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The sum of Christian religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus first, by way of catechism, and then afterwards more enlarged by a sound and judicious exposition, and application of the same : wherein also are debated and resolved the questions of whatsoever points of moment have been, or are controversed in divinity / first Englished by D. Henry Parry, and now again conferred with the best and last Latin edition of D. David Pareus, sometimes Professor of Divinity in Heidelberg ; whereunto is added a large and full alphabetical table of such matters as are therein contained ; together with all the Scriptures that are occasionally handled, by way either of controversy, exposition, or reconciliation, neither of which was done before, but now is performed for the readers delight and benefit ; to this work of Ursinus are now at last annexed the Theological miscellanies of D. David Pareus in which the orthodoxall tenets are briefly and solidly confirmed, and the contrary errors of the Papists, Ubiquitaries, Antitrinitaries, Eutychians, Socinians, and Arminians fully refuted ; and now translated into English out of the original Latin copy by A.R.The summe of Christian religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus first, by way of catechism, and then afterwards more enlarged by a sound and judicious exposition, and application of the same : wherein also are debated and resolved the questions of whatsoever points of moment have been, or are controversed in divinitie / first Englished by D. Henry Parry, and now again conferred with the best and last Latine edition of D. David Pareus, sometimes Professour of Divinity in Heidelberge ; whereunto is added a large and full alphabeticall table of such matters as are therein contained ; together with all the Scriptures that are occasionally handled, by way either of controversie, exposition, or reconciliation, neither of which was done before, but now is performed for the readers delight and benefit ; to this work of Ursinus are now at last annexed the Theologicall miscellanies of D. David Pareus in which the orthodoxall tenets are briefly and solidly confirmed, and the contrary errours of the Papists, Ubiquitaries, Antitrinitaries, Eutychians, Socinians, and Arminians fully refuted ; and now translated into English out of the originall Latine copie by A.R.
London: printed by James Young, 1645
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
IT is farther questioned, and it importeth much to the knowledge of our selves to enquire, What manner of liberty, or to what actions the liberty which was in ⟨p. 84⟩mans will before the fall extended it self: and, Whether it were any or none at all; and if it were any, In what state it remaineth after the fall: and Whether it be restored; and, How, and by what means: and, How far forth it is restored. Whence it is apparent, that the degrees of free-will may most fitly be considered and distinguished according to the four estates of man: namely, of man not yet fallen into sin, or fallen; or renewed and restored, or glorified: that is, what manner, and how great the liberty of mans will was before the fall; what manner of liberty remaineth after the fall, before regeneration: of what condition it is in this life after regeneration, and what it shall be in the life to come after glorification.
IT is farther questioned, and it importeth much to the knolwedge of our selves to enquire, What manner of liberty, or to what actions the liberty which was in ⟨p. 84⟩mans will before the fall extended it selfe: and, Whether it were any or none at all; and if it were any, In what state it remaineth after the fall: and Whether it be restored; and, How, and by what meanes: and, How far forth it is restored. Whence it is apparent, that the degrees of free-will may most fitly be considered and distinguished according to the foure estates of man: namely, of man not yet fallen into sin, or fallen; or renewed and restored, or glorified: that is, what manner, and how great the liberty of mans will was before the fall; what manner of liberty remaineth after the fall, before regeneration: of what condition it is in this life after regeneration, and what it shall be in the life to come after glorification.
1The first degree of liberty in man not yet fallen, was a mind lightened with the perfect and certain knowledge of God, and a will by the proper inclination and free motion thereof yielding perfect obedience unto God; but yet not so confirmed in this knowledge and inclination, but that it could decline and defect from that obedience by her own proper and free motion, if hope or show of any good to come by defecting were offered unto it: that is, the Will of man was free to good and evil; or freely chose good, but so, that it had an ability of choosing evil: so that it might persist in good, God preserving it; and might also fall into evil, God forsaking it. The former is proved from the perfection of the Image of God in which man was created; the latter is too evident by the event of the thing it self, and by testimonies of Scripture▪ God hath made man righteous; 2but they have sought many inventions. God hath shut up all in unbelief, that he might have mercy on all. In which words Paul testifieth, that God of especial deep wisdom confirmed not the first man against the fall, nor allotted him such a portion of grace, that he might not be seduced by the Devil, and moved to sin; but that he therefore permitted him to be seduced, and fall into sin and death, that as many as were saved out of the common ruin, might be saved by his mercy alone: For, if nothing be done without the everlasting and most good counsel of God, the fall also of our first Parents may be so much the less exempted from it, by how much the more God had precisely and exactly determined from everlasting concerning his chief work, even mankind, what he would have done.
