit. We were dead in our sins: by nature the sons of wrath. Wee are not able of our selves to thinke any thing as of our selves. With these testimonies concurreth every mans experience, and the weary sense of conscience, which proclaimeth, that we have no liberty and pronenesse of will to doe that which is good; but too great freedome and readinesse to practise evill,3 unlesse we be regenerate: as it is said, Convert thou me, and I shall be converted: Wherefore there is no love of God in us by nature; and therefore we have by nature no readinesse to obey God.
1This liberty of the unregenerate is the most wretched servitude of sin, and very death in sins, whereof the Scripture teacheth in many places: Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin. Know ye not, that to whomsoever ye give your selves as servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness? Promising unto them liberty, and are themselves servants of corruption. Object. 1. Nothing more easy, saith Erasmus, then to keep a mans hand from stealing. Again, Socrates, Aristides, and many others have showed and exercised many virtues: Therefore they had free-will to do good before regeneration. Answ. This is an ill definition of a good work and free-will to do good, which is a power of yielding obedience pleasing to God.2 The unregenerate steal within by their lust and desire, though not by outward fact: that the unregenerate contain their hands, that is, observe outward discipline, this is also Gods benefit, who by his general providence governeth also the hearts of the wicked, and bridleth their in-bred wickedness, that it break not forth, and affect that which it would. But hereof it followeth not, that it is easy to begin inward obedience, or that to contain their hands from stealing is simply a good work. Neither are these good works before God, that is, pleasing unto God, which have not joined with them faith and inward obedience: But faith and inward obedience could not be in them, because they were not regenerated. Repl. 1. The works of the Law are good; Heathen men did the works of the Law: Therefore the works of the Heathen were good: And by consequence, Heathen men also, or unregenerate, had liberty of doing good. We answer to the Major by a distinction:3 The works of the Law are good; true, by themselves: but they are made ill by an accident; and so are the works of the Law made ill by an accident of the unregenerate: because they are not done by them for that end, and after that sort which God commanded. Repl. 2. There remain also many true notions in the minds of the unregenerate concerning God and his will, and the right ordering of their life: Wherefore the Will working according to these notions, and the direction of true reason, doth not sin, but worketh well. Ans. 1.
1This liberty of the unregenerate is the most wretched servitude of sin, and very death in sins, whereof the Scripture teacheth in many places: Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin. Know ye not, that to whomsoever ye give your selves as servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousnesse? Promising unto them liberty, and are themselves servants of corruption. Object. 1. Nothing more easie, saith Erasmus, then to keep a mans hand from stealing. Againe, Socrates, Aristides, and many others have shewed and exercised many vertues: Therefore they had free-will to doe good before regeneration. Answ. This is an ill definition of a good worke and free-will to doe good, which is a power of yeelding obedience pleasing to God.2 The unregenerate steale within by their lust and desire, though not by outward fact: that the unregenerate containe their hands, that is, observe outward discipline, this is also Gods benefit, who by his generall providence governeth also the hearts of the wicked, and bridleth their in-bred wickednesse, that it break not forth, and affect that which it would. But hereof it followeth not, that it is easie to begin inward obedience, or that to containe their hands from stealing is simply a good worke. Neither are these good workes before God, that is, pleasing unto God, which have not joyned with them faith and inward obedience: But faith and inward obedience could not be in them, because they were not regenerated. Repl. 1. The workes of the Law are good; Heathen men did the workes of the Law: Therefore the works of the Heathen were good: And by consequence, Heathen men also, or unregenerate, had liberty of doing good. We answer to the Major by a distinction:3 The workes of the Law are good; true, by themselves: but they are made ill by an accident; and so are the works of the Law made ill by an accident of the unregenerate: because they are not done by them for that end, and after that sort which God commanded. Repl. 2. There remaine also many true notions in the minds of the unregenerate concerning God and his will, and the right ordering of their life: Wherefore the Will working according to these notions, and the direction of true reason, doth not sin, but worketh well. Ans. 1.