N05663:16
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
PART II. Wherein it is considered, Whether there is, or can be any such Sort of FREEDOM OF WILL, as that wherein Arminians place the Essence of the Liberty of all moral Agents; and whether any such Thing ever was, or can be conceived of. SECT. I. Showing the manifest Inconsistence of the Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in the Will's self-determining Power. Pag. 31. SECT. II. Several supposed Ways of evading the foregoing Reasoning considered. Pag. 35. SECT. III. Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come to pass without a Cause of it's Existence. Pag. 41. ⟨image ?⟩SECT. IV. Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, thro' the Activity of the Nature of the Soul. Pag. 47. SECT. V. Showing that if the Things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and can't help the Cause of Arminian Liberty; and how this being the State of the Case, Arminian Writers are obliged to talk inconsistently. Pag. 51. SECT. VI. Concerning the Will's determining in Things which are perfectly indifferent, in the View of the Mind. Pag. 55. SECT. VII. Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will consisting in Indifference. Pag. 63. SECT. VIII. Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite to all Necessity. Pag. 73. SECT. IX. Of the Connection of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding. Pag. 76. SECT. X. Volition necessarily connected with the Influence of Motives. With particular Observation of the great Inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's Assertions and Reasonings, about the Freedom of the Will. Pag. 84. SECT. XI. The Evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of moral Agents. Pag. 98. SECT. XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future Volitions of moral Agents, inconsistent with such a Contingence of those Volitions, as is without all Necessity. Pag. 117. And infers a Necessity of Volition, as much as an absolute Decree. Pag. 122. SECT. XIII. Whether we suppose the Volitions of moral Agents to be connected with any Thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary, in such a Sense, as to overthrow Arminian Liberty. Pag. 131.