1The first degree of liberty in man not yet fallen, was a mind lightened with the perfect and certaine knowledge of God, and a will by the proper inclination and free motion thereof yeelding perfect obedience unto God; but yet not so confirmed in this knowledge and inclination, but that it could decline and defect from that obedience by her owne proper and free motion, if hope or shew of any good to come by defecting were offered unto it: that is, the Will of man was free to good and evill; or freely chose good, but so, that it had an ability of chusing evill: so that it might persist in good, God preserving it; and might also fall into evill, God forsaking it. The former is proved from the perfection of the Image of God in which man was created; the latter is too evident by the event of the thing it selfe, and by testimonies of Scripture God hath made man righteous;
The creature can by no means retain that righteousness and conformity with God except God, who gave it, keep it; neither can be lose it, if God will have it kept:1 according to these sayings, Every good giving, and every perfect gift is from above, 2and cometh down from the Father of lights. In it was life, and the life was the light of men, which lighteneth every man that cometh into the world. Take not away thy holy Spirit from me. 3If thou hide thy face they are troubled. The foundation of God remaineth sure, and hath this seal: The Lord knoweth who are his. And of our confirmation and establishment in the life to come:4 In the resurrection they are as the Angels of God in heaven. As then man could not have fallen except God had withdrawn his hand, and not so forcibly and effectually affected his will, and ruled it in temptation; so neither could he persist in integrity, when he was tempted, except God had sustained and confirmed him, even as he confirmed the blessed Angels, that they should not defect and fall away together with the other Apostates. Seeing therefore such was the first mans estate, from which he wittingly and willingly fell; the crime and fault of sin neither can, nor ought to be laid on God, but on man only, albeit notwithstanding he fell by the eternal counsel and will of God.
The creature can by no meanes retain that righteousnesse and conformity with God except God, who gave it, keep it; neither can be lose it, if God will have it kept:1 according to these sayings, Every good giving, and every perfect gift is from above, 2and cometh downe from the Father of lights. In it was life, and the life was the light of men, which lightneth every man that cometh into the world. Take not away thy holy Spirit from me. 3If thou hide thy face they are troubled. The foundation of God remaineth sure, and hath this seale: The Lord knoweth who are his. And of our confirmation and establishment in the life to come:
1Humane reason fancying her own wit, deriving the blame of sin from her self, when she heareth these things, is troubled, and keepeth a stir, and feigneth many absurdities to follow, except such a liberty of doing well or evil be given to man, that his perseverance or falling depend of his own will alone: First, That God was the cause of that first sin, and by consequent, of all other sins, as which came all of the first fall. Likewise, That he was the cause of the sin of the Devil seducing man: especially seeing the first sin is not to be accounted a punishment, as other sins: for no sin had gone before, which should be punished with that sin: and therefore, seeing God would not will that as a punishment, he may seem to have willed it as a sin. Answ. But although there be nothing to the contrary why sin may not be the punishment even of it ⟨p. 85⟩self: whereas in the same action both the creature,2 depriving himself of that conformity which he had with God, might sin, and God depriving him of that good, which he of his own accord casteth away, might punish, as it is said of covetousness, There is nothing worse then when one envieth himself: and this is a reward of his wickedness. Yet notwithstanding there are other ends besides punishment,3 for which it was convenient for God to will the action both of the Devil and of man. God would the temptation of man, which was done by the Devil,4 as a trial of man, by which it might be made manifest, whether he would persevere in true piety towards God: even as God himself did tempt Abraham immediately, when he commanded him to do that which he yet would not have done. God would that assent of man, by which he did yield unto the Devil against the will of God, as a manifestation of the weakness and feebleness of the creature, which cannot keep the gifts wherewith he was adorned by God, without Gods special instinct and aide. Likewise, he would have this done as an occasion or way, to manifest his justice and severity in punishing, and his mercy in saving sinners: as Exodus 9.
For first, Whatsoever things God doth, they are always just. 2. He was not bound unto man to preserve and confirm him in goodness. 3. He would have man to be tempted and to fall, that he might try mans perseverance in true piety towards God. 4. That he might manifest the weakness of the creature. 5. That his fall might be an occasion and way to manifest Gods justice and mercy. These things very well agree with the nature and law of God. Now that they say, That man did not fall of his own free-will, except he had equal power as well to persist in obedience, as to fall: the consequence is not of force, because they reason from an ill definition of mans liberty, which they imagine cannot stand, if it be determined and ruled by God. But the whole Scripture witnesseth, that it sufficeth for the liberty of the creature, if the Will be inclinable of it self to the contrary of that which it chooseth, and doth of it own accord choose that which the mind either liketh, or disliketh.
For first, Whatsoever things God doth, they are alwaies just. 2. Hee was not bound unto man to preserve and confirme him in goodnesse. 3. He would have man to be tempted and to fall, that he might try mans perseverance in true piety towards God. 4. That hee might manifest the weaknesse of the creature. 5. That his fall might be an occasion and way to manifest Gods justice and mercy. These things very well agree with the nature and law of God. Now that they say, That man did not fall of his owne free-will, except hee had equall power as well to persist in obedience, as to fall: the consequence is not of force, because they reason from an ill definition of mans liberty, which they imagine cannot stand, if it be determined and ruled by God. But the whole Scripture witnesseth, that it sufficeth for the liberty of the creature, if the Will be inclinable of it selfe to the contrary of that which it chuseth, and doth of it owne accord chuse that which the mind either liketh, or disliketh.
And hence also is that dissolved that they say, That man is not justly punished of God, if he could not avoid his fall: For he that sinneth willingly, or doth draw on himself the necessity of sinning, is justly punished, his own conscience accusing him; neither is it unjust that he is forsaken of God, and deprived of the grace of the holy Ghost, who wittingly and willingly casteth it away, and that he suffer the punishment of this his ingratitude and contempt of God, although he cannot, God forsaking him, do otherwise: For none is forsaken of God, except he be willing to be forsaken: As, It must needs be that offences shall come, 1but woe be unto that man by whom the offence cometh.
And hence also is that dissolved that they say, That man is not justly punished of God, if he could not avoid his fall: For he that sinneth willingly, or doth draw on himself the necessity of sinning, is justly punished, his owne conscience accusing him; neither is it unjust that he is forsaken of God, and deprived of the grace of the holy Ghost, who wittingly and willingly casteth it away, and that he suffer the punishment of this his ingratitude and contempt of God, although he cannot, God forsaking him, doe otherwise: For none is forsaken of God, except he be willing to be forsaken: As, It must needs be that offences shall come, 1but woe be unto that man by whom the offence cometh.
1At length they say, That God is made cruel, envious, and far from bounty and mercy, if he did not bestow that grace upon man, without which he knew man could not stand or consist in temptation; and yet would have him tempted of the Devil. But these and the like tauntings and reproachings of the works and judgements of God, out of doubt are joined with great impiety, because they over-turn the ground and principle, which is the first degree and step to godliness and reverence towards God, that is, that whatsoever God doth, it is good and just, and not disagreeing from his nature and law, whether the reason thereof be known unto us, or unknown: Wherefore this answer should suffice, that it disagreeth not from the mercy and goodness of God, whatsoever he doth. But there is not want also of other answers: As, that denial of grace doth not disagree, but very well agreeth with the mercy & bounty of God, when God will have this to be an occasion of bestowing a greater grace and benefit; as it is apparent in the fall and restoring of man again, that that is not disagreeing from mercy, or any other virtue, which doth appertain to the manifesting of the glory of the chief good, which is God: For although it be mercy not to rejoice in the ruin or destruction of his creature, yet mercy ought ⟨p. 86⟩not to fight with justice: now it is just, that more regard should be had of the chief good, that is, God (both by himself, and by others) then of all creatures. Wherefore very well do agree together in God, his mercy, which will not the death of a sinner; and his justice which suffereth mankind to fall, that by his fall the severity and goodness of God may appear.
1At length they say, That God is made cruell, envious, and far from bounty and mercie, if he did not bestow that grace upon man, without which he knew man could not stand or consist in temptation; and yet would have him tempted of the Divell. But these and the like tauntings and reproachings of the workes and judgements of God, out of doubt are joyned with great impiety, because they over-turn the ground and principle, which is the first degree and step to godlinesse and reverence towards God, that is, that whatsoever God doth, it is good and just, and not disagreeing from his nature and law, whether the reason thereof be knowne unto us, or unknowne: Wherefore this answer should suffice, that it disagreeth not from the mercy and goodnesse of God, whatsoever he doth. But there is not want also of other answers: As, that deniall of grace doth not disagree, but very well agreeth with the mercy & bounty of God, when God will have this to be an occasion of bestowing a greater grace and benefit; as it is apparent in the fall and restoring of man againe, that that is not disagreeing from mercy, or any other vertue, which doth appertaine to the manifesting of the glory of the chiefe good, which is God: For although it be mercy not to rejoyce in the ruine or destruction of his creature, yet mercy ought
1The second degree of free-will is in man fallen, borne of corrupt parents, and as yet not regenerate. In this state the Will verily doth work freely, but it is carried to evil only, and can do nought else but sin. The reason is, because the privation of the knowledge of God in the understanding ensued on the fall, and the want of inclination in the heart and will unto obedience; in whose stead blindness and averseness from God succeeded, which man cannot shake off, unless he be regenerated by the holy Ghost. Briefly, it is the fitness and proneness in man after his fall, being unregenerate, to choose only evil. Of this blindness and corruption of mans nature after the fall it is said:2 All the thoughts of man are only evil. Can the Blackamoor change his skin? &c. Every man from his youth is given to evil, and their stony hearts cannot become flesh. A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit. We were dead in our sins: by nature the sons of wrath. We are not able of our selves to think any thing as of our selves. With these testimonies concurreth every mans experience, and the weary sense of conscience, which proclaimeth, that we have no liberty and proneness of will to do that which is good; but too great freedom and readiness to practise evil,3 unless we be regenerate: as it is said, Convert thou me, and I shall be converted: Wherefore there is no love of God in us by nature; and therefore we have by nature no readiness to obey God.
1The second degree of free-will is in man fallen, borne of corrupt parents, and as yet not regenerate. In this state the Will verily doth worke freely, but it is carried to evill only, and can doe nought else but sin. The reason is, because the privation of the knowledge of God in the understanding ensued on the fall, and the want of inclination in the heart and will unto obedience; in whose stead blindness and aversnesse from God succeeded, which man cannot shake off, unlesse he be regenerated by the holy Ghost. Briefly, it is the fitnesse and pronenesse in man after his fall, being unregenerate, to chuse only evill. Of this blindnesse and corruption of mans nature after the fall it is said:2
1This liberty of the unregenerate is the most wretched servitude of sin, and very death in sins, whereof the Scripture teacheth in many places: Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin. Know ye not, that to whomsoever ye give your selves as servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness? Promising unto them liberty, and are themselves servants of corruption. Object. 1. Nothing more easy, saith Erasmus, then to keep a mans hand from stealing. Again, Socrates, Aristides, and many others have showed and exercised many virtues: Therefore they had free-will to do good before regeneration. Answ. This is an ill definition of a good work and free-will to do good, which is a power of yielding obedience pleasing to God.2 The unregenerate steal within by their lust and desire, though not by outward fact: that the unregenerate contain their hands, that is, observe outward discipline, this is also Gods benefit, who by his general providence governeth also the hearts of the wicked, and bridleth their in-bred wickedness, that it break not forth, and affect that which it would. But hereof it followeth not, that it is easy to begin inward obedience, or that to contain their hands from stealing is simply a good work. Neither are these good works before God, that is, pleasing unto God, which have not joined with them faith and inward obedience: But faith and inward obedience could not be in them, because they were not regenerated. Repl. 1. The works of the Law are good; Heathen men did the works of the Law: Therefore the works of the Heathen were good: And by consequence, Heathen men also, or unregenerate, had liberty of doing good. We answer to the Major by a distinction:3 The works of the Law are good; true, by themselves: but they are made ill by an accident; and so are the works of the Law made ill by an accident of the unregenerate: because they are not done by them for that end, and after that sort which God commanded. Repl. 2. There remain also many true notions in the minds of the unregenerate concerning God and his will, and the right ordering of their life: Wherefore the Will working according to these notions, and the direction of true reason, doth not sin, but worketh well. Ans. 1.
Those legal notions, whether they belong to the first,1 or to the second Table of the Decalogue, they are not perfect and sufficient: And therefore God cannot be rightly worshipped, according to these remains or relics of spiritual light, except there come thereunto the knowledge of God, and his divine will out of the Word of God, which is delivered to the Church. 2. Men not brought up in the Church, do patch many false ⟨p. 87⟩things with these true imprinted notions of nature, and do heap sins upon errors. 3. Such is the frowardness of the will and affections, even against the judgement of rightly informed and ruled reason, that they obey not so much as those natural notions, much less those which are to be adjoined out of the Word of God. Wherefore also are those complaints even of the Heathen: I see the better, and I like them, but I follow the worse: and that accusation of the Apostle,2 The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, which with-hold the truth in unrighteousness: wherefore those notions, without the grace of the holy Ghost, do not engender true godliness in them.
Those legall notions, whether they belong to the first,1 or to the second Table of the Decalogue, they are not perfect and sufficient: And therefore God cannot be rightly worshipped, according to these remaines or reliques of spirituall light, except there come thereunto the knowledge of God, and his divine will out of the Word of God, which is delivered to the Church. 2. Men not brought up in the Church, doe patch many false ⟨p. 87⟩things with these true imprinted notions of nature, and do heap sins upon errours. 3. Such is the frowardnesse of the will and affections, even against the judgement of rightly informed and ruled reason, that they obey not so much as those naturall notions, much lesse those which are to be adjoyned out of the Word of God. Wherefore also are those complaints even of the Heathen: I see the better, and I like them, but I follow the worse: and that accusation of the Apostle,
1Object. 2. God commendeth us for good works: Therefore good works are in our power and will. Answ. This is a fallacy, concluding of that which is no cause, as if it were a cause. God commendeth our good works, not because they are or can be performed of us, without our renewing by the holy Ghost; but because they are agreeable unto his Law, and good and pleasing unto him: yea, because they are his own gifts and effects in us, and we his instruments, unto whom he communicateth himself and his blessings: according as it is said, Whom he predestinated, them also he called. Repl. Who doth not in such sort work well, as that it is in his own power to do either well or ill, he deserveth neither commendation nor reward; but those good things which men do, are not in their power and arbitrement: Therefore they deserve not either commendation or rewards for their virtues. Answ. If the question be of desert, we grant the whole argument: For it is true, that no creature can deserve or merit ought at Gods hand; neither ought the praise, or commendation, or glory be given to us, as if the good which we do were of our selves, it being God which worketh whatsoever is good in all. But if they say, that neither reward or commendation is justly given, more is in the conclusion then was in the premisses: For God, to testify that righteousness pleaseth him, and to show forth more and more his bounty and goodness, doth adorn it with free rewards.
1Object. 2. God commendeth us for good workes: Therefore good workes are in our power and will. Answ. This is a fallacy, concluding of that which is no cause, as if it were a cause. God commendeth our good workes, not because they are or can be performed of us, without our renewing by the holy Ghost; but because they are agreeable unto his Law, and good and pleasing unto him: yea, because they are his own gifts and effects in us, and we his instruments, unto whom he communicateth himselfe and his blessings: according as it is said, Whom he predestinated, them also he called. Repl. Who doth not in such sort work well, as that it is in his owne power to doe either well or ill, hee deserveth neither commendation nor reward; but those good things which men doe, are not in their power and arbitrement: Therefore they deserve not either commendation or rewards for their vertues. Answ. If the question be of desert, we grant the whole argument: For it is true, that no creature can deserve or merit ought at Gods hand; neither ought the praise, or commendation, or glory be given to us, as if the good which we do were of our selves, it being God which worketh whatsoever is good in all. But if they say, that neither reward or commendation is justly given, more is in the conclusion then was in the premisses: For God, to testifie that righteousnesse pleaseth him, and to shew forth more and more his bounty and goodnesse, doth adorne it with free rewards.
1Obj. 3. What God doth wish and will to be done of us, that we are able to perform by our selves; but God doth wish and will our conversion, and our good works: Therefore we are able to perform them by our selves: And so consequently, we need not the operation and working of the holy Ghost. Answ. This reason is a fallacy, deceiving by the ambiguity or the word wish: For in the Major proposition it is taken, as it useth properly to signify: in the Minor not so. God is said to wish, by a figure of speech called Anthropopathy, making God to be affected after the order of men: and therefore the kind of affirmation is divers in the Major, and in the Minor. But God is said to wish in two respects: 1. In respect of his commanding and inviting. 22. In respect of his love towards his creatures, and in respect of the torment of them that perish, but not in respect of the execution of his justice. Repl. 1. He it is that inviteth others, and is delighted with their well-doing: it followeth thereof, that their well-doing is in their own power, and not in his▪ who inviteth them; but God is he who inviteth us, and is delighted with our well-doing: Therefore it is in our selves to do well. Answ. We deny the Minor, because it is not enough that God inviteth us: but our will also to do well must be adjoined, which we cannot have but from God only. God therefore doth wish our conversion, and doth invite all unto it, that is, he requireth obedience towards his Law of all, he liketh it in all, and for the love which he beareth unto his creature, he wisheth nothing more then that all perform it, and all be saved; but yet a will to perform it they only have, whom God doth regenerate by his Spirit: Ye have seen all that the Lord did before your eyes: 3yet the Lord hath not given you a heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear unto this day.
1Obj. 3. What God doth wish and will to be done of us, that we are able to performe by our selves; but God doth wish and will our conversion, and our good works: Therefore we are able to performe them by our selves: And so consequently, we need not the operation and working of the holy Ghost. Answ. This reason is a fallacy, deceiving by the ambiguity or the word wish: For in the Major proposition it is taken, as it useth properly to signifie: in the Minor not so. God is said to wish, by a figure of speech called Anthropopathy, making God to be affected after the order of men: and therefore the kind of affirmation is divers in the Major, and in the Minor. But God is said to wish in two respects: 1. In respect of his commanding and inviting.
Object. 4. That which cannot be avoided, is not sin; The unregenerate cannot avoid sin: Therefore their works are not to be accounted sins. Answ. We deny the Major:1 For it is enough to make sin, if it be voluntary. And how much the more necessarily men sin, with so much the greater will they sin. They cannot therefore pretend necessity to cloak their fault. This doth the example of the Devil prove, who sinneth so much the more grievously, how much the more necessarily he sinneth, wittingly and willingly striving against God, and contumeliously despiting ⟨p. 88⟩him. But they do vainly and wickedly cavil, That the justice of God doth not impute those sins to the Devil, which he necessarily doth commit after his corruption. Likewise, That the Devil is now finally and without hope of pardon cast away of God, but men have power yet in this life either to persist in sin, or to forsake it; and therefore those actions only of theirs are sins, in which sin cannot be avoided: For God is wroth with all sins of men and Devils, and punisheth all sins with eternal pains, or with equivalent punishment unto eternal. Neither doth therefore necessary and inevitable or unavoidable sin cease to be sin, for that there is, or is not hope of obtaining recovery and pardon: For, whatsoever is committed against the Law of God, that is sin, whether it can be avoided, or not avoided, whether he who sinneth, forsaketh his sin, or persisteth in it.
Object. 4. That which cannot be avoided, is not sinne; The unregenerate cannot avoid sinne: Therefore their workes are not to be accounted sins. Answ. We deny the Major:1 For it is enough to make sin, if it be voluntary. And how much the more necessarily men sin, with so much the greater will they sin. They cannot therefore pretend necessity to cloak their fault. This doth the example of the Divell prove, who sinneth so much the more grievously, how much the more necessarily hee sinneth, wittingly and willingly striving against God, and contumeliously despiting ⟨p. 88⟩him. But they doe vainly and wickedly cavill, That the justice of God doth not impute those sins to the Divell, which he necessarily doth commit after his corruption. Likewise, That the Divell is now finally and without hope of pardon cast away of God, but men have power yet in this life either to persist in sin, or to forsake it; and therefore those actions only of theirs are sins, in which sin cannot be avoided: For God is wroth with all sins of men and Divels, and punisheth all sins with eternall paines, or with equivalent punishment unto eternall. Neither doth therefore necessary and inevitable or unavoidable sin cease to be sin, for that there is, or is not hope of obtaining recovery and pardon: For, whatsoever is committed against the Law of God, that is sin, whether it can be avoided, or not avoided, whether he who sinneth, forsaketh his sin, or persisteth in it.
Object. 5. They who cannot but sin, are unjustly punished; but the unregenerate cannot but sin: 1Therefore God doth unjustly punish them. Answ. They who necessarily sin, are unjustly punished, except that necessity come voluntarily, and by their own will. But men have drawn upon them that necessity voluntarily in the first Parents, and themselves also do willingly sin: Therefore God doth justly punish them.
Object. 5. They who cannot but sin, are unjustly punished; but the unregenerate cannot but sin: 1Therefore God doth unjustly punish them. Answ. They who necessarily sinne, are unjustly punished, except that necessity come voluntarily, and by their owne will. But men have drawne upon them that necessity voluntarily in the first Parents, and themselves also doe willingly sinne: Therefore God doth justly punish them.
1Humane reason fancying her owne wit, deriving the blame of sin from her self, when she heareth these things, is troubled, and keepeth a stirre, and feigneth many absurdities to follow, except such a liberty of doing well or evill be given to man, that his perseverance or falling depend of his owne will alone: First, That God was the cause of that first sin, and by consequent, of all other sins, as which came all of the first fall. Likewise, That he was the cause of the sin of the Divell seducing man: especially seeing the first sinne is not to be accounted a punishment, as other sins: for no sinne had gone before, which should be punished with that sinne: and therefore, seeing God would not will that as a punishment, he may seem to have willed it as a sin. Answ. But although there be nothing to the contrary why sin may not be the punishment even of it ⟨p. 85⟩selfe: whereas in the same action both the creature,2 depriving himselfe of that conformity which he had with God, might sinne, and God depriving him of that good, which he of his owne accord casteth away, might punish, as it is said of covetousnesse, There is nothing worse then when one envieth himselfe: and this is a reward of his wickednesse. Yet notwithstanding there are other ends besides punishment,3 for which it was convenient for God to will the action both of the Divell and of man. God would the temptation of man, which was done by the Divell,4 as a triall of man, by which it might be made manifest, whether he would persevere in true piety towards God: even as God himselfe did tempt Abraham immediately, when hee commanded him to doe that which hee yet would not have done. God would that assent of man, by which he did yeeld unto the Divell against the will of God, as a manifestation of the weaknesse and feeblenesse of the creature, which cannot keep the gifts wherewith he was adorned by God, without Gods speciall instinct and aide. Likewise, he would have this done as an occasion or way, to manifest his justice and severity in punishing, and his mercy in saving sinners: as Exodus 9. Romanes 9. Now God, respecting and willing these things in that perswasion and enticement of Sathan, and in mans assenting and yeelding thereunto, did notwithstanding all this while hate the sinne of both; and therefore did not will it, neither cause it, but justly permitted and suffered it to be done